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Abstract 
The Maasai/Kikuyu agro-pastoral borderlands of Maiella and Enoosupukia, located in 
the hinterlands of Lake Naivasha’s agro-industrial hub, are particularly notorious in 
the history of ethnicised violence in the Kenya’s Rift Valley. In October 1993, an 
organised assault perpetrated by hundreds of Maasai vigilantes, with the assistance 
of game wardens and administration police, killed more than 20 farmers of Kikuyu 
descent. Consequently, thousands of migrant farmers were violently evicted from 
Enoosupukia at the instigation of leading local politicians.  
Nowadays, however, intercommunity relations are surprisingly peaceful and the 
cooperative use of natural resources is the rule rather than the exception. There 
seems to be a form of reorganization. Violence seems to be contained and the local 
economy has since recovered. This does not mean that there is no conflict, but 
people seem to have the facility to solve them peacefully. How did formerly violent 
conflicts develop into peaceful relations? How did competition turn into cooperation, 
facilitating changing land use? 
This dissertation explores the value of cross-cutting ties and local institutions in 
peaceful relationships and the non-violent resolution of conflicts across previously 
violently contested community boundaries. It mainly relies on ethnographic data 
collected between 2014 and 2015. The discussion therefore builds on several 
theoretical approaches in anthropology and the social sciences – that is, violent 
conflicts, cross-cutting ties and conflicting loyalties, joking relationships, peace and 
nonviolence, and institutions, in order to understand shared spaces that are 
experiencing fairly rapid social and economic changes, and characterised by conflict 
and coexistence.  
In the researched communities, cross-cutting ties and the split allegiances 
associated with them result from intermarriages, land transactions, trade, and 
friendship. By institutions, I refer to local peace committees, an attempt to 
standardise an aspect of customary law, and Nyumba Kumi, a strategy of anchoring 
community policing at the household level. In 2010, the state “implanted” these 
grassroots-level institutions and conferred on them the rights to handle specific 
conflicts and to prevent crime.  
I argue that the studied groups utilise diverse networks of relationships as adaptive 
responses to landlessness, poverty, and socio-political dynamics at the local level. 
Material and non-material exchanges and transfers accompany these social and 
economic ties and networks. 
In addition to being instrumental in nurturing a cohesive social fabric, I argue that 
such alliances could be thought of as strategies of appropriation of resources in the 
frontiers – areas that are considered to have immense agricultural potential and to be 
conducive to economic enterprise. Consequently, these areas are continuously 
changed and shaped through immigration, population growth, and agricultural 
intensification. 
However, cross-cutting ties and intergroup alliances may not necessarily prevent the 
occurrence or escalation of conflicts. Nevertheless, disputes and conflicts, which 
form part of the social order in the studied area, create the opportunities for locally 
contextualised systems of peace and non-violence that inculcate the values of 
cooperation, coexistence, and restraint from violence. Although the neo-traditional 
institutions (local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi) face massive complexities 
and lack the capacity to handle serious conflicts, their application of informal 
constraints in dispute resolution provides room for some optimism.   
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Notably, the formation of ties and alliances between the studied groups, and the use 
of local norms and values to resolve disputes, are not new phenomena – they are 
reminiscent of historical patterns. Their persistence, particularly in the context of 
Kenya, indicates a form of historical continuity, which remains rather “undisturbed” 
despite the prevalence of ethnicised political economies. Indeed, the formation of 
alliances, which are driven by mutual pursuit of commodities (livestock, rental land, 
and agricultural produce), markets, and diversification, tends to override other 
identities.  
While the major thrust of social science literature in East Africa has focused on the 
search for root causes of violence, very little has been said about the conditions and 
practices of cooperation and non-violent conflict resolution. In addition, situations 
where prior violence turned into peaceful interaction have attracted little attention, 
though the analysis of such transitional phases holds the promise of contributing to 
applicable knowledge on conflict resolution.  
This study is part of a larger multidisciplinary project, “Resilience in East African 
Landscapes” (REAL), which is a Marie Curie Actions Innovative Training Networks 
(ITN) project. The principal focus of this multidisciplinary project is to study past, 
present, and future thresholds and sustainable trajectories in human-landscape 
interactions in East Africa over the last millennia. While other individual projects 
focus on long-term ecosystem dynamics and societal interactions, my project 
examines human-landscape interactions in the present and the very recent past (i.e. 
the period in which events and processes were witnessed or can still be recalled by 
today’s population).  
The transition from conflict to coexistence and from competition to cooperative use of 
previously violently contested land resources is understood here as enhancing 
adaptation in the face of social-political, economic, environmental, and climatic 
changes. This dissertation is therefore a contribution to new modes of resilience in 
human-landscape interactions after a collapse situation. 
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Preface: “I am Kikuyu, Maasai, and Dorobo!” 
An elderly man in his 60s, James Mambo refers to himself as a Kikuyu, a Maasai, 
and a Dorobo. James lives with his wife and two of their six children in a pole-and-
mud house with a corrugated iron roof in an area known as Kigumu, near Mpeuti 
village in Enoosupukia, Narok county (Figure 3). The house is located about 50km 
from Naivasha town and approximately 15km from the southern shores of Lake 
Naivasha. James’s father, Kinyanjui, was born of Kikuyu parents who lived in a small 
village known as Kikuyuni, in Kiambu, before the British colonial government 
expropriated native lands in the central province of Kenya (including Kiambu, Nyeri, 
and Murang’a). 
As European settlers increasingly transformed native lands into commercial farms, 
thousands of local inhabitants (native population) including James’s grandfather 
migrated from the European-controlled zones (see Figure 1) in search of settlement 
and land. Together with his family, James’s grandfather left his ancestral land 
towards the end of 1902, setting off westwards through Limuru to Naivasha (Figure 
4). Some European commercial farmers were already in the Naivasha area, among 
them Lord Delamere (see Thomson, 1887). 
The family moved further into the southern periphery of Lake Naivasha for fear of 
“clashes” between settlers and pastoral Maasai who claimed ancestral rights to the 
lands occupied by the British1. The family settled in the undulating landscape of 
Maiella farm, on the borderlands2 of the Maasai-controlled Narok district and close to 
Dorobo hunting grounds of Enoosupukia, east of the Mau forest (Figure 4). One must 
cover a distance of about 135km from Kiambu to Maiella through Limuru or Nairobi. 
                                                          
1 Letter to Amos Kimunya, Minister for Lands and Housing, “Appeal against the brutal eviction from 
Enoosupukia” (Simon Ngayami’s personal archives, Mpeuti village, Enoosupukia). 
2 In this study, “borderlands” are territorially defined as the physical space along the border (following 
Feyissa and Hoehne, 2008). In the context of my thesis, the “border” does not refer to the institution of 
inter-state division according to international law (ibid); rather, I refer to county borders within a state 
(Kenya), particularly an area around the border of Narok and Nakuru counties where fieldwork was 
conducted. As shown in the following chapters, the adjoining areas of the two counties (the 
borderlands) are characterised by cross-border settlement, exchanges, and transactions (both social 
and economic) that characterise the extraction/appropriation of different resources between the 
individuals and groups inhabiting them – they are fields of opportunities as well as fields of resource 
contestations and conflicts. However, I must clarify that the borders I refer to are not “highly visible 
lines of separation between political, social, and economic space” (Newman, 2006: 144). There are no 
formal or visible dividing lines (boundaries) between counties in the studied area, as is the case in 
most of Kenya, and the boundary here is not a natural obstacle restricting the movement of persons, 
things, or ideas (following Kristof, 1959: 273).   
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Trekking such a distance is quite a task, especially when one is accompanied by 
small children and livestock. 
 
Figure 1. The White Highlands of Kenya (source: modified from the European  
                Settlement Board, ‘To Farm in Kenya’, in: 753.14r.46 (16), Rhodes House  
                Library, Oxford; copyright Monica Feinen, 2016).   
 
At the time, Maiella farm, then under a British farmer, was gearing for commercial 
agriculture and thus needed native labourers. European patrons referred to them as 
squatters (Anderson, 2005). James’s grandfather joined other Kikuyu labourers, 
whom settlers preferred for cultivation, while their Maasai and Dorobo counterparts 
took up herding and milking jobs on the farm. However, the Dorobo juggled between 
foraging (beekeeping and hunting) in Enoosupukia forest and wage employment on 
the European farm. Often they skipped the latter to participate in foraging activities.  
Kikuyu squatters began to create small crop farms on the fringes of Maiella farm. 
Such cultivation would consequently facilitate their later movement into Dorobo 
hunting grounds and Maasai grazing areas outside Maiella farm, mostly as client 
cultivators. Their Maa-speaking neighbours gave them land in exchange.  
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In early 1903, Kinyanjui (James´s father), then a teenager, left Maiella farm alone for 
a nearby Maasai village known as Inkoroinito close to Suswa town, freeing himself 
from having to eventually work on the commercial farm like his parents. A Maasai 
family (the Kilogu family) adopted Kinyanjui at Inkoroinito village. Henceforth, he 
cultivated and assisted with household chores for his new family.  
Adoption of non-Maasai individuals was especially common among rich Maasai 
families (with large herds of stock and big parcels of land). Kikuyu parents often 
encouraged their young folks to move and try out possible opportunities of land 
ownership and accumulation of capital (including livestock) among the Maa-
speakers. The Kikuyu also exchanged daughters for land with Maasai landowners. 
These strategic and peaceful alliances continue to date. 
 Adoptees assumed Maasai names and were socialised in the Maa language. Apart 
from adoption, morans (young male Maasai warriors) also obtained Kikuyu girls 
during cattle raids. They too underwent the process of acculturation, like their Maasai 
counterparts who succumbed to Kikuyu raiders. Nyokavi, a popular name among the 
Kikuyu, signifies such raids. It means, “one who came from the Maasai” in Gikuyu 
language.  
As an adopted child, Kinyanjui customarily became a son of the Kilogu family and 
consequently, just like other sons of the family, assumed rights as an heir to the 
family property – land and livestock. Adoption of “outsiders” is embedded in Maasai 
custom, which dictates that such non-biological person(s) may not succumb to 
possible witchcraft or spells cast upon the host family (blood relatives). In the event 
of unfortunate circumstances, the male adoptee would hence become sole heir of the 
family property.  
Later on, the Kilogu family gave Kinyanjui land to cultivate. The search for a wife saw 
him return to his homeland in Kiambu. He found himself a Kikuyu woman with whom 
he journeyed back to Maasailand and established their manyatta (Kraal) on the 
inherited land. They had three sons, among them James Mambo, who narrated this 
story. 
James and his two brothers observed all the tenets of the Maasai ideal including 
initiation and participation in the social organization of moranhood. They too inherited 
land from their father. Their “becoming” Maasai placed them in an advantageous 
position to accumulate more land from their Maasai social network – and they did so.  
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James married a woman born of Maasai and Dorobo parents from Nairragie Enkare, 
a Maasai/Kikuyu settlement near Narok town. They raised a family of six, who share 
Dorobo, Kikuyu, and Maasai blood. Such offspring are branded nusu nusu (plural 
manusu), which is derived from the Swahili word nusu (“half”; see further discussion 
in the last part of Chapter 1). Two of James’s sons married Kikuyu women from 
Maiella whose parents trace their previous homeland to central province of Kenya. 
Two of his daughters married into Maasai families in Enoosupukia. They have 
established themselves within the Maasai social fabric.  
By the 1980s, a family that left Kiambu eight decades ago had progressively 
established itself in Maasailand with diverse affine networks spanning geographic, 
social, and economic boundaries, and with a multiple embodiment of identities. 
Progressively, Kikuyu farmers branded their localities in Maasailand with names 
already used to refer to specific places in central province. Through a combination of 
purchase, gifts, adoption, and barter, Kikuyu have successfully colonized agricultural 
frontiers3 formerly dedicated to hunting and livestock grazing by Maa-speaking 
communities, specifically by recreating githaka4. Among other activities, they 
influenced Maa-speakers to begin commercial cultivation, business enterprise, and 
education.  
How then could this seemingly tightly knit society degenerate into violent conflict? 
What weaknesses did perpetrators of violence exploit in order to evict members of 
Kikuyu descent from their Maasai neighbourhoods in Enoosupukia?  
Through politicisation of land and ethnic categories in the early 1990s, the 
Kikuyu/Maasai borderlands of Enoosupukia experienced massive violence, which 
                                                          
3 Following Jepson (2006: 291), an agricultural frontier is where capital-intensive commercial 
agriculture develops in areas that were previously “unoccupied” or under subsistence or low-input 
extensive production systems, such as cattle ranching. Alfred Rieber (2001) categorized frontiers into 
three basic types, 1) consolidated state frontiers, 2) dynamic frontiers of advancing settlements, and 
3) symbolic frontiers. He noted that features of two or even three of these types occasionally coincide 
with one another (see further usage of “frontier” and “borderland” in Kopytoff, 1987; Kristof, 1959; 
Journal of Borderland Studies). Rieber’s “dynamic frontier of advancing settlements” may be used to 
conceptualize the studied area. It is characterised as an advancing line of settlements engaged 
primarily in agricultural or mixed economy, confronting a seminomadic and/or technologically less 
developed culture (Rieber, 2001: 5814). Moreover, it influences contact and interaction, creating a 
mixture of cultures and hybridity of identities (Newman, 2006:150). In the case under consideration, 
herders and migrant farmers have progressively changed and shaped an area that was previously 
dedicated to livestock grazing and hunting through subsistence and commercial agriculture, a process 
that culminates in territorial colonization (expansion) of farmers and farming, interactions and 
exchanges, albeit with instances of violent conflicts, as discussed in the following chapters. 
4 A system of control of land characterised by immigration and the subsequent pattern of settlement 
with reference to genealogies of Kikuyu mbari (patriarchal kinship groups) (further described in 
chapter 3).  
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broke down many aspects of coexistence between the two groups. James’s family 
fled the violence, which targeted Kikuyu farmers (known politically as “aliens”), and 
Kikuyu-friendly families in Enoosupukia and its environs. The family managed to 
salvage a few household items before fleeing to Maiella trading centre (see Figure 3) 
to join other internally displaced persons of Kikuyu descent.  
Interestingly, after the violence, James and other Kikuyu families with Maasai blood 
and those who had rented, purchased or cultivated land gifted to them by their 
Maasai friends progressively returned to Enoosupukia to reclaim or re-rent land. For 
some, like James’s family, the process was fast. Others are still entangled in 
protracted disputes with perceived land grabbers, some of whom are the younger 
generation who accuse their Maasai parents of “dishing out” land to Kikuyu 
“outsiders” – they consider such land to be their rightful inheritance, as discussed in 
later chapters.  
This story puts land at the centre of local processes of inclusion and exclusion. The 
process of assimilation, strategic change of place, identity, and culture is not new in 
the game of “inclusion and exclusion” among the Maasai and their neighbours 
(Galaty, 1993b: 177). What is interesting in the following discussion is how networks 
of relationships between Maasai and Kikuyu after the 1993 violence re-shape 
property rights discussions, affect the social-economic world of the two groups, and 
respond to changing land-use patterns and to market and local economies.  
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Background 
This dissertation has its inception in earlier fieldwork (in 2010) that formed part of the 
project “Resilience, Collapse, and Reorganisation in Social-Ecological Systems of 
African Savannahs (RCR)”. While studying labour migration and changing livelihoods 
in Lake Naivasha’s cut-flower industry for my masters degree, I became conscious of 
the existence of commercial agriculture in smallholder farmlands rented mainly by 
Kikuyu land-seeking clients from Maa-speaking landowners in the hinterlands of the 
lake basin.  
Some flower farm workers at Lake Naivasha who are interested in supplementing 
their low wages, along with those who do not manage to find employment in the 
horticultural hub, often diversify into cultivation through leasehold arrangements 
outside the lake area. Enoosupukia and Maiella, which lie on the southern periphery 
of Lake Naivasha basin in the Kenya’s Rift Valley, are considered to hold immense 
potential in land acquisition among landless migrant farmers, market-oriented 
cultivation, livestock trade, and entrepreneurship. The areas are also renowned for 
intergroup violent conflicts going back several decades. This marked a crucial point 
of departure for the current anthropological study.  
Conceptualisation of the PhD project and fieldwork followed discussions within the 
project “Human Mobility, Networks, and Institutions in the Management of Natural 
Resources in Contemporary Africa” funded by the Volkswagen Foundation, and the 
generous research funding from the European Commission through the Marie Curie 
Actions Innovative Training Networks (ITN) project “Resilience in East African 
Landscapes” (REAL).  
My initial visit to Enoosupukia and the bordering Maiella in late 2013 revealed that 
everyday social and economic activities were strongly linked to diverse networks of 
relationships between Maasai and Kikuyu neighbours inhabiting the borderlands. 
Interestingly, ethnicity, the history of resource-based conflicts, and politicised 
violence in these areas did not seem to stop these groups from appropriating 
resources in pursuit of social and economic benefits. They did not also appear to limit 
social exchange and interactions.  
Therefore, as expansion of the horticulture industry and natural resource harvesting 
at Lake Naivasha (the centre) continues, tremendous land-use changes, from 
pastoralism and hunting to local market-oriented food production, are taking place in 
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the hinterlands of the basin (the periphery), albeit with pertinent challenges. Former 
communally owned lands that were dedicated to livestock grazing on the fringes of 
Lake Naivasha provide food for thousands of flower farm workers, to residents of 
Naivasha central, and to other growing populations outside Naivasha. Informants 
shared interesting stories of reciprocity that define their shared social- ecological 
environments: 
We fought and ended the violence ourselves. We want peace now because 
violence does not help. Those who cause us to fight are far away and do not 
care for our welfare. They are only interested in securing government 
positions. After the 1993 violence, the Maasai and the Kikuyu are living in 
peace. The Kikuyu farm in our land, we marry Kikuyu wives, we go to Maiella 
and they come to Nkampani without any problems compared to the days of 
violence [1993]. Problems relating to land ownership were the cause of 
violence in this region, although politics is to blame. Today we use the land 
together. We are one people. 
(Maasai informant, Nkampani village, 13.10.2013)  
 
 A Maasai does not need to sell a cow or a goat to buy food for his family or to 
pay school fees for his children. Kikuyu have shown us that there is wealth in 
soil. This is why we [Maasai] are farming. When we [Maasai] go to the banks, 
hospitals, and schools, we find many Kikuyu people working there, and so we 
want our children to go to school so that they can also get these jobs. 
(Maasai informant, Ol tepesi le Persimei village, 25.11.2013)  
 
I am teaching my Maasai women friends that they should abandon the 
tradition of giving birth at home with the assistance of midwives. I inform them 
that antenatal clinics can best avert many dangers during pregnancy and 
childbirth. Their midwives do not have information on how to treat unexpected 
dangers such as excessive bleeding during childbirth or other complications. 
(Kikuyu woman, Kigumu village, 03.06.2014) 
 
 As a Kikuyu renting farmland in Mpeuti village, you have to know how to 
relate well with the Maasai or Dorobo landowners so that you can farm longer. 
For instance, you have to pay the agreed amount of money in good time and 
without causing problems, otherwise they will rent the land to someone else. 
This is the new business among pastoralists here. 
 (Kikuyu farmer, Maiella trading centre, 10.09.2014) 
 
The Maasai call me “Bakteng”. This name connotes respect and strong 
friendship. To them, I am very special in their lives. I have helped Maasai to 
start small shops and hotels in the villages of Mpeuti and Nkampani. They 
collect their stock mostly on credit from my shop here in Maiella and pay their 
debts once they have sold the goods. By doing so, I do not have to keep a 
large stock in my shop and wait for individual shoppers who may buy just one 
item at a time. I make business as I help others. If violence were to erupt as it 
did in 1993, I would flee to any of my Maasai friends.   
(Kikuyu wholesaler, Maiella trading centre, 16.09.2014) 
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Figure 2. Counties of Kenya showing Narok and Nakuru counties (source: modified  
                from GeoCurrents). 
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Figure 3. Study area at the border area of Narok and Nakuru counties: Maiella Sub- 
               location villages - Nkampani, Kokoti, and Maiella trading centre;  
               Enoosupukia Location villages - Mpeuti, Olosho lole Kaloi, and Ol tepesi le  
               Parsimei (source: field data, 2014).  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
 
The Maasai and Kikuyu are one large “family” and the conflicts 
between them can be taken as any normal conflicts in a family setting, 
except that politics knocks the heads of two brothers against each 
other, as it was in 1993. The survival of one group is largely dependent 
on the other. 
 (Shushu, Maiella trading centre, 21.08.2013)  
 
“There was no Maasai camp without its Kikuyu; that’s my Kikuyu! That’s mine!” – 
these are the words of a Maasai elder who was describing how, in the colonial 
period, Kikuyu clients and the daughters they offered as wives enlarged a Maasai 
chief’s or elder’s households, giving him weight in the community (see Waller, 1993: 
241). Kikuyu obtained settlement and rights to land from their Maa-speaking 
neighbours, while their presence as dependants on Maasai households enhanced 
symbolic capital on the part of Maasai. These symbiotic relations have strong social 
and economic benefits.   
Interdependent relationships between Maasai (including Dorobo5 hunters and 
gatherers) and their neighbours, particularly Kikuyu farmers, have existed at least 
since the early days of their contact with Europeans. The relationships can be 
analysed in terms of three aspects. (1) social-cultural: intermarriage, adoption, and 
initiation, among other ritual ceremonies; (2) economic ties: trade, patron-client 
services, and cooperative resource-use; and (3) political networks: military alliances 
against common enemies, and anti-colonial campaigns (see Lawren, 1968; 
Sorrenson, 1968; Muriuki, 1974; Tignor, 1976; Berntsen, 1976; Galaty, 1993b: 187-
190; Spear and Waller, 1993; Spencer, 1998; Blackburn, 1996).  
These ties and networks represent important adaptive responses in the social-
ecological environments of East African rangelands. More importantly, the 
relationships offered insurance against anthropogenic and naturally occurring risks, 
uncertainties, and disasters, including warfare, poverty, livestock diseases, and 
droughts. The survival of one group was largely dependent on the other.  
Despite the mutual benefits for which Maasai and Kikuyu sustained peaceful 
relations, conflicts, which primarily revolved around struggles over access to and 
ownership of resources, were an integral part of the social order (e.g. Campbell, 
                                                          
5 The Dorobo progressively “became” Maasai by adopting the Maa language and culture (see Kratz, 
1980; Blackburn, 1996). Chapter 2 provides more insights about the Dorobo.  
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1993: 261; Spear, 1993: 22; Waller, 1993). Interestingly, violent conflicts rarely 
succeeded at creating lasting divisions. Neither Maasai nor Kikuyu survived in 
isolation from one another.  
Rather, the Maasai and Kikuyu survived by exploiting strategic alliances and 
capitalised on cultural symbolic repertoires necessary for reducing opposition and 
rivalry. They anchored coexistence largely on notions of sharing resources, ideas, 
wives, norms, values, and institutions. Moreover, binding oaths of friendship (e.g. 
Muriuki, 1974) as well as adoption and intermarriages encouraged social control and 
restraint from undesirable behaviour, but did not necessarily prevent instances of 
violent conflict. Consequently, oscillations between conflict and coexistence defined 
social structure (Galaty, 1993a: 68). John Galaty notes that coexistence often 
preceded and succeeded periods of open conflict in the Rift Valley.  
The twenty-first century has seen an increasing interpenetration of past relationships. 
Specifically, Maasai and Kikuyu strive to deal with contemporary property rights 
issues and social-political dynamics. However, population growth and increasing 
scarcity of land, coupled with politicisation of land and ethnic categories, produce 
notions of belonging and lead to the violent regulation of resources. These factors 
constrain peaceful relationships, but also create opportunities such as the innovation 
of institutions – rules that govern social behaviour and by which actors sanction 
offenders.  
In the study area of Maiella and Enoosupukia, south of the Lake Naivasha basin, two 
periods accounted for massive violence between Maasai and Kikuyu: 1969/1970, 
and 1992/19936. In both periods, intergroup violence coincided with political 
campaigns and general elections in Kenya, the first general elections having 
occurred in 1969, after independence in 1963. The 1993 violence was the worst ever 
witnessed in the history of the two groups. 
In October 1993, an organised assault perpetrated by hundreds of Maasai vigilantes, 
with the assistance of game wardens and administration police, killed more than 20 
migrant farmers of Kikuyu descent. Consequently, thousands of migrant farmers, the 
majority of whom were victims of European expropriation of land in the Central 
Province of Kenya, were violently evicted from Enoosupukia at the instigation of local 
                                                          
6 Situations in 1997, 2007/2008, and 2013 are also highlighted. In the study area, however, these 
periods were characterised by tensions and small-scale conflicts or disputes, but not large-scale 
intercommunity violence as had been witnessed in the late 1960s and the early 1990s. 
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politicians. Informants noted that about a dozen Maasai lost their lives at the hands 
of Kikuyu men of Maiella who retaliated against the Maasai vigilantes.  
Nowadays, however, intercommunity7 relations between Maasai and Kikuyu are 
surprisingly peaceful, and the cooperative use of natural resources is the rule rather 
than the exception. There seems to be a form of reorganization. Violence seems to 
be contained and the local economy has since recovered. This does not mean that 
there is no conflict, but people seem to have the facility to solve them peacefully. 
How did formerly violent conflicts develop into peaceful relations? How did 
competition turn into cooperation, facilitating changing land use?  
This dissertation goes beyond the factors that shaped the 1993 violence and 
previous violent conflicts between Maasai and Kikuyu to explore the value of cross-
cutting ties and local-level institutions in turning a previously violent setting into a 
social situation characterised by a multitude of intercommunity ties.  
By cross-cutting ties, I refer simply to alliances and ties which people (individuals and 
groups), create with one another as social beings (see Kang, 1976; Gluckman, 1955; 
Colson, 1953). Cross-cutting ties were theorised by social anthropologists in the 
1950s and were thought of as significant elements of social organization in 
communities characterised on the one hand by the existence of corporate kin groups 
(and other strongly tied groups) and on the other hand by ties linking these groups. 
The commonly used ties are those that structure day-to-day interactions guiding and 
shaping people’s choices, practices, and activities in their social and ecological 
environments.  
Cross-cutting ties foster and give meaning to concepts of sharing, exchange, and 
interdependence, and may develop into allegiances or conflicting loyalties where 
exchanges, ties, and practices are governed by social constraints.   
In the studied area, cross-cutting ties and the conflicting loyalties associated with 
them result from intermarriage, land transactions, trade, and friendship. These not 
only account for peaceful assimilation but also involve a wide range of reciprocal 
exchanges of goods and services, social and symbolic capital, and cooperative use 
of land resources.  
                                                          
7 The usage of “community” appreciates the heterogeneity of actors, their often divergent interests, 
differential access to and control of resources, with possible conflicts over such resources, 
connections with external actors and markets, as well as the alliances, which individuals, households, 
and groups forge in order to successfully pursue their interests.  
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The dissertation adopts an anthropological approach to analyse how networks of 
relationships and social exchanges structure a cohesive social fabric in the areas 
surrounding Lake Naivasha8. It is worth mentioning that interpersonal and intergroup 
ties can easily become fragile and collapse or break down, thus explaining conflict or 
violence (e.g. Fukui, 1994; Schlee, 1997). In the context of my thesis, actors 
continuously rebuild ties, nurture new ones, and/or sustain existing ones. 
Nevertheless, the presence of cross-cutting ties is not a guarantee for the absence of 
conflict. Quite to the contrary, the co-presence of people with diverse interests and 
the co-management of land and resources among these groups will inevitably lead to 
conflicts. What the thesis shows is that certain conditions enable cross-cutting ties to 
prevent conflicts from getting out of hand, from becoming violent, and from leading to 
a complete breakdown of social ties.  
Irrespective of the presence of cross-cutting ties and split allegiances, institutions 
become crucial to prevent people from fighting one another and to regulate social 
behaviour (see Darby, 2003; North, 1998). They are the generally agreed-upon and 
enforced prescriptions that require, forbid, or permit specific actions for more than a 
single individual (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992: 250). 
Building on the institutionalist perspective, an important part of this work utilises 
extended cases and narratives to describe how the local peace committee, an 
attempt to standardise an aspect of customary law, and Nyumba Kumi, a strategy of 
anchoring community policing9 at the household level, attend to conflicts and 
disputes in the southern Rift Valley of Kenya. Here, disputes and conflicts relate to 
ownership of land, the alignment of boundaries, the rights of tenants, and the validity 
of land sales. Others include herder-farmer disputes, theft, marital, and in-law 
disputes. 
                                                          
8 Following Homans (1958), Thibaut and Kelley (1959), and Blau (1964), the exchange theory 
assumes (a) behaviour is motivated by the desire to increase gain and to avoid loss (or to increase 
outcomes that are positively valued and to decrease outcomes that are negatively valued); (b) 
exchange relations develop in structures of mutual dependence; (c) actors engage in recurrent, 
mutually contingent exchanges with specific partners over time; and (d) valued outcomes obey the 
economic law of diminishing marginal utility (or the psychological principle of satiation). Important 
discussions arising from this theory include power inequalities and access to valued resources, the 
value of exchanges in minimising risk and dealing with uncertainty, and relational cohesion as a 
principle of social exchange (see Cook, 2001: 5045-6). For critics of this theory see Emerson (1976).  
9 Community Policing (CP) is a policing philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which 
support the systemic use of partnerships between communities and government policing agencies, 
and problem solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to 
public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime (DGCP, 2015). 
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The discussion shows how institutions become a web of interrelated norms (formal 
and informal) governing social relationships. Social networks of individuals and 
households help in anticipating, preventing, pacifying, and resolving small-scale 
interpersonal disputes, thereby limiting their possible escalation into large-scale 
intercommunity strife10.  
Though necessary in ensuring peaceful relationships, institutions, like cross-cutting 
ties, may not prevent the occurrence or escalation of violence. As shown in this 
dissertation, local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi face internal and external 
constraints that could easily threaten peaceful relations. Nevertheless, actors 
increasingly integrate norms and values into the overriding social structure, thereby 
enhancing their relevance and effectiveness.  
 
Maasai and Kikuyu: brief overview of literature and gaps 
The Maasai (including Dorobo) and their neighbours (particularly Kikuyu) have 
attracted enormous attention from administrators, travellers, traders, missionaries, 
and scientists since their first contact with Europeans (Hughes, 2006a). 
Consequently, there is a wealth of literature on East African agro-pastoral 
landscapes, which tackle important topics relating to Maasai and their neighbours, 
dating at least from the nineteenth century.  
Some scholars have described the groups’ history (Lawren, 1968; Tignor, 1976; 
Berntsen, 1979; Waller, 1979; Sorrenson, 1968; Spear and Waller, 1993; Jennings, 
2005; Hughes, 2006a). Others discuss the construction, development/transformation, 
and contestation of identity and ethnicity within the notion of inclusion and exclusion 
(Galaty, 1977; 1993b: 174-192; Waller, 1993; Sorrenson, 1968). Spencer (1998; 
2003; 2004) tackles the important topic of social organisation, and emphasises the 
resilience of traditions of age-set organization and the pastoral economy. 
Recent anthropological studies focus on pastoral risk management. Leslie and 
McCabe (2013) describe resilience strategies in two East African pastoral 
communities, while Fratkin and Mearns (2003) compare risk management among the 
                                                          
10 In Kenya, there is a tendency to label disputes, conflicts, or violence as “intercommunal” or 
“interethnic”. These labels are often politically intended to obscure the main actors (organizers and 
perpetrators) or to pass the wrong impression of the situation, even when vigilante groups are 
allegedly paid or organized against members of society (commercialization of violence). Therefore, 
usage of these labels in the dissertation reflects uncertainty of the actors and the complexity involved 
in the analysis of related social phenomena, as shown in the example of the 1993 violence, discussed 
in chapter 3.  
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Maasai of East Africa and pastoralists of Mongolia. Diversity of livelihoods, the 
distribution of costs and benefits of conservation and tourisms, and maintenance of 
institutions that facilitate restocking, among others, are discussed (McCabe and 
Leslie, 2013).  
Fratkin and Mearns (2003) discuss cultivation and the shift from subsistence 
pastoralism to commercial pastoralism as examples of livelihood “sustainability” 
among the Maasai of Kenya. Some geographers have also added their voices to the 
discussion of risk managements and drought coping strategies in the pastoral 
context (Butt, Shortridge and WinklerPrins, 2009). They show the importance of 
pastoral mobility as a drought-coping strategy.  
Further, under the project “Land Use Change, Impacts and Dynamics” (LUCiD), a 
team of scholars described land-use change and economic improvement in 
Maasailand (Homewood et al., 2009; Cochrane et al., 2005; Radeny et al., 2007). 
Among other topics, they discuss livelihood diversification and the reorganisation of 
gender roles. Closely related studies have focused on tenure transformation, paying 
attention to the dissolution of communal lands and the implications of this for the 
future of the pastoral economy and the Maasai in general (Rutten, 1992; Lesorogol, 
2003; 2008; Fratkin, 2001; Mwangi, 2007; Seno and Shaw, 2002; Lusenaka, 1996). 
A good number of studies discuss the conservation dilemma that arises due to the 
increasing fragmentation, privatisation, development, and cultivation of Maasailand 
(Lamprey and Reid, 2004; Okello, 2005; Groom and Western, 2013; Worden, 2007). 
The list of literature relating to the Maasai in general, and by extension to their 
neighbours, is long. The contributions presented are only a small portion of many 
studies. Above all, these contributions are thorough and excellent descriptions of 
social and ecological systems and related changes especially in the southern 
rangelands of Kenya. Their temporal scope, which spans both colonial and post-
colonial periods, makes history relevant in contemporary social dynamics. However, 
literature on linkages and interfaces is much rarer. This can probably be explained by 
the overt focus on ethnic communities, often as distinct objects, at the cost of visions 
of “a society”. 
Generally, some of these contributions pay very little attention to the role of agency 
and social institutions in the prevention and non-violent resolution of intermittent 
disputes and conflicts in the Maasai/Kikuyu society. We learn a lot about the benefits 
of social mechanisms and social relationships (networks) in groups’ social, 
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economic, and political prosperity but less about the potential of the networks of 
social relations to limit and/or resolve local disputes and conflicts. More importantly, 
peaceful relationships and nonviolent resolution of conflicts – which, for instance, 
encourage cooperative resource use – have not received the attention they deserve 
despite their being crucial adaptive strategies in shared agro-pastoral landscapes. 
Recent work by Mutie (2003), however, shows enthusiasm towards this topic. Mutie 
provides an excellent description of the coexistence of Maasai and Kamba despite 
conflict. He argues that coexistence involves ethnic distinction, social exchange, 
complementarity, and interdependence as well as ethnic antagonism and conflict. 
However, his work still lacks a comprehensive analysis of the roles of social and 
economic networks and institutions in limiting conflict or violence and in nonviolent 
resolution of conflicts. Maasai-Kikuyu relations (or, generally, intergroup relations) 
that foster peace have received little attention.  
Additionally, the contributions have in common the understanding that agro-
pastoralism and off-farm strategies contribute to economic improvement and 
development. Farming limits dependency on the livestock economy. In the studied 
area, market-oriented cultivation mainly by non-Maasai and non-pastoralist land-
seeking clients (the majority of them Kikuyu) explains the massive conversion of 
pasturelands into intensively cultivated farm plots. Cultivation through leasehold 
arrangements presents economic opportunities on the one hand and challenges on 
the other, sometimes with potential conflicts. Agricultural intensification and its link to 
Kikuyu’s githaka system, deserves more attention. Research in this area will help us 
to address the question of whether the fragmentation and privatisation of East 
African pastoral ranches increases (or reduces) the vulnerability of pastoralism and 
the livestock economy. This study reveals what seems to be a transformation of the 
Kikuyu’s githaka system, an important tool for appropriating and controlling land.  
Moreover, local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi institutional innovations are 
fairly new developments in the area surrounding Lake Naivasha and, more generally, 
in Kenya. These institutional developments represent attempts at co-management of 
conflicts, as discussed in this thesis. This work is one of the first attempts to 
investigate how these institutional innovations play out in an area prone to violent 
conflicts, socio-political interference, land-use change, and tenure transformations. 
Through case-oriented views, I will demonstrate how local peace committees and 
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Nyumba Kumi broker agreements between conflicting parties at the local level, and 
also describe situations where such institutions lack the capacity to do so. 
In relation to fragmentation, privatisation of formerly communally owned pastoral 
ranches, and consequent cultivation, this dissertation offers insights into the 
adaptation of pastoralism in intensively cultivated areas. Specifically, it shows how 
actors re-organise property rights to land through land transactions, how Maasai 
landowners and Kikuyu land-seeking clients negotiate access to and use of land, and 
how they relate leasehold arrangements to the overriding social structure and value 
systems. Leaseholds become an important strategy to protect land against land 
grabbers, including the state, while the returns are often ploughed back to livestock 
development. This work shows how leasehold arrangements constitute conflicting 
loyalties that not only limit conflict but also encourage cooperative use of resources. 
It also highlights contestations in leaseholds arrangements.  
Lastly, the familiar description of Maasai-Kikuyu relationships as highly antagonistic 
is somewhat misleading. In the 1970s, scholars described agricultural Kikuyu as 
living in terror of their perpetual enemies, the pastoral Maasai (see Berntsen, 1976). 
Such descriptions persist to date. For instance, Amman and Duraiappah (2001) link 
land tenure, land use, and land degradation to increasing violent conflicts between 
herders and farmers in Narok county, which forms part of this study. They paint the 
Maasai as victims of transforming land tenure systems, the market economy, and 
land appropriation by outsiders, among them non-Maasai farmers and private 
developers.  
On the contrary, this study approaches Maasai and Kikuyu as peaceful neighbours. It 
shows that congenial and cordial relationships between the two groups extend far 
back into history and, although the groups progressively became victims of social-
political changes that interfere with existing alliances, they still manage to buffer such 
changes. 
Additionally, Maa-speakers are not merely victims of land tenure transformation and 
appropriation by outsiders. Indeed, they too play a crucial role in accelerating land 
subdivision and privatisation as well as land transfer to non-Maasai land-seeking 
clients. Lesorogol (2003; 2008), for example, explains how competing interests and 
economic and ideological reasons caused pastoral communities to progressively 
privatise formerly communally owned ranches to form individually owned plots at 
least since the 1970s. In the studied area, such privatisation has progressively 
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increased commoditisation of land, and led to the creation of mainly two categories of 
people – “winners” and “losers”. 
Those who could be referred to as “winners” profit from leasehold arrangements and 
the market economy associated with private property – which, in this area, includes 
agricultural investment and, sometimes, the use of land as collateral for loans or for 
speculation. They then use the returns from their proprietorship of the soil and from 
leasehold arrangements to restock herds or to buy more stock, to purchase 
supplementary feed and drugs, or to hire/lease grazing far away from the intensively 
cultivated areas as an adaptive strategy to cope with droughts and reduced 
availability of pasture. Land renting thus complements the livestock economy. 
Privatization of land, though seen to increase vulnerability in livestock systems 
(Galvin, 2009), also serves critical ideological needs, such as assuring young men of 
their inheritance rights. “Losers”, as Rutten (1992) put it, “sell wealth to buy poverty”.  
  
Therefore, despite ethnicity being thought of as a “spoiler” in many situations in 
Kenya, this work shows that ties and alliances in mixed communities have persisted 
rather “undisturbed” despite the prevalence of ethnicised political economies. As 
individual land holdings shrink, as populations grow, and as new markets open, 
individuals and households explore land and settlement in the frontiers by nurturing 
close ties with others, often with little regard to their identities. They employ various 
strategies to appropriate resources while remaining conscious of the inherent risks, 
including conflicts, but they are willing to take their chances in an effort to improve 
their wellbeing and that of their future generations.  
 
Research questions  
The study was guided by two central questions: what are the roles played by: 
a. cross-cutting ties, and  
b. local institutions 
in turning violent conflict into peaceful interaction and competition into cooperation, 
thereby facilitating changing land use?  
Specific questions included:  
1. What is the link between land, politics, and conflicts in the history of the agro-
pastoral landscape of Maiella and Enoosupukia? 
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2. To what extend do cross-cutting ties and the conflicting loyalties associated 
with them promote social-economic interdependence and enhance locally 
contextualised forms of social control necessary for peaceful relations 
between Maasai and Kikuyu?  
3. How are rules (institutions) innovated in the face of changing human-
environment relationships? 
4.  In what ways has the recent effort by the state to “implant” grassroots-level 
institutions (local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi) affected the 
management of conflicts and crime, and under what circumstances can they 
contribute institutional support for peaceful conflict management and crime 
prevention?   
 
Strengths and limitations of the study  
This thesis tackles and revisits one of the great discoveries of social anthropology, 
namely the importance of cross-cutting ties and split allegiances in the alleviation of 
conflict and the maintenance of social order. It develops a number of interlinked 
themes, which give the thesis several different arguments. More importantly, it 
engages with people’s life stories in particular ways in order to understand their 
reflections and experiences of conflict and the benefits they derive from sharing 
social and economic spaces peacefully.  
The study relies of the tradition of anthropological inquiry, namely participant 
observation, which provides a researcher with first-hand experience and day-to-day 
contact with informants, thus allowing him to understand and interpret social 
situations in a holistic way. Its willingness to examine the experience of non-Western 
cultures is ideally situated to inform us about the nature of human peace (Sponsel, 
1994: 7-8). 
In terms of theory, the dissertation goes beyond the explanations of violence 
(common in the social sciences) in order to understand systems of peace and 
nonviolence. By doing so, one is able to understand how actors turn a violent 
situation into peaceful one, and possibly how they maintain social order and mutually 
beneficial relations.  
However, anthropologists and ethnographers often attempt to describe social 
situations in particular contexts. Measurement of behaviour, the durability of ties, and 
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the effectiveness of institutions is an obvious limitation. Cross-cutting ties, just like 
institutions, may only be effective within limited temporal and spatial dimensions, and 
are dependent on socio-political factors which play out in specific communities and 
contexts. The goal here, however, is not to emphasize the durability of ties or 
effectiveness of institutions. Rather, the aim is to understand the locally 
contextualised ways through which actors create and sustain ties, how and why ties 
break down, and how actors nurture new ties and/or rebuild existing ones – more so, 
what cross-cutting ties actually mean for people in their daily affairs as well as for the 
larger social dynamics. 
Obviously, the study’s focus on a particular case limits its generalisability. However, 
focusing on a specific geographical area best allows the description of a community 
and its unique needs, most of which are defined and shaped by context-specific 
dynamics. It also allows one to utilise a mixed-methods approach, thereby drawing 
on a wide range of complementary datasets to understand past and present 
relationships in mixed communities.  
Furthermore, the study goes beyond an ethnographic description of one community 
(very typical for East Africa) and focuses on a space and time within which two 
communities meet and become one society, fluid and with frictions. The findings 
therefore shed light on possible scenarios in similar or different social-ecological 
situations, both in East Africa and beyond.  
 
Outline  
This dissertation is divided into nine chapters. Part 2 of the introduction deals with 
some theoretical concerns, seeking to locate the study within broader discourses of 
violent conflict, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. Chapter 2 discusses the 
design adopted for research and the methods utilised to collect data. Chapter 3 
contextualises the history of mobility and interactions between Maasai, Kikuyu, and 
Dorobo in the former Maasai southern reserve where the study area is located. The 
chapter highlights historical alliances, exchanges, and transactions between these 
groups as well as their struggle over resources. It also shows how the post-colonial 
era ushered in a politicisation of land and ethnic categories, which accounted for 
intermittent conflicts beginning from the mid-1960s and politicised violence in the 
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early 1990s in the studied area. The efforts aimed at reinstating peaceful relations 
after the violence are central to the discussion on peacebuilding.  
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 focus on a number of themes that are developed in the form 
of narratives: intermarriage, land transactions, livestock trade, and hairdressing, 
respectively. More importantly, the chapters show how diverse networks of 
relationships develop into conflicting loyalties, which enhance social solidarity, 
minimise ethnic-based classifications, and foster structural constraint on individual 
choices, actions, and behaviour. Conflicting loyalties also increase the material and 
psychological costs of conflict.  
Chapters 8 and 9 shift focus of the discussion to peacebuilding in Kenya and the 
studied area. Chapter 8 frames peacebuilding with reference to local peace 
committees and Nyumba Kumi. Here, I apply the co-management approach to 
theorize institutional innovation and to discuss Kenya’s devolved peace and security 
framework, which is framed by ideas of decentralization and delegation of 
responsibilities from the state to the community level.  
Chapter 9 presents a dozen extended cases that provide the reader with details of 
actual disputes in the studied area, dispute-resolution processes, and the constraints 
involved. It also draws some general themes arising from the cases. Nowadays, local 
peace committees and Nyumba Kumi handle the bulk of disputes at the local level. 
However, complex conflicts like those exemplified by Cases 11 and 12 exceed the 
capacity of these institutions and that of local administrative structures as well. Most 
of these often politicised conflicts have the potential to transform into violence.  
The conclusion reflects upon the main questions addressed in this study. It joins 
strands from preceding discussions and explores various motivations that drive the 
formation of ties and alliances in multi-ethnic settings, despite the inherent risks. 
Moreover, it critically examines the durability of cross-cutting ties and the 
effectiveness of local institutions, and proposes areas for further research.  
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Theorizing violent conflict and peaceful relations 
Several theories that link violent interaction to specific social dynamics are briefly 
highlighted. To explain peaceful relations in the society, cross-cutting ties and 
conflicting loyalty theory, joking relationships, the “peaceful societies”, and 
institutions are briefly discussed. The objective here is not a critical or 
comprehensive review of theory; rather it is my intention to highlight those elements 
of these different theoretical approaches that matter most for this thesis; informing 
my initial methodological design as well as the later interpretation of the data.  
However, before embarking on theoretical discussion of peacebuilding, it is important 
to begin by addressing the preoccupation of anthropology, and the social sciences 
more generally, with violent conflicts.   
 
Anthropology and the social sciences’ pre-occupation with violent 
conflicts 
Violence and conflicts have long been of interest to anthropologists and other social 
scientists (e.g. Vanhanen, 1999; Sponsel, 1996: 96). Anthropological interest in 
conflict is wide-ranging, from personal motivation in conflict, through the social 
structures and dynamics of specific conflict situations, to interest in the global nature 
of contemporary militarism (Sluka, 1992: 20). According to Sluka, anthropologists 
and other social scientists are more interested in the subject of social conflict today 
than in the past. Notably, in the post-World War II era, particularly the late 1950s and 
1960s, anthropological interest in social conflict and violence was greatly stimulated 
by the national liberation struggles and other conflicts associated with the process of 
decolonisation in the Third Word, where the majority of anthropologists worked 
(Sluka, 1992: 21). 
Resource conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa gain much attention across the social 
sciences (e.g. cases in Le Meur et al., 2006; Derman et al., 2007). The major thrust 
of the literature has focused on the search for root causes of violence, linking violent 
interaction to specific social dynamics: the politicisation of ethnicity (Vanhanen,1999; 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Sambanis, 2001; Jackson, 2002), social 
exclusion (Le Billon, 2001; Richards, 2003; Watts, 2004), contested entitlements 
(Brass 1985; Bryant, 1998), the militarisation of profit-seeking elites (“greed and 
grievance”) (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), and competition over scarce resources 
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(Homer-Dixon, 1994). Generally, natural resources are at the centre of violence and 
conflict in Africa (Alao, 2007).  
Notably, scholarly discussions in the Global North have a keen focus on violence and 
conflict. In the edited volume “Anthropology of Violence and Conflict”, Schmidt and 
Schröder (2001) of the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) use 
examples from Africa, North and South America, Albania, Sri Lanka, and the former 
Yugoslavia to emphasise that violence is a key feature of human social relations. 
Sluka (1992: 19) notes that social life inevitably entails frustrations and 
incompatibilities between individuals and groups, and so conflict, which varies in 
degree and form, is a basic form of human interaction that occurs in all social 
systems – social conflict is a cultural universal.  
In East Africa, just like in most parts of the continent and the globe, the root causes 
of violence have received much attention in the recent past. While discussing 
pastoralist conflict in the Rift Valley, Mkutu (2008) links the arms trade, which 
according to him is a symptom of state failure, to the escalation of banditry, cattle 
rustling, raiding, and ethnic conflict. Other scholars link Kenya’s violent conflicts to 
the question of land and the politicisation of ethnic categories (Kanyinga, 2009; 
Galaty, 1992; Klopp, 2001: 134-160; Human Rights Watch, 1993). In Uganda, 
Bainomugisha, Okello and Ngoya (2007) associate the politicisation of borders, 
erosion of traditional authorities, and environmental scarcities to land conflicts. 
Others relate overpopulation, climate change, and environment-induced migration to 
violent conflicts in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia, among other parts of the world (see 
further examples in Reuveny, 2007).  
While the major thrust of social science literature in East Africa has focused on the 
search for root causes of violence, very little has been said on the conditions and 
practices of non-violent conflict resolution11. In addition, situations where prior 
                                                          
11 Conflict resolution is the settlement or avoidance of disputes between individuals or groups of 
people through solutions that refrain from violence and that attempt to reunify, re-harmonize, and 
preserve amicable relations between people involved in internal conflicts (Bonta, 1996: 406). Miall 
(2004) notes that “conflict resolution” or “transformation” are preferred than “conflict management”, 
which sees conflicts as ineradicable consequence of differences of values and interests within and 
between communities, whose propensity arises from existing institutions and historical relationships, 
as well as from the established distribution of power. Disputes are “short-term disagreements that are 
relatively easy to resolve, while conflicts are long-term, deep-rooted problems whose resolution is 
dependent on the nature of the conflict, the parties involved and the institutional processes through 
which negotiations and resolution is based…disputes and conflicts can occur independently of one 
another, they may also be connected, that is, short-term disputes may exist within a larger, longer 
conflict” (Spangler and Burgess, 2013). 
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violence turned into peaceful interaction have attracted little attention, though the 
analysis of such transitional phases holds the promise of contributing to applicable 
knowledge about conflict resolution. 
Despite the fact that violence is costly in many ways (loss of lives, loss of access to 
resources, degradation), actors seem to be caught up in a vicious circle from which 
there is no escape. However, Fearon and Laitin (1996: 175) have drawn attention to 
actors who succeed in managing conflicts peacefully. Providing examples from Africa 
and the post-Soviet world, they argue that peaceful and even cooperative relations 
between ethnic communities are far more common than is large-scale violence. In 
many ways cooperation is the norm and violence the exception in Kenya and in the 
study area too. Indeed, even the most notorious agro-pastoral areas prone to ethnic 
violence in Kenya show considerable commitment towards peaceful relations. Such 
cases include the Oromo and Pokomo in Tana River county (Prins, 1952; KNCHR, 
2012; Cuppen, 2013) as well as Pokot and Marakwet in West Pokot and Elgeyo-
Marakwet Counties (Huho, 2012) among others.  
However, when social scientists have dealt with such transitions towards peaceful 
intergroup relations, they have often focused on the effects of government measures 
and NGO activities (e.g. peace caravans). Such formal post-conflict peacebuilding 
strategies tend to concentrate on short-term political and economic stabilisation at 
the national level (Filipov, 2006: 7) and often fail to attend comprehensively to factors 
that shape conflicts at the grassroots level. Hence, social science research focusing 
on such interventions often deals with changing State-community relations. 
Sponsel (1996: 96) notes that the general tendency to focus on the causes of 
violence has often implied a neglect of nonviolent conflict management strategies. 
While taking note of the disproportionate interest in warfare by anthropologists, 
Gregor and Sponsel (1994) argue that “for human society to persist, even the most 
violent of them, there must be order, sociability, reciprocity, cooperation, and 
empathy – perhaps even compassion and love”. Indeed, all societies exhibit patterns 
of conformity and cooperation (Nader, 1968: 238). 
Hussein, Sumberg and Seddon (1999: 402-414) assert that the popular views of 
acute violent interaction have been supported by academics, practitioners, and 
donors, consequently raising the handling of resource conflicts high on Africa’s 
development policy agenda. They claim that the popularisation of what appears to be 
a “conventional wisdom” – increased competition for resources leading to increased 
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violent conflicts – leaves little room for local negotiation, adaptation and innovation, 
and seems to deny any role for agency in the non-violent resolution of local conflicts.  
While it is necessary to understand the factors that shape violence and conflicts, it is 
equally important to go beyond the disputes themselves to the processes involved in 
achieving and enforcing settlements in order to understand conflict management, 
and not to focus on the perhaps premature merely spectacular violent solutions. This 
study is an attempt to do so.  
 
Peaceful relations  
Evidently, it is more difficult to define peace than violence in a sociologically 
meaningful manner. Various attempts have been made to do so (e.g. Robarchek and 
Robarchek, 1998; Galtung, 1967; 1969). Galtung (1969: 183), for instance, 
understands peace as the absence of interpersonal and structural violence. 
Structural violence is a violence embedded in the social-economic structure of 
society and is reflected by such conditions as widespread poverty, hunger, avoidable 
diseases, and social-economic deprivations (Thee, 1980: 4-5).  
However, while discussing societies that are considered peaceful, authors have 
noted the capacity for interpersonal violence and forms of structural and symbolic 
violence. They have shown how cultural strategies are utilised to contain such 
violence (e.g. Fabbro, 1978; Robarchek and Robarchek, 1998; Bonta, 1996; 1997; 
Dentan, 2001; Fernea, 2004). In this study, peace is defined not simply as the 
absence of violence, but as the capacity for and practice of nonviolent cooperation in 
the face of pertinent challenges.  
Nonviolent cooperation invariably builds on processes of conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding. In this study, conflict resolution is understood as the settlement or 
avoidance of disputes between individuals or groups of people through solutions that 
refrain from violence and that attempt to reunify, re-harmonise, and preserve 
amicable relations between people involved in internal conflicts (Bonta, 1996: 406). 
Peacebuilding broadly focuses on the social, psychological, political, and economic 
environments at the grassroots level and aims to create a structure of peace that is 
based on justice, equity, and cooperation (i.e. positive peace), thereby addressing 
the underlying causes of violent conflict so that they become less likely in the future 
(Gawerc, 2006: 339).  
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Why are societies peaceful? How is violence turned into cooperation? There are 
several explanations, which can be attributed to peaceful relations in human 
societies. These are discussed below.   
 
Cross-cutting ties and conflicting loyalty theory  
The theory of cross-cutting-ties/conflicting loyalties argues that cross-cutting ties 
between communities lead to conflicting loyalties with a number of actors; these 
actors in turn will attempt to prevent violence between communities (e.g. Radcliffe-
Brown and Forde, 1950; Gluckman, 1955; Colson, 1953). In a cross-cultural study, 
Kang (1976) operationalised cross-cutting ties and took various forms of exogamy 
and intercommunity marriages as a major evidence for the presence of such groups 
(Kang, 1976: 203). However, she only found weak effects to support the cross-
cutting ties hypothesis (e.g. Göhlen, 1990; Kang, 1976).  
Indeed, in some cases where cross-cutting ties exist they even escalate conflicts 
(Schlee, 1997). Fukui (1994) notes that cross-cutting ties may easily become fragile, 
collapse and/or break down thus explaining conflict. This study presents a rather 
different picture. I argue that during and/or after violent conflict, actors often manage 
to reorganise, strengthen and/or form new ties and alliances or try to sustain existing 
ones – various motivations to do so are tackled here. Intergroup ties therefore do not 
necessarily diminish with instances of violent conflict, and the breakdown of ties may 
not necessarily explain conflict. This is not to mean that the disruptions and 
disturbances brought about by violence do not affect networks and ties. Rather, ties 
and alliances operate in a complex social world where such perturbations may even 
strengthen them. Among the Arusha farmers and their neighbouring pastoral Maasai 
of Tanzania, for instance, scholars have shown how social systems may control or 
limit conflicts that are always possible as the result of divergence of sentiment or 
interest (see Gulliver, 1963; Spear, 1993: 122-133; Galaty, 1993b: 182-192).  
From a local perspective in Maiella and Enoosupukia, social ties matter, and they 
served to motivate me to reconsider the cross-cutting ties hypothesis. I hypothesise 
that it is especially the multiplex character of cross-cutting ties which inhibits or rather 
discourages violent interaction. In situations of violence, it is the actors who have ties 
with both conflicting groups that will first and foremost engage themselves in 
peaceful intercommunity relations.  
39 
 
In the context of my thesis, relationships which result from cross-cutting ties are often 
accompanied by significant material transfers and engagements. Therefore, cross-
cutting ties foster and give meaning to concepts of sharing and interdependence, and 
may develop into allegiances or conflicting loyalties where reciprocal exchanges and 
social capital are governed by social constraints. 
 
Joking relationships  
The joking relationships theory is akin to cross-cutting ties ideas. Joking relationships 
are central to studies on social structure and function in social anthropology. British 
Anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown (1940: 195) defines joking relationship as a relation 
between two persons in which they are by custom permitted, and in some instances 
required, to tease, make fun of, ridicule, joke openly, and insult one another and so 
on in a joking and reciprocal manner without taking offence.  
He categorises joking relationships into two: (1) symmetrical, where each of the two 
persons tease or make fun of the other, and (2) asymmetrical, where A jokes at the 
expense of B and B accepts the teasing in good humour but without retaliating; or A 
teases B as much as he pleases, while B in turn teases A only a little. This makes 
joking relationships, “a combination of friendliness and antagonism, whose 
expression arouses hostility, but it is not meant seriously and should not be taken 
seriously” (Radcliffe-Brown, 1940: 196). Some joking relationships may be only 
verbal, while others may include horseplay, and yet others could include elements of 
obscenity (Radcliffe-Brown (1940: 195; Kuper, 1977).  
Recent studies on joking relationships and ethnic humour point out that such 
relations are important in conflict resolution and peacebuilding in divided societies 
(Zelizer, 2010),  in creation of supportive social relationships (Jones, 2007), and in 
simplifying everyday life by increasing the positive evaluation of one’s own group 
through negative evaluation of others (Grubor and Hinic, 2011). However, ethnic 
humour, comedy, and other aspects of joking relationships have the potential to 
exacerbate conflict by intentionally or unintentionally demonising others (Zelizer, 
2010: 1).  
In the context of Maiella and Enoosupukia, joking relationships represent a part of 
normal conversations between friends. They often take the form of “Churchill Show”, 
a popular television comedy in Nairobi, which is designed primarily to create humour 
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out of the everyday lives of ethnic groups in the country. However, comedians must 
not confuse making fun of others with being cruel or “injuring” the feelings of those 
implicated. In the same way, while friends use ethnic jokes to ridicule, for instance, 
“rigid” cultural practices such as female circumcision or pastoral tendencies among 
Maasai, they ensure that such jokes do not cross the line and so spoil their good 
relations or interfere with economic transactions. In Chapter 6, a Kikuyu and a 
Maasai engage in an informative joking relationship during a transaction involving 
livestock.  
 
Societies at peace/non-violent societies 
Some anthropologists and sociologists have described a small number of human 
societies as “peaceful”. The encyclopaedia of selected peaceful societies12 lists 
about twenty-five such societies, among them Mbuti, Nubians, Rural Thai, Semai, 
Amish, Batek and Yanadi. Societies that are considered peaceful “live a nonviolent 
way of life which is almost totally free of interpersonal violence or overt expressions 
of hostility” (Robarchek, 1981: 103; Bonta, 1993; 1996). Such societies consider 
peaceful behaviour to be honourable and conducive to the accumulation of symbolic 
capital.  
Fabbro (1978: 17) describes peaceful societies as not engaging in violence against 
other groups, having no civil wars or internal collective violence, not maintaining a 
standing military-police organisation, experiencing little or no interpersonal lethal 
violence, and lacking certain forms of structural violence (also Howell and Willis, 
1989). Peaceful societies observe varying cultural practices; some do experience 
violence (e.g. murders, fights etc.), but they share the attribute of utilising cultural 
strategies to contain it.  
These studies (on peaceful societies) all focus on small-scale societies or minorities. 
Therefore, although necessary when discussing peace and nonviolence, the 
“peaceful societies” perspective is not relevant to my study. Rather, this thesis 
examines major populations, which are rather heterogeneous and whose members 
exemplify notable social-economic disparities, and experience some forms of 
competition as well as having considerably different cultures. Interestingly, these 
                                                          
12 www.peacefulsocieties.org 
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cultural differences, including those established in traditional belief systems, become 
increasingly narrow as groups progressively share norms, values, and institutions.  
 
 Institutions and co-management of conflicts  
Apart from the cross-cutting ties theory, research on the institutionalist perspective 
features as equally important in understanding social relations. Coming mostly from 
political science, this perspective argues that it is institutions (rather than ideals or 
conflicting loyalties) that prevent people from fighting one another (e.g. Darby, 2003). 
Institutions are meant to establish rules of conduct, monitor behaviour, and sanction 
deviant behaviour if need be (see also North, 1998).  
The present study borrows insights from recent work and practice in peacebuilding 
and conflict resolution, which have popularised the co-management of natural 
resources and related conflicts. Co-management connotes a collaborative 
institutional arrangement among diverse stakeholders for managing or using a 
natural resource and for managing related conflicts (Castro and Nielsen, 2001). 
According to Borrini-Feyerabend et al, (2000), co-management enables two or more 
social actors to negotiate, define, and guarantee among themselves the sharing of  
management functions, entitlements, and responsibilities for a given territory or set of 
natural resources. Brown (1999) notes that co-management is more of a “working 
partnership” between the state, local communities, and other stakeholders whose 
principles are embodied in participatory/collaborative management.  
Castro and Nielsen (2001) argue that co-management agreements between 
indigenous people, other stakeholders, and state agencies offer substantial promise 
as a way of dealing with natural-resource-based conflicts. However, they observe 
that co-management agreements can set new conflicts in motion, or cause old ones 
to escalate. The result, according to these scholars, may not be power-sharing, but 
rather a strengthening of the state's control over resource policy, management, and 
allocation, a situation that may further marginalize indigenous communities rather 
than contributing to local empowerment.  
Driven by ideas of “sustainable peacebuilding”, scholars and practitioners call for a 
participatory/collaborative approach to the management of violent conflicts 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011; Lederach, 1997; Borrini-Feyerabend et 
al, 2000). Noting the inability of the state to deliver the promise of sustainable peace 
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in Africa and elsewhere, there is increasing recognition of non-state actors (the local 
community and civil society) in peacebuilding initiatives (e.g. Adam, Verbrugge and 
Boer, 2014; Baranyi and Weitzer, 2006; Reychler, 2002: COM, 2004; FAO, 2002; 
Lederach, 1997; Marshall, 2006; Miall, 2004; Rupesinghe, 1995; USAID, 2012; 
Wehrmann, 2008). What is required, according to Castro and Nielsen (2001), is a 
clear assessment of the benefits and limitations of co-management as a mechanism 
for promoting conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and sustainable development.  
In the last few decades, Kenya’s agenda on peacebuilding, conflict management, 
and crime13 prevention has circled around co-management ideas (or what some call 
hybrid governance). Following the 2007/2008 post-election violence, widespread 
interethnic clashes14, and Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kenya (see Anderson and 
McKnight 2014; Anderson and McKnight, 2015; Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom, 2015; 
International Crisis Group, 2014), the state embarked on a devolution of capacities to 
ensure security and peace at the local levels. The state gave the rights to handle 
specific local conflicts and crime prevention issues to local peace committees and 
Nyumba Kumi.  
Especially the peace committees’ initiative has gained considerable popularity in 
most agro-pastoral settings in Kenya, which are prone to violent conflicts (see 
examples in Pkalya, Adan and Maside, 2004; Huho, 2012; Cuppen, 2013). Chapters 
8 and 9 of the dissertation contribute to these studies. More importantly, chapter 8 
show how the devolved peace and security framework in Kenya is already enmeshed 
in various complexities that characterise co-management arrangements, following 
Carlsson and Berkes (2005).    
Despite these challenges, I argue that the interplay between formal and informal 
institutions in the co-management of conflicts is necessary. However, I acknowledge 
that local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi are in many ways “incomplete” and 
face serious constraints, most of which come from formal state apparatus and state 
laws, as discussed in this thesis. I also regard the institutionalist perspective as 
necessary. However, I suggest that the perspective mostly aims to explain how 
violent activities can be brought to an end successfully. 
 
                                                          
13 The Kenya 2015 Crime and Safety Report notes that crime rates are at a critical level. 
14 The land question, ethnocentrism, and politics are major causes of ethnic violence in Kenya as 
already discussed (see also Oucho, 2002). 
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Study area: people, economy, and administration 
Location and people 
The study area of Maiella and Enoosupukia falls in a portion of the former British-
established Maasai southern reserve, in the southern part of Lake Naivasha basin in 
Kenya’s Rift Valley. This area borders the Mau Forest Complex (Figure 4). Mobility 
and historical interactions between Maasai, Dorobo, and Kikuyu communities in this 
area are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Maiella derives its name from Majella, a massif in central Italy. The area known as 
Maiella today was until 1964 a settler farm (Maiella Estate) constituting some 16,338 
acres of land. According to residents, an Italian commercial farmer who acquired the 
estate from a British settler coined the name. Archival sources indicate that colonial 
administrators contracted Italians for infrastructural development (e.g. construction of 
roads)15. There is also indication that during World War II, when Italian and British 
soldiers fought in East Africa in the 1940s, the British may have taken some Italian 
soldiers as prisoners of war who ended up working on British commercial farms in 
Kenya. However, there is little evidence to suggest when and under what 
circumstances ownership of the estate was transferred. Chapter 3 goes deeper into 
the history and transformation of Maiella Estate.  
Enoosupukia refers to the Maa word osupukiai, which identifies a tree species (Latin: 
Dombeya dombeya) from which bees produce a very sweet, white honey (Matter, 
2010: 39). Maasai (including Dorobo) and Kikuyu have inhabited this place for at 
least the last century. Through intermarriage, the offspring of a specific type of mixed 
parentage, known locally as nusu nusu, have become an important part of the 
population.  
Nusu nusu (plural, manusu) is derived from the Swahili word nusu (“half”), and is 
mainly a cultural symbol of conflicting loyalties in the studied area (as discussed in 
Chapter 4). Nusu nusu is often used today by other people to refer to individuals of 
mixed identities, referring to offspring of Maasai/Kikuyu/Dorobo intermarriages, but 
those individuals rarely use the term in reference to themselves. The name is also 
commonly used to refer to Kikuyu who acquired Maasai identity through adoption, as 
labourers, friends, and in-laws of the Maasai. Some progressively acquired Maasai 
                                                          
15 Rhodes House, Oxford/ Handing Over Report/Mr. A.D. Galton-Fenzi to Mr. R.A. Jeary/Narok 
District/1st March 1957. 
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names and culture throughout the twentieth century. Some Kikuyu informants 
branded this group “Dorobo”, owing to a lack of clear identity.  
Notably, the processes of shifting ethnic identity have historical roots. The 
motivations and the conditions that enable or even provoke changes in ethnic identity 
but also the reproduction of ethnic boundaries, become clearer in the chapters 
below.  
 
Figure 4. Study area and its environs (source: field data, 2015).  
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It is not clear when the term “nusu nusu” was coined but archival sources show that it 
was already in use in the 1950s. In a 1957 handing-over report, Galton-Fenzi, who 
was then District Commissioner of the Maasai reserve, noted that the nusu nusu 
population “would always be a problem for administrators”, due to their alliances to 
both dominant ethnic communities and their somewhat unclear relation to land16. 
Generally, manusu are strategically allied to the Maasai, for security of land tenure 
among other reasons, but still have positive regard for their Kikuyu identity (language 
and ancestry) and are more than willing to mobilise such identities when the need to 
do so arises17. Rogers, a nusu nusu, qualifies this group: 
Every nusu nusu has a Maasai umbrella name with which they are associated. 
That name makes them Maasai and protects their ownership rights to land in 
Maasailand even if they married Kikuyu wives. Manusu are also Kikuyu, they 
speak Gikuyu because their mothers mostly come from Kikuyuland.   
(Rogers, Gogoti market near Mpeuti village). 
 
By virtue of their mixed identity, manusu have a good command of both Maa and 
Gikuyu languages and cultures. Indeed, the majority are multilingual, having also 
learned Swahili and English in school. Others are multicultural – like the Olosho lole 
Kaloi population, who trace ancestry to a Meru ancestor from the Mt. Kenya area.  
Nusu nusu share some attributes with a group that John Galaty refers to as Narok 
Nusui. It is not clear, even from my informants, whether manusu and Narok Nusui 
both refer to a single group. According to Galaty (1993b: 189), “Narok Nusui 
represent not simply the children of Maasai and Kikuyu but bilingual bicultural 
families and individuals, now distanced from the pastoral economy, who participate in 
education, farming, trade, and land acquisition much more frequently than pastoral 
Maasai”.  
The manusu I refer to often capitalise on the livestock economy, some utilising 
returns from commercial cultivation to increase herds. They utilise their strategic 
                                                          
16 Rhodes House, Oxford/ Handing Over Report/Mr. A.D. Galton-Fenzi to Mr. R.A. Jeary/Narok 
District/1st March 1957.   
17 Such precariousness of identities creates some difficulties in anthropological description of people 
and situations, more so in this study. The story at the onset of this thesis (preface) shows the example 
of an individual who claims three identities (Maasai, Dorobo, and Kikuyu). Indeed, during fieldwork, 
the questions asked could easily trigger informants to shift identities and ethnicities in order to find an 
appropriate answer. For example, when asked about land ownership in the Maasai villages, some 
Kikuyu claimed to be nusu nusu (or simply Maasai) perhaps to indicate some form of security of 
tenure. Throughout this dissertation therefore I have adopted the labels Maasai, Dorobo, nusu nusu, 
and Kikuyu depending on specific contexts (such as in the case materials provided). Though 
seemingly appearing to be “one society” (as opposed to different ethnic groups in a setting), identities 
and ethnic affiliations still play strategic roles.  
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position to accumulate land from their network of Maasai landowners, most of which 
is in turn leased to land-seeking clients, the majority of them Kikuyu. Some sell 
livestock to raise money for farm inputs like fertilisers and seeds and to hire farm 
labour and equipment, including tractors. Others keep considerable herds of cattle 
and small stock and are likely to rent, purchase, or negotiate for pastureland away 
from the cultivated areas.  
A good number hire herders so that they can invest more time in coordinating 
commercial cultivation. As observed during fieldwork, manusu do not discriminate 
between the sexes in schooling their children. Notably, their strategic position in the 
two communities is crucial in livestock trade and in leasehold arrangements, as 
discussed in later chapters.  
 
Economy 
The local economy at Maiella and Enoosupukia is anchored on ongoing efforts 
towards peaceful intercommunity relations. Agro-pastoralism has progressively 
replaced specialised pastoralism and hunting, which were the main economic 
activities at least in the early twentieth century. Today, Maasai (including Dorobo) 
also cultivate, just like their Kikuyu neighbours. Due to changes in land-use patterns, 
hunting and gathering practices are no longer tenable; only a handful of Dorobo 
families have one or two hives today. These communities also practice a mixture of 
off-farm activities.  
Enoosupukia is characterised by good agricultural soils and abundant rainfall, which 
allows for up to three harvests per year for some staples including vegetables: Irish 
potatoes (locally known as shangi), onions, cabbages, carrots, various types of leafy 
vegetables, and legumes such as beans and peas (Pisum sativum). Cereals (maize 
and wheat) are favoured in the warmer parts of Enoosupukia and Maiella.   
Unlike other areas of Narok county, which have well-established large-scale 
plantations of wheat and other commercial crops, dilapidated roads and a difficult 
topography to manoeuvre within, as well as frequent heavy rains in parts of the study 
area, constrain large-scale mechanised cultivation. Instead, small-scale subsistence 
and commercial cultivation dominate. Leasehold arrangements on land between 
Maasai and Kikuyu are tackled in detail in Chapter 5.  
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The study area is in close proximity to Lake Naivasha’s agro-industrial hub, a leading 
exporter of cut flowers and horticulture to Europe and other world markets. Proximity 
to this hub provides a ready market for food produce from Enoosupukia and Maiella 
to the population of over 650,000 people living around the lake (KPHC, 2009). This 
booming market for food produce has progressively drawn large numbers of youth 
(between 20 and 40 years of age), who constitute the largest proportion of Kenya’s 
growing population, into commercial cultivation through leasehold arrangements in 
Enoosupukia and its environs. One could describe them as “social engineers” who 
are more interested in commodity chains and motivated by individual/household 
commercial gains than they are concerned with considerations of ethnicity or 
identities. Ethnic identities, though important considerations, may not deter the young 
generation in particular from conquering frontiers and markets in pursuit of financial 
independence – the opportunity to lease farmland in Enoosupukia and to engage in 
the livestock economy holds substantial promise for the accumulation of wealth and 
financial independence.  
Apart from Naivasha, other markets for food produce have progressively opened up, 
including Nairobi, Machakos, and Mombasa, among other towns in Kenya. Some 
produce also crosses into Kampala. Therefore, dealers in produce usually rely on 
trucks to transport food from the study area to these markets. Some food peddlers 
use donkeys, “boda boda” (motorcycles), and bicycles to ferry produce from rented 
farm plots to nearby markets.  
Despite the booming cultivation, livestock still holds a vital place in Maasai culture 
and society. The number and type of livestock kept by Maasai, Dorobo, and Kikuyu 
depends on the availability of grazing areas, people’s ability to restock after 
calamities like droughts and livestock diseases, and their ability to rent, purchase, or 
utilise kin and/or friendship networks to access pastures within or outside the 
cultivated areas. Livestock include cattle, donkeys, sheep, and goats. Herders prefer 
small stock (sheep and goats) due to the continued reduction of grazing areas for 
cattle because of intensive cultivation.  
Indeed, sheep define the “new” pastoralism in Enoosupukia and Maiella. The cold 
weather patterns are conducive to sheep rearing. Goats do well in warmer parts. 
Consequently, herders wishing to keep large herds of goats often rely on friends and 
family in areas with favourable (warmer) weather and abundant pastures like Suswa, 
Longonot, Kedong Valley, Gilgil, Kajiado, Maai Mahiu, and Mosiro to mention a few 
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(Figure 4). They move livestock in an organised way and with respect to seasons, 
existing social networks, and relative abundance of pastures across these areas18.  
Notably, the Maasai use such connections to practice a form of nomadic lifestyle 
while remaining sedentary. I use the concept “sedentary nomadism” to refer to this 
practice. Simply put, it is a situation in which herders relocate livestock from 
intensively cultivated and inhabited areas so as to maximise opportunities for 
pastures and water in sparsely populated areas with little or no cultivation, like the 
areas mentioned above. Moving livestock to these areas allows herders to practice 
proprietorship of the soil in Enoosupukia and to limit herder-farmer disputes, as 
discussed later on.  
 
Administration 
In terms of administration, Maiella Sub-Location, just like Enoosupukia Location, has 
a chief and an assistant chief. The central government vets and recruits these 
administrators. Upon recruitment, chiefs and their assistants select a core of village 
elders from their respective administrative units (villages). The central government 
also supplies chiefs with a few administration police officers with whom they can 
legally enforce orders. Together with the police, chiefs have powers to punish and/or 
sanction offences. They can arrest and temporarily detain offenders while waiting for 
their transfer to police stations at the county or Sub-county levels.  
Chiefs ensure that community members exercise social order and restraint from 
crime and related activities at the local level – they are the “eyes” of the central 
government in the villages. However, chiefs have no authority over land, although 
they hear and determine matters pertaining to land disputes. Whenever the matters 
(in dispute) presented by villagers exceed their capacity, the chiefs may refer them to 
formal courts.  
Since 2010 when the state “implanted” local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi 
institutions in the community levels to manage conflicts and to prevent crime, it 
conferred chiefs with additional powers to implement both institutions in their 
administrative regions. Nowadays, these institutions form the grassroots-level peace 
                                                          
18 Details on the seasonal movement of livestock across these areas are beyond the current project. 
Nevertheless, I have already set in motion plans to study this adaptive mechanism for a journal article.  
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and security apparatus in Kenya’s devolved governance system (as discussed in 
Chapters 8 and 9). 
The next chapter explores the methods utilised in this study.  
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CHAPTER 2: Methods 
This chapter discusses the methods adopted for fieldwork. The chapter starts with a 
short summary of the methods and, thereafter, a detailed account of specific tools 
and data collection procedures.  
Fieldwork for this study involved people of mainly two ethnic groups – Maasai (Maa-
speakers) and Kikuyu – who live together on the borderlands of Narok and Nakuru 
counties in Enoosupukia and Maiella, respectively (Figure 3). Fieldwork employed a 
mixed methods approach (see Creswell, 2003; Bernard, 2006 for comprehensive 
discussion). In a mixed methods approach, a researcher collects qualitative and 
quantitative data and tends to base knowledge claims on pragmatic grounds. This 
form of inquiry is based on the assumption that collecting diverse types of data best 
provides a broad understanding of a research problem in a specific social situation 
(Creswell, 2003: 17-21). 
Participant observation, extended cases, open-ended interviews, narrative research 
(in this case biographical accounts and oral testimonies), informal conversations, and 
focus groups were intrinsic to the methodological design of this study. Oral 
testimonies and archival materials were fundamental in contextualising histories of 
social problems like land disputes and in helping to understand social change, social 
relationships, and land-use change. 
Quantitative strategy primarily utilized a questionnaire survey method involving 
roughly 240 households, which were selected using disproportionate stratified 
random sampling (disproportionate stratification) in six villages. Half of these villages 
are mostly occupied by Maasai (including Dorobo) and the other half mostly by 
people of Kikuyu descent. The use of mixed methods in a single case enables a 
researcher to develop a deep understanding of complex and actual social situations 
in which conflict and coexistence both exist (Gluckman and researchers in the 
Manchester School have popularised this approach in anthropological inquiry).   
In much of the anthropological tradition, researchers tend to collect more qualitative 
data than quantitative data; this study is no exception. Therefore, analyses and 
results are presented in the form of case studies, descriptions, illustrations, and 
processes. Detailed case-oriented studies are especially important here. They 
represent actual scenarios carefully selected to engage the reader with the first-hand 
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experiences of informants in their social and ecological situations. Quantitative data 
was organised using SPSS software.  
To begin a detailed discussion of these methods, I would like to start with my role as 
a participant observer, in which I doubled as a farmer in a leasehold arrangement at 
Mpeuti village, Enoosupukia.  
 
Cultivating researcher   
When I started fieldwork in Enoosupukia towards the end of 2013, I always admired 
the Irish potatoes, maize, onions, and cabbages grown on rented land. Some Kikuyu 
farmers told me interesting stories about how much money they made from the sale 
of farm produce. Having come from a semi-arid village in Machakos, these stories 
were like music to my ears.  
After spending some time in the field, I took my assistants and close allies – Joseph 
Tome, a Maasai of Nkampani village; Sarah Nyanjui, a Kikuyu of Maiella trading 
centre; Philip Kaloi, a nusu nusu (Maasai/Kikuyu) of Olosho lole Kaloi village; and 
John, a Dorobo of Mpeuti village – to my rural home in Machakos, about 200Km from 
Enoosupukia. Being a Kenyan researching on the sensitive topics of land, violence, 
and peacebuilding, this journey was also meant to prove to residents of Maiella and 
Enoosupukia that I was not a government spy after all. I had tried in vain to convince 
the untrusting residents that I was just an ordinary Kenyan doing research in my own 
country. Some believed that research was a speciality of Europeans, and that I had 
ulterior motives being there. Such fears intensified when some thought that I had 
actually arrested the few friends. However, constant (actually annoying) phone calls 
during the trip provided some assurance that we were just fine. 
Upon arrival in Machakos, my visitors were confronted with dry farms with stunted 
maize crops. John, who is also the chair of Mpeuti village local peace committee, 
sympathised with my situation and promised to help me to secure farmland in 
Enoosupukia. Some Maasai elders whom I had met earlier had also already 
proposed to give me farmland.  
Nandwa, a Maasai elder of Nkampani village, was among the generous elders. One 
day he took me to his 25-acre farm in Suswa where he grows maize and beans for 
commercial purposes. He pointed out one part of his farm: “Ole Kiok, when you are 
ready I will give you two acres there [pointing] free of charge so that you can grow 
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crops and get food for your family”. “Ole Kiok” is the name that was used widely to 
refer to me among my Maa-speaking friends and informants. They said that my 
actual name, Kioko, meant “ears” in the Maa language, and was thus ridiculous. “Ole 
Kiok” refers to an ancestor of a large Maasai kin group, which spans southern Kenya 
and northern Tanzania. Nandwa continued, “I have employed four Luhya guys who 
will attend to your farm as they do to mine, and all you have to do is to pay them a 
little money for planting, weeding, and harvesting; and should you want to sell some 
produce, they will also organise for a truck to collect it from the farm”.    
Later on John introduced me to his brother, Max, who was intending to sublet an 
acre of land. Someone believed to be living in Nairobi was already farming this 
particular piece of land. Since this person had difficulty in paying the agreed amount 
of money for the lease and did not maintain close contact with Max, however, it was 
easy for Max to transfer user rights to me. I negotiated for a price of KES 6,000 (€60) 
to lease the acre for a period of one year. 
In February 2014, I took my sister, Muthoni, to the farm and introduced her to John’s 
family. Since she had already met John in Machakos, it was easy to generate 
rapport. Muthoni would henceforth take up farming on the land while staying in my 
rented house in Maiella trading centre. I provided her with capital to purchase farm 
inputs and to organise planting, weeding, spraying of pesticides, and harvesting.  
The first harvest did not meet our expectations, but was sufficient for a start. Frost 
had damaged a large section of her Irish potato crops. After the harvest, Muthoni 
identified two additional plots within the area, with the intention of expanding her 
business. She again approached Max, with whom she negotiated for additional land. 
In time, she made many friends with whom she attended church and ceremonies in 
the villages. The ole Kaloi family especially praised her for assisting in cooking during 
the circumcision ceremony of their two daughters. However, she had to deal with 
scores of Maasai men who showed a lot of interest in gaining her hand in marriage, 
as a second or third wife in most cases. Her presence in Mpeuti village was quite 
symbolic, and had a definite positive effect on my work.  
In May 2014, I decided to become an active farmer while still conducting my daily 
interviews. John, who had frequently persuaded me to never leave Maasailand 
empty-handed, set aside one acre of his farm for me at a cost of KES 8,000 (€80) for 
a year of lease. Due to my frequent trips abroad for PhD-related training, I organised 
with Mike, a former campus-mate at the University of Nairobi who is also a farming 
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enthusiast, to assist with managing the land. We agreed to share the costs and 
profits. Henceforth, John (our landlord) became our local correspondent, and played 
a very important role in engaging and supervising local labour on the farm.  
With John at the helm, Mike and I did not have to be present on the farm on a regular 
basis. We sent John money to pay our labourers through Mpesa, a mobile money-
transfer service popular in Kenya. Having been raised in Naivasha, Mike had reliable 
connections through which we were able to purchase seeds at cheaper prices than in 
Maiella. 
In June 2014, we planted Irish potatoes and peas on half of the acre and maize on 
the other half. Peas were especially uncommon in Mpeuti. Despite impressive results 
especially with maize, we ended up spending a lot more money than we had 
anticipated. In total, we spend approximately KES 30,000 (€300) on operating costs. 
Much of this money was spent on employing local labour and paying John in 
compensation for the time he spent supervising workers and relaying information 
about the farm to us. Interestingly, John hired his two wives to weed the area planted 
with peas and Irish potatoes, thereby maximising most of the money that went to 
labour. 
To maintain good relations with John and Max, I ensured that I kept in touch by 
calling them on the phone and asking about their families, even when I was in 
Europe. Mike, whose focus was more commercially driven, was cautious at first 
about nurturing close ties with the landowner because he believed that this would 
ultimately increase our transaction costs – and it did. Indeed, John and his friends 
always invited us to contribute money towards social events like marriage 
ceremonies, burial arrangements, and to assist in settling their medical bills or paying 
school fees. Our physical appearance at such events was not always as valued as 
our sending money through Mpesa, but such events were a good platform to meet 
informants. My sister represented me at some of these events, especially when I 
returned to Europe, but I was constantly reminded to bring nice “stuff” from Europe. 
We were part of the family, they said.   
Whenever I visited Mpeuti village, I brought back some telephone airtime for John or 
transferred it to his mobile phone so he could keep us updated about the farm. I also 
bought cakes for his children, as well as sugar, soap, rice, juice, and bread from the 
supermarkets in Naivasha town for his wives. John and I met quite often for a cup of 
tea. Apart from discussing farm matters, I took the opportunity to ask him more about 
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the operations of his local peace committee and how the committee handled herder-
farmer disputes and those involving access to and use of land between land-seeking 
clients and landowners. 
With his assistance, I managed to hold focus group discussions with his local peace 
committee and those of other villages. I also helped John to realise his dream of 
making European friends when I organised for one of my supervisors, together with a 
team of scientists from Europe with whom I work in Kenya, to visit his home. We 
feasted on nyamachoma (roast meat) and boiled potatoes and I could see John 
struggling to converse with a few of my friends. Having Europeans visit his home 
earned him considerable symbolic capital and somehow legitimised his role as the 
area chair of the local peace committee – one whose popularity had extended 
beyond the African continent.     
Combining data collection and farming helped me to become more accepted in the 
community. I was able to meet many tenants and landlords and gained deep 
knowledge of land transactions and related dispute-resolution processes as well as 
local market-oriented food production. Through participant observation, I understood 
how non-Maasai people easily brought friends and family into the area to cultivate, a 
strategy that seems to work quite well among Kikuyu migrants in the colonisation of 
agricultural frontiers formerly dedicated to livestock herding.  
Despite our enthusiasm for farming, one thing forced us to rethink our farming 
strategy. Towards mid-February 2015, our maize was ready for harvesting, but it 
came to our attention that thieves had been descending on it in the cover of night 
making away with large amounts. This was very disappointing given the time and 
money that we had invested. Apparently, we had planted maize in a season when 
everyone planted something else. Therefore, our farm became the main source of 
food for less deserving villagers. As a result, we did not make as much profit as 
anticipated. We only managed to secure enough food for ourselves, and some 
surplus for planting. Before we could negotiate with John on a price for the crop 
residue, he went ahead and fed it to his cattle. 
Furthermore, whereas renting farmland is considerably cheaper for the majority land-
seeking clients, contributing money to activities and ceremonies to appease 
landowners can be quite costly. Moreover, unlike us, farmers reduce operating costs 
by doing the work on their farms themselves, and rarely will they hire labour. By the 
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end of fieldwork, Mike and I introduced two other friends who later negotiated for 5 
acres of farmland from two Dorobo landowners.  
 
 
Photograph  1. A piece of land rented by the researcher during fieldwork: landowner 
                       John (right) and Mkamba, a labourer (left) (source: field data, 2015). 
 
Cross-border research  
I conducted fieldwork in six neighbouring villages mainly in 2014 and 2015. Half of 
these villages – that is, Maiella trading centre, Nkampani, and Kokoti – fall within 
Maiella Sub-location, Nakuru county, while the other half – Mpeuti, Olosho lole Kaloi, 
and Ol tepesi le Parsimei – are located in Enoosupukia Location, Narok county 
(Figure 3). As noted earlier, these villages constitute the borderlands around the two 
counties.  
Though neighbouring one another, these villages have deplorable earth roads 
connecting them, some of which were used as livestock paths in the colonial period. 
Therefore, one often prefers walking rather than driving. Together with my assistants, 
we hired “boda boda” (motorbikes) during mapping and data collection. The situation 
was rather difficult during the rainy seasons, as we often had to cut short our 
interviews around 3pm, promising to call back the following day lest we end up 
soaked by rain on our way back.  
Long treks allowed us to meet many villagers on our way and to explain our study. I 
continually reminded my assistants how to answer the simple questions: what are 
you doing? Why here? Who send you? Will the study benefit us and how? In fact, I 
often asked my assistants these very questions just to be sure they could provide 
correct information about the study. In such interconnected villages, providing full 
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information about a study allows others to possibly transmit similar messages to 
prospective informants.  
More importantly, we took care while discussing the emotional land-ownership 
problems and violent conflicts. Nevertheless, it took us time to build rapport and to 
bring the untrusting informants to take part in our study. Ultimately, some were willing 
to reveal sensitive information, particularly on the organisation and perpetration of 
violence in 1993, on the condition of anonymity. My participation in cultivation greatly 
improved my relationships with informants.  
Long treks also afforded us the opportunity to chat and discuss the results of our 
interviews. In most of the conversations, I began to notice that my Maasai and 
Kikuyu assistants were always teasing one another in a humorous way while 
comparing cultural practices between the two groups. I began to record their Swahili 
conversations and to compare them with those of others in the study area, which I 
found to involve numerous forms of joking relationships. Kikuyu often tease Maasai 
about female circumcision, illiteracy, and what they consider to be “backwardness”. 
The Maasai in turn tease Kikuyu for being “thieving”, home wreckers due to 
perceived immorality on the part of their women, manipulative in economic 
transactions, and also teased them about the rampant cases of divorce in the Kikuyu 
community. Unfortunately, there is hardly enough space here to describe and 
analyse such joking relationships.  
To ensure close contact with both groups, I secured a small rental house in Maiella 
trading centre, which is practically the nerve centre of the surrounding villages. It was 
also supplied with electricity, making it easier to work on my computer and to charge 
my camera and recorders. Mobile phones were not necessary especially in areas like 
Olosho lole Kaloi, Nkampani, and Ol tepesi le Parsimei, where there is hardly any 
network coverage (at least until about a year ago).  
Maiella trading centre afforded me the opportunity to observe social-economic 
interactions in the marketplace, in the small hotels, in the transport sector, and the 
busy offloading zone where farm produce is ferried by trucks from small-scale farms 
in Enoosupukia and its environs. It was a neutral place to stay and to establish my 
presence with the groups of interest. I also improved my spoken Gikuyu (Kikuyu 
language) but the Maa language proved quite difficult, probably more than German, 
which I still struggle with to date. As much as I very much wanted to use Maa words 
in the discussion, my ability to do so is greatly limited.  
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James Ferguson, in one of the colloquiums in Cologne University in 2015, said, “You 
learn a lot by listening”. While observing and listening to social-economic interactions 
and related conversations, I continually took notes on my phone and made 
recordings where possible. Such often informal conversations proved worthwhile in 
the course of fieldwork, sometimes as a means of reference, the results of which are 
used in consecutive chapters. Indeed, almost every aspect of social life is crucial in a 
study of this kind.  
Anthropologists interested in participant observation often study one community. In 
the context of my study, tackling mixed communities was both a challenge and an 
opportunity. I was able to understand cross-border interactions and exchanges and 
to monitor specific aspects of cooperation between the two groups. However, as a 
Kenyan doing fieldwork in a former conflict zone, I had to be careful not to be seen 
as approving of or favouring one community above the other. In fact, I was constantly 
reminded that until recently only foreign scholars found ease in doing fieldwork in the 
area, while Kenyans were thought of as government spies interested in land matters, 
or even as land grabbers. The cross-border approach – studying mostly two groups 
at the fringe of two counties – was an important consideration for an all-
encompassing study, as explained below.   
 
Choosing study villages: important considerations  
Choice of villages to study involved mapping the settlements near Lake Naivasha – 
that is, Ndabibi, Moi Ndabi, Ngondi, and Kongoni, among others – and those located 
further from the lake around Sakutiek and the Enoosupukia area in Narok county 
(Figure 4). The reasons for my choice of this particular study area included: the 
presence of both Maasai and Kikuyu who live together; the existence of well-
established agro-pastoral livelihoods; and the fact that the area lies on a shared 
border of two counties, making it an interesting place for comparative and cross-
border studies.  
More importantly, the six villages were hardest hit during the politically instigated 
violence of October 1993 pitting Maasai pastoralists against Kikuyu farmers (see 
Chapter 3). The study area therefore offered an interesting opportunity to explore the 
transition from violence to peaceful cooperative relations today. 
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Proximity of the villages to one another and to the horticultural hub in Naivasha was 
also a factor to consider. Apart from looking at the connection between the centre 
(Lake Naivasha and the agro-industrial hub) and the periphery (villages on the rural 
fringes of the lake), such proximity allowed me to cover a considerable number of 
different specific locales within less time and to interview many people within the 
stipulated period of fieldwork. 
With the generous assistance of area chiefs of Maiella and Enoosupukia, we 
identified elders from the Maasai and Kikuyu communities who helped us to identify 
village boundaries and specific landmarks as well as infrastructure such as earth 
roads, water points, churches, schools, and the former conflict zone of Enoosupukia, 
among others. Here, village boundaries are not officially marked, but are known to 
the elders and to the majority of villagers. Sub-villages within the main villages of 
study were considered when choosing informants.  
 
Choosing informants  
The cross-border study was necessary primarily for the purposes of accounting for 
cross-group and in-group dynamics within an inclusive sample. Except for Nkampani 
village, which is dominated by Keekonyokie Maasai, Maiella trading centre and 
Kokoti villages house a large number of members of the Kikuyu community. Mpeuti, 
Olosho lole Kaloi, and Ol tepesi le Parsimei villages feature a mixture of Maasai 
(Purko, Damat, Dorobo, and Keekonyokie) as well as Kikuyu and other smaller 
ethnic groups. The former are dominant.  
The three villages of Maiella Sub-location are part of a 16,338 acre piece of land 
which is subdivided into 18 villages with a total population of 9,238, living in 2,137 
households (KPHC, 2009) (see Table 23 appendices). From the census, the three 
villages of interest in Maiella Sub-location have a population of 3,921, living in about 
900 households. About 40% of the households are located in the more peripheral 
villages of Nkampani and Kokoti, while the remaining 60% are in Maiella trading 
centre. Maiella trading centre, which is more of a small town, is further subdivided 
into four sections (Maiella I, Maiella II, Maiella III, and Maiella IV) with roughly 500 
households and a population of about 2,000. For the purposes of this study, the four 
sections of Maiella were combined to form one village, which I refer to as Maiella 
trading centre. 
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A household in the small town of Maiella mainly consists of one family with between 
about two to six persons (children and parents). However, some households have 
only one or two persons, who may not necessarily be related by blood but rather 
through friendship. Such people conveniently share small rental houses as they do 
business or cultivate in Enoosupukia. Households further from the urban areas are 
more defined by “members eating from the same pot”, except in polygynous Maasai 
families where each wife traditionally prepares meals for her family independently.  
Approximately 3,000 people inhabit the three villages in Enoosupukia. While referring 
to the 1999 population census, Scott Matter, a Canadian anthropologist who did 
fieldwork in Enoosupukia in early 2000, noted that Enoosupukia’s population stood at 
approximately 9,000, in about 2,000 households. He found that Dorobo accounted 
for 14% of the Location's population and together with Purko Maasai accounted for 
13% of households, while the Keekonyokie Maasai overwhelmingly represented the 
rest of the Location. However, in the 2009 census, Enoosupukia’s population stood 
at approximately 15,000 in about 3,000 households, accounting for a roughly 60% 
increase within a decade.  
It is not possible to attribute the population growth to an increase in the migrant 
farming population (mainly Kikuyu) alone, since Kenya’s current census data do not 
include ethnic categorisations. However, there is no doubt that the area continues to 
receive an overwhelming number of land-seeking clients, some coming from the 
Lake Naivasha region while others come from as far as Uganda and Tanzania. 
With the help of village elders and research assistants, I developed lists of household 
heads of each village accounting for the variables of sex/gender, ethnicity, age, 
marriage, economic activities, and place of initial origin (to understand mobility) into 
consideration. Some of the lists were exhaustive, depending on specific topics for 
which informants were selected. I then relied on disproportionate stratification to pick 
a sample of roughly 240 households, half from each side of the six villages studied 
for the purpose of a questionnaire survey.  
In a disproportionate stratified random sampling strategy, the sample size of 
each stratum does not have to be proportionate to the population size of the stratum 
(see Bernard, 2006: 155). Based on the large population in the study area, data 
requirements, and differences in dependent variables (age, sex, and ethnicity), 
sampling of this nature was more appropriate, as discussed by Bernard (2006: 187).  
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The key to minimising bias was to begin with two quotas, which guaranteed 
representation of both Maasai and Kikuyu. I then selected four subgroups from each 
village, each consisting of about 10 households, making at least 40 households. This 
means that the three villages of Maiella Sub-location accounted for roughly 120 
households and those of Enoosupukia Location for another 120 households, making 
240 in total. In the villages of Kokoti and Maiella trading centre, which are dominated 
by members of the Kikuyu community, the subgroups were as follows: 
a. Subgroup 1: Male and female elders born in the early 1900s. The majority of 
them were Kikuyu farmers and members of a migrant group which bought 
Maiella Estate, a 16,338-acre piece of land currently known as Ng’ati farm 
(discussed in Chapter 3).  
b. Subgroup 2: Kikuyu tenants (male and female) engaged in leaseholds in the  
villages of Enoosupukia whose landlords are either Dorobo and members of 
other Maasai sections, or manusu, referring to the offspring of 
Maasai/Kikuyu/Dorobo intermarriage;  
c. Subgroup 3:  Kikuyu farmers (male and female) who were evicted from  
Enoosupukia during the 1993 violence; and 
d. Subgroup 4: Kikuyu households or individuals who have married off their 
daughters into Maasai families. This subgroup also featured a few Kikuyu men 
who had married Maasai women and/or manusu.  
For Nkampani village, which houses a large Keekonyokie Maasai population, the 
subgroups were similar to those of Mpeuti, Olosho lole Kaloi, and Ol tesei le Parsimei 
villages in Enoosupukia Location. In each of these villages, four subgroups, each 
consisting of at least 10 households (or more in some cases) were as follows: 
a. Subgroup 1: Male and female elders born before 1950, represented by 
Dorobo, Keekonyokie, Damat, and Purko sections of Maasai as well as 
manusu. 
b. Subgroup 2:  Maasai (including Dorobo) and manusu who lease farmland to 
Kikuyu land-seeking clients from Maiella and beyond. 
c.  Subgroup 3: Maasai households into which Kikuyu women are married (target 
being their husbands).   
d. Subgroup 4: Kikuyu women who are married in Maasai villages. 
The choice of these subgroups was deliberately intended to facilitate the collection of 
oral history data (oral tradition) and biographical accounts to enable a historical 
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contextualisation of intergroup relations and to understand related dynamics across 
time. The subgroups were also chosen to allow a deep understanding of the 1993 
violence and post-violence relations. By sampling tenants and landowners, one is 
able to understand how land rentals or leaseholds are negotiated and organised, and 
the possible disputes involved as well as the dispute resolution processes. This 
sample also focused on those producing cross-cutting ties. In the total sample, a 
representation of sex and age allowed the inclusion of all voices on matters central to 
the study and the communities studied. Table 1 summarises the disproportionate 
stratified random sampling method in the study area. 
 
Table 1. Disproportionate stratified sampling in Maiella and Enoosupukia. 
 
VILLAGE 
 
SUBGROUP 
(10 or more households in each village representing 
males and females) 
 
SAMPLE 
SIZE 
(approx.) 
 
 
Maiella Trading Centre; 
Kokoti 
 
Elders born in the early 1900s. Mostly members of 
Kikuyu Ng’ati farmers. 
 
 
 
80 
Kikuyu farmers renting farmland in Maasai-
dominated villages. 
Kikuyu farmers who were evicted from Enoosupukia 
during the 1993 violence 
Kikuyu households with Maasai in-laws. 
 
 
Nkampani; 
Mpeuti; 
Olosho lole Kaloi 
and 
Ol tepesi le Parsimei 
Elders born in the early 1900s. Mostly Dorobo, 
Keekonyokie, Damat, Purko Maasai as well as 
manusu. 
 
 
 
160 
 
Maasai (including Dorobo) as well as manusu who 
lease land to Kikuyu tenants of Maiella and beyond. 
Maasai households where Kikuyu women are 
married (target being their husbands) 
Kikuyu women married by Maasai men. 
 
In the course of the survey, two categories of groups were added: (1) “new” land 
buyers or “new” inhabitants of both Maiella and Enoosupukia; and (2) “others” 
referring to individuals representing other ethnic groups in the region, including 
Buganda, Kamba, Luhya, Luo, and Kalenjin. After the survey, we collected data from 
informants who were not included in the quantitative sample, but qualified as 
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members of the respective subgroups. The idea behind the survey was to start with a 
manageable sample, which would then act as a guide to the areas of interest for 
more qualitative studies. It particularly enabled us to come up with a list of informants 
for extended studies on selected topics like land rentals, land disputes, and 
intermarriage (see extended cases in Chapter 9).  
 
Data collection: qualitative and quantitative approaches 
For the purposes of a household survey, I developed two questionnaires. The first 
questionnaire had six main parts, most of which required explanations rather than 
simple yes/no answers. The six parts included: (1) household general information; (2) 
demographics and biographical data; (3) household assets and livelihoods; (4) the 
1993 violence; (5) interpersonal and intercommunity relations in the post-conflict 
period; and (6) the social-economic benefits realised through coexistence.  
The second was an ego-centred network questionnaire, which contained a set of 16 
questions requiring the informants (egos) to generate names of alteri with whom they 
associate closely. I contextualised the 12 name-generating questions used by 
Schweizer, Schnegg, and Berzborn (1998: 4) within the socio-economic context of 
the study area, and added another four questions suited for the study (see Table 24 
appendices). 
However, the ego-centred survey did not yield as many results as anticipated. In 
most cases we were unable to contact the alteri mentioned by egos, thus 
compromising a comprehensive investigation of reliable links and networks that 
stretch beyond them. Usually, such alteri turned out to live outside the study area, 
some being in-laws, relatives, and friends in Kiambu, Narok, and Maasai Mara, to 
mention a few.  
The survey helped my assistants and me to increase our presence in the study 
villages. During and after the survey, I made contact with key informants for 
extended studies. This was necessary to arrange for frequent visits in order to 
facilitate in-depth interviews. Extended studies, as presented in this thesis, cover a 
variety of topics including trade and dispute resolution (chapters 6, 7, and 9).  
Other key informants included specific government officials like members of the 
Narok land office, who were involved in land subdivision in the study area in the 
1970s and 1980s. Currently, these officers receive and file cases relating to land 
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disputes, subdivision of land (e.g. for inheritance), and purchase of land (these are 
commonly known as objection cases). They also bear witness in courts in cases 
relating to land ownership or boundary disputes where necessary.  
The Locations’ heads of peace committees, chiefs and their assistants, and elders 
who work closely with chiefs were also among the key informants. Religious leaders, 
youth, and women leaders were also key informants in this study. The 
aforementioned government officials told us how they link community-driven means 
of resolving conflicts and disputes to the formal state system. They also informed us 
about how they collaborate with one another and with their elders, youths, and 
members of the community to control raiding and possible cross-border crimes.  
Members of World Vision, which runs projects on children’s education and advocacy 
for Alternative Rites of Passage (ARP) against Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) 
were among the expert interviewees. Expert interviews also included members of the 
Association of Media Women in Kenya (AMWIK), an NGO that was directly involved 
in preaching coexistence and advocating for unity between Maasai and Kikuyu after 
the 1993 violence. AMWIK’s project timeline ended in the first half of 2013. AMWIK 
informed the study about its role in peacebuilding, and provided numerous 
magazines containing information on relevant achievements.  
Towards the end of 2014, we embarked on focus group discussions with local peace 
committees, Nyumba Kumi committees, women and youth groups, and members of 
the business community to enrich data on conflict resolution and trade relations. 
Although dispute settlement is largely a private matter in this area, I was lucky to be 
admitted into a few of these conclaves. The most important were private discussions 
with local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi committees where I was not allowed 
to share their work-related “secrets” with the public. My assistants were not admitted 
in such conclaves, because the discussions there were often sensitive.  
Initially, my curiosity was drawn to disputes surrounding land and the processes of 
settlement. I spent much time studying herder-farmer disputes, boundary disputes, 
and disputes relating to the rights of tenants, among others. However, I progressively 
widened my scope to explore all issues that are linked to peace and security, when it 
became evident that many more forms of dispute existed: marital and inheritance 
disputes, trade-related disputes, the crime of abusive language or slander, and 
occasional fights, among others.  
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The majority of these disputes and conflicts are directly related to land and economic 
activities. The studied disputes mainly involve Maasai/Kikuyu, Maasai/Maasai, and 
Kikuyu/Kikuyu. Table 25 (appendices) presents a summary of close to hundred 
disputes studied in the course of fieldwork. The list of disputes in the studied area 
cannot be exhausted in this study. Indeed, I chose to focus only on particular 
scenarios of interest, often looking at how actors pacify situations that could easily 
arouse conflict or violence, as opposed to focusing on the majority of minor disputes.  
Secondary data sources like publications, online journals, newspapers, government 
documents, civil society documents, and magazines also informed this study. I 
conducted archival research in Oxford University’s Rhodes House and Weston 
library in August 2014 and January 2015. I also visited the London National Archive 
at Kew Gardens to study land transfer files (commonly known as FCO-141 files). 
Oxford was more useful, however. I also conducted similar studies in the Kenya 
National Archives in Nairobi. Additionally, I enrolled with the British Institute in East 
Africa library, which also stores books on Kenya’s history and intercommunity 
relationships over the last two centuries. Chapter 3 builds specifically on archival 
sources.  
The maps used in this dissertation were developed with the assistance of a 
cartographer based at the University of Cologne, as well as a GIS specialist from the 
Survey of Kenya with whom I mapped the study area. The maps include information 
gathered from Kenya’s Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), 
Bureau of Statistics, and the Survey of Kenya. 
 
Methodological limitations 
This study could be criticised for failing to broaden its scope to cover other 
communities in similar or different social and geographical contexts. Enoosupukia, 
just like Maiella, is also diverse not only geographically but also in terms of its 
inhabitants and their activities. Indeed, the Maasai I discuss here are those mostly 
connected to the urban area, whose way of life has progressively transformed in line 
with the urban lifestyle and the market economy. That said, a comparative approach 
could have changed or developed the results (see the strengths and limitations of 
comparative research in Mills, Bunt, and Bruijin, 2006). However, studying groups in 
a particular setting over time (typical for ethnographic research) enables a researcher 
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to capture and understand social systems more holistically and in an in-depth 
manner.  
On the balance between qualitative and quantitative research, Creswell (2003) 
reminds us that the situation today is less a question of quantitative “versus” 
qualitative, and more about how research practices lie somewhere on a continuum 
between the two, because studies tend to be either more quantitative or more 
qualitative in nature.  
In summary, and building on the strengths of this study (see introduction), the 
findings aim to draw the attention of researchers towards comprehensive analyses of 
situations defined by conflict and coexistence. Indeed, there is need to go beyond the 
disputes and conflicts themselves, to the processes involved in achieving and 
enforcing settlements, and to analyse post-conflict situations.  
 
 
Photograph  2. Trucks that ferry food produce from Enoosupukia and Maiella   
                         (source: field data, 2014).  
 
 
Photograph  3. Maasai herder moving sheep from the intensively cultivated  
                        Enosupukia area (source: field data, 2014). 
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CHAPTER 3: People and Land: Maasai, Kikuyu, and 
Dorobo 
 
This chapter aims to answer one question raised in the introduction: What is the link 
between land, politics, and violent conflicts in the history of the agro-pastoral 
landscape of Maiella and Enoosupukia? The chapter has two main sections. The first 
section contextualises the history of migration, settlement, and interactions between 
Maasai, Kikuyu, and Dorobo in the Maasai southern reserve in the early twentieth 
century. Intercommunity relationships mainly circled around rights to land and 
settlement. Each group is tackled independently in an attempt to highlight its unique 
position in relation to others and to the land question. The social situation discussed 
involves conflicts and coexistence, where the latter takes precedence.  
The next section links the colonial history of the area to the post-colonial situation. 
For the colonial era (from the1890s to around 1960), the discussion tells a story of 
indigenous adaption to social-ecological environments through networks of 
relationships among native groups, despite colonial anti-migration policies. In the 
post-colonial period (after 1963), the clamour for access rights and control of 
agricultural frontiers, was met with politicisation of land and ethnic categories, which 
damaged existing relationships between Maasai and Kikuyu, leading to the violence 
of 1993, which also spread to other parts of the Rift Valley.  
Despite the violence, Maa-speakers and their Kikuyu neighbours continued to 
nurture new ties and to protect existing ones, thereby echoing historical patterns 
when disturbances and disruptions caused by violence were part of the social order. 
The “resilience” of such alliances testifies to a form of historical continuity in 
intergroup relationships where adaptation involves inclusion and exclusion, conflicts 
and alliances. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the violence to explore local 
efforts aimed at reinstating peaceful relations, and to examine what this means for 
the future of the studied groups.   
Conflicts between these groups over resources affect their coexistence immensely, 
but also become a platform through which systems of peace and nonviolence are 
created, anchoring on networks of relationships, negotiations, compromise, and 
peaceful resolution of possible conflicts. This chapter sets the stage for later 
discussion of the value of cross-cutting ties and institutions in peaceful coexistence 
and nonviolent resolution of conflicts in Maiella and Enoosupukia. 
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Maasai southern reserve: migration, settlement, and 
agricultural colonization 
In this section, migration, settlement, and interactions between Maasai herders, 
Kikuyu farmers, and Dorobo hunter-gatherers19 on a portion of the Maasai southern 
reserve during the colonial period are discussed. The discussion benefitted from 
archival sources: annual reports covering areas of Narok and Nakuru districts, as 
well as political, administrative, economic, and social welfare record books of the 
Maasai southern reserve. These materials cover the period between 1900 and 1960. 
Much of this information is stored in microfilms at Rhodes House library and Weston 
library in Oxford University20. The discussion also features oral history accounts and 
secondary sources that corroborate archival data.  
It is important to keep in mind that migration of Kikuyu and Maasai groups to the 
southern reserve was mainly a response to the expansion of “White Highlands”, 
marginalisation, and acute pressure upon land and people in Kenya around the 
1900s. Drawing on archival and oral data, scholars have described the forced 
transfer of populations by the British administration in Kenya in the effort to create 
commercial farms (Anderson, 2005; Hughes, 2006; Sorrenson 1968). Anderson 
(2005:21) notes, “White farms absorbed large chunks of land in Kiambu, Nyeri, and 
Murang’a (central Kenya), as well as areas further north, around Nanyuki and great 
tracts of land in the Rift Valley, and far west on the plateau beyond, such as Laikipia” 
(see Figure 1). British land policies including the Crown Land Ordinance (of the early 
1900s), notes Anderson, aggravated the situation.  
The process of expropriation, selling, leasing, and/or bestowing native land upon 
European commercial farmers forced thousands of Kikuyu (and other native groups) 
into tenancy labour on the white farms; many more were thrown into more intensive 
competition for cultivation rights in the reserves while others migrated from 
                                                          
19 I do not use farming, pastoralism, and hunting (or gathering) to define ethnic categories. These 
groups practice a wide range of livelihoods (including off-farm strategies). Agro-pastoralism 
represents the dominant economy for the communities. The Dorobo are treated in the much of this 
chapter as an entity, and as separate from Maasai. However, I take notice of the fact that Dorobo are 
not one group and that they progressively abandoned their hunting and gathering tendencies to 
become (agro-) pastoralists, adopted Maasai culture, and became a section of the Maasai. Elsewhere 
in the dissertation, the term “Maasai” or “Maa-speakers” is used in reference to all sections of the 
Maasai in the studied area: Keekonyokie, Purko, Damat, as well as Dorobo.  
20 Towards the end of 2014, the archives in Rhodes House library were moved to Weston Library, 
which is part of the Bodleian libraries of Oxford University. I did much of my archival work at the 
Rhodes House library. Hence, I refer Rhodes House as the source of these archives.  
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European-controlled areas (Anderson, 2005). The promise of land and the possibility 
of acquiring livestock and capital encouraged many Kikuyu squatters on European 
farms and migrants from central Kenya to establish links with Dorobo hunters and 
Maasai pastoralists in the Rift Valley. 
The main argument in this section is that interactions between Maasai, Dorobo, and 
Kikuyu groups accounted for friendly and strategic social-cultural relations necessary 
for fusion and exchange. Friendly relationships necessitated accumulation of 
agricultural land by Kikuyu farmers from Maa-speaking communities despite 
restrictions from the colonial administration, which prohibited migration and 
settlement of Kikuyu farmers on the Maasai southern reserve.  
An attempt is made in this section to connect these historical relationships to the 
contemporary situation. However, this past-present connection becomes clear as we 
proceed to later chapters, which tackle specific relations (in the form of cross-cutting 
ties) in detail. First, I will describe the removal of Northern Maasai from Laikipia to the 
southern reserve, albeit briefly. Thereafter, I will shift focus to the situation of Kikuyu 
in the reserve. Kikuyu success in the agricultural colonisation of Maasai landscapes 
benefitted from the instrumental githaka system of control of land (described later in 
this chapter). Most studies attending to the githaka system tend to describe it as a 
“thing” of the past, referring to its firm presence in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. In this study, I will show the continuity of this system of control of land to 
date, albeit with some changes. Githaka emerges as a powerful tool for appropriation 
of resources as Kikuyu expand their frontiers in Maasailand. Finally, I will briefly 
describe the Dorobo as discussed in the anthropological literature, their role in land 
transfers to “newcomers”, especially in Enoosupukia, and the social-economic 
changes witnessed in the community today.  
A thorough description of these groups under the colonial administration, and 
particularly the topic of appropriation of their “ancestral” lands, is beyond the scope of 
this study. A fairly brief sketch of the situation is included, however, in order to inform 
the background of this thesis, particularly focusing on the move to the southern 
reserve (in 1911), more than on the earlier move of sections of Maasai to Laikipia 
(around 1904 - 1905)21. Tackling these three groups simultaneously to portray their 
relations with the colonial state, with one another, and to land matters risks 
                                                          
21 For more on the two moves see Hughes (2006a; Chapter 2).  
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overlooking important historical details that could enrich the story. It is only fair to 
take responsibility for such shortcomings.     
 
Removal of the northern Maasai from Laikipia 
Thorough research has already been done on this topic (Hughes, 2006a; Tignor, 
1976; Anderson, 2005; Sorrenson, 1968). In exchange for Laikipia, the colonial 
administration moved the northern Maasai to a portion of the southern reserve, the 
area across Mara River. In July 1908, Mr. H.R. McClure, then Assistant District 
Commissioner, undertook a lengthy tour through what he described as “little known” 
and “uninhabited” districts of Loita and Osero to assess their suitability for the 
northern Maasai22.  
According to the 1911 annual report of the southern reserve, similar tours and 
“consultations” between British officials23, representatives of native groups from the 
north and south including Lenana (Olonana), Masikonde, and Ole Gilisho24 and their 
elders, as well as Uasin Gishu Maasai farmers,25  followed between September 1908 
and September 1910.  
At the time, the Maasai southern reserve proper – the Districts of Loita, Osero, and 
Engatett – were already occupied by Purko and Loita Maasai in large numbers, as 
well as by groups of Kaputiei, Sigirari, Matapato, Lo’ Dogolani and Kak-o-Nyuki 
(Keekonyokie)26. Keekonyokie were resident at Naivasha27, interacting and 
exchanging with Dorobo hunter-gatherers and some sections of Maasai and with 
members of the Kikuyu community. Various sources point to the fact that the majority 
of members of Kikuyu descent had progressively left the overpopulated ancestral 
                                                          
22 Rhodes House, Oxford/MSS.Afr.S.1409. Copy of Southern Masai [sic] Reserve District Political 
Record Book. From the Commencement to the 31st December 1911. H.R. McClure, Ass. District 
Commissioner. 
23 Including H.R.McClure, Mr. Bagge (Provincial Commissioner, Naivasha) as well as His Excellency 
Sir James Hayes Sadler. 
24 The British anglicised his name as Legilishu; his full names was Parsaloi ole Gelisho (Hughes, 
2006: 6). 
25 Farmers at Uaso Nyiro, which formed part of the proposed area, were to be compensated by the 
colonial administration for their portion of land (Rhodes House, Oxford/MSS.Afr.S.1409. Copy of 
Southern Masai [sic] Reserve District Political Record Book. From the Commencement to the 31st 
December 1911. H.R. McClure, Ass. District Commissioner). 
26 Also spelled as Kakonyukye/ Il Keekonyokie. 
27Rhodes House, Oxford/MSS.Afr.S.1409. Copy of Southern Masai [sic] Reserve District Political 
Record Book. From the Commencement to the 31st December 1911. H.R. McClure, Ass. District 
Commissioner. 
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highlands of Central Province (Kikuyu Land Unit), most of which had been settled by 
commercial farmers28.  
Archival sources note that the representatives of Northern Maasai who toured the 
part of the southern reserve in September 1910, together with administration officials, 
declared themselves in favour of the move and signed a treaty to that effect, except 
for chief Ole Gilisho and some northern Maasai, who were opposed to the move29. 
However, an alliance of British officials and Maasai chiefs who are thought to have 
already sympathised with the colonial administration successfully “persuaded” these 
factions to support the move. This led to the drawing up of a fresh treaty in April 
1911, which Ole Gilisho and all representatives of northern Maasai signed and was 
sanctioned by the Secretary of State (see Hughes 2006 for criticisms of the alleged 
agreements).  
The exodus of Northern Maasai with thousands of livestock from Laikipia began on 
2nd June 1911 along four routes leading over the Mau. Unsubstantiated colonial 
reports give the impression that the “journey was successful despite a period of rains 
and cold on the Mau in August 1911, which left some stocks dead and claimed some 
Maasai lives30”. Hence, Laikipia became Crown Land, and the colonial administration 
subsequently leased farms to ranchers31. 
Hughes (2006a) notes, “the administration moved Maasai at gun point and, ironically, 
they paid for their own removal through revenue”. A group of Maasai led by Ole 
Gilisho hired Mombasa-based British lawyers, who took the colonial administration to 
the High Court in 1913 to contest the controversial treaties/agreements – they lost on 
a technicality, went to appeal, and lost again (see Hughes, 2006a for accounts of 
resistance and Maasai land claims). The Maasai, notes Hughes, were unable to 
                                                          
28 Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S.17/. Preparation of Development Plans for the Colony of Kenya. 
Report of the Sub-Committee on Social Welfare, Information and Mass Education. January 1946: In 
/R.H.O 753. 14. R. 6/. Kenya Blue Books and Pamphlets. Economic and Social Affairs. 1943-51. 
29 Rhodes House, Oxford/MSS.Afr.S.1409. Copy of Southern Masai [sic] Reserve District Political 
Record Book. From the Commencement to the 31st December 1911. H.R. McClure, Ass. District 
Commissioner. See details of resistance to the move in Tignor, 1976: 84-85; Hughes, 2006a. 
30 Rhodes House, Oxford/MSS.Afr.S.1409. Copy of Southern Masai [sic] Reserve District Political 
Record Book. From the Commencement to the 31st December 1911. E.C. Crewe Read, A.D.C, 
Ngong Bagas. Report on 11th October 1911. Clearly, archival sources seem to downplay the 
conditions on the Mau. However, Hughes (2006a: 50-55) gives some evidence of deaths and suffering 
experienced by Maasai and their livestock and the consequent exchanges in administrative circles. In 
Chapter 3, she investigates the truth behind the deaths.  
31 National Archive, Kew Gardens, London. FCO 141/18979. Purchase of farms and other properties. 
Letter written by R.V. Bowles of Gendin Farm Ltd, Nakuru to J.D.B Shaw dated April 17th, 1966.  
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provide facts in court to support their claims that people and livestock died during the 
move, particularly over the Mau.  
What became of northern Maasai on arrival at the southern reserve? What happened 
when the British gave northern Maasai exclusive rights of ownership of the southern 
reserve, which other groups occupied or claimed?  
Personal archives32 of Simon Ngayami in Enoosupukia indicate that Ole Kool’s family 
was the first Maasai family to arrive in Enoosupukia from Laikipia. The family left 
Laikipia through Nanyuki, Aberdare forest (route) to Kinangop (now known as 
Nyandarua) best known to Maasai as Kinopop. Due to the cold climate in the area 
surrounding the Aberdare forest they moved towards Nakuru, settling in Gilgil, and 
then moved to Naivasha’s south lake area at around 1908. 
Due to grazing conflicts between Ole Kool and white settlers who wanted to take 
control of the Naivasha farming belt, Ole Kool found his way to Enoosupukia, where 
he was welcomed and given land by Dorobo hunters. Later on, other Maasai families 
(patriarchal households with livestock) joined him, including Ole Risanjo, Ole Sakara, 
Ole Karia, Ole Nchoko, Ole Nabaala, Ole Morijoi, Ole Nkaru, and Ole Kitaika, among 
others, who also found refuge among the Dorobo33. For the Dorobo, “land was 
plenty”, and their generosity was a means of expanding their social circle, perhaps a 
form of insurance against possible hardships in the future. Although Dorobo had 
specific indigenous ways of showing claim to land (see page 76), sharing resources 
was an important means of accumulating symbolic capital, perhaps with perpetual 
expectations of gifts as in bride wealth payments.  
However, resettlement of Northern Maasai by colonial officials in the proposed 
reserve meant transfer of exclusive rights of tenure. Lord Lansdowne emphasised 
the fact that the definite acceptance of the policy of native reserves implied an 
absolute guarantee that the natives would, so long as they desired it, remain in 
undisputed and exclusive possession of the acres set aside for their use (Hughes, 
2006a: 34). These exclusive rights became a contentious issue soon after the move. 
                                                          
32 Simon Ngayani is a Dorobo who previously worked in the chief’s office in Enoosupukia. He is also 
involved in the fight for Dorobo rights to land. Currently, Simon works with the Green Belt Movement 
to restore Enoosupukia forest and has assisted researchers from Canada, Europe, and Kenya on the 
Dorobo land question. At his home in Sintakara village in Enoosupukia, Simon has a collection of 
documents, letters, and reports, most of which relate to autochthony with respect to Dorobo rights to 
land as well as the process of privatisation of communally owned lands in Enoosupukia from the late 
1970s.   
33 Letter to Amos Kimunya, Minister for Lands and Housing, “Appeal against the brutal eviction from 
Enoosupukia” (Simon Ngayami personal archives).  
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The area that became the southern reserve was not unoccupied or unused, as the 
colonial officials were fond of emphasising. Evidence shows that other groups either 
settled on or claimed some if not most of the acres promised to the Maasai. The 
Dorobo, Purko, Loita, and some smaller sections of Maasai as well as Kikuyu 
occupied some 4,095 square miles (~2,700,000 acres) of the area proposed to be 
ceded to northern Maasai34. Purko, Loita, Matapato and other sections of southern 
Maasai often used the colder areas of Mau, which were inhabited by Dorobo, as 
refuge for dry-season grazing35. 
According to Thomson (1887:177), “members of the Kikuyu community were also 
resident at Naivasha prior to the coming of northern Maasai”. Thomson also notes 
that “they bordered the Maasai country in an area forty miles in breadth from 
Ngongo-a-Bagas (Ngongo) to the point of the plateau overlooking Naivasha at 
Kidong Valley (at the waters of Guaso Kedong) [Figure 4], and in a length of about 
seventy miles ending on the southern side of Mount Kenya”. Additionally, Kikuyu 
subsequently occupied areas from Ngong Hills to Athi River Station, and thence 
along the Railway Line to Simba Station36, carving themselves niches along the 
edges of and within the southern reserve. Thomson (1887: 188-192) reports their 
presence in the reserve in 188337.  
From these strategic points, and following the occupation of the central highlands of 
Kenya by settlers, the Kikuyu continued to push their frontier westwards from Nairobi 
through Limuru to Naivasha and into Enoosupukia and some parts of Narok. 
For instance, at Olosho lole Kaloi village, Ole Kaloi, a Maasai elder, shared his vivid 
recollection of how members of Kikuyu descent began to arrive at the study area at 
least prior to 1900. His father, just like the Dorobo, gave land free of charge to 
members of Kikuyu descent who sought refuge in Enoosupukia away from the 
European-controlled Central Province. He too eventually gave land free of charge to 
similar destitute persons, most of whom were targeted by the colonial regime or 
                                                          
34 Rhodes House, Oxford/MSS.Afr.S.1409. Copy of Southern Masai [sic] Reserve District Political 
Record Book. From the Commencement to the 31st December 1911. H.R. McClure. Ass. District 
Commissioner. 
35 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Maasai District Annual Report/1933. 
36 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Maasai District Annual Report/1931-32/District 
Commissioner. 
37 See further, Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Maasai District Annual Report/1929/District 
Commissioner. 
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feared for their lives following the 1952 Emergency (Mau Mau movement). He 
recalled: 
Olosho lole Kaloi and Olalabwak [Figure 6] were covered with forests. Inside 
the forests lived wildlife like Lions, which ate our livestock. When Kikuyu came 
to request for settlement and land to cultivate, we gave them land in the 
forested areas so that they could assist us in clearing it because we wanted to 
chase the wildlife away from our manyattas38.  
 
The Dorobo, though having inhabited the eastern part of Mau prior to the great 
pastoralist migration from Laikipia39  became “visible” to the administration long after 
northern Maasai had settled on the reserve, as discussed below.  
Therefore, several if not all parts of the southern reserve were already claimed 
and/or used by other groups. Consequently, the arrival of northern Maasai with 
thousands of stock set the stage for competing claims over portions of the reserve 
between herders, hunters, and cultivators, particularly from the 1920s. Recurrent 
conflicts between Maasai herders and Kikuyu farmers (and sometimes European 
farmers) over stock theft and grazing rights intensified, particularly during drought 
periods when Maasai moved their herds into farmers’ fields (Campbell, 1993: 261).  
Hughes (2006b; 2007) explains why these conflicts were inevitable by showing the 
problems that met northern Maasai on the southern reserve. She notes:   
The southern reserve, to which thousands of Maasai were forcibly moved from 
the Rift Valley and Laikipia, was an inferior substitute for their former northern 
territory. Its western extension, which was created in 1911-12 to 
accommodate Maasai migrants from Laikipia, lacked sufficient permanent 
water sources, accessible forests, and drought refuges. Overgrazing and 
overstocking were a direct result of increased confinement, overcrowding in 
certain areas, curtailment of seasonal migration, a permanent state of 
quarantine and early restrictions on cattle trading.  
 
Kikuyu in the Maasai southern reserve: expansion through githaka 
“We did not mind when poor Kikuyu came and worked for us and got food in time 
of famine, but now they come with families and herds of stock…” 
(Waller, 1993: 237 quoting a Maasai informant). 
 
Members of the Kikuyu community had close relations with Maasai herders of the 
southern reserve proper and with Dorobo hunter-gatherers before the great migration 
                                                          
38 In the Kikuyu society, being the first to clear a forest and to create farmland is itself a traditional 
claim of ownership of that land. Nowadays, however, “new” property rights arrangements (such as 
leasehold tenure) have replaced such traditional ownership rights.  
39 Interview with Dorobo elders at Mpeuti village, Enooosupukia. 13.04.2014. 
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of northern Maasai from Laikipia (see further, Waller, 1993: 228). In his 1883 
expedition, Thomson argues that it was commonplace for Maasai and Kikuyu women 
to move freely to each other’s villages and manyattas, engaging in informal 
exchange of grain (from the latter) and hides (from the former) irrespective of 
constant feuds between the two groups (Thomson, 1887: 177-78). Kaputie Maasai 
were in great numbers some distance east of Ngongo and, together with other 
Maasai sections, periodically accessed the open ranches between the forests 
through Kikuyu settlements for grazing (Thomson, 1887: 179). This search for 
grazing spaces evoked occasional feuds between Kikuyu and their Maasai 
neighbours. 
Archival sources show that interactions and exchanges between Kikuyu and Dorobo 
extend deep into known history and particularly in central Kenya40. Based on a 
study41 aimed at unravelling the origin, meaning, and principles of githaka (Kikuyu 
traditional land tenure system) by G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan, and L.S.B. Leakey, who 
were appointed by the Governor, Kikuyu chiefs, elders, and all githaka owners in 
Kiambu, described how they acquired land from the Dorobo hunters and beekeepers 
before the arrival of the British42.  
In the following few paragraphs, I explore the history of the githaka system of tenure 
in order to explain its origin and principles and how the Kikuyu used it from the 1960s 
onwards as a strategy to appropriate agricultural frontiers that were formerly 
dedicated to livestock grazing by Maasai herders and used as hunting grounds by 
the Dorobo. Through recreation of githaka, the Kikuyu also managed to purchase 
some ranches previously owned by British settlers who showed indications of 
                                                          
40 According to headmen in Embu, the Wandorobo were a hunting people who used to visit the area 
on hunting expeditions before the arrival of Europeans; they came from the north and disappeared to 
the south (Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S/4/1929/Embu, p. 22/Kiambu, appendix, p. 48/. Native 
Land Tenure in the Kikuyu Province. Report of Committee. G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan and L.S.B. 
Leakey. November 1929. 
41 Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S/4/1929/Embu, p. 22/Kiambu, appendix, p. 48/. Native Land Tenure 
in the Kikuyu Province. Report of Committee. G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan and L.S.B. Leakey. 
November 1929. 
42 The history of occupation of Kiambu and Central Kenya by the Kikuyu is not clarified. Archival 
sources, however, note that they did not come in en masse in one historical event, but possibly, 
entering the Kikuyu Province from the east, they found a country which was then practically all forest, 
generally uninhabited, or only very sparsely inhabited by hunting tribes. And for several generations 
before the Protectorate was declared, they still were pushing their frontiers further into these and other 
forest hunting grounds (Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S/4/1929/Kiambu, p. 6/. Native Land Tenure in 
the Kikuyu Province. Report of Committee G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan and L.S.B. Leakey. November 
1929). 
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returning home when Kenya attained independence. The discussion draws from the 
mentioned study43 and additional sources that corroborate it.  
 
Githaka (plural ithaka) is understood as a system of control of land characterised by 
immigration and the subsequent pattern of settlement with reference to genealogies 
of Kikuyu mbari (patriarchal kinship groups) (Sorrenson, 1968; Muriuki, 1974; Beech, 
1917). The githaka system in its integrity is simply the methods of clan and 
patriarchal control expressing themselves in relation to land44.  
 
Githaka: origin 
Although there are obvious grounds to question the authenticity of archival sources, 
other secondary sources point to the possibility that Dorobo hunter-gatherers may 
have occupied some parts of central Kenya that are commonly referred to as Kikuyu 
heartlands at least before 190045. Mervyn Beech speculates that the Kikuyu 
emigrated from areas of Mt. Kenya (Figure 1) to this locality at least some hundred 
years ago (Beech, 1917). Sorrenson (1968), who illustrates the spread of Kikuyu 
from the Mt. Kenya area to Nairobi and further west towards Naivasha, echoes her 
views.  
According to the study on Kikuyu land tenure46, Kikuyu who interacted with Dorobo 
hunter-gatherers in Kiambu subsequently approached the Dorobo with the intention 
to buy their land for cultivation. However, at first, the Dorobo objected on the ground 
that the cutting of forest for cultivation would spoil their honey supply and drive the 
game away from the game paths and traps. Ultimately, the Dorobo asked the Kikuyu 
to pay for the land, which they agreed to do. 
Every Kikuyu who bought land ceremoniously adopted a Dorobo as a token of good 
faith and out of respect of rights of first ownership. An oath of adoption bound the 
                                                          
43 Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S/4/1929/Embu, p. 22/Kiambu, appendix, p. 48/. Native Land Tenure 
in the Kikuyu Province. Report of Committee. G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan and L.S.B. Leakey. 
44 Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S/4/1929/Kiambu/Native Land Tenure in the Kikuyu Province. 
Report of Committee G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan and L.S.B. Leakey. November 1929. 
45 There is little evidence to show where the Dorobo originated and how they came to assert their 
rights to the forests in these areas. 
46 Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S/4/1929/Kiambu/Native Land Tenure in the Kikuyu Province. 
Report of Committee G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan and L.S.B. Leakey. November 1929. In Kiambu, the 
committee interviewed 16 chiefs (among them Koinange, Wahuriu, Muhoho, and Waweru), 14 Native 
Council Members and all githaka owners and Kiama (local council) elders in Kiambu district. They 
considered the land tenure system here to be the most elaborate. 
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Kikuyu to be a protector of the Dorobo. After negotiations over the price, which might 
be between dozens and hundreds of stock47, there was a ceremony of marking out 
the boundaries, where a ram known in the Kikuyu language as durume ya mgwatura 
(the ram for dividing) was supplied by the purchaser and slaughtered, and then the 
tatha (contents of the intestines) were taken for the ceremony of marking out. The 
Dorobo led the way, pointing out his marks on trees or holes in the ground, which 
marked his hunting area off from that of other Dorobo. Four to five Kikuyu elders, 
who painted lilies and other marks along the boundary, accompanied by a Dorobo 
witness, followed him.  
When the boundary had been marked, they would all sit down and the Dorobo would 
claim a few things, among them a branding iron used for making honey-barrels – an 
indication that he was going to move his honey barrels – and a young ewe, which 
had not yet borne a lamb. The ewe was called mwati wa njegeni (the ewe of the 
stinging nettle) and was meant to compensate the Dorobo for the stings sustained in 
marking out the boundary. The ewe and the ram sealed the contract. They also 
made the contract binding by putting a curse on anyone who broke it.  
The Dorobo did not necessarily sell his whole area. He usually reserved a part, which 
he might sell separately subsequently. The Kikuyu usually bought a part, and bought 
more as he could afford it. As Kikuyu felled trees to cultivate, the game animals 
retreated further into the forest, and the piece of land between the recesses of the 
forest and the part sold became game-less, and hence valueless to the Dorobo 
owner, so he would be more willing to sell that portion48. However, to prevent other 
Kikuyu from buying the land, a buyer would get his relations to help with the 
purchase price. Occasionally, the Dorobo who sold land stayed on it and was given a 
Kikuyu wife. Sometimes he accepted a Kikuyu girl instead of stock in payment for 
land, in which case he had to stay.  
The buyer of land became the founder of a mbari (clan) and was considered the 
trustee of the land (muramati). Land bought in such a way was held by the mbari. As 
the mbari expanded, the eldest sons of the various wives founded sub-mbari and 
                                                          
47 Mervlyn Beech gives accounts of purchase of large chunks of land by Kikuyu from Dorobo in the 
Kikuyu district. For instance, a Kikuyu named Munene bought 9,000 acres of land from three Dorobo 
(Marishoga, Rurete, and Ithiri) at a price of 1,000 oxen, some sheep, and goats.  
48 Communication from Mr. Northcote, the District Commissioner of Kiambu, to Mervyn Beech, “Kikuyu 
System of Land Tenure”. Oral accounts at Olosho lole Kaloi (described earlier in this chapter) 
corroborate these land exchanges.  
77 
 
subsequently divided the original holdings accordingly49. Ultimately, the land of a 
sub-mbari was divided into individual holdings – according to the first-born son of 
each wife, who then held the land for himself and his brothers. Such land could only 
be sold (usually within the mbari) with the consent of all brothers concerned, and that 
of the mbari. If sold to someone outside the mbari, boundaries were ceremonially 
marked as for a new githaka, but unlike with the Dorobo, there would be no adoption. 
Apart from members of the mbari, other persons who could negotiate for cultivation 
and settlement rights on a githaka included ahoi (tenants), athoni (in-laws), and 
aciriarua (adoptees), all of whom were subject to certain restrictions.  
A muhoi (plural ahoi) negotiated rights on a githaka out of need, or if one wanted to 
stay near a friend. Usually, requests for such rights were preceded by the 
presentation of gifts (like beer) to a landowner (muramati), who then sought 
permission from mbari elders on behalf of the muhoi. A muhoi would only settle on a 
githaka subject to separate arrangements with the landowner and approval by clan 
elders following a ceremony where the muhoi supplied a ram called ndurume ya 
thama (the ram for moving house) and another called ndurume ya gutukania mburi 
(the ram for mingling the flocks). Members of the mbari owning the land, and any 
other ahoi already resident on the land, would feast on both rams. The concerned 
muhoi would then receive permission to build his village on a site allotted to him, 
thereby becoming a muthami (a resident muhoi).  
A muhoi had no voice in the management of any part of the githaka or in any affairs 
of the mbari, and could not bring tenants or other persons onto the land. Clan elders 
reserved the right to evict any muhoi accused of serious misbehaviour, including 
witchcraft and theft. A landowner could also ask ahoi to vacate the land if a member 
of the family needed it, or for some other purpose, the refusal of which amounted to 
misbehaviour and possible eviction. Failure to vacate would be a sign that a muhoi 
was endeavouring to assert property rights, which he did not have. However, children 
of a muhoi would stay on in their father’s place so long as there was room for them, 
subject to exactly the same restrictions as their father. 
                                                          
49 See also A.E. Barlow, Kikuyu Land Tenure and Inheritance, Church of Scotland Mission, Kenya 
Colony. Available online, 
https://archive.org/stream/cbarchive_102086_kikuyulandtenureandinheritence1932/Nos._45-
46_56_1932_Barlow_djvu.txt (Accessed 26.04.2016).  
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Athoni (singular muthoni) include the brothers and unmarried sisters of a husband 
and wife respectively. They too could negotiate for cultivation and settlement rights in 
a githaka. Athoni could be turned out at any time for any serious misbehaviour, but 
not merely on the grounds that the land was wanted. A muthoni could stay on even 
when the woman through whom he was a relation-in-law died. Just like a muhoi, a 
muthoni could bring no one else onto the property.  
Aciriarua (singular muciriarua), usually an indigent young man of another clan who 
requested to be adopted by a rich man as his son, had also to obtain permission 
from the mbari elders. Once ceremonially adopted he took the clan name, completely 
severing his connection with his own clan, and his adopted father gave him gardens 
and bought him a wife. Such an adopted son could be disinherited for serious 
misbehaviour if the elders of the mbari so decided – in which case anything that he 
had was confiscated, except purely private and personal property.   
 
The committee that described the githaka system as shown here concluded that the 
Dorobo were still selling land to Kikuyu in the same way to the north-west of Nairobi 
and on the edge of the Rift Valley (at Kijabe) until the late nineteenth century50. 
Although the Crown Land Ordinance ended this traditional pattern of mbari 
expansion, there is indication that the practice still lived on in the twentieth century 
and persists to date, as discussed later in this chapter. 
Through such friendly relationships, the Kikuyu perfected the art of agricultural 
colonisation not only in Kiambu but also progressively into uncultivated frontiers 
beyond Nairobi. Capt. Lugard reports similar appropriation of uncultivated frontiers by 
the Kikuyu in 1890. He notes, “Kikuyu penetrated, deforested, and cultivated forests 
formerly hunted by Dorobo from Kiambu to Nairobi as well as Dagoretti and Fort 
Smith”51. The trend continued after independence, where Kikuyu progressively 
appropriated frontiers in the Maasai southern reserve (Waller, 1993: 228-30; 
Hornsby, 2012: 249; Klopp, 2001: 137). In the next section, I will show how about 
600 Kikuyu successfully purchased a former settler ranch (Maiella Estate) 
constituting some 16,338 acres by recreating githaka.  
                                                          
50 Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S/4/1929/Kiambu/Native Land Tenure in the Kikuyu Province. Report 
of Committee G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan and L.S.B. Leakey. November 1929. 
51 Rhodes House, Oxford/753.14. S. 40/Kenya Miscellaneous Blue Books on Economics & Finance. 
Report of the Land Settlement Commission. G. A.S. Northcote, District Commissioner, Kiambu. 1919. 
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Acquisition of uncultivated land by Kikuyu was rather simple and nonviolent. Through 
customary negotiations over rights to land and ceremonies, Kikuyu adopted non-
Kikuyu members from whom they purchased land, thereby increasing its legitimacy 
and weight. Therefore, appropriation of resources was imbued with exchanges that 
constituted symbolic capital (see further examples in Toulson, 1976; Sorrenson, 
1968; and Muriuki, 1974).  
Toulson (1976) argues that prior to the transfer of northern Maasai from Laikipia, the 
social order was permeable enough to allow co-operation between “tribal” groups, 
allowing Maasai to take Kikuyu wives, thereby transferring traditions of Maasai to 
Kikuyu (e.g. circumcision methods and acephaly) while land transactions took place 
between Kikuyu and Dorobo. Indeed, the bond between Maasai and Kikuyu was so 
strong that the colonial administration had to move Kikuyu relatives of northern 
Maasai from Laikipia to the southern reserve as well (see Waller, 1993: 231).  
Oral testimonies from a Dorobo elder at Enoosupukia corroborate the peaceful land 
transactions between them and members of Kikuyu community: 
Kikuyu came to this area [Enoosupukia] without any bad intentions. They were 
fleeing from mzungu [white man] who wanted to take them captive in their own 
land. We had to assist them. In those days, land here was plentiful and 
households were very few and scattered in the forest. When Kikuyu asked if 
they could cultivate, we told them to open up as much land as they could 
manage; that land would henceforth belong to them. We assumed that no 
person could have the energy to clear much forest or dig a large plot, 
otherwise they would die! Surprisingly, Kikuyu cleared larger areas than we 
could possibly imagine!. Some of them also cultivated food for “their” Dorobo  
and were given land as payment. In fact, most of us shed tears when we saw 
a tree being cut down and burnt for charcoal.  
(Dorobo elder, Mpeuti village, 12.05.2014). 
 
After the arrival of northern Maasai, district annual reports of the Maasai southern 
reserve from the early 1900s to the 1960s indicate continued immigration by Kikuyu. 
The 1914-1915 annual report of the Maasai district notes that “there was persistent 
influx of Kikuyu into the reserve who quickly married into and/or assimilated the 
customs and habits of the Maasai making it difficult to distinguish those who had 
lived with Maasai for a few years from true Maasai”52. Some examples of such 
customs and habits included the adoption of Maa language, initiation, and some 
                                                          
52 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Maasai District Annual Report/1914-1915/District 
Commissioner. 
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features of the age-grade system (Hinde and Hinde, 1901: 9; Muriuki, 1974: 39-
46/80-86).  
The report notes that such admixture of Kikuyu blood “was among all divisions of 
Maasai particularly the Keekonyokie53 and Il Dala Lekutuk”. Arguably, intermarriage 
and cultural fusion aided in the change of identities (Kikuyu “becoming” Maasai) and 
facilitated easier appropriation of resources on the part of the Kikuyu. Elsewhere in 
the Meru reserve, Timothy Parsons shows similar ways by which Kikuyu “became” 
Meru in the colonial period (Parsons, 2012: 68).  
There is no doubt that interactions between Kikuyu and Maa-speaking groups 
existed before the 1900s. However, it was the colonial state, and especially the loss 
of Kikuyu and Maasai lands to white settlers, which prompted massive movement 
from central Kenya and Laikipia into the south of the Rift Valley. Between 1904 and 
1920 approximately 70,000 people had migrated west from central Kenya owing to 
the lack of grazing there, or due to the loss of land to settlers, while others sought to 
acquire livestock and capital as squatters and labourers on European farms, against 
tax demands from the colonial state (Anderson, 2005: 25). By the 1930s, according 
to Anderson, the Kikuyu squatter community, which left central Kenya numbered 
more than 150,000. 
There is no doubt that Kikuyu migration into what became the Maasai southern 
reserve around 1910 goes back some hundred years, if not more. A similar influx of 
Kikuyu migrants continued during the colonial period despite administrative attempts 
to stop it (discussed below). This trend of migration and the facility to do so were well 
known, but the problem, for colonial officials and some Maa-speakers, was how to 
control such movement. 
 
Controlling Kikuyu immigrants, and the recreation of githaka 
From the early 1920s, the colonial administration kept the southern reserve as a 
“closed” district under the Outlying District Ordinance of 190254 (also Waller, 1993: 
234-235). The official explanation for effecting the policy, as outlined in the 1927-
1928 annual report, was to control the movement and activities of those entering, 
particularly stock traders, and to regulate the movement of cattle, check the spread 
                                                          
53 As noted earlier, Keekonyokie maintained residence at Naivasha before the 1900s. 
54 Which set restrictions on District lands as in the land controlled by the British crown. 
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of disease, and encourage the growth of proper trade centres and markets and for 
payment of taxes55.  
However, native groups held a contrary opinion: that the object of the policy was to 
lock non-Maasai immigrants, popularly known to colonial administrators as “aliens”, 
out of the Province. This argument seems to hold some truth considering the plight of 
land-seeking members of the Kikuyu community whose pursuit of settlement and 
agriculture was severely sanctioned from the 1920s onwards. 
Why was it necessary to control movement and activities of the Kikuyu in the 
reserve?  
First, the administration considered Kikuyu a “menace to peace” in the reserve. Their 
presence within areas bordering European farms and in the reserve was associated 
with increasing cases of cattle theft and instability, seemingly reiterating Thomson’s 
experience at their hands in 1883. Thomson describes the Kikuyu as “murderous and 
thievish” because they “constantly descended on [his] caravan making away with 
whatever they could lay hands on” (Thomson, 1887: 177-187).  
The administration exercised overwhelming authority by collecting and returning 
unauthorised squatters to their reserves, while some were located in gazetted trading 
centres where they could carry on legitimate trade56. Paradoxically, this shows the 
importance attached to non-Maasai traders in the reserve.  
Secondly, the administration blamed Kikuyu for politically influencing Maasai and 
altering what they referred to as “prevalent good attitudes and relations between 
them and the former”. An example of this political influence is given where the 
Maasai opposed a vital Rinderpest vaccination exercise organised by administration 
officials in 1931 to curb the spread of the disease. In the 1931-1932 annual report, 
the District Commissioner notes, “the most active opposition of this crucial 
vaccination came from the Kaputie section, which had already come under influence 
of Kikuyu political agitators”57. This unity of purpose eventually culminated in the 
Emergency of 1952.  
However, the policy to close the district did not last long, as the situation changed 
rather drastically following a devastating drought between 1933 and 1935, whose 
severity had not been witnessed in the history of the reserve. The drought wiped out 
                                                          
55 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1927-1928. 
56 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1923-1924. 
57 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1931-1932. 
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over 40% of livestock in the entire region. It not only reorganised the way of life 
among the groups in question but also changed the administrative ideas to 
seemingly condone Kikuyu presence in the reserve.  
The 1934 annual report describes the intensity of its wrath:  
Conditions of acute drought have again prevailed over the whole district. 
Except in the Trans-Mara area, the result of the past two years has been 
cataclysmal for the Maasai. The average annual rainfall at Narok over the 10 
years from 1923 to 1932 was 31.72 inches, but in 1933 only 11.81 inches and 
in 1934 only 14.99 inches were recorded. In Kajiado less than 20 inches fell in 
the whole 23 months from February 1933 to December 1934. By the middle of 
the year the cattle almost throughout the district were in a starvation condition; 
by the end of the year the countryside was littered with carcasses of dead 
cattle in such numbers that scavenging animals and birds were unable to deal 
with them and they dried in the sun to parchment-covered skeletons. The 
District Commissioner of Kajiado considers the number of deaths of cattle 
from starvation and disease induced by migration into unsuitable areas must 
be at least 100,000 in his district alone. Figures given by the District 
Commissioner Narok indicate a state of things almost as bad. The hides of 
about 117,000 cattle have been railed at Kajiado against a normal average of 
round about 80,000, while births and survivals amongst calves are far below 
normal58.  
 
Reactions to the drought can be analysed in two ways. (1) Movement of both Maasai 
and Kikuyu across territorial boundaries increased unabated, in contrast to the 
situation before. (2) Colonial officials condoned cultivation by Kikuyu and encouraged 
its uptake among Maasai59. The massive loss of livestock suffered during the drought 
informed the administration’s decision to support farming against traditionally strict 
pastoral tendencies. In fact, the administration did little to encourage Maasai’s uptake 
of cultivation; individuals recognised that farming would reduce the risk of poverty. 
By the start of 1935, “drought and starvation had forced hundreds of Maasai to adopt 
cultivation while others took refuge among their Kikuyu neighbours or were squatting 
with relatives on European farms at Naivasha and the surrounding area”60. Except 
for the European population in the reserve, which is said to have increased from 20, 
recorded in the 1915-1916 annual report, to about 150, recorded in the 1933-1934 
                                                          
58 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1934. 
59 John Lamphear argues that agro-pastoralism among the Maasai dates back to the eighteenth 
century or thereabout (see Spear, 1993:11). Therefore, the mid-1930s describe a period of massive 
cultivation by both Maasai and Kikuyu on the southern reserve. 
60 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1933-1934.  
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annual report, figures for native populations between 1900 and the 1960s are 
inconsistent. However, they tend to suggest a general growth trend.   
There are several explanations for such inconsistences: in some years, no census 
was taken; in periods of drought or other calamities, officials we unable to get 
accurate figures to account for natives since the majority of them were always 
migrating within and outside the reserve. Further, some reports counted Dorobo and 
Kikuyu separately while others bundled them together with Maasai as they became 
absorbed into the Maasai culture. Additionally, the estimate given by the central 
government for the ratio of children to the whole population (i.e. 37%) was not 
utilised across all districts.  
Nevertheless, the 1935 annual report notes that cultivation increased drastically 
almost across the entire reserve more than in any other year in its history. The 
Kikuyu, perhaps operating like “social engineers”, took advantage of the drought 
situation to enhance agricultural colonisation in the reserve, and particularly created 
alliances that promised mutual benefits for them and for their Maa-speaking 
neighbours. The Maasai who did not involve themselves directly in cultivation opted 
to engage Kikuyu farmers to cultivate for them. According to the 1935 annual report: 
The utter failure of the Masai system of economics, which relies solely on 
scrub cattle and small stock for their satisfaction of needs, is now beginning to 
be apparent even to the Maasai, and one bright spot in the situation is that 
they are showing themselves ready both in local native council meetings and 
in less formal gatherings to consider remedies…cultivation by Masai in the 
Loitokitok area has increased fourfold in the past year [1934], and a few 
families of Maasai are beginning to cultivate, or to engage Kikuyu to cultivate 
for them, on the Ngong Hills. At the time when this report is written [February 
1935] there are some three hundred Maasai destitute who have taken refuge 
among the Kikuyu and are reported to be cultivating there. There are also 
some hundreds who have taken refuge with relatives squatting on farms in the 
European area, including those in Naivasha61. 
 
When colonial administrators relaxed their grip on restrictive policies of movement 
into the reserve due to the drought, Kikuyu moved into the reserve in numbers, 
bringing their families and livestock; they established villages and took up cultivation. 
Campbell notes that the focus of such migration was initially the Mau Escarpment, 
before spreading to other parts of the reserve (Campbell, 1993: 261). The fact that 
the Maasai were struggling to maintain their pastoral economy encouraged them to 
                                                          
61 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1935. 
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accept members of the Kikuyu community as client cultivators and to adopt farming 
themselves (Spear and Waller, 1993: 223).  
However, both the Maasai and the administration were seemingly oblivious of the 
fact that such territorial occupation by members of the Kikuyu community was a 
recreation of githaka, through which Kikuyu had earlier accumulated agricultural 
frontiers in areas like Kiambu among Dorobo hunters (discussed earlier in this 
chapter; see also Waller, 1993: 229/233; Muriuki, 1974: 51). 
While on the reserve, the Kikuyu enlarged their githaka by bringing Maasai and 
Dorobo neighbours and friends closer. They made themselves available for labour 
and intermarriage as a strategy to secure rights to land; they adopted Maasai culture 
and language; some labelled themselves “Maasai” and branded themselves with new 
Maasai names, while yet others knocked out a few lower teeth or pierced their 
earlobes in the effort to “become” Maasai.  
The majority of Kikuyu adopted Maasai cultural norms and ideals to negotiate and 
cement their belonging, fitting within the Maasai social fabric and became part of the 
societal structure. Boys born of Kikuyu parents were encouraged to join the Maasai 
age-set system. For Arthur Phillip, a former judicial advisor in the colonial 
government, the future identity of the Maasai was difficult to comprehend given the 
breadth of intermarriage and identity transformations. He describes them as “a tribe 
with a notable past but a doubtful future”62. His sentiments are echoed by Campbell, 
who concludes that “the struggle within Maasai society over just what it means to be 
Maasai intensifies” (Campbell, 1993: 269-70). 
The influx of farmers and consequent agricultural intensification on former pastoral 
and hunting grounds intensified disputes between Maasai, Dorobo, and Kikuyu 
regarding access to and control of resources. Although an immediate intervention 
was necessary, both the administration and the Maa-speakers watched rather 
helplessly as ithaka grew vigorously, as noted in the 1935 annual report: 
The land question still holds a prominent position and the interpenetration by 
the Kikuyu, who originally came as labourers for Maasai cultivators but 
progressively brought their villages, continues, though Maasai opinion is 
against it, yet it progresses in view of the supine attitude of the Maasai elders 
who generally only complain after a Kikuyu village is built, even if they ever 
complain63. 
                                                          
62 Rhodes House, Oxford/753. 12. r. 7/1945 (1), p. 141.Report on Native Tribunals. Arthur Phillip: In 
Kenya Miscellaneous Blue Books on Social Affairs. 1930-1958.   
63 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1935. 
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Masaai responses to outsiders were conflicting; on the one hand, they seemed to 
acknowledge colonial ideas regarding their ethnic exclusivity, while on the other, they 
continued to interact with the Kikuyu and protected individual Kikuyu clients and 
relatives from removal by colonial authorities (Galaty, 1993b: 188).  
In the 1950s, following the declaration of the Emergency, the administration effected 
yet another policy to counter the movement of “aliens” and their activities on the 
reserve. However, this time around, the policy largely favoured Kikuyu who had 
already settled on the reserve and those already married into Maasai manyattas. In 
relation to cultivation, the administration together with Maasai elders had no choice 
than to designate cultivation zones in favour of Kikuyu farmers, but the administration 
strictly prohibited Kikuyu women married into Maasai manyattas from cultivation. 
Galton-Fenzi, District Commissioner of the reserve in 1957, quotes the policy in his 
handing over report to R.A Jeary64: 
The policy is that never again should Kikuyu aliens be allowed to infiltrate into 
this District and to take up sporadic cultivation in this area. All pure Kikuyu 
males must reside in the Nairageingare (Nairregie Enkare) settlement area, 
which is strictly limited and controlled. The Kikuyu/Masai “nusu nusu”65 
population will always be a problem. The present policy is that such persons 
should, if they have been on a detention or restriction order, be confined to the 
Nairigiengare settlement area. However, if they were not picked up during the 
Emergency of Mau Mau offences they are allowed to pursue their normal 
business, other than that of cultivating outside Nairigiengare area. Cultivation 
is only allowed in those places jointly agreed upon by the Masai and the 
administration. The third problem relating to the Kikuyu is that of Kikuyu 
females married to Masai. We have been allowing the Masai concerned to 
have their Kikuyu wives with them in their manyattas subject to there being no 
cultivation and the head of the manyatta must sign a document guaranteeing 
the good behaviour of the Kikuyu females concerned. 
 
Despite the administration’s spirited efforts to stop the movement of Kikuyu farmers 
and their activities in the reserve, this discussion shows that such efforts were 
ultimately unsuccessful. The desire of the administration to foster a Maasai-only 
territory and a strict pastoral economy (what defines “Maasainess”) by labelling 
others “alien” also failed. Instead, members of the Kikuyu community succeeded in 
establishing and expanding githaka through the agricultural colonisation of 
                                                          
64 Rhodes House, Oxford/ Handing Over Report/Mr. A.D. Galton-Fenzi to Mr. R.A. Jeary/Narok 
District/1st March 1957. 
65 Offspring of Maasai/Kikuyu/Dorobo intermarriages (defined in Chapter 1).  
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pasturelands and hunting grounds and by drawing both herders and hunters into 
them. 
Intermarriages between Kikuyu, Maasai, and Dorobo saw Kikuyu accumulate land in 
exchange for their daughters, while Kikuyu who supplied Maasai with labour often 
received land in return (Blackburn, 1996; Klopp, 2001; Matter, 2010; Waller, 1993: 
228-229). Le Meur et al. (2006: 14) note that interactions and forms of cooperation 
between agriculturalists and pastoralists persist to date, allowing for economic and 
productive activities, which are embedded in social relations that contribute to give 
them a specific shape.  
Kikuyu farmers have successfully settled and cultivated the former Dorobo hunting 
grounds of Enoosupukia and in other areas of Narok county today. Similar land-use 
changes and interactions are witnessed in Laikipia,66 among other parts of Kenya. In 
the most of these areas, Kikuyu have endured violent confrontations with their 
neighbours and demonstrated an impeccable spirit of resilience. Such colonisation of 
frontiers persists to date, as shown in the case of Maiella Estate and the consequent 
expansion into lands previously used for livestock grazing (which will be covered 
after the next section).  
Indeed, the subdivision and privatisation of communally owned ranches in the 
Maasai reserve after the 1960s, though disturbed by disputes and conflicts, may 
have served to affirm the rights of tenure of non-Maasai individuals who customarily 
joined the Maasai social fabric. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 show that cross-cutting ties 
between these groups create the strongest impediment to their separation amidst 
external socio-political pressure.  
 
Dorobo in the Maasai southern reserve 
This section begins by briefly defining and distinguishing some sections of Dorobo 
hunter-gatherers. Later on, I will focus on the Salaita, whose interaction with other 
groups in the research area is worth mentioning.  
The Dorobo, otherwise known as Andorobo/Wandorobo/Wanderobo/Il Torobo/ 
Torobo are not one “tribe”. Rather, the umbrella term refers to autonomous hunting 
populations living in scattered groups in the Rift Valley in what are now Kenya and 
                                                          
66 Ongoing study by Marie Gravesen (2013-2016) in Laikipia. 
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Tanzania; the largest group of which are the Okiek/Ogiek (for detailed description 
see Kamau, 2000; Blackburn, 1974; Klumpp and Kratz, 1993; Kratz, 1980). 
“Dorobo” is a term adopted from the Maasai word il torobo, which means “a poor 
person who has no cattle and has to live by hunting and gathering” (Kimaiyo, 2004; 
Hinde and Hinde, 1901: 11; Galaty, 1993b: 193 ‘Notes’)67. Kratz (1980: 358) notes: 
“European explorers and colonial officials classified the ‘tribe’ as serfs or outcasts of 
their more numerous neighbours and were and still are commonly written as 
‘remnants’, the ‘dying’, and remain of original inhabitants”. However, are Dorobo a 
“dying” “tribe”? Or are they (re)adjusting to rapidly changing surroundings and 
situations? Thomas Widlok (1999; 2004) has described relations between the so-
called “Bushmen” with their neighbours in colonial and post-colonial Namibia. He 
shows how “Bushman” autonomy is affected and changed and their strategies to 
deal with ensuing dilemmas – perhaps to insinuate they have the “capacity” to deal 
with change just like other hunter-gatherer societies faced with similar situations. For 
the Dorobo studied, it is their hunting tendencies and, perhaps, “original” culture, 
which may be considered as disappearing under the weight of “modernity” and 
contact with neighbours.  
Several hunting groups, which are associated with the Dorobo, appear in literature 
and archival sources. Around the Mount Kenya area, “the Gumba [Agumba], a 
Dorobo group, hunted and lived in holes; they did not cultivate, they had their own 
language but were different from Athi68 hunters of Chuka and Meru who engaged in 
both hunting and cultivation”69. 
In Central Kenya, Dorobo hunted and gathered honey in the former forests of Embu 
and Kiambu as already noted. Furthermore, Okiek on the eastern Mau, which 
neighbours the study area, have lived there at least since the eighteenth century 
(Kimaiyo, 2004). Without distinguishing between Dorobo and Okiek, Kimaiyo notes, 
“a big population of Ogiek in Mau division (Narok) is settled in Enoosupukia”. He 
further classifies the hunting and gathering groups as follows: The Ogiek living in 
                                                          
67 According to Kimaiyo, the Ogiek (singular, Ogiot) rejected the nickname “Dorobo” on the grounds of 
it being demeaning to them. Okiek are a highland hunting people who speak an eastern dialect of 
Kalenjin (Galaty, 1993b, 193) and thus should not be confused with other hunter-gatherer groups such 
as that of the Enoosupukia Dorobo. 
68 Informants at Enoosupukia referred to Athi as “Dorobo of Kikuyu” and described them as a people 
with a stammering dialect of the Agikuyu language in their speech. They were popular for making pots 
from a type of soil called Siathi. Some are said to be inhabiting Kinare forest today. 
69 Rhodes House, Oxford/753.12.S/4/1929 p. 6, 23/. Native Land Tenure in the Kikuyu Province. 
Report of Committee.G.V. Maxwell, S.H. Fazan and L.S.B. Leakey. November 1929. 
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Enoosupukia and Enooseyia he calls the Saleita; the Ilkiragarien group, Olkume; the 
Ilekiminkish group, Ilesinoni; and the Naro-sura group, Ildikiri. He further notes that 
the groups combined constitute three major clans of Ilmakesen, Ilkumae, and Ilaiser. 
However, the history and identity of the Dorobo, how they define and identify 
themselves collectively and as distinct sections, and how to classify “different” 
sections of foraging groups, remain problematic (Kratz, 1980: 355-368). 
On the Maasai southern reserve, Dorobo began to feature in colonial administrative 
records almost a decade after northern Maasai had settled in the reserve. The 1923-
1924 annual report70 notes, “…besides the Maasai, there exists a number of small 
groups of peoples in the reserve known collectively as Wandorobo or Il Torobo who 
are outcast Maasai and Lumbwa but with traces of some other aboriginal blood in 
some sections”.   
The report classifies this group into two: (1) those who had acquired cattle and lived 
practically as and with Maasai, although unlike the latter they still hunted and ate 
game; and (2) the forest-dwelling Torobo, who are further divided into three main 
groups including the Salaita and Palagilak71. Each of these groups is said to have 
had another four or five sub-divisions and a headman for each sub-division, since 
sovereignty dictated that the sections could not be bundled under one responsible 
headman. The sub-divisions constituted about half a dozen families.  
The report describes only two of the three groups, the Salaita and the Palagilak. It 
notes:  
The Salaita live mainly in the forest bordering on the Naivasha farms. They 
are largely by origin of Maasai of Il Damat section and are a pleasant people 
and peaceful except where their honey-barrels are concerned. They live in a 
state of constant subdued warfare with the Kikuyu squatters on the farms, but 
with the Masai they are on excellent terms.  
The Palagilak72 live in the Great Mau forest. They are a shyer and more 
independent people containing probably a large strain of Lumbwa. Having a 
much larger forest area to retreat into they are not above coming into blows 
with the Masai on occasions.  
 
Additionally, both Salaita and Palagilak lived entirely by hunting, apiculture, and 
performing menial jobs such as skinning and the rite of circumcision for the Maasai. 
They were experts in witchcraft and poisons too. A few owned stock, which were 
                                                          
70 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1923-1924. 
71 Archival sources described only two of the three groups; that is, Salaita and Palagilak (see above).  
72 It is still not clear whether these groups are only distinguished by the languages they speak.  
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often left during the honey season with their Maasai patrons and, unlike what was 
often the case with the Maasai, the Dorobo ate their stock when times were hard73. 
According to colonial administrators, “Dorobo were economically ‘useless’; they did 
not even make an effort to engage in the trade of beeswax”74. 
The Salaita are of crucial interest here. Interactions between them, Kikuyu and 
Maasai account for the history of land transactions, as already noted. While the 
Kikuyu and northern Maasai laud the Dorobo for their generosity in providing them 
with land for pasture and for cultivation in the southern reserve, Purko Maasai in 
particular blame the Dorobo and their allies for supporting the massive conversion of 
pasturelands and refuge for dry-season grazing into land for cultivation. Indeed, this 
environmental destruction narrative often rears its ugly head in political campaigns, 
where some appeal to the Maasai vote by meddling in the emotionally charged land 
question. 
When asked, members of the Salaita group in Enoosupukia distinguished 
themselves from the Ogiek and wanted to be called “Dorobo of Keekonyokie Maasai” 
or, simply, “Enoosupukia Dorobo”. In fact rarely will one define himself using “Salaita” 
as a group name, although many use this name to refer to this former hunting group. 
Enoosupukia Dorobo consider the Ogiek as “Dorobo of Kalenjin”, who are allied to 
the Nandi of the Rift Valley inhabiting the Mau Forest Complex. Just like the 
Mukogodo in Lee Cronk’s ethnography (Cronk, 2004), the Enoosupukia Dorobo 
adopted agro-pastoralism and progressively discarded their foraging tendencies at 
some point in their history. Blackburn (1996:192) notes that since the 1960s all 
Dorobo groups have had some gardens and/or domestic animals.  
Beekeeping is very rare in the Enoosupukia area; I only witnessed about four 
beehives, and a few trees with hollow trunks where bees established their colonies 
(see photograph 4). There was no mention of the existence of hunting. Indeed, the 
present generation of young Dorobo has little or no knowledge of bee keeping or 
hunting. The older generation, though still aware of the existence of plants from 
which arrow poison is derived, prefer to keep this knowledge from the younger 
generation for fear of misuse. The few families that do harvest honey mainly apply it 
                                                          
73 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1923-1924. 
74 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Annual Report/1923-1924. 
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on bread or eat it as a snack. Those wishing to prepare local brews for social 
functions must purchase honey from the markets or use sugar instead. 
There is no doubt that the Maasai and Kikuyu were influential on the Enoosupukia 
Dorobo in their adoption of agro-pastoralism. There are indications that such 
diversification also involved the acquisition of a wide range of cultural traits, and 
perhaps the adoption of Maa and Gikuyu as the languages of interaction and trade. 
Apart from a few words that some elderly Dorobo in Enoosupukia recall in what may 
have been their “language”, there is little evidence to suggest that this group spoke a 
unique language different from those used by neighbouring groups.  
 
 
 
 
Photograph  4. A hollow trunk in which bees form honeycombs at Mpeuti village  
                         (source: field data, 2014). 
 
Nowadays, new generations of Dorobo learn Swahili, the national language of 
Kenya, through social-economic interactions with their neighbours and through 
formal education. Unlike the Mukogodo, the influence exerted on the Enoosupukia 
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Dorobo by their agricultural neighbours has prompted the former to join the lucrative 
field of commercial agriculture, often as landowners who lease farmland to land-
seeking clients. The majority of Dorobo households in Enoosupukia practice some 
form of cultivation as well, even if it means bringing in friends to cultivate for them, or 
hiring labour. A good number have joined the market economy and deal in livestock 
trade and the sale of food produce.  
Most Dorobo use returns from leaseholds to build themselves modern houses (made 
of wood with corrugated iron roofs); some have bought plastic water storage tanks to 
harvest rainwater. Indeed, only a handful can recall stories told by their ancestors 
who survived in rock caves and rock shelters or under tree shelters.  
It is rather problematic to speculate when the Enoosupukia Dorobo changed their 
clothing style, but there are indications that other groups close to the urban areas 
and the White Highlands could have exchanged clothes for various products or for 
land with the Dorobo. However, there is no doubt, according to informants, that the 
trade in clothes from the early 1900s, and especially the growth of a second-hand 
clothing market in Maiella trading centre around the 1960s, largely encouraged the 
shift to modern clothing among Maa-speakers.  
Nowadays, the Enoosupukia Dorobo, just like other communities across Kenya, have 
the tendency to buy “matching” trousers and coats to serve as suits. They no longer 
wear tiny animal skins that were tied around their waists dangling at the front while 
barely covering their private parts. Organisation into bands is also “outdated”; the 
Dorobo have progressively fitted themselves into the Maasai organisation and the 
Kikuyu structure. 
Therefore, to say that the Dorobo are living on the margin or at the mercy of their 
more powerful neighbours would probably amount to an insult. In some cases, such 
as in land rentals, they actually control and perhaps “rule” their neighbours.  
Even when control of land seems to weigh heavily on them, there is a tendency to 
retreat to their historical identities to claim autochthony (as first comers or “original” 
forest occupants) and to use collective bargains and action in defence of their right to 
land against outsiders and land grabbers, including the government.  
Galaty (1993a: 186-187) offers an example of when the Dorobo enhanced their 
collective claim to land by reinstating their historical identities: 
In the mid-1970s when land was being adjudicated in the Enoosupukia region, 
Dorobo communities suddenly reasserted distinct separate identities many of 
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them had long sought to discard in order to validate their claims to land, while 
Maasai suddenly insisted that Dorobo were and always had been fully Maasai 
and so should join together with them to form ranches. 
 
Nowadays, the Dorobo (or Ogiek, for lack of a unifying group name) have created 
networks with national and international civil society groups and organisations with 
which they can validate indigenous claims to land, sometimes through national and 
international courts. Claims over rights to land through civil society groups have 
earned the Dorobo a special place in the international sphere, especially in 
discussions that relate to the rights of indigenous peoples.  
Concerns and activism over Dorobo indigenous land rights by civil society groups 
and NGOs, such as the Ogiek Peoples’ Development Program (OPDP) and Survival 
International,75 have intensified today. On the local level, groups such as the Ogiek 
Women Empowerment Programme are also raising their voices on issues of 
emancipation and affirmative action in the national political space. These groups 
invoke the instruments of “marginalisation” and “indigeneity” to claim property rights 
to land and to seek participation in decision-making and political representation.  
In her recent work, Gabrielle Lynch (2016) explains how the Sengwer community of 
Cherangany Hills in Kenya claim autochthony (as “original” occupants of the hills) to 
insist upon a particular ethnic label and brand (that of indigeneity) in the interests of 
protecting and promoting community interests, such as land use and ownership 
rights. Odhiambo (2015) reports on a similar situation of litigation among the 
Ilchamus of the Baringo lowlands of Kenya, where the group has won several court 
cases against the Kenyan state in relation to land matters. Hodgson (2011) also 
shows the importance of Maasai indigenous identity in the context of economic 
liberalisation, transnational capitalism, state restructuring, and political 
democratisation.  
Many Dorobo/Ogiek recall the events of 2008, when a government-led exercise to 
restore the Mau forest saw police evict thousands of people who were allegedly living 
illegally in the forest. Prior to the evictions, these groups mounted firm resistance 
against the state, voicing claims of original occupation of the forest and accused the 
state of undermining their ownership rights. Dorobo elites (some educated in Europe) 
mobilised community members and sought assistance from international civil society 
                                                          
75 http://www.ogiekpeoples.org/; http://www.survivalinternational.org/ 
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groups against the government of Kenya. They maintained that their style of hunting 
and gathering was not destructive to the environment, and blamed KANU political 
cronies for grabbing and destroying the forest through illegal logging and charcoal 
burning.   
Nevertheless, the government effected the evictions and police set fire to hundreds 
of homes and food stores. Through assistance from civil society groups, the 
Dorobo/Ogiek community took their plea for justice to the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights in Arusha, Tanzania. In 2013, the court ruled in favour of 
their land grievances, thereby validating their autochthony claims.  
Arguably, the incentive to claim autochthony in the interest of protecting ownership 
rights to land among the Enoosupukia Dorobo today is strongly linked to changes in 
the economic value of land due to commercial farming in the rural areas, which is 
largely driven by expansion of markets for food produce and for farmland. Therefore, 
the Dorobo can either sell or lease land to make money. They can also use land as 
collateral for bank loans, although they are greatly limited in their ability to do so 
because most of them have no title deeds for their individual holdings. However, land 
has commonly been used as collateral for informal (interpersonal) loans.  
 
In this first part of this chapter, I have explored interactions between Maasai, Kikuyu, 
and Dorobo communities. Such interactions are primarily based on negotiations 
surrounding access to and control of land, and are not without tensions and conflicts.  
I argue that appropriation of resources is linked to the shifting of identity and social 
boundaries. Individuals and groups utilise these strategies despite inherent risks (like 
conflicts) and often with little regard to ethnicity. Such strategies of resource 
appropriation often override other identities. However, as noted by Galaty 
(1993b:191-192), “although this form of shifting of identities and social boundaries 
has the potential of nurturing social cohesion, it does not necessarily obscure or 
erase lines of demarcation between communities”. 
 
In the next section of this chapter, I will show how the 1993 violence in the study area 
was linked to specific social dynamics, and will then analyse the aftermath of the 
violence.  
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From violence to peaceful interactions 
After exploring mobility and intergroup relations in the colonial period in the last 
section, the following section continues with the situation in the post-colonial period. 
The focus here is on land transfers and the agricultural colonisation of Maasailand by 
Kikuyu through the influential githaka system, and the link between this and the 1993 
violence and to other social dynamics. Politicised violence, just as the claims of 
autochthony in some contexts, emerges as a powerful tool to regulate Kikuyu 
expansion and their perennial “thirst” for land in Maasailand. I will then conclude with 
an assessment of local efforts to reinstate peaceful relations after the violence. This 
section sets the stage for detailed analyses and discussion of the importance of 
cross-cutting ties and split allegiances, and the value of local institutions in the 
alleviation of conflict and the maintenance of social order. 
The impact of linking physical space to ethnic identity in the colonial period became 
apparent in the post-colonial era. After independence, ethnic territorial exclusivity 
was interpreted locally to mean territorial control against the “others” – likening it to 
colonial land policies. Coupled with increasing migrant populations coming into the 
Rift Valley and subsequent land-use changes in the 1970s and 1980s, the land 
question became emotionally charged, and threatened historical relations between 
Maasai herders (including Dorobo) and agricultural Kikuyu in the studied area. 
Kenya’s reintroduction of multi-party politics in 1991, and the consequent ethnic-
divisive electoral campaigns of 1991/1992 transformed occasional disputes and 
conflicts into violence in 1993. 
 How then did Maasai and Kikuyu reinstate peaceful relations after the violence? This 
section begins with land transfers from Maa-speakes to Kikuyu farmers and the 
impacts these had, particularly in post-colonial times. Thereafter, I will discuss the 
nexus between land conflicts, political agency, and the 1993 violence.  
 
Land transfers: agricultural colonization through githaka 
Around the 1970s and 1980s, the Enoosupukia area faced massive deforestation, 
paving the way for cultivation mainly in small-scale farms, mostly by immigrants of 
Kikuyu descent from Central Kenya who, along with other groups, were looking to 
settle in agricultural lands either factually or perceived to be under-utilised, like the 
Rift Valley (see Hornsby, 2012: 249).  
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Traditionally, the Salaita (Enoosupukia Dorobo) inhabited the forest in Enoosupukia, 
as already mentioned. Dorobo elders in Mpeuti village said they and other Maasai 
who later came to the area had transferred rights of access to land through sale 
and/or exchange and in the form of gifts to “newcomers”, mostly of Kikuyu descent, 
since at least the early 20th century. Blackburn (1996) adds that access rights to land 
were also transferred both within and between local groups as compensation or 
penalties imposed in dispute resolutions by councils of elders. As noted earlier, 
Kikuyu also became clients and workers in Maasai homesteads in exchange for 
access to land (Klopp, 2001: 151). 
These early transfers of rights to land were informal and involved word-of-mouth or, 
in only a few instances, hand-written agreements as evidence of transfer. The terms 
and legitimacy of such agreements are largely contested today (see Case 11) as the 
clamour for individual titles, often for speculation or collateral for loans, intensifies. 
The Maasai accuse the Kikuyu of altering the agreements to defraud illiterate Maa-
speaking groups of more land. Kikuyu and Maa-speakers disagree on whether these 
transactions constituted permanent or temporary transfers of rights, and whether the 
transferred rights indicated use rights only, or actually meant a full transfer of 
ownership rights (Matter, 2010: 138). 
Figure 4 shows responses from sixty farmers of Maiella and Enoosupukia on the 
question of acquisition of rights to land in the early 20th century. It indicates that a 
large number of the respondents attribute their rights to land to the Ng’ati Co-
operative Society (discussed shortly), and a sizable number to inheritance (from 
Maasai including Dorobo and Kikuyu ancestors), as well as through gifts and 
purchase. Land rentals are discussed in detail in chapter 5. 
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Figure 5. Acquisition of land in early 20th century in Maiella and Enoosupukia  
               (source: field data, 2014) 
 
 
Land ownership not only changed in Enoosupukia but also on the Maiella side, where 
between the early and mid-20th century large commercial farms had dominated. In 
Maiella, until 1964 an Italian (known locally as Loska) ran a large settler farm (16,338 
acres) known as Maiella Estate. Archival sources indicate that British colonial 
administrators in Kenya contracted Italians for help with infrastructural development 
(e.g. construction of roads)76. These Italians may have eventually acquired some 
commercial farms in Kenya. Some elders in the studied area speculated that the 
Italian prisoners of war whom British soldiers captured during the World War II battles 
in Somalia around the 1940s, and who later worked on British commercial farms in 
Kenya, may have ultimately acquired some of these commercial farms.  
Kikuyu squatters and labourers on Maiella Estate said that Loska had served as a 
manager on the farm under a British owner (known locally as Kirikwi) before he later 
acquired it77. However, none could tell when and what circumstances led to the 
transfer of ownership of the estate. Informants noted that the Italian inherited 
squatters and labourers from the British farmer, but also dispatched trucks to ferry 
Kikuyu labourers from Central Kenya periodically towards the mid-1900s.  
                                                          
76 Rhodes House, Oxford/ Handing Over Report/Mr. A.D. Galton-Fenzi to Mr. R.A. Jeary/Narok 
District/1st March 1957. 
77 The FCO-141 land transfer files of Kenya (1960-1970s) located at the National Archives in Kew, 
London, show very little on land transfers in the study area although the files only represent a small 
fraction of land transfers at the time.  
 
97 
 
After independence, the Italian sold Maiella Estate (then registered as Maiella Limited 
Company) to Ng’ati Farmers, a society made up of about 600 farmers mostly of 
Kikuyu descent. Ng’ati farmers registered Maiella Estate under the provisions of the 
Co-operative Societies Act Cap 490 of the Laws of Kenya as Ng’ati Farmers’ 
Cooperative Society Limited. The society obtained a title deed for the farm in July 
197478.  
The majority of Ng’ati farmers had laboured on the Maiella Estate. They consolidated 
themselves and reached out to friends, relatives, and patrons especially from central 
Kenya to be able to purchase the farm, consequently recreating a large githaka. 
Waller (1993: 233) refers to this form of territorial accumulation as the Kikuyu’s 
colonisation of white farms in the Rift Valley. Hornsby (2012: 249) argues that “Kikuyu 
were a ‘richer’ community and had better access to loan facilities”, which enabled 
them to “accumulate and privatise pastoral land” (Klopp, 2001: 137). Attempts by the 
Maasai to regain possession of Maiella Estate from the Italian – an area which they 
already claimed as their ancestral land – were ultimately unsuccessful. The decision 
to auction the land in the first place did not please them, but they did little to stop the 
transfer of ownership of the Estate to the Kikuyu.  
According to informants, membership of the society was open especially to former 
labourers on the commercial farm (Maasai, Dorobo, Kalenjin, and some Turkana). 
However, the fact that the Kikuyu mobilised family and friends from outside the region 
to assist in purchasing the farm probably confirms the intention to have exclusive 
control, against the others.  
Maiella Estate offered a promise of githaka to former squatters and labourers on the 
European farm. It also gave hope to many more squatters who had already been 
forcibly evicted and “repatriated” from European farms in the Rift Valley to their 
Kikuyu homeland or to resettlement schemes away from their white landlords in the 
1930s and 1940s (see Anderson, 2005: 26). According to Anderson, these squatters 
were in need of land and settlement, but there was not much space left in the 
ancestral lands upon which they could set themselves up, since their relatives had 
                                                          
78 Court of Appeal at Nakuru, No. 64 of 2004: Between Ng’ati Farmers’ Co-operative Society Limited 
(Appellant) and Counsellor John Ledidi and 15 Others (Respondents). An appeal from the judgement 
and decree of the High Court of Kenya at Nakuru (Rimita, J.) dated 12th May 2002, In HCCC NO. 89 
of 1996. 
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subdivided the often small parcels of lands amongst themselves. He concludes, “it 
seemed as through the returnees were no longer welcome” (Anderson, 2005: 28).  
Therefore, it is not surprising that Maiella Estate attracted many friends and relatives 
of former squatters and labourers. Other Kikuyu targeted lands in other parts of 
Kenya, the majority of which were quickly acquired through familial or group 
enterprises after independence. However, the githaka system through which Kikuyu 
appropriated resources in the frontiers underwent considerable changes in meaning 
and social significance after the 1960s, as discussed below.  
 
Wealth-in-people, wealth-in-things: transformation of githaka 
The significance of githaka at least before the mid-1960s was its symbolic capital, 
rather than any economic capital that it gained for a landowner or trustee (the 
muramati) and the mbari (clan). Guyer (1995) describes such capital as wealth-in-
people. Wealth-in-people describes social systems in which status, power, and 
influence are achieved and mediated through the number of one's dependants, 
followers, or other social ties and affiliations (Guyer, 1995: 89-90; Berry, 1993: 15). 
Drawing from this definition, therefore, one may argue that society accorded much 
respect, power, and honour to a githaka owner (muramati and mbari) by virtue of 
having dependants, that is, ahoi (tenants and labourers), athoni (in-laws), and 
aciriarua (adoptees).  
In other words, the more people one had on a githaka the wealthier one was 
presumed by society to be, and thus the more weight one had in the community. 
When understood from this perspective, one may argue that the social significance of 
a githaka and that of its occupiers was perhaps more meaningful to society and to 
githaka owners than the economic or commercial value that land represented. To 
increase the social status of landowners, therefore, it was common for Kikuyu clans 
(mbari) to admit other Kikuyu and members of other ethnic groups as dependants 
onto a githaka. Through the principle of ethnic inclusiveness as opposed to ethnic 
exclusiveness, Kikuyu landowners adopted both landless Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu 
dependants (like Maa-speakers) into clan-controlled ithaka to increase their weight 
and presence in the society. 
Maiella Estate, and other ithaka created after independence were considerably 
different than the ones described above. The meaning of githaka had changed 
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considerably. The symbolic value attached to githaka increasingly lost ground to its 
economic and commercial value. In other words, there was a transformation from the 
notion of wealth-in-people to that of wealth-in-things. Wealth-in-things gives weight to 
the material worth and/or reliable networks that occupiers of githaka provide, bring, or 
attract for its welfare. Based on oral accounts, at least from the 1970s, landowners 
required dependants (ahoi, athoni, and aciriarua) to contribute to the material welfare 
of the property by herding and cultivating for their hosts.  
Apart from their material contribution, there also emerged the need to protect and 
enhance the security of tenure of ithaka. Therefore, some dependants and affiliates 
could be admitted onto a githaka if they held reliable social-political connections, 
which could be appropriated whenever the need to protect githaka rights arose. 
Additionally, the presence of people on a githaka symbolised ownership and thus 
served to enhance its security by acting as a deterrent against possible land grabbers 
in an increasingly vibrant land market.  
Therefore, the fact that Kikuyu groups recreated most of these ithaka in lands 
perceived to “belong” to other groups encouraged them to admit individuals of those 
particular groups as a strategy to increase their “acceptance” in “foreign” territories 
and to protect their ownership rights. Generally, however, the numbers of dependants 
on ithaka reduced progressively as commoditisation of land increased and as 
communally owned ranches were continuously individualised and privatised from the 
1970s and 1980s.  
In the context of Maiella Estate, membership to the society was open especially to 
former labourers on the commercial farm, as noted above. However, unlike the 
previous githaka of the nineteenth century, membership to the Ng’ati Co-operative 
Society was pegged on a subscription fee of about KES 2000 (€20), the payment of 
which earned members equal shares on the estate. Although this fee was intended 
for settling the cost of the farm (KES 800,000 or €8,000)79, it may also be interpreted 
as a strategy to control “free riders” including some dependants who would have 
otherwise been admitted to a githaka without any financial obligation.  
Moreover, such commitment was taken as a necessary precondition for collective 
bargaining whenever unexpected shocks ensued, such as the need to protect 
                                                          
79 At a current price of about KES 300,000 (€3,000) an acre, the cost of 16,338 acres of Maiella Estate 
is close to 5 billion Kenya Shillings (€50 million). Case 11 (under the concluding remarks) in chapter 9, 
discusses both social and economic values of land today.  
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ownership rights. Only about five Maa-speakers paid their membership fee. From the 
mid-1970s onwards, a team of nine Kikuyu directors of the Ng’ati Farmers’ 
Cooperative Society supervised the subdivision of the farm among its members.  
The 16,338-acre piece of land was cut into a great number of small plots in three 
phases, covering the dry, hilly, and wet parts, and was subsequently cultivated by 
members of the Ng’ati society. The society also set aside land for infrastructure: 
schools, churches, roads, a market, and an administration police post, among others. 
Case 12 in chapter 9 describes the subdivision process in detail, and the grievances 
that emerged thereafter.  
The purchase and consequent subdivision of Maiella Estate encouraged hundreds of 
Kikuyu to migrate into the Rift Valley, many of whom came at the invitation of family 
and friends already in the Ng’ati society. Some migrants hoped to find land and to 
settle in the area, while others were in search of farm labour, perhaps to use their 
wages to purchase their own ithaka. Some Ng’ati members also purchased land 
belonging to desperate members in a bid to expand their ithaka. It also served as a 
strategy to create room for more relatives and friends from central Kenya and 
elsewhere.  
The demand for cultivation labour intensified as the number of landless migrants 
increased. The former soon found wage labour on individual ithaka holdings already 
allocated to Ng’ati members. During interviews, Ng’ati members said that the monthly 
wage for destitute Kikuyu and non-Kikuyu labourers towards the end of the 1970s 
was KES 2.50 (€ 0.25). Some elders likened this patron-client relationship to that 
between squatters and settlers during the colonial period. Githaka owners were 
equated with settlers whom many perceived to amass wealth through the sweat of 
the land-poor. 
Figure 6 below shows settlements and forest cover in Maiella and Enoosupukia in 
1975, respectively, following the occupation of Maiella Estate by Kikuyu Ng’ati 
society members. The settlements (shown by the “dots” on the map) are 
concentrated on the Maiella side, while the Enoosupukia side was largely forested 
(the darker shade on the map) at the time.  
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Figure 6. A 1975 map showing settlements (dots on the map) and forest cover (dark  
               shade) at Maiella and Enoosupukia, respectively. At the time, settlements,  
               consisting of mainly Kikuyu Ng’ati farmers, were concentrated on the side 
               of Maiella Estate. Enoosupukia was largely forested, except for a few  
               settlements at the Maiella/Enoosupukia border; perhaps an indication of the 
               expansion of farming and conversion of Enoosupukia forest. 
               (Source: original map, Sheet 133/3, National Museums of Kenya; copyright 
               Monica Feinen, 2016).  
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Therefore, Maiella Estate (Ng’ati farm) became an ideal point from which Kikuyu and 
other migrants could push their frontiers into nearby areas of the former Maasai 
southern reserve. This strategic niche particularly served to connect land-seeking 
clients from the Lake Naivasha area, members of the Ng’ati society, and persons 
from other parts of Kenya, to land opportunities in Enoosupukia and other parts of 
Narok.  
Consequently, in the last four decades, rapid agricultural intensification in 
Enoosupukia particularly through leasehold arrangements between Maa-speaking 
landowners and land-seeking clients (see chapter 5) has changed and shaped the 
landscape enormously. Figures 7 and 8 show the “explosion” of settlements at 
Maiella and continuing expansion of settlements and farming in Enoosupukia. 
As shown in Figure 7, the subdivision of Maiella Estate (the large githaka constituting 
16,338 acres), resulted in very small individual holdings of merely between 2.5 and 5 
acres. Some landowners further subdivided their individual holdings, taking 
advantage of the land market. As families grew, individual githaka units grew much 
smaller. Consequently, unlike in the nineteenth century when patriarchal inheritance 
assured the young generation of githaka ownership rights, the tiny individual land 
holdings shown in Figure 7 could not accommodate a large mbari (clan) or sub-mbari 
(sub-clan) units anymore.  
Therefore, and perhaps as a strategy to limit possible kin-based disputes over the 
control of their fathers’ holdings80, sons and, sometimes, single mothers, had to find 
alternative land on which to establish a family. Enoosupukia was the nearest frontier 
that provided hope for land, settlement, and cultivation. The result, as shown in 
Figure 8, was the massive conversion of the Enoosupukia forest, through market-
oriented cultivation (see “land rentals”, chapter 5). 
 
                                                          
80 Figure 25 (appendices) shows numerous kin-based land disputes arising from inheritance or from 
the sale of githaka units in Maiella.  
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Figure 7. Maiella (Ng’ati farm): individual land holdings and trading centre, after the 
               subdivision and privatisation of Maiella Estate (source: Google Maps,  
               2016). 
 
 
Figure 8. Enoosupukia “forest”: the “new” frontier for commercial farming, mainly 
               through leasehold arrangements (source: Google Maps, 2016).  
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In the early 1990s, this scramble for uncultivated frontiers was met with politicisation 
of land and ethnic categories, which culminated in massive violence in 1993 as 
discussed below.  
 
The 1993 violence: links to politics of land and belonging  
The sale of Maiella Estate to mainly Kikuyu farmers sparked outrage among the 
Maasai who claimed its occupation before colonialism. Maasai complained that they 
were born on the land and that their ancestors had occupied it since time immemorial 
(see also Matter, 2010: 133). The Maasai began to seek ways of reclaiming Maiella 
Estate, citing historical injustices, and accusing settlers of “stealing” “their” land and 
transferring it to “outsiders”.  
After the sale, a section of Keekonyokie Maasai continued to live in Nkampani village, 
which was part of Maiella Estate (see Figure 3). Consequently, periodic conflicts 
pitting Ng’ati farmers and Nkampani Keekonyokie Maasai began from 1968 but 
increased during the subdivisions of the estate from the mid-1970s onwards81.  
Several people died. Maasai burnt Kikuyu houses built on or near the disputed 
Nkampani area, while Kikuyu farmers killed Maasai livestock found grazing near 
Kikuyu settlements or on crop farms. In retaliation, Maasai fed their livestock on crops 
planted by the Kikuyu82 and Kikuyu opened up more farmland near Maasai 
manyattas83. Occasionally, Maasai and Kikuyu exchanged blows at drinking dens in 
Maiella trading centre, or hurled rungus (sticks) or stones at each other. Such violent 
conflicts continued into the 1990s (Hornsby, 2012: 548) shifting between low and high 
intensities. An informant described the situation:  
Whenever people heard someone scream, both groups quickly armed 
themselves with machete, spears, bows, and arrows in readiness to fight and 
defend their territories irrespective of the cause of alarm. 
 
On the Enoosupukia communal land, residents and the then District Land 
Adjudication Office declared two areas for subdivision in the 1970s: Kipise 
Adjudication Section, and Enoosupukia Trust Land, which they called Part A and Part 
B respectively. Official adjudication of Kipise started in 1977 (see also Matter, 2010: 
8-9). However, the presence of a large number of immigrants, most of whom claimed 
                                                          
81 Interview with former councillor and Nkampani elder, John Ledidi, December, 2013. 
82 Interview with Maasai elders in Nkampani village, 23.10. 2013. 
83 Interview with Maasai elders in Nkampani, January, 2014. 
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ownership rights to various parcels of land, as well as numerous cases relating to 
entitlements to land filed by Maa-speakers against members of their own community 
or those of Kikuyu descent and vice versa, constrained the subdivision process. 
Moreover, corruption allegations on the side of the Demarcation Committee dragged 
the subdivision process to completion in 200784, having lasted for close to four 
decades since its inception. 
Notwithstanding such dynamics, cultivation in the study area increased rapidly in the 
1980s as farmers sought to utilise “their” parcels of land to deter others from claiming 
ownership at the time of the subdivision. In the early 1990s, however, the rapid 
agricultural expansion in Enoosupukia was disrupted in the run-up to the 1992 
general elections, which set the stage for political conflict. A new multi-party era in 
Kenya shaped ethnic strife targeted particularly on migrant groups (known politically 
as “aliens”) supposedly settling in regions that were traditionally occupied by other 
groups (see Klopp, 2001). Existing tensions and conflicts on the Maiella side also 
took a new twist, gearing up for violence. 
The “survival” of Kikuyu in traditionally pastoral Maasai lands required of them to 
show allegiance by voting for William Ole Ntimama, a then powerful government 
minister and a Maasai politician – whom they defied in favour of a regime change. 
Nevertheless, Ole Ntimama, who stood on a Kenya African National Union (KANU) 
ticket, was elected unopposed in the December 1992 general elections, which were 
marred with allegations of massive vote rigging, political “silencing” of opponents, and 
ethnic violence, especially in the Rift Valley. Ole Ntimama soon embarked on a 
spirited effort to evict the Kikuyu from Enoosupukia, arguing that their farming 
activities had destroyed the Enoosupukia forest and water catchment areas in Narok.  
In excerpts from the Daily Nations newspaper, shown below (Figure 9), Ole Ntimama 
stated, “We shall not turn back, we cannot allow our innocent people to suffer 
because of other peoples’ greed” (Daily Nation, September 13, 1993). A few weeks 
later, in October 1993, the Daily Nation reported on massive violence in Enoosupukia 
in which over twenty Kikuyu farmers were killed (Daily Nation, October 18, 1993, see 
below). About 10,000 farmers were forcibly evicted from Enoosupukia, allegedly to 
restore the damaged forest. The violence was perpetrated by an unofficial Maasai 
                                                          
84 Title deeds have not been issued for the areas demarcated to date, but only recently to those 
resettled in Sintakara village after eviction from the “protected” Enoosupukia forest.  
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militia of hundreds of morans (an age-set of young Maasai), game wardens, and 
administration police, assisted by a small core of local government officials and some 
residents, most of whom were eager to take back small parcels of land they had sold 
to Kikuyu farmers (Klopp, 2001: 164; Hornsby, 2012: 548). The Enoosupukia trading 
centre, as well as churches and schools, which were attended by both Maasai and 
Kikuyu children, were burned or destroyed. 
However, sources differ regarding the estimates of those killed in the violence. 
Hornsby (2012: 548) put the dead at over twenty, while Matter (2004) estimates the 
number of dead at about fifty. Klopp (2001: 163) has an estimate of thirty-five, while 
Little (1998) puts the number at seventeen. None of these sources specify the 
ethnicity of the dead.  
Informants at Maiella and Enoosupukia who witnessed the violence had difficulty in 
estimating the people who died in the violence; numbers ranged between twenty and 
fifty. A few informants who witnessed the violence described the situation. According 
to them, administration police and game wardens disguised in Maasai shuka (red 
robes) shot and killed Kikuyu farmers who tried to salvage belongings as they fled. 
Immediately, morans wounded the dead farmers’ bodies using machetes to conceal 
bullet wounds. Others noted that morans carried their dead to distant places for 
burial. It is believed that Kikuyu men who retaliated killed about fifteen morans.  
During the “tribal clashes”, manusu were blamed by Kikuyu for showing allegiance to 
Maasai, while some Maasai blamed them for failing to openly declare their most 
preferred affiliate at the time. In some instances, both Kikuyu and Maasai accuse 
manusu of double standards in land matters to date. Women, girls, and 
uncircumcised boys were not harmed in the violence – probably an indication of 
strong adherence to a code during warfare involving moran fighters. A Kikuyu woman 
described how she intercepted morans who approached her home in Enoosupukia:  
My husband [a Kikuyu] was in the house when about six armed morans came. 
I intercepted them at the compound and began wailing, “Please do not kill me!, 
why would you kill a woman? Please! Please!”. I knew I was endangering my 
life but I had to save my husband who quickly escaped to safety when the 
morans were busy soothing me. When they entered my house, one of them 
reached inside the pants of my son to check if he was circumcised, and upon 
realising that he was not, they departed after warning us to leave the area 
immediately.  
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          Daily Nation, Sept 13, 1993                              Daily Nation, Sept 14, 1993 
 
 
Daily Nation, October 18, 1993 
 
Figure 9. Newspaper clippings: William Ole Ntimama vows to evict Kikuyu “aliens”  
               from Enoosupukia, Narok; Members of Parliament (MPs) react to the  
               incitement remarks soon afterwards; Violence breaks out there after  
               leaving dozens killed and thousands forcibly evicted from the area 
               (Source: Nation Media Group Archives, Nairobi).  
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Photograph  5. Remains of a church at the destroyed Enoosupukia town (source:  
                         field data, 2014). 
 
Thousands of internally displaced people, most of them members of the Kikuyu 
community, pitched camp in a Catholic Church at Maiella trading centre where they 
received food aid and shelter from NGOs and members of the public. The National 
Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK), which kept a list of those displaced, estimated 
that there were around 10,000 victims (Klopp, 2001: 168).  
In late 1994, many of the displaced people were transported in government trucks 
and “dumped” in Central Province (the perceived land of their ancestors) under the 
cover of night (Hornsby, 2012: 549; Klopp, 2001: 175). Only a few were resettled in 
Moi Ndabi (Figure 4), a controversial settlement scheme. The state resettled only 
about 200 families at Moi Ndabi, which is approximately 5 Km from Lake Naivasha. 
Informants said that Kalenjin families were given 10 acres of land; Maasai families 
were given 5 acres, while the rightful IDPs, Kikuyu, received 2.5 acres per family. 
Klopp (2001: 175) sees the skewed allocation of land as a form of reward to 
supporters of the then ruling government. Therefore, hundreds of internally displaced 
people rented houses in Maiella trading centre.  
William Ole Ntimama, who Klopp (2001: 154) described as “a high powered 
patronage boss”, has since been blamed for the attacks. Prior to the violence, Ole 
Ntimama warned Kikuyu in a political rally that he would “press them and make them 
lie low like an envelope”85. Ole Ntimama’s media rhetoric may have made him the 
                                                          
85 Interview with Kikuyu informants who attended the rally, January 2014. 
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most culpable for instigating the violence, but some informants noted that there were 
firm indications that the meticulously planned and executed violence was associated 
with more powerful actors in the ruling government.  
Some local informants and representatives of the county government (whose names 
and positions are withheld due to the sensitivity of the matter) believe that the 
meticulous organisation and perpetration of the attacks may not have involved Ole 
Ntimama alone. To them, other elites, probably more powerful politicians than Ole 
Ntimama himself and businesspersons with interests in the area, who cared for the 
welfare of neither Kikuyu nor Maa-speakers, may have had a hand in the violence. 
They allege that the agricultural potential of Enoosupukia must have been in the mind 
of the organisers of the violence, with the intention to grab it.  
The agency of local actors is also important here. As evidence shows, some selfish 
Maa-speakers of Enoosupukia supported the violence in a bid to take back the plots 
of land they had earlier sold or given to members of the Kikuyu community. The land 
that was mainly targeted included plots which were entangled in protracted disputes 
over boundaries and/or the actual sizes of pieces of land that Maasai (including 
Dorobo) sold or gave to their Kikuyu neighbours. Some Maa-speaking youths took 
advantage of the violence to repossess lands they believed to be their rightful 
inheritance, which their parents and grandparents had however given/sold to Kikuyu 
farmers. Land disputes of this kind threaten intergroup cooperation to this day (see 
Case 11).   
Kikuyu informants also suggested that some local perpetrators of the violence aimed 
to make quick money from the very Kikuyu to whom they had already sold land at 
cheap prices. They did so by demanding financial “compensation” from the Kikuyu 
concerned, with the intention to meet the prevailing market rate and economic 
potential of such lands. Others hold that Ole Ntimama wanted to evict them from 
Enoosupukia to create grazing space for his fellow Purko Maasai.  
 
 
110 
 
 
 
Photograph  6. Maasai cattle grazing on the remains of Enoosupukia forest. In the  
                        last decade, the county government in collaboration with the Wangari 
                        Maathai’s Green Belt Movement initiated reforestation to rehabilitate  
                        the forest. However, rampant invasion of the remnants of the forest by 
                        pastoralists, loggers, and farmers constrain such efforts (source: field  
                        data, 2014). 
 
In spite of these explanations, scholars and human rights groups link politics to the 
“culture of violence” in Kenya and the study area (KHRC, 1998: 2011; Anderson and 
Lochery, 2013: Anderson, 2010; Kanyinga, 2009; Galaty, 1992; Klopp, 2001: 134-
160; Human Rights’ Watch, 1993; Waki, 2008; Akiwumi, 2001). As discussed, 
patronage politics transformed earlier disputes and small-scale conflicts into large-
scale violence. Indeed, prior to the violence, relationships between Maasai and their 
Kikuyu neighbours were largely peaceful (Matter, 2004: 73). 
It is important to emphasise that the violence in Maiella and Enoosupukia in 1993 
only represents one of the many areas in the Rift Valley and elsewhere that suffered 
the brunt of politicised violence in the 1990s and after 2000. A report prepared by the 
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and Kenya Human Rights 
Commission (KHRC) in 2007, “Massive Internal Displacements in Kenya Due to 
Politically Instigated Ethnic Clashes”86, lists about a dozen districts87 that were 
affected by political violence in the 1990s and 2000s, and provides testimonies of 
                                                          
86 Available online https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/Kenya_engNB.pdf  (Accessed 05.05.2016).  
87 The districts include Narok, Laikipia, Kajiado, Uasin Nkishu, Nandi, Nakuru, Trans Nzoia, Trans 
Mara, and others on the Kenyan coast.  
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many of the affected victims. The report shows that the affected come from diverse 
ethnic groups.  
 
Costs of violence and reinstating peaceful relationships 
Between 1995 and early 2000, a great deal of time was spent preaching peace, 
reconciliation and coexistence between the two warring groups. The church, NGOs, 
local administration (chiefs), and elders from Maasai and Kikuyu communities 
spearheaded peace forums, which centred on intergroup dialogue. Peace forums 
brought together the youth, women, religious leaders, and elders from both groups to 
discuss a way toward reconciliation.  
The high costs associated with the violence were unbearable for many: sick Maasai 
in Enoosupukia could not visit the main hospital in Maiella after the violence for fear 
of being attacked by Kikuyu. Most boda boda (motorcycle) operators who plied their 
trade along Maiella and Enoosupukia routes suspended their services, rendering the 
most reliable means of transport for food and people unavailable. This especially 
affected the Maasai, since the Kikuyu controlled the boda boda business. 
Schoolchildren, especially from Enoosupukia, stayed at home because their schools 
had been burned down (Klopp, 2001: 170). Shortages of food increased since food 
crops had been set on fire on the farms or fed to Maasai herds.  
Consequently, landowners in Enoosupukia already began to look for land-seeking 
clients among the Kikuyu a few months after the violence as a result of looming 
poverty, perhaps an indication that the survival of Maa-speakers was partially linked 
to the presence and activities of Kikuyu neighbours. This also reminds us how, 
historically, groups used to appropriate ties and alliances as a form of insurance 
during difficult times.  
Indeed, the “return to peace” was especially encouraged by the Maasai. Discussions 
on how to reinstate peaceful relations and to manage future conflicts were conducted 
in over fifty meetings involving the area chiefs and local Maasai and Kikuyu elders, 
who later spread the word through the villages among youths, women, and church 
groups.  
Intergroup dialogue breathed renewed strength into efforts at peaceful coexistence in 
many peace forums, including peace tournaments organised by the Association of 
Media Women in Kenya (AMWIK), as well as in related peace campaigns by World 
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Vision of Ndabibi, Naivasha. Awareness was raised of the potential for the political 
instrumentalisation of violence, and youths were cautioned against being used to 
further others’ selfish political aims. 
Trust between Maasai and Kikuyu began to take root again in the early 21st century. 
Hundreds of the internally displaced people who had taken refuge in Maiella trading 
centre began to return to the former conflict areas to re-rent or reclaim their land. 
Local peacebuilding efforts received the support of the state, which embarked on the 
devolution of capacities for enhancing peace and security to the local level through 
local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi from 2010. Chapter 8 deals with local 
peace committees and Nyumba Kumi institutions in detail.  
Apart from local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi, higher courts are also 
involved in the settlement of land disputes in Maiella and Enoosupukia. The most 
famous court case, which relates to a dispute over Maiella Estate between members 
of Ng’ati Farmers’ Society and the Nkampani Maasai, began in 1996 and lasted for 
over a decade. It was admitted in the Court of Appeal in Nakuru that the Maasai were 
occupying some portions of the 16,338 acres of Maiella Estate and that they had 
jointly built thereon five primary schools and a secondary school. However, the Ng’ati 
Society contended that the occupation by the Maasai was pursuant to a written 
agreement entered into in 1979 allowing the Maasai to graze and use the dipping 
facilities for their cattle at an annual fee of KES 3,700 (€370). Ng’ati farmers added 
that the agreement only allowed for grazing, and that the Maasai were not supposed 
to start forest fires or to construct manyattas, cut trees, burn charcoal, or invite other 
Maasai onto the suit land, let alone build schools88. 
After a decade of heated and expensive proceedings, the High Court of Kenya ruled 
in favour of the Maasai, on the grounds of marginalisation and historical injustices, 
allowing them to be apportioned 4,027 acres out of the 16,338 acres of the farm.  
The invocation of “marginalisation” especially privileges Maasai over other groups in 
land claims (see Hodgson, 2011; Little, 1998: 444; 1992: 4).  
The ruling, though received with heated criticism from both groups, inculcated 
cooperative use of natural resources, and access rights to land have since been 
                                                          
88 Court of Appeal at Nakuru, No. 64 of 2004: Between Ng’ati Farmers’ Co-operative Society Limited 
(Appellant) and Counsellor John Ledidi and 15 Others (Respondents). An appeal from the judgement 
and decree of the High Court of Kenya at Nakuru (Rimita, J.) dated 12th May 2002, In HCCC NO. 89 
of 1996. 
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negotiated peacefully (as discussed in the following chapter). Interestingly, the 
Maasai have extensively leased the land allocated to them by the court to Kikuyu and 
other farmers. It thus befits its name, Nkampani, which is derived from enkampa, a 
Maa word referring to a cultivated area.  
The court case demonstrated the value that contemporary Maasai attach to land 
ownership. It reiterates David Campbell’s assertion that land is supplanting cattle as 
the critical and valued resource in Maasailand (Campbell, 1993). Before closing this 
chapter, I would like to present a summary of half a century of conflict and land 
related tensions and their impacts on existing cross-cutting ties (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Overview over conflicts and violence in Maiella and Enoosupukia (1970- 
               2014) 
 
Year Explanation and Type 
of Conflict 
Timeframe  Organisers 
and 
Perpetrators 
Impact on 
Cross-cutting 
Ties 
1968-early 
1970s 
Land-related conflicts: 
struggle over control of 
Ng’ati farm between 
Kikuyu Ng’ati farmers 
and Keekonyokie 
Maasai of Nkampani 
village– 
destruction/burning of 
houses and crop fields, 
and killing of cattle at the 
boundary of the disputed 
area.  
Retaliatory 
attacks 
lasting 
between a 
few hours to 
days. 
- Retaliation 
between 
Morans and 
Kikuyu men 
for damages 
caused.  
-No mention of 
politicians 
instigating the 
conflict. 
 
-Markets in 
Maiella and 
Suswa still 
shared. 
 -No reports of 
divorce or 
separation in 
interethnic 
intermarriages. 
-Cooperative 
land-use at 
Enoosupukia 
continued.  
Mid-1970s 
and 1980s 
Land-related tensions: 
Land tenure reforms 
were a main driver of 
violence. Enoosupukia 
and Maiella were shifting 
from 
community/group/trust 
ownership to private 
property. Intra- and 
inter-community 
struggles over rights of 
tenure.  
 
1977-1980s. 
 
 
-Impacts of 
multiparty 
politics already 
beginning to 
take shape 
against 
migrant 
Kikuyu. 
-No violence 
reported. 
-Boundaries 
negotiated 
peacefully despite 
adverse political 
campaigns. 
-Intermarriage 
and cooperative 
land-use 
persisted. 
-Markets 
uninterrupted.  
1991-
1993 
Political and Land-
related conflicts and 
Violence: Multi-party 
(Majimbo) politics along 
ethnic largely accounted 
for the violence. 
-Conflicts 
between 
1991 and 
1992. 
-Violence in 
October 
-Local 
politicians with 
a grassroots 
core of 
organisers. 
-Several schools 
and Enoosupukia 
shopping centre 
destroyed.  
-Eviction of 
Kikuyu and 
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However, restoration of 
Enoosupukia forest was 
offered as the main 
reason for evicting 
Kikuyu farmers who 
were blamed for its 
destruction. (See also 
Anderson and Lochery, 
2008; Anderson, 2007; 
Klopp, 2001). 
1993 lasting 
for about 3-7 
days. 
-Forceful 
evictions of 
Kikuyu 
farmers from 
Enoosupukia 
in late 1993 
and 1994. 
-Over 20 
Kikuyu lives 
lost; 
unaccounted 
number of 
Maasai killed 
by Kikuyu 
fighters. 
 
-Police and 
game wardens 
deployed to 
assist in the 
eviction. 
-Hundreds of 
Maasai 
Morans from 
outside 
Enoosupukia 
“poured” into 
the area by 
government 
trucks. 
-Some rogue 
local actors 
wanted to 
repossess the 
lands already 
transferred to 
Kikuyu 
farmers. 
 
(See Klopp, 
2001: 164; 
Hornsby, 
2012: 548; 
Human Rights’ 
Watch, 1993).  
Kikuyu-friendly 
Maasai/Dorobo 
from 
Enoosupukia. 
-Narok/Nakuru 
borders 
impassable for 
fear of 
retaliations, 
crippling access 
to markets, 
hospital and 
public transport at 
Maiella. 
- Some Kikuyu in-
laws living with 
Maasai family 
protected. 
-Food crops and 
livestock of some 
evicted Kikuyu 
tenants protected 
by their landlords. 
-Some Maasai 
landowners 
offered security to 
their Kikuyu 
clients at the time 
of harvesting of 
their crops. 
 
2007/2008 
to 2014 
-Tensions in Maiella and 
Enoosupukia following 
the 2007/8 post-election 
violence, especially in 
Kenya’s Rift Valley. 
-Peaceful coexistence 
and resolution of land-
related disputes through 
LPCs and courts from 
2008-2014. 
 
-No violence 
was reported 
in the study 
area in 
2007/2008.  
-Rumours had 
it that 
unknown 
Maasai 
bandits 
threatened to 
cause 
mayhem in 
Maiella for 
selfish gains– 
this did not 
materialise.  
- During the post-
election violence 
of 2007/8 many 
Kikuyu and 
Maasai opted to 
remain indoors 
while others 
converged at 
Maiella Centre to 
follow of the post-
election violence 
on television. 
-Normal 
operations 
continued in the 
markets and 
fields, albeit with 
caution due to the 
potential for 
spread of 
violence to the 
study area. 
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-Land rentals and 
intermarriages 
increased.  
 
 
This section has explored the question of post-colonial land transfers and its link to 
violent conflicts. It adds knowledge to colonial land exchanges and transactions 
between Maasai, Dorobo, and Kikuyu. It is important to emphasise in the preceding 
section the value of local efforts to reinstate peaceful relations after the 1993 
violence. In short, peaceful intercommunity relations are possible after a collapse 
situation.  
Apart from Maasai and Kikuyu, scholars and the media report on other agro-pastoral 
communities in Kenya, which have shown optimism and determination in the 
transition from conflict to coexistence. In 2001, a resource-related conflict between 
Pokot and Marakwet communities left about fifty people dead. After the violence, 
community members, area leaders, and organisations (the Red Cross Society, Kerio 
Valley Development Authority etc.) cooperated to find solutions to cattle rustling and 
other vices. Through various peace initiatives targeting integration – water resource 
sharing from Embobot and Kerio rivers for irrigation cultivation, construction of 
schools to serve children in the two communities, and barter trade – the two 
neighbouring communities are in the process of rewriting their history. Community 
members also use local laws and customs (including the curse) in a bid to control 
cattle rustling and violence89. Similar stories are told among the Orma and Pokomo 
and other agro-pastoral groups in Kenya (Pkalya, Adan and Masinde, 2004; Cuppen, 
2013).  
 
The following chapters of the dissertation seek to answer the second question raised 
at the beginning of the thesis: To what extent do existing cross-cutting ties and the 
conflicting loyalties associated with them promote socio-economic interdependence 
and locally contextualised forms of social control necessary for peaceful relations 
between Maasai and Kikuyu in Maiella and Enoosupukia?  
                                                          
89 “Tot Kalowa peace project yields results in Elgeyo Marakwet”, Standard News Kenya,  Jan 31, 
2015,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p9j7tgK5UaA; “Residents of North Rift broker peace among 
warring communities”, Standard News Kenya,  May 24,  2015, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GjERCHwrkic 
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To answer this question, I will discuss the cross-cutting ties and conflicting loyalties 
which emerge from intermarriage, land rentals, and trade relations. The topics are 
organised into chapters; that is, Chapter 4, 5, 6, and 7 respectively. Interestingly, 
these intergroup social-economic relationships complement one another and give 
relevance to historical ties and networks of the last centuries between the Maasai 
(including Dorobo) and Kikuyu. The following chapters help to link the past to the 
present, revealing how the local communities in question adapt to changing local 
environments, property rights, and land-use patterns, and how actors form ties and 
alliances to benefit from local and national markets.  
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CHAPTER 4: Marriage-related cross-cutting ties 
 
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950) demonstrated the importance of marriage and 
kinship in understanding social cohesion among African societies: 
…a system of kinship and marriage can be looked at as an 
arrangement which enables persons to live together and co-operate 
with one another in an orderly social life.  
Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950:3) 
As already discussed in the introduction chapter, intermarriage between ethnic 
groups in Kenya has a long history. The rules of exogamy and other cultural factors 
only offer a partial explanation for the existence of marriage outside closely related 
groups, some of which formed part of this study. In addition to other social-economic 
motivations discussed in this chapter, the conflicting loyalties theory offers a possible 
explanation of the value of such alliances in minimising conflict. 
How do ties in intermarriage constitute conflicting loyalties? How do actors use 
marriage as a strategy to appropriate resources? By building on a recently published 
article on this topic, (Kioko and Bollig, 2015), this chapter describes the value of 
Maasai-Kikuyu marriage for peaceful relations in the south of the Lake Naivasha 
Basin. It presents findings from biographical interviews and oral testimonies, which 
traced the origin of marriage partners and the ties and conflicting loyalties (kin-based, 
friendship, or otherwise) which emerge out of intermarriage. Furthermore, I show 
how especially Kikuyu women married by Maasai fit into and/or change the Maasai 
ideal. 
About 140 biographical interviews were conducted across the six villages studied. 
The informants were selected deliberately to include as many cases of intermarriage 
between Maasai and Kikuyu as possible. Biographical interviews and questions 
relating to intermarriage revealed a disproportionate number of Maasai women 
married by Kikuyu men as opposed to Kikuyu women married by Maasai. In the first 
part of this chapter, this disparity in intermarriage is discussed. Thereafter the focus 
shifts to the description of how cross-cutting ties constitute conflicting loyalties, in 
order to explain peaceful relationships and reciprocity.  
Despite its importance in enhancing social cohesion, intermarriage has its share of 
difficulties. In the last section of the chapter, I will offer an example where co-wives 
(Maasai and Kikuyu) compete over the attention of their Maasai husband and over 
control of land and family property.   
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Maasai-Kikuyu intermarriage and cross-cutting ties 
This section opens with an overview of changing patterns of intermarriage between 
Maasai and Kikuyu over the last 50 years. I will then discuss why disparities in 
intermarriage exist, and the socio-economic consequences of Maasai–Kikuyu 
intermarriage. 
 
Changing patterns of intermarriage  
In a sample of 140 marriages documented for Maiella and Enoosupukia, 48 
intermarriages (34%) between Maasai and Kikuyu were recorded (Figure 7). Out of 
the 48, about 13 were recorded prior to the 1980s. Since the late 1980s (and 
surprisingly even in the early 1990s when the area faced violent conflicts) 
intermarriages have increased, with Maasai men habitually marrying Kikuyu wives. A 
considerable number of children result from these intermarriages. It is these children 
who embody the conflicting loyalties of their parents and kin. 
 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of intermarriages over the last 50 years (source: field data,  
               2014). 
 
The households resulting from these marriages accounted for over 250 children. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of Kikuyu women who are married into Maasai 
households in three villages, and the number of children of mixed identity. 
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Table 3. Number of intermarriages and mixed identities. 
 
Village 
Kikuyu Women 
Married by Maasai 
Children with Mixed Identity 
Nkampani            18                 104 
Olosho lole Kaloi            11                   70 
Mpeuti (including Kigumu)            19                                                  94
Total            48                  268 
(Source: field data, 2014). 
 
Sourcing spouses 
Kikuyu women who marry Maasai men come from diverse backgrounds as shown in 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Geographic (village) origins of Kikuyu women married among the Maasai.  
Village Place of origin 
 Kiambu Kitale Naivasha Meru Murang’a Nakuru Narok Ngong Nyahuruhu Nyeri TOTAL 
Nkampani 1 0 3 0 2 1 8 1 2 0 18 
Olosho 
lole Kaloi 
0 3 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 1 11 
Mpeuti 
/Kigumu 
5 0 8 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 19 
TOTAL 6 3 15 1 5 1 12 1 2 2 48 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
 
Naivasha and Narok score highest as places of origin for Kikuyu women in such 
mixed marriages (Table 4). Especially in Naivasha, the majority women who work in 
the cut-flower industry find husbands in the surrounding region (Kioko, 2012). 
Maiella, Kinangop, Naivasha town, Maai Mahiu, Ndabibi and Ng’ondi (see Figure 4) 
are social and economic spaces for both Maasai and Kikuyu, and as such are places 
where close relationships between Maasai and Kikuyu are more likely to emerge.  
A large number of Kikuyu came from Nairragie Enkare, a settlement near Narok 
town, and spread to other areas of the county in 1950s and 1960s. Initially, during 
the colonial period, administration officials at Narok used Nairragie Enkare, which is 
a few kilometres from Enoosupukia, as a “holding point” (a “protected” settlement 
scheme) for Kikuyu migrants who moved into the southern reserve. The main 
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purpose of the settlement scheme was to contain Kikuyu farmers in one particular 
area in a bid to limit the spread of cultivation in other parts of the reserve90.  
Later on, after independence, the Kikuyu began to spread outwards from Nairragie 
Enkare, sometime through intermarriage, into the areas dominated by Maa-speaking 
groups. 
Kikuyu women shared interesting stories about how they had met their Maasai 
husbands (Table 5).  
 
Table 5. Biographical notes of Kikuyu women marrying Maasai husbands. 
Kikuyu 
woman 
married to 
Maasai man 
 
Age 
 
Origin 
 
How the couple met 
 
 
Informant 1 
 
 
55 
 
 
Murang´a  
My parents moved from Muranga to Enoosupukia in the 1960s 
in search of a place to cultivate. They became friends with my 
husband’s parents (Maasai) and lived as neighbours. To 
cement their friendship I was given for marriage to this Maasai 
family in 1978. Since then we have lived as friends and in-laws. 
I am the only wife in this household and I have 9 children. 
 
Informant 2 
 
50 
 
Naivasha 
(Maiella).  
I visited my uncle who was farming in Olosho lole Kaloi village. 
During the visit I made friends with some Maasai youth. I 
eventually got married there in 1976. I am the only wife in the 
household and I have 14 children.  
 
Informant 3 
 
48 
 
Kitale  
 
My parents bought land in Olosho lole Kaloi village. I grew up in 
this village and eventually got married in 1984. I am the first 
wife of my husband, with 9 children. My husband’s second wife 
is Maasai and we live in peace.  
 
Informant 4 
 
47 
 
Naivasha 
(Ngondi) 
 
I met my husband in Ng’ondi as he was moving cattle during 
the dry season. We became friends and eventually got married 
in 1985. I am the only wife and I have 5 children. 
 
Informant 5 
 
40 
 
Kitale 
 
My father is the former head teacher of Olosho primary school. 
He bought land in this village and moved his family there. I 
grew up in the new village and got married in 1993. I am the 
first wife, with 8 children. My husband’s second wife is Maasai. 
 
 
Informant 6 
 
 
65 
 
 
Nyeri 
 
I was born in Nyeri. My mother maintained friendship with a 
Kikuyu woman who was a neighbour in Nyeri before she was 
married among the Maasai. When I came of age for marriage 
the woman asked my mother to have me marry her son. I was 
married to the son in 1978. I am the only wife, with 7 children. 
 
 
Informant 7 
 
 
38 
 
 
Muranga 
 
My parents migrated from Muranga to Enoosupukia in search 
of farmland in the 1970s. At Enoosupukia, our family became 
friends with the family of Tima Kaloi (Maasai). In 1993, we were 
evicted from Enoosupukia. We rented a house in Maiella and 
lived there. However, friendship between the two families 
                                                          
90 Rhodes House, Oxford/ Handing Over Report/Mr. A.D. Galton-Fenzi to Mr. R.A. Jeary/Narok 
District/1st March 1957, 3. 
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continued and was strengthened when my father gave me over 
to the son of Tima for marriage in 2001. I have 5 children. 
 
Informant 8 
 
25 
 
Naivasha 
(Ndabibi) 
 
My parents moved from Ndabibi in Naivasha to Enoosupukia to 
farm. We were evicted from Enoosupukia during the 1993 
violence and went back home to Ndabibi. I met my husband 
(Maasai) in Ndabibi when he was grazing. We got married in 
2010 and have 2 children. 
 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
Disparities in intermarriage 
While a large number of Kikuyu women are married to Maasai men, Kikuyu men 
show reluctance in marrying Maasai women. There are a number of reasons for this 
imbalance. 
 
Bridewealth: Kikuyu men suggested that the bridewealth required for a Maasai 
woman is high. For instance, to marry a Maasai woman who has managed to 
complete secondary education, one may be required to cover her education costs. In 
a separate study among the Gusii of Kenya, Hakansson (1990) shows a similar link 
between education, marriage, and bridewealth. In the context of my study, a focus 
group discussion at Ol tepesi le Parsimei village estimated bridewealth for an 
educated Maasai woman to be about KES 400,000 (€4,000). 
Additional bride wealth often includes four head of cattle (two mature cows with 
calves), several dozen to hundred small stock, shukas (Maasai cloth), and blankets 
for the bride’s father and his brother(s), and sugar and honey (about 4kg of each). In 
addition, a ram or bull is required for slaughtering at the wedding ceremony. 
However, it is still uncommon to find many Maasai girls who have completed 
secondary education in the study area.  
Bridewealth for young Maasai women who have not attained high school education is 
also high. For instance, Mrs. Molo, a Kikuyu woman married to a Maasai of 
Nkampani village, told us that she had already paid five head of cattle to the family of 
a Maasai girl who was barely 15 and was still attending primary school. For Mrs. 
Molo, early payment of bridewealth eases the burden in the future, at the time of the 
marriage. The Molos will already have settled much of the bride wealth before the 
actual marriage takes place.  
In contrast to approximations of bride wealth for Maasai women, Kikuyu often only 
require a cow and its calf, about 100 sheep, a blanket, and some cooking utensils as 
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bridewealth. Generally, the cost of these items is summed up and the bridewealth is 
then paid in the form of money. There is a tendency during these bridewealth 
negotiations to set lower prices for livestock than their actual market value. For 
instance, those who wish to give cash instead of livestock could be asked to pay 
KES 2,000 (€20) for a sheep as opposed to the actual market cost of about KES 
5,000 (€50). This is because the age and size of the livestock to be presented as 
bridewealth are rarely considered, except in the case of animals that will be 
slaughtered for a marriage-related feast.  
In the sampled households, some Maasai paid between KES 30,000 (€300) and KES 
60,000 (€600) as total bridewealth to their Kikuyu in-laws. Land has commonly been 
used as payment for bridewealth to some Kikuyu in-laws. This reiterates the notion 
that marriages could also be seen as strategies to appropriate resources. In both 
instances, payment of bridewealth is spread over a long period, customarily to foster 
dialogue between in-laws. The two families exchanging spouses, and their networks 
of kin and friends, “should” ultimately form an entity.  
Indeed the majority of Maasai men interviewed were still indebted to their Kikuyu in-
laws; some were planning to start paying bridewealth at the time of circumcision of 
the sons borne by the Kikuyu women. In most instances, they will pay almost the 
same amount irrespective of whether the women attended high school or primary 
school or not. 
 
Education: Among Maasai, education is largely a recent phenomenon and is still 
subject to immense cultural pressure. Kikuyu men usually do not want to bring home 
uneducated Maasai women. In contrast, educated and independent Maasai women 
rarely avail themselves for marriage to Kikuyu farmers who may be of lower 
academic qualification. Moreover, as Hakansson (1994) notes, “women’s 
opportunities and independence have increased, making them capable of making 
independent social and economic arrangements, which are especially shaped by 
political-economic factors as well as culture-specific gender and kinship identities”.  
Hakansson (1990) who studied marriages among the Gusii community, notes that 
women who possess higher education qualifications rarely marry illiterate men. 
Women in the studied area share similar incentives. However, the majority of illiterate 
Maasai men want to marry Kikuyu or Maasai women who have attended school at 
least to a level sufficient to meet the educational needs of the schoolgoing children. 
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Independent Kikuyu women who have attained higher education, on the other hand, 
consider some Maasai ideals like Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and polygyny to 
be archaic and do not avail themselves for marriage.   
 
Female Genital Mutilation: Generally, Kikuyu men have a negative attitude towards 
marrying circumcised women. FGM remains persistent in the study area among 
Maasai, and only a few girls manage to escape the cut. In-depth interviews 
conducted by Sarah Nyanjui (a Kikuyu research assistant who hails from Maiella) 
show that a good number of Kikuyu women married by Maasai men submitted 
themselves for circumcision to fit in the Maasai ideal, irrespective of their age at 
marriage. Some who underwent the cut already had children before marriage. They 
also recommend the practice for their daughters.  
Uncircumcised women in the Maasai society are considered immature and impure; 
midwives may not attend to them during childbirth unless a ritual ceremony is 
conducted to cleanse them. However, one must point out that not every Kikuyu 
woman who is married in the Maasai society undergoes the cut. In fact, very few 
Kikuyu women were willing to reveal such information about themselves and their 
friends. Nevertheless, the Maasai who abide by tradition laud Kikuyu women who 
practice FGM, because this demonstrates their willingness to adopt Maasai culture 
and traditions.  
 
Divorce, children: Formal marriage dissolution is very rare among the Maasai, but 
short-term marriage dissolution is common and usually involves the wife leaving the 
marital home and returning to her natal home (Coast, 2001: 89). Often, women cite 
lack of material support from their husbands, beating, and drunkenness among their 
reasons for leaving (also Coast, 2001).  
Marital disputes in the Maasai context are solved through negotiations between in-
laws, often with efforts from the groom’s family. Such security in marriage forms an 
important pull factor for Kikuyu women, which is cemented by childbirth. Especially 
when a Kikuyu woman married to a Maasai gives birth to a son, or sons, she 
culturally acquires respect, and her rights to land and family property (e.g. livestock) 
become more secure due to the value attached to children (especially sons) in 
Maasai culture.  
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The opposite is true in the contemporary Kikuyu lifestyle, where “rampant” 
elopements, separations, and divorce are commonplace; the sex of a child often 
does not matter as compared to Maasai culture. Table 25 (appendices) shows 
examples of how marital disputes between Kikuyu couples easily end in separation 
or divorce. In the Maasai context, community members may utilise various cultural 
laws to protect the union between a Maasai couple or a Maasai/Kikuyu couple who 
fall out in marriage. For instance, elders may threaten a husband or a wife with a 
curse if that person did not honour their marriage (see Case 5 Chapter 9).   
 
From cross-cutting ties to conflicting loyalties 
Irrespective of these disparities, intermarriage unites in-laws and their larger social 
networks of both Kikuyu and Maasai kin and friends. In-law bonds facilitate peaceful 
relations between the families tied in kinship, but may also influence their friends and 
neighbours in a similar direction. Through in-law relations, the wider network of 
friends gains opportunities to negotiate for access rights to land. In-laws and their 
close core of friends receive land as gifts and/or through purchase.  
Intermarriage therefore plays a crucial role in the context of access to land and 
settlement. Kikuyu as wife-givers and Maasai as landlords who lease land to Kikuyu 
clients demonstrate a reciprocal social relationship where each party is indebted to 
the other – usually in the form of an exchange of daughters for land.  
Possible disputes over land thus become a family matter rather than a cause of 
disagreement between ethnic groups. This makes disputes easier to manage and 
averts instances of large-scale rivalry. As noted by Flap (1997: 209), persons that 
find themselves in situations of conflicting loyalties frequently and for long periods will 
gradually develop strong self-discipline and tolerance. 
Apart from access rights to land, intermarriage strengthens personal security, 
involves a wide range of socially meaningful material flows, and grows economically 
meaningful ties, as explained from a Kikuyu point of view:  
The Maasai have a lot of respect for their in-laws. Since the time my 
three daughters got married to Maasai husbands, I feel respected. I 
occasionally receive presents sent by my in-laws, especially in the 
form of foodstuffs brought by boda boda [motorcycles]. The Maasai 
have become loyal customers in my bar here in Maiella and in my 
lodges too. To cement these relations, I occasionally throw a party in 
their honour where I call all my Maasai friends for goat eating and 
celebrations… they go home drunk, calling my name and celebrating 
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me. The 1993 “clashes” can be thought of as ordinary conflicts in any 
family setting. However, if violence did occur while I was in the 
homestead of any of my in-laws or my Maasai friends, I would be 
offered protection, and if I had to leave for safety’s sake they would 
hire a boda boda to take me home. However, I have not encountered 
such cases.  
(Shushu, Maiella Centre, 21.8.2013) 
 
According to Shushu, security and cordial relations, which involve a wide range of 
material transfers and which feed into local business networks, are enhanced 
through intermarriages. Kikuyu and Maasai in-laws and their larger networks of 
families and friends feel safe in the presence of one another and often celebrate the 
gains achieved. The exchanges shown in the excerpt may be compared to those 
among the Trobriand Islanders (Mauss, 1925). They become foundations for social 
constraint, reciprocal exchange, or unreciprocated sharing91, which are important in 
enhancing social solidarity. 
The stability of Maasai marriages was especially notable since no divorce or 
separation was reported, especially at the time of the violence (in 1993). Instead, 
some Kikuyu families took refuge with their Maasai in-laws and friends, while the 
majority of Kikuyu left their properties under the care of Maasai families. In Ol tepesi 
le Parsimei village, for instance, the Nadokila family offered refuge to a Kikuyu 
brother-in-law after the Enoosupukia evictions. He settled on a piece of land that was 
paid as bridewealth for his sister.  
Elsewhere, in Olosho lole Kaloi village, many Kikuyu tenants left their belongings and 
crop farms under the care of their Maasai relatives or friends. Some Kikuyu women 
who had married into Maasai villages moved outside the conflict areas temporarily 
with the assistance of their husbands.  
However, since women and children are not to be harmed during violence 
irrespective of their ethnicity, as dictated in Maasai custom since at least the 1800s, 
some Kikuyu women did not flee the violence. Others fled only when it became clear 
that some perpetrators of the violence were in fact non-Maasai who were targeting 
Maasai households thought to be Kikuyu-friendly (also Klopp, 2001: 163–170).  
                                                          
91 Thomas Widlok (2013:17) differentiates “sharing” from “reciprocity. He quotes James Woodburn 
(1998) who noted that sharing is characterized precisely by contexts in which transfer is not 
[necessarily] based on specific kin obligations and in which it is not creating specific long-term 
commitments. 
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Later on, however, some Kikuyu tenants complained that some Maasai hosts had 
taken advantage of their absence and grabbed their land and food crops. Some also 
reported that their properties and household items were either damaged or stolen. 
The Maasai concerned instead shifted blame to the perpetrators of the violence. 
Such grievances still find their way to the courts today, despite attempts to find 
solutions at the local level.  
In Enoosupukia, Kikuyu women are lauded for introducing cultivation into Maasai 
households, thereby providing alternative food sources for often large Maasai 
households. Adoption of Kikuyu farming techniques (for Irish potatoes, carrots etc.) 
by Maasai has lowered their risk of poverty. The presence of staple food also means 
that Maasai do not have to sell livestock in large numbers in order to provide money 
to buy food or for school fees. In this way, farming is increasingly attributed to the 
stabilisation of household herds, as emphasised by Allen: 
Today, many Maasai households with Kikuyu wives are easily 
detectable due to the presence of food crops such as bananas, 
Irish potatoes, maize, and beans. The gardens are also well 
tended. These families never care for blood, milk, or meat as 
food, and they do not frequently sell livestock to buy food as 
they did before. Cultivation has given Maasai hope in livestock 
production.  
    (Allen at Maiella Centre, 19.8.2013) 
 
Kikuyu women have gained respect in Maasailand for “bringing development” – small 
businesses and off-farm activities, the safeguarding and expansion of herds and 
farmland, and education. Trading centres in Maasai villages feature small hotels and 
shops, which have transformed rural villages into micro-trading centres. Trust 
between Maasai shop owners and Kikuyu suppliers has necessitated the exchange 
of goods through credit. 
In Nkampani village, for instance, a Kikuyu woman who married into the area started 
the only kiosk that offers mobile phone charging services, owing to the lack of 
electricity in the area (only until recently). Further, Kikuyu traders provide a ready 
market for Maasai herds both locally and regionally, while also marginally inculcating 
the practice of keeping exotic livestock breeds among the Maasai.  
For most Maasai, however, modern breeds are still expensive to maintain, especially 
given the rapidly changing landscape. Kikuyu women are also regarded as socially 
competent in that they involve themselves in community development activities such 
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as women’s groups and faith-based organisations. As a result, some have been 
elected by villagers to join local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi committees 
(see chapter 8).  
Some become agents of change. For instance, Veronica, a Kikuyu woman married in 
Mpeuti village, dedicates much of her time to tackling topics relating to reproductive 
health with her Maasai friends. Veronica encourages Maasai women to abandon the 
tradition of relying on midwives. Instead, she informs them about the value of 
antenatal clinics as the best way to avert many potential dangers during pregnancy 
and childbirth. These are among many ways through which Kikuyu women try to fit in 
the Maasai society – establishing belonging by offering themselves in useful ways for 
the service of others. 
 
As discussed, intermarriage not only provides for non-obligatory material transfers 
and exchanges but also creates social and economic environments, which provide 
land-renting opportunities for land-seeking clients and in-laws. I argue here that 
intermarriages as described create enabling spaces for coexistence, 
interdependence, and conflict management, especially where disputes over land are 
handled with due respect for inherent ties.  
Moreover, rather than encouraging the emotional attachment to a particular ethnic 
identity, intermarriage allows for “divided” or “mixed” identities, builds inter-group 
allegiances or conflicting loyalties, and necessitates cultural diffusion, which links 
communities together through internalized norms, values (e.g. circumcision), and 
institutions. As discussed, ties that are linked to marriage transcend the immediate 
reasons for which they are intended and open up windows of opportunity in social 
exchange and economic transactions.  
Indeed, intermarriage rather neutralises notions of “we” versus “them”, which, if 
triggered politically or otherwise, may lead to violent conflict. The sharing of norms, 
values, and institutions prompts people to engage in dialogue and to appreciate 
cultural diversities.  
More importantly, the discussion shows that the 1993 violence did little to erode the 
marriage-related cross-cutting ties between Maasai and Kikuyu. Rather than causing 
divorce, separation, or disunity, the violence may have served to strengthen the 
institution of marriage, whose effect can be seen in the rising cases of intermarriage 
after the violence. The use of marriage strategically to appropriate resources is not 
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new in the studied groups, as already noted. However, it is necessary to explore the 
institution of marriage and related developments under conditions of rapid social-
economic changes, where such alliances may not necessarily escalate violence, as 
observed by Schlee (1997). Rivalry in a polygynous setup involving Maasai and 
Kikuyu wives is possible, as discussed below.  
 
Rivalry in polygyny, control of land, and challenging patriarchy  
In The World of Telelia (Spear and Waller, 1993: 157-172), Telelia Chieni and Paul 
Spencer narrate the worldview of a Maasai woman of Matapato in a polygynous 
setting. Telelia describes powerlessness among women against the patriarchy of 
male authority in the Maasai society. She also reveals some form of symbolic power 
associated with Maasai women in the society – the means through which sons are 
born, raised, and acquire wealth (livestock). Women also feed their husbands just 
like they feed their small children.  
Whereas patriarchy still defines authority and decision-making with regard to 
inheritance and family matters in the basic social unit of the Maasai community, 
fieldwork revealed a rather striking change where polygyny involves Maasai and 
Kikuyu co-wives. As observed during fieldwork, Kikuyu women who are married to 
Maasai men increasingly make decisions relating to the use of land, especially 
regarding the crops to be grown and, sometimes, the sale of surplus produce.  
In fact, some of these Kikuyu women make commercial agriculture their main 
economic activity; some keep chicken for sale. When asked, a good number said 
that their intention was to become financially independent so that they could limit 
dependency on their husbands and thus reduce the power and authority that male 
breadwinners exert over poor wives.  
Strategies to control land in a Kikuyu/Maasai polygynous setup was also noted. The 
Kikuyu wife will most likely select a portion of her husband’s land for cultivation and 
consciously protect it as her own property even if it means preventing her Maasai co-
wife from utilising the farm. Jane, a Kikuyu woman married to a Maasai man of 
Nkampani village, explained: 
I personally “opened” this farm when I got married. Before then, the land was 
bare except for grass and scrubs. I prepared the land and began to grow 
crops for my family. I also sell some produce. Recently, my husband married a 
Maasai woman as a second wife, without my consent. I am still unhappy about 
129 
 
the marriage but I must continue to care for my children. If she wants to farm, 
she must “open” her own land elsewhere and fend for her children. 
(Jane, Nkampani village, February 2014) 
 
This is a form of competition (or jealousy), which places the husband in the middle. It 
is also a strategy for establishing a foothold in terms of family resources. Such 
competition has the potential to generate massive divisions in a polygynous setting, 
especially where the husband has made a decision to marry a second wife without 
consulting his first wife. To minimise marital conflicts in a polygynous setting, 
husbands who own land in different locations opt to relocate one of their wives to a 
different piece of land. Each wife then enjoys the opportunity to control the land 
allocated to her by her husband. The majority of men without much land may decide 
to build their wives houses that are further away from one another within the same 
compound. 
Possible marital disputes and property rights contestations between co-wives in a 
Maasai/Kikuyu context are minimised when a husband and the first wife share the 
decision to bring home a second wife. In most cases, the first wife will suggest a 
possible second wife to her husband, after the former has vetted her. Some will 
propose to have their friend as a co-wife in a bid to limit future divisions in the family. 
Moreover, the first wife (irrespective of her ethnic background) may decide to find her 
husband a second wife in order to enhance her symbolic position as the mother of a 
large family including the children born of her co-wife.  
It is important to emphasise, however, that decisions regarding marriage differ 
between individuals and families; most men still insist on controlling such decisions. 
However, based on observation, the majority of marriages between Kikuyu women 
and Maasai men are monogamous. In fact, most Kikuyu women do not subscribe to 
the decision to have their Maasai husbands bring home a co-wife. A good number of 
Maasai men are actually happy to have smaller “nuclear” families, particularly due to 
difficult economic conditions where schooling and other needs are important. 
Nevertheless, some Maasai men impregnate their mistresses in order to use this as 
an excuse to marry them. 
Above all, the majority of Kikuyu women married by Maasai men told us that they do 
not subscribe to polyandry – the long-standing custom in Maasai culture where a 
woman ideally marries the age group of his husband. “Wife-sharing” in Maasai 
culture means that a husband must give up his bed (wife) to a visiting age-mate. The 
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woman is obliged customarily to entertain the visitor, sometimes sexually; otherwise, 
the visitor may curse her fertility or that of the livestock.  
However, the cultural significance of polyandry and wife-sharing is largely 
constrained by the rising cases of HIV/AIDS. Consequently, the Maasai and Kikuyu 
we spoke to prohibit sexual relations outside the family setting. However, cases of 
extramarital affairs persist. To limit polyandry, some women revealed to my female 
research assistant that they claim that they are sick, are having their menstrual 
period, or are pregnant to deter a visitor (age-mate of the husband) from demanding 
sexual favours. The Maasai youth we spoke to said that polyandry was on the 
decrease in their society.  
 
The following chapter deals with land transactions; how formerly contested land 
resources become shared. It will also briefly highlight the position and value of 
intermarriage in the access and control of land.  
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CHAPTER 5: Land transactions: from contested to shared 
landscapes 
 
Commercial cultivation in former communally owned pastoral rangelands in East 
Africa has rapidly increased in the last few decades, sometimes raising the question 
of the sustainability of traditional pastoralism. Nowadays, these frontiers are 
important food sources for local, national, and regional markets that are experiencing 
rising growth in populations. In particular, mobility and fragmentation of pastoral 
lands and subsequent agricultural intensification rapidly increased in Kenya and 
Tanzania in the last few decades of the twentieth century, often negatively affecting 
neighbouring wildlife conservation areas (e.g. Lesorogol, 2008; Börjeson, Hodgson, 
and Yanda, 2008; Leslie and McCabe, 2013 and Okello, 2005). In the studied area, 
cultivation, through leasehold arrangements, has extensively changed the Narok 
landscape during the past three decades. 
This chapter explores land rentals (leaseholds) as key drivers of the ongoing 
conversion of formerly communally owned pastoral landscapes into intensively 
cultivated landscapes. Apart from describing how actors negotiate and organise 
leaseholds, the chapter discusses the value of leasehold arrangements and related 
cross-cutting ties for peaceful coexistence between Maa-speaking landowners and 
Kikuyu clients in the south of the Kenya’s Rift Valley92.  
How does competition over land turn to cooperation facilitating new arrangements of 
property rights and changing land use in multi-ethnic settings? How does land 
become a social and an economic resource, and what is the implication of leaseholds 
in peacebuilding? What forms of disputes and conflicts arise in the context of shared 
land resources as actors strive to maximise both cultivation and pastoralism, and how 
are these attended to on the local level?  
In the attempt to address these questions, the chapter shows how scarce resources 
offer the promise of social integration and cohesion in shared social-ecological 
spaces. Discussion thus goes beyond the popular depiction of land as a highly 
contentious and socially divisive form of capital to investigate its unifying effect and 
its contribution to social capital.  
                                                          
92 The discussion builds on a recently published article (Kioko and Bollig, 2015). 
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The chapter opens with a brief overview on land rentals across ethnic boundaries. 
Thereafter, I will show how actors advertise land and how they negotiate prices and 
lease periods. I will then focus on trust-building between landowners and land-
seeking clients and describe the cross-cutting ties that emerge out of shared 
landscapes. Data for this chapter was particularly gathered through participant 
observation, where the researcher rented farmland from a Dorobo owner during 
fieldwork (see methods “cultivating researcher”).  
 
Land rentals in the Maasai/Kikuyu context  
Almost every Kikuyu family in Enoosupukia and Maiella is engaged in farming, either 
on rented land or on their own land. Maa-speaking families too are increasingly 
engaging themselves in cultivation, but to a lesser extent than the Kikuyu. Land-
renting is both a social and an economic activity in the researched area. On the one 
hand, landowners gain income, which is often reinvested in restocking herds, 
expanding farming activities, and paying school fees, while land-seeking clients are 
provided with the opportunity to invest in farming.  
On the other hand, land rentals are accompanied by a multitude of interactions, 
negotiations, and friendships, and they also build trust between those involved, and 
thus reinforce the economic value of the land. In the end, user rights are transferred 
to land-seeking clients while landowners retain rights of disposal.  
Due to the fertile soils and favourable rainfall patterns, Enoosupukia has attracted 
hundreds of land-seeking clients from diverse regions of Kenya and beyond since at 
least the start of the 20th century. This is in fact only a small number compared to the 
rest of Narok county. In the case under consideration, a good number of tenants 
already stay on their rented plots after seeking approval from landowners. This 
reminds us of how Kikuyu ahoi (tenants) negotiated for settlement rights on lands 
owned by others (see pages 75-78). In most instances, Maasai, Kikuyu, and nusu 
nusu landowners ask their tenants to build semi-permanent huts (dakis) on the 
rented plots and to settle there, or use the dakis as stores for their harvests.  
Not every land-seeking client can easily win the trust of a landowner to facilitate the 
construction of a daki. New clients in particular must demonstrate allegiance to their 
landlords over a period of time, while limiting any activities or behaviours that could 
arouse suspicion. For instance, clients must ensure that they do not openly show 
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peculiar attachment to the rented land in a way that could be interpreted as intent to 
claim ownership. Clients could do so by putting up structures like houses or food 
stores without the consent of the owner. They must demonstrate satisfaction with the 
temporary access and user rights that the landowners accord them. A client cannot 
interpret continued cultivation on the same plot of land after successful extension of 
lease periods as the right to claim ownership of the land.  
Landowners dedicate a lot of time to monitoring the behaviour and activities of their 
clients, and may allow the trusted ones to build dakis. Indeed, the landowners we 
spoke to who allow tenants to construct dakis have a story to tell about each tenant. 
Often a landowner will begin by sharing a vivid story of how well he knows the tenant 
and, sometimes, their family, and for how long the two have had such a patron-client 
relationship – suggesting some amount of trust between them. Trust-building 
between tenants and landowners is discussed below in detail.  
Those who do not build dakis can rent rooms at Mpeuti trading centre or the nearby 
Olanka trading centre to store their produce or farm inputs. Agricultural intensification 
in Enoosupukia has led Dorobo and other Maa-speaking individuals to construct 
rental houses often made of wood and corrugated iron in a bid to tap into the 
available market. Consequently, trading centres like Mpeuti and Olanka, which has 
replaced the damaged Enoosupukia trading centre over time, are expanding fast. 
In Olanka trading centre, clients working on rented farms have access to shops, 
rental houses, hotels, and clubs, some already installed with satellite televisions 
where customers can catch the latest news, the popular National Geographic 
channels, and live European football matches after work. Indeed, a local economy 
that collapsed during the 1993 violence has progressively recovered; landscapes 
have become busy spaces for commerce and social interaction. 
The majority of tenants we spoke to hailed from the Central Province of Kenya. 
Kikuyu are the dominant group, as shown in the case study below. Some tenants 
have employed labourers, who eventually use their savings and/or connections to 
acquire land and become tenants themselves. Such networks emerge from their 
continued presence in the Maasai environments, but tenants also make the effort to 
please their landlords through a combination of strategies, discussed below. 
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 Photograph  7. A daki built by a Kikuyu client on a rented plot of land owned by a 
          Maasai of Mpeuti village, Enoosupukia. The daki serves as temporary    
          house and a store for produce and farm equipment (source: field data, 2014). 
 
 
Photograph  8. A wooden hut rented by a Kikuyu farmer from a Dorobo landowner.  
                         This particular hut is used as a store for seed potatoes and farm    
                         equipment (source: field data, 2014). 
 
Through land rentals, the intention of the Maasai is to populate their landholdings 
with crops, farmers, and dakis. That way their land is not left idle to possibly attract 
land-grabbers. Furthermore, the leasing of large parcels of land to outsiders is 
intended to deter the government from expanding the “protected” Enoosupukia forest 
area.  
In 2004 and 2005, government officials evicted residents of Mpeuti, the majority of 
them members of the Dorobo community, in a spirited effort to expand the forest 
area. The government through officials in Narok and in collaboration with local 
politicians resettled the displaced in the nearby Sintakara/Olanka village. Such 
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developments prompted Maa-speaking landowners to lease large areas of land to 
prevent the government from initiating future evictions.  
In a recent study, Leslie and McCabe (2013: 119) noted similar cases in the north-
east of Tanzania, where villagers have leased large areas to outsiders for 
commercial cultivation to reduce the risk of losing their land through efforts by the 
government of Tanzania to expand Simanjiro Park. Elsewhere in northern Kenya, 
Bollig (2014) found that villagers use community-based conservation schemes as a 
way to exclude outsiders from resource use and also to prevent the state from land 
grabbing.  
 
Advertising land, negotiating prices and lease periods 
Maasai landowners send word via Kikuyu farmers in the area that they are willing to 
sublet more land; land is never officially advertised. A land-seeking person can also 
directly approach a landowning person if the land-seeker has already secured 
himself plots in the community. New land-seekers are often introduced to landowners 
by relatives or friends who have already gained the trust of the landowners. Land 
rentals thus enrich social capital by nurturing new relations that possibly bridge 
perceived ethnic identities.    
The cost of renting a piece of land depends on the dryness or wetness of the region, 
on how its potential for cultivation is evaluated, and on the prior relations between a 
landowner and individual tenants. In the wet regions of Enoosupukia, to rent about 
an acre of land may cost up to KES 8,000 (€80) per annum. Drier areas in Maiella 
and its environs (like Moi Ndabi) have prices between KES 1,000-3,000 (€10–€30) 
for an acre for a year’s lease, while for drier parts of Enoosupukia (Olosho lole Kaloi 
and Ol tepesi le Parsimei) to rent an acre costs between KES 3,000 and 4,000 (€30 
and €40) per year of lease.  
In-laws and close friends are often exempted from paying for plots allocated to them. 
This demonstrates the conflicting loyalties involved in land rentals. The size and 
number of plots of land as well as lease periods vary, and are negotiable depending 
on prior working relations with the landowners.  
Lease agreements are mostly informal and often do not involve written documents. 
However, landowners who lease land to many tenants have developed ways of 
monitoring lease periods and payments. Ole Sere, for instance, who has leased land 
136 
 
to over thirty tenants on his farm (mostly Kikuyu women and young men) in Mpeuti 
village, keeps a book of records with tenants’ names, the size and number of plots of 
land allocated to them, and payments. Lease periods often run for two years, with the 
possibility of extension.   
Figure 8 shows the pricing of rental land among 60 land-renting farmers in Maiella 
and Enoosupukia, where the majority of tenants paid KES 3,000 or 4,000 (€30 or 
€40) for a year of lease. 
 
 
Figure 11. Pricing of rental land per acre per annum (source, field data, 2014). 
 
Formal payment regulations for leaseholds are non-existent. Payment is often made 
at the beginning of the lease period, or at specific times agreed upon by both parties 
involved within the lease period. However, it has become commonplace for some 
tenants to consciously spread their payment across the first year of lease. For these 
tenants a debt opens space for dialogue and negotiations with landowners. Upon 
settlement, a tenant gains more trust, as he is known to be one who keeps his word, 
and thus increases his chances for extension of lease periods beyond the agreed 
time and may negotiate for more land.  
Tenants ensure that they pay rental debts in good time to avoid conflict with 
landowners (see case study below for further discussion on rental debts). In cases 
where tenants delay payments without prior arrangement with their landlords, the 
latter often transfer such plots to other tenants. Having outstanding debts on rented 
land minimises the chances of renting more land in the future for affected tenants. 
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New tenants are required to pay for rented land as soon as the lease period starts. 
Once trust is built, they too can negotiate with landowners.  
Trusted tenants easily access rental land on credit, with the expectation of settling 
their debts upon harvesting and selling their produce. In the case of poor harvests or 
the loss of crops to frost or to insufficient rains, individual tenants often negotiate with 
their patrons to extend their payment to the next season. Indeed, payment for 
leaseholds is largely flexible and comes with a wide range of social interactions, 
friendship, and sharing, often with the obligation to reciprocate, as described below.  
Interestingly, such interactions have enabled Kikuyu tenants to learn Maa, which 
eventually may replace Swahili as the language of interaction and commerce. Maa-
speaking landowners are pleased with tenants who make the effort to learn Maa. 
Landowners also learn Gikuyu from their tenants. Learning another’s language 
improves rapport and eases possible tensions in negotiations and communication, 
and particularly in dispute resolution. Both tenants and landowners have the 
tendency to refer to words that connote friendship in the Maa or Gikuyu languages in 
everyday communication.  
 
 Trust-building and cross-cutting ties in land rentals 
Trust-building is essential in transactions and relations surrounding land rentals. 
Tenants told me that making a simple phone call to landowners and greeting them 
before or after farm work is considered very commendable as it helps to build 
rapport. In a way it also allows landowners some kind of “cordial control” of the work 
efforts of their clients. For Maasai landowners, in-depth knowledge of their tenants 
(origin, marital status, children, and employment) enables them to understand each 
tenant individually.  
For instance, Ole Sere (in the case study below) has provided some land free of 
charge to a few poor tenants (mostly Kikuyu women). “Once they make some money 
and get food, they can then start to pay”, he said. Other strategies for maintaining 
trust and friendship involve presenting gifts to landowners (such as shoes, foodstuffs, 
blankets, mobile phone airtime etc.), inviting them for social events and ceremonies 
(e.g. circumcision parties, marriages, and church meetings), adhering to the agreed 
payment models and honouring debts, and, often, chatting with them. Some tenants 
help landowners with menial tasks in their farms or at their homesteads.   
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Some tenants also reward landowners with money following bountiful harvests, while 
others lend money to landowners when the need arises, and they can also borrow 
money from the landowners. Instead of returning any money they may have 
borrowed from their tenants, landowners often extend their lease periods. Tenants 
also give or sell crop residue to landowners for their herds to eat. Crop residue in an 
acre of land is rented out on a short-term basis at about KES 3,000 (€30) to any 
interested herder, some coming to Enoosupukia from as far as Nyandarua and Gilgil 
with their herds, especially during the dry seasons. Such symbiotic relations have 
increasingly become the foundations of cohesion and sharing of resources. However, 
some landowners may easily abuse the power of ownership rights to land and 
demand that their tenants provide them with crop residue free of charge for their 
cattle.  
Except in selected cases, landowners do not place restrictions on the crops tenants 
may grow, although fast-maturing crops like Irish potatoes, onions, cabbages, and 
kale are preferred since they guarantee returns in a short period. However, planting 
long-maturing fruit trees is adopted as a strategy by tenants to control their lease 
periods, and may easily arouse suspicion from landowners. As noted earlier, the 
strategy is often interpreted as intent to possibly claim ownership of the land or to 
limit the chances of transfer of the plot of land to a new tenant. However, whenever 
the dry seasons approach, some Maasai landowners may ask Kikuyu tenants to 
grow maize so that they can utilise the residue for their livestock. Herders adopt this 
strategy as a way of minimising the vulnerability of their herds to drought.   
On their part, Kikuyu tenants minimise risks by renting pieces of land across several 
Maasai villages. They also do so with the intention of maximising on the crops most 
suited to specific villages. Widely distributed farm plots serve as insurance against 
losses due to frost or poor rains in specific areas.  
A striking observation in the field was the importance that landowners attach to the 
welfare of tenants, their rented farms, and produce. Landowners become the “eyes” 
of tenants who do not spent much time on their rented land. They monitor any cases 
of crop damage by livestock and possible theft of produce, and help affected tenants 
to pursue such cases in order to gain compensation from the offenders. They also 
monitor the growth of crops and may advise those tenants who live away from their 
farms (like those hailing from Nairobi) to arrange for weeding or the spraying of their 
crops with pesticides.  
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The relationship described here is best analysed from the perspective of the 
principal-agent theory (further discussion of theory, see Eisenhardt, 1989; Miller and 
Watford, 2002). In the context of the described leasehold arrangements, the principal 
(landowner) and the agent (client) though having partly differing goals, form 
relationships that help to reduce/avert risks for the benefit of their contracts. Some of 
the incentives that landowners pursue include the possibility of getting crop residue 
for their livestock from tenants after harvests, and the fact that the mere presence of 
tenants on a farm increases security of tenure for the landowners. Tenants must 
adhere to some operational rules to secure their possibility of prolonging their leases 
after the expiry of the first contracts.   
The case study of Ole Sere’s farm enriches the discussion of the principal-agent 
theory and of land rentals in general. It presents an actual scenario of leasehold 
arrangements by focusing on one piece of land in Mpeuti village, Enoosupukia, 
where close to forty tenants farmed during the period of data collection.  
 
Land renting: the case study of Ole Sere’s farm 
Ole Sere is a nusu nusu (offspring of Maasai and Kikuyu) who lives in Mpeuti village, 
Enoosupukia. He owns about forty acres of land, some of which he has subdivided to 
give to his sons. Ole Sere and his sons have leased most of their land to dozens of 
mainly Kikuyu land-seeking clients. Indeed, manusu, who embody conflicting 
loyalties to the kin and ethnic groups of their parents, play an important role in land 
rentals by facilitating migrant farmers with farmland or with reliable connections 
among their networks of Maasai landowners through which they can negotiate 
leaseholds.  
In mid-2014, Ole Sere allowed me (and my assistants) to include his farm in our 
extended studies. I interviewed him on several occasions to find out how he 
manages his tenants, and about payments for leaseholds and possible credit 
relations in land rentals. The choice of his farm as the location of an extended study 
was based on the fact that Ole Sere had successfully managed the farming business 
while at the same time maximising pastoralism despite an extensively cultivated 
landscape.  
My assistants and I then embarked on interviewing as many of Ole Sere’s tenants as 
we could manage. We began with those who were frequently present on their rented 
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farm plots, and later searched for those who lived further from their plots, through the 
chain referral method (see Bernard, 2006). For the tenants who lived quite far from 
their farms and from Mpeuti village (in areas like Nairobi or Naivasha), we targeted 
their employees on the farms or their close allies with whom they cooperated in the 
farming business. We also relied on proxy data from the landowner where 
necessary. In total, we managed to interview 30 tenants aged between 20 and 40 
years of age who had leased between half an acre and two acres of farmland. Kikuyu 
were the dominant ethnic group, as shown in Table 6.   
 
Table 6. Ethnic composition of tenants at Ole Sere’s farm in Mpeuti village 
Ethnicity No.         % 
Kikuyu 27 90.1 
Kamba 2 6.67 
Others 1 3.33 
Total 30 100 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
 
Table 7 below shows the places of origin of Ole Sere’s tenants. When quantified with 
respect to the area of origin, the information from the table shows that the majority of 
tenants (43.3%) hailed from the former Central Province (Nyeri, Ndenderu, Murang’a, 
Nyandarua, Kinangop, Kiambu, and Limuru). Nakuru county comes second as a 
source of tenants, accounting for 36.3% of tenants (from areas of Gilgil, Naivasha 
town, Maiella, Molo, and Subukia). Narok county accounts for 10% of tenants 
(Enoosupukia and Kiragarien), while western Kenya (Eldoret), Northern Kenya 
(Isiolo), and Tanzania account for 3.3% each.  
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Table 7. Sending areas of tenants at Ole Sere’s farm in Mpeuti village, Narok county 
  Place of origin                                                            No. of Tenants  
  Eldoret 1 
Enoosupukia 2 
Gilgil 1 
Isiolo 1 
Kiambu 3 
Kinangop 3 
Kiragarien 1 
Limuru 2 
Maiella 6 
Molo 1 
Murang’a 2 
Naivasha town 2 
Ndenderu  1 
Nyandarua 1 
Nyeri 1 
Subukia 1 
Tanzania 1 
Total 30 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
 
In terms of gender, male tenants dominate, with 66.7%, with women accounting for 
33.3%. Out of the tenants interviewed, only 5 (16.7%) are single, while 25 (83.3%) 
are either married with children, or single parents. Of these land-seeking clients, 8 
(26.7%) successfully negotiated with their landlord (Ole Sere) to construct dakis on 
their rented plots. The remaining 22 (73.3%) either live in Maiella trading centre or 
further from the study area.  
Based on his records, Ole Sere does not know all his tenants by name. This is 
because his trusted tenants with whom he has long-standing relationships introduce 
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new tenants to him. Consequently, Ole Sere has classified new tenants under the 
names of trusted ones who introduce them. By doing so, he allocates supervisory 
duties to his trusted tenants who, apart from monitoring the activities of the new 
tenants on their rented plots, also ensure that they pay their leaseholds in good time 
and that they adhere to other, often unwritten, operational rules. Examples of such 
unwritten operational rules are discussed above.  
Interviews revealed several ways through which tenants maintain good relationships 
with the landowner, particularly for the purposes of possible extension of lease 
periods. Table 8 shows that tenants prefer to pay for leaseholds promptly or to 
negotiate with their landlord for later payment in the instances where one is not able 
to pay in time. Greetings and chatting with the landowner (face to face) are also 
important ways through which tenants maintain good relations with their landlord.  
 
                      Table 8. Maintaining good relations in leasehold arrangements 
Good relations                       No.             % 
Presents 3 10 
Greetings 8 26.67 
Paying on time 15 50 
Phone calls 4 13.33 
Total 30 100 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
 
Credit relations in land rentals represent the product of successful negotiations over 
access and user rights to land. It also demonstrates trust between tenants and 
landlords. In the case under consideration, 20 clients (66.7%) accessed land on 
credit. One may argue that their continued cultivation on Ole Sere’s land is based on 
a “tested” commitment to repay their debts and/or to foster good relations by avoiding 
conflicts with one another and with their landowner.   
Ole Sere described how he cared for the welfare of his tenants and their produce: 
Most of my tenants are women and young men who have rented between one 
and two acres of land each. Walking from Maiella to farm in Enoosupukia on a 
daily basis is tiresome, considering the work they do. Therefore, I told them to 
build dakis and live here with their families, but some say that they are still 
afraid and cite the 1993 violence. Several have built dakis on their rented 
plots, though. Should anyone interfere with their normal activities it would 
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mean that he is trespassing into my territory, and I will take personal 
responsibility and take the intruder to court in the same way I would do to 
someone who steals my livestock. I have told my tenants to report such cases 
to me – only one case came to my attention, and was properly resolved. I also 
monitor their farms for possible damage by livestock. If a Maasai herd 
destroys their crops, I will personally take charge and help the tenants to get 
compensation. We have to respect each other. 
 
For Maasai landowners, minding the welfare of tenants ensures a steady inflow of 
income. By the end of 2014, Ole Sere had collected close to KES 300,000 (€3,000) 
from his tenants for that year. He reinvested most of his money in livestock 
development through renting pastures away from the intensively cultivated area. He 
also used part of the returns to pay school fees for his son at the university.  
Not all landowners are good. Over time, Kikuyu tenants who have cultivated in 
Enoosupukia for an extended period have gathered information on both good and 
bad landlords, and do not recommend the latter to land-seeking clients. For instance, 
the majority of tenants I spoke to knew “Christopher”, a Maasai landowner, who 
threatens tenants and warns them against pursuing cases when his livestock 
damage their crops. For this reason, many tenants have left his land for other 
landlords.  
Recently (October 2014), a Dorobo landlord wanted to evict a Kikuyu tenant by 
accusing him of feeding his, the landlord’s, chicken with poison. While confronting 
the tenant, the landlord’s wife slapped the tenant in the face and began screaming 
that the tenant had tried in vain to rape her. The tenant immediately reported the 
matter to the chair of his local peace committee, in Mpeuti village. Upon further 
interrogation of witnesses and the disputants, the committee found the allegations 
baseless and warned the landlord against future cases.  
The landlord apologised and the tenant resumed farming on his rented plot. The 
relationship between the two may return to normal, or the tenant may vacate the land 
when his lease period ends. Such cases of selfish landlords who want to shorten the 
lease periods of tenants do occur. In chapter 9, I will provide extended studies of how 
local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi institutions handle land and related 
disputes in the study area.  
 
Despite inevitable challenges, land renting encourages salient social and economic 
relations, which are accompanied by material exchanges, engagements, and 
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respect. I argue that credit relations in land rentals particularly reveal the depth of 
trust between landowners, tenants, and the wider community. The fact that actors 
care about the welfare of others reinforces the social value of land rentals, while the 
social-economic spaces created encourages dialogue, trust, peaceful negotiations in 
cases of dispute, and cooperative use of land resources.  
Land rentals play an important role in peacebuilding through the multiple allegiances 
and alliances that cross-cut ethnic divides. Such cross-cutting networks are important 
in maintaining social cohesion in societies (see also Lehmann, 2009 in a very 
different context), but may also increase herder-farmer disputes as shown in 
chapters 8 and 9.  
I argue that negotiations over access to land and the ensuing transfer of user rights 
from Maa-speaking landowners to mainly Kikuyu tenants makes land a shared rather 
than a contested resource. Cooperative use of land, as discussed, becomes the 
basis of intercommunity exchanges and reciprocal obligations, trust and other socio-
economic interactions.  
The discussed principal-agent relationship between landlords and tenants relate to 
Jean Ensminger’s case in the Kenya’s coast where trust between cattle owners and 
employed herders reduces monitoring of the latter by the former. Cattle owners 
cement such relations by adopting “deserving” herders (Ensminger, 2001). Similarly, 
the majority of landowners in Enoosupukia do not necessarily have to monitor the 
activities of their tenants; they allocate these monitoring duties to their trusted 
tenants most of whom are responsible for introducing new land-seeking clients. From 
an anthropological perspective, the social value of principal-agent relations may often 
outweigh their economic value, particularly when assessed within a complex social 
environment in which they exist.  
 
Chapter 6 and 7 focus on trade-related cross-cutting ties and how the pursuit of 
commodities overrides identities.  
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CHAPTER 6: Livestock trade and cross-cutting ties 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 dealt with intermarriage and cooperative use of land resources 
between Maasai and Kikuyu, respectively, as important infrastructures that make 
intercommunity violence rather impossible. Chapters 6 and 7 will tackle the important 
subject of intergroup trade, which is linked to growing markets for goods and 
services. The current chapter explores the social-economic networks and allegiances 
(or conflicting loyalties) that characterise livestock trade between the studied groups. 
To what extent does trade in livestock enhance social cohesion? How do economic 
interactions in livestock trade contribute to the sustainability of peace between 
communities? 
Livestock trading and marketing (whether official or unofficial, see Little, 2013) is the 
mainstay of the pastoral economy in the horn of Africa and elsewhere (Bollig, 
Schnegg and Wotzka, 2013; Dahl and Hjort, 1976; McPeak and Little, 2006; Barret, 
2001; Kerven, 1992). According to Kerven (1992), pastoral exchange and marketing 
has a long history, which stretches beyond the colonial period in most of Africa, 
during which many actors have influenced the changing patterns of their market 
integration. Studies have focused on livestock markets and risk management, some 
tackling the topics of livestock pricing, droughts, weak government policies, and 
conflicts among the leading risks. They have also proposed some policy options that 
could help to minimise such risks (Baiely et al, 1999; Barret et al, 2001; Pavanello, 
2010; Dahl and Hjort, 1976).  
The studies emphasise the economic significance of livestock marketing especially in 
the semi-arid areas of East Africa. The social effects that accompany livestock trade 
are of equal importance. Both social and economic values give livestock markets a 
definite shape. This chapter looks at how livestock trade becomes an impetus for 
intercommunity communication and integration, cultural diffusion and ethnic 
tolerance, and the transfer of ideas, among other aspects of social exchange. By 
doing so, one may argue that trade in livestock enhances peaceful coexistence 
between groups despite pertinent challenges, as is the case between Maasai and 
Kikuyu of the studied area.  
More importantly, I show how a collapsed livestock economy at the time of the 1993 
violence has progressively recovered in the last two decades to become a crucial 
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social-economic space and an important component of the survival of the two groups 
under study.  
 
The social-economic matrix of livestock trade: actors and roles 
The Maasai and Kikuyu of Maiella and Enoosupukia access two important livestock 
markets. Every Wednesday, hundreds of traders and their livestock converge in 
Suswa town, some 75km from Narok town and about 100km from Naivasha (see 
Figure 4). Suswa livestock market is the largest in the area in terms of the number of 
livestock it attracts for trade as well as the number of participants, both Maasai and 
non-Maasai, some coming from as far as northern Tanzania.  
The majority of cattle and small stock are loaded onto trucks, which ferry them to 
Nairobi and the nearby towns for slaughtering. Notwithstanding the Maasai dislike of 
parting with their stock, the colonial regime in Kenya imposed heavy taxes on native 
populations, which forced Maasai to release their sheep, goats, and cattle to the 
markets. According to a 1931-1932 annual report, stock markets grew exponentially 
in the Maasai, Luo, Kisii, Ngong, Nairobi, and Mombasa districts93. Notably, the post-
colonial period has contributed principally in the growth of Suswa and other stock 
markets.  
However, this chapter will not focus on the Suswa livestock market. Instead, I will 
explore interactions between Maasai and Kikuyu at a smaller rural livestock market 
and slaughterhouse. These are located at Maiella trading centre and serve a 
population of about 20,000 inhabitants of the studied area and its environs. The 
livestock market at Maiella trading centre occurs every Tuesday and Friday, although 
sheep, goats, and cattle are traded almost on a daily basis in the studied area.   
Choice of this particular market and the slaughterhouse was based on two factors: 
(1) Maiella livestock market experienced a collapse situation during the violence of 
1993. A once flourishing livestock market, which brought together hundreds of 
herders and traders was abandoned for several months during and after the 
violence. There was no activity at the slaughterhouse either. (2) At least in the last 
two decades, the Maiella livestock market and the slaughterhouse have been in a 
progressive and promising state of recovery.  
                                                          
93 Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. Afri./515/Maasai District Annual Report/1931-32/District 
Commissioner. 
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This form of resilience may be attributed to the transformation of attitudes towards 
violence, the willingness of community members to accommodate each other 
irrespective of ethnic identities, and the growth of markets for meat in nearby towns 
including Naivasha central and the agro-industrial hub with hundreds of thousands of 
workers. The commodification of livestock is therefore a leading impetus in the 
cooperation between herders and other livestock traders, and particularly between 
Maasai and Kikuyu.   
 
 
Photograph  9. Livestock market at Suswa town, Narok county (source: field data,  
                         2014). 
 
 
Photograph  10. Kikuyu-owned slaughterhouse at Maiella trading centre, which  
                          serves both Maasai and Kikuyu populations (source: field data,  
                          2015). 
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The success of livestock trade in the studied area is strongly linked to specific actors 
in the local food system. They include livestock suppliers, brokers, butchers, a 
slaughterman, a government veterinary officer, meat distributors, and consumers. 
These actors cut across ethnicity, creed, and geographical boundaries. Each actor 
represents a vital component for the overall functioning of the food system. Actors 
have unique roles, which bring them into close interaction with other members in the 
system. The description of the roles of these actors (below) shows several ways 
through which ties and alliances are developed and sustained.  
 
Livestock suppliers: These include Maasai herders (including Dorobo and 
manusu), Kikuyu farmers, and members of other ethnic groups with presence in the 
studied area. Maasai herders dominate the supply of livestock to Maiella livestock 
market and slaughterhouse. Comparatively, Kikuyu keep less livestock than their 
Maasai counterparts. Such small numbers are easier to manage especially during 
the dry seasons, when the majority of Kikuyu harvest fodder from their rented farm 
plots for their livestock. Rarely will Kikuyu sell stock in bulk.  
In contrast to Maa-speaking suppliers, the majority of Kikuyu suppliers keep livestock 
in controlled environments. They practice zero grazing in small spaces on their 
compounds, and mainly keep livestock to supplement farming. However, a good 
number of Kikuyu graze along the roads or in open spaces like fields. A number of 
Kikuyu negotiate with their Maasai friends and/or in-laws to keep part of their 
livestock with their herds. A few Kikuyu who lack the means to raise stock prefer to 
let their sheep and goats to roam scavenging for feed in the markets.  
Kikuyu mainly keep and supply small stock (mostly sheep) but some have cattle, 
including exotic varieties, such as Friesian, which fetch higher prices than the local 
varieties. Almost everyone with livestock can act as a supplier to the slaughterhouse 
and the livestock market. Unlike the majority of herders, ordinary villagers often sell 
their livestock only when the need to do so arises – to cater for medical bills, to pay 
school fees, to purchase farm inputs, or to purchase food whenever crops are hit by 
unfavourable weather conditions. In this case, livestock acts as an important safety 
net or insurance against future uncertainties. Therefore, stock buyers (most of them 
Kikuyu butchers) form an important part of the solution to these social problems.  
However, over time, butchers have developed close ties with some suppliers upon 
whom they can depend to avail animals to the slaughterhouse when necessary. 
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Butchers contact these suppliers whenever the demand for meat increases or when 
there is shortage of animals for slaughter at the market. During interviews, butchers 
informed us that their most reliable stock suppliers are pastoral Maasai. Some 
butchers mentioned up to five names of trusted suppliers whom they may call upon 
without prior notice to bring animals for slaughter.  
Interviews revealed that kin and friendship networks play a crucial role in livestock 
trade. For instance, Susuki, a Maasai of Enoosupukia who frequently supplies 
livestock to two Kikuyu butchers, is married to a Kikuyu woman from Maiella trading 
centre. Lii, a trusted Kikuyu supplier of livestock for slaughter, is a brother of one of 
the butchers but lives in Enoosupukia among the Maa-speaking community. Lii acts 
as a livestock broker; he traverses the Maasai villages to purchase livestock for 
trade. Another supplier, Lemeria, is a nusu nusu (his father is Maasai and the mother 
is Kikuyu). Lemeria is one of the main livestock brokers who have established 
presence in Olosho lole Kaloi village, Mpeuti village, and the entire Kipise 
adjudication area. Other brokers and suppliers are shown in Table 9 below.  
Based on my own observation, a good number of Maasai pastoralists, just like the 
Kikuyu, are also reluctant to sell their livestock in bulk. In fact, most of them sell 
livestock only when the need arises (e.g. to pay school fees, to attend to the sick 
etc.). Farming, leaseholds, and other off-farm activities have progressively replaced 
dependency on money from livestock sales.  
Furthermore, the sale of animals is largely dependent on seasons. During the dry 
season, traders at Maiella always expect a good supply of animals from Maasai 
herders, some of whom have no prior contact with them. Similarly, a large number of 
animals arrive at the livestock market for sale. The result is a reduction in livestock 
prices due to good supply.  
According to Barret (2001), livestock markets can exacerbate climate risks for 
pastoralists because livestock prices often decline during dry periods. Nevertheless, 
Maasai adopt the sale of livestock during the dry season as a risk-management 
strategy (see also Campbell, 1979). In most cases, stock buyers, mainly Kikuyu 
butchers, farmers who wish to build herds, and herders who have the necessary 
connections to areas with abundant pastures, maximise on dry seasons to purchase 
livestock in bulk, as discussed below.  
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Livestock brokers: These are mainly young Maasai and Kikuyu males. They link 
butchers, the livestock market, and suppliers, although they still double as suppliers 
themselves. Rarely do women (Kikuyu or Maasai) involve themselves in livestock 
trade, except Kikuyu women who own livestock. Maasai widows prefer to send their 
sons or close allies to sell livestock on their behalf. However, as in the Suswa 
market, Maasai women in particular take advantage of the large numbers of traders 
to sell their milk, food, and Maasai garments and ornaments, while some Kikuyu 
women sell shoes and clothes. Livestock trade in these areas is therefore 
accompanied by many more transactions, including the sale of Maasai sticks, spears 
and pocket knives, as well as photography.  
Being a broker means that a person devotes a lot of time to actively searching for 
livestock for sale within the studied area and its environs. Some also establish 
networks with suppliers and ordinary herders who will later inform them when they 
decide to sell their livestock. Brokers make a profit from livestock trade by ensuring 
that they negotiate for lower prices for each animal than the market prices. 
Negotiations for livestock prices are conducted through haggling (see below). Others 
rely on friendship or kinship ties to negotiate for lower livestock prices.  
During the study, we were not able to pin down the actual number of brokers. 
However, about a dozen livestock brokers specialise in cattle trade in Maiella trading 
centre, while another dozen of them deal with small stock (sheep and goats).  
Brokers do not always buy livestock for immediate disposal. The majority have 
managed to grow their own herds solely for sale. Some even buy young stock and 
rear them to maturity for sale. Those who are actively involved in the trade may hire 
a herder or keep some livestock with their friends or family.  
Dry seasons bring opportunities for livestock trade, as already noted. In the case of a 
drought, brokers make bulk purchases of livestock, especially from Maa-speaking 
herders who are afraid to lose livestock to the drought. During the wet periods, 
however, herders usually refrain from selling livestock in the hope of rebuilding their 
herds. When rains come, some herders (both Maasai and Kikuyu) attend livestock 
markets in Suswa and Maiella to purchase animals for rearing. Abundance of 
pastures encourages herders to build and/or rebuild their herds and gives them hope 
of recovery of weak animals which survived the drought. This cycle of livestock 
production and management is principally supported by funds accrued from 
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commercial cultivation, returns from leaseholds on land, and from interpersonal 
loans.   
Brokers (and butchers) know very well that they must maximise on the dry season to 
purchase stocks in order to ensure that they still have livestock for trade and 
slaughter during the wet season when herders are not willing to part with their stocks. 
By doing so, they ensure constant supply of meat to consumers irrespective of the 
season, and without necessarily increasing meat prices. The strategy also saves 
brokers and butchers from increased livestock prices during the wet seasons. 
However, livestock purchased during dry seasons are often very weak and thin. 
Therefore, the majority of buyers must invest time and money to “fatten” them and 
make them fit for slaughtering while others do so until the rains come and the 
pastures begin to grow. The practice of “fattening” weak animals for sale, most of 
which then do survive droughts, is not new, as shown by Dahl and Hjort (1976:164). 
Nowadays, fattening involves feeding the animals in a zero grazing environment, 
giving them drugs and vitamin injections bought from veterinary shops in Maiella or 
Naivasha, and spraying them with pesticides to improve their health. Though often 
expensive and risky to some, actors consider the purchase of weak animals during a 
drought and subsequent fattening of them as a lucrative venture.  
A mature bull that fetched a price of KES 5,000 (€50) compared to the normal prices 
of around KES 40,000 (€400) might be sold at a higher price after fattening. Buyers 
take the utmost care so that they do not overfeed weak animals or give them too 
much water; otherwise, the animals might die of bloat. Once the animal has survived 
the fattening process, its prices could grow eightfold.  
While many herders refrain from the sale of livestock during the wet periods, some 
prefer to only sell animals that show signs of sickness or those with disabilities – the 
blind, or those with broken limbs. Some also prefer to sell the very old animals or 
those whose economic value is considered low. Based on observation, herders 
rarely sell female animals. Herders prefer to save cows for reproduction. Indeed, 
butchers noted that they only received offers for cows that herders considered to be 
infertile, sick, or too old. Therefore, this is a well-organised economy where actors 
are conscious of the risks as well as risk management strategies.  
Apart from the implication of seasons on livestock marketing, people’s desire to be 
able to pay their children’s school fees, as well as to raise capital for commercial 
agriculture, largely affect livestock trade. Brokers are usually keen to accumulate 
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animals from both Kikuyu and Maasai herders who may need to pay fees when 
schools reopen. There is also a tendency by Kikuyu farmers to sell their livestock 
prior to planting season in order to raise capital for farming, including money to pay 
leaseholds.  
Following bountiful harvests, such farmers may sell food produce and use the money 
to buy livestock from herders. This form of diversification is aimed at complementing 
farming and livestock economies and is a response to social, environmental, and 
climatic uncertainties.  
 
Butchers: Much has been said about butchers already. Butchers sell cooked or raw 
beef, mutton, and goat meat to consumers in the study area and its environs. The 
slaughterhouse in Maiella served about fifteen butcheries at the time of this study. 
These are located in Maiella trading centre, Dry village market, and Goigoi village 
market (all of which are within Maiella). Three butcheries at Maiella trading centre 
specialise in beef and another seven specialise in mutton and goat meat. All these 
butcheries are owned and run by Kikuyu. Other butcheries, which periodically benefit 
from the Maiella livestock trade, are located in Kongoni and Karagita. Kongoni and 
Karagita settlements are close to Lake Naivasha (see Figure 4) and house 
thousands of flower farm workers of the agro-industrial hub, who constitute a crucial 
market for meat from the studied area. Ironically, there were no butcheries at the 
Maasai villages studied (as at the date of the study), although Maasai herders are 
the main suppliers of livestock for slaughter.  
Supply and demand therefore encourages the growth of salient trade ties between 
the two groups. The survival of livestock marketing and the stock market in this area 
relies on actors from the two communities. Butchers must coordinate closely with 
suppliers, brokers, and other actors in the livestock food system.  
Butchers may also double as suppliers and/or brokers. On the one hand, such a 
multiplicity of roles helps them to maximise their profits while minimising risks by 
avoiding possible exploitation by the actual brokers through exorbitant animal prices. 
On the other hand, butchers who double as brokers or suppliers have a better 
chance of ensuring a constant supply of animals for slaughtering, especially when 
the supply from herders is low, or whenever there is a hindrance in supply, say due 
to heavy rains (see Table 9).  
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Consequently, almost all butchers keep their own animals, often with their friends or 
relatives, or at their respective homes. For instance, during fieldwork, I observed that 
George, one of the Kikuyu butchers, owned three bulls, which he kept on the 
compound of a Catholic Mission in Enoosupukia. He also had another three bulls and 
three cows at his home in Maiella trading centre. Whenever the supply of livestock is 
low, butchers bring their own animals to the slaughterhouse. They make sure to 
replenish their stock back home by purchasing more animals during the market days 
and from their respective suppliers.  
Meat consumption is quite high in Maiella and Enoosupukia. The demand for cooked 
meat is higher as compared to raw meat. Market days (Tuesdays and Fridays) are 
especially the busiest for butchers because traders converge at the trading centre, 
some bringing second-hand clothing for sale. Moreover, hundreds of people leave 
their villages to visit Maiella trading centre on market days.  
To ensure a constant supply of meat, butchers must endeavour to nurture close 
relations with individual herders, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, including those who 
are not necessarily frequent suppliers. They cement such ties through mobile phone 
communication (calling and texting) and frequent visits. Moreover, butchers spend 
most of their time searching for livestock in the Maasai villages. They also visit the 
livestock markets in Maiella trading centre and Suswa to sample possible animals for 
slaughtering. Consequently, every butcher has hired two to four workers who 
manage the butcheries in their absence.  
Butchers hire men or boda boda (motorbike) operators to transport animals to the 
slaughterhouse whenever they make purchases further from Maiella trading centre. 
A boda boda can transport at least two goats or sheep to the slaughterhouse. To 
enable transportation of live goats or sheep, boda boda operators place the goats or 
sheep inside a big crate (like that used to carry bread). The crate is then tied onto the 
seat of the boda boda, and the animal is fastened with ropes to prevent movement 
during transportation. However, butchers prefer to hire men (Kikuyu or Maasai) to 
drive cattle or other livestock to the slaughterhouse. In some cases, the owner of the 
livestock may offer to drive them to the slaughterhouse. Payment for the service 
depends on the distance covered for the delivery.   
Often, when butchers buy livestock from a Kikuyu or a Maasai seller, they negotiate 
with them to keep the animals until they can find help driving them to the 
slaughterhouse. On a single day, a butcher may buy livestock from several sellers 
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and leave them in the seller’s compound. Some last there for weeks under the care 
of the sellers. This shows the trust that butchers develop with their sellers or 
suppliers. However, when butchers purchase animals for immediate slaughtering, 
they hire someone to drive the animals directly to the slaughterhouse.  
As a buffer to low supply of livestock for slaughtering, butchers at Maiella trading 
centre subdivide the available meat amongst themselves to ensure they all have 
some meat for trade at all times, as shown in Table 9. A bull can be subdivided 
amongst several butchers, whenever the supply of cattle is low. This follows an 
arrangement between the butchers where the owner of the animal slaughtered sells 
portions of the meat to other butchers wholesale. This is a form of social capital, 
whose effect supersedes the often competitive and capitalistic market environments.  
Moreover, low supply of cattle opens up opportunities for barter trade – the exchange 
of goat meat and mutton for the available beef, the amounts of which are calculated 
in kilograms. These arrangements are mainly informal and are built on trust and 
friendship. More importantly, such relationships encourage reciprocity, which shapes 
the market space. Butchers utilise such reciprocal relations as insurance against bad 
days.  
 
Slaughterman: The Sub-county health sector registered only one slaughterman, a 
Kikuyu, who slaughters animals on behalf of butchers. Butchers pay the 
slaughterman some KES 300 (€3) and KES 100 (€1) for every head of cattle or small 
stock slaughtered, respectively.  
Every part of the animals is made use of. Some people make soup from intestines, or 
roast them for their customers. Others prepare animal heads and limbs for their 
customers, while some trade in skins. After slaughtering, the slaughterman does not 
engage himself in the trade of meat or other products. An interview with the 
slaughterman revealed that he too doubles as a livestock broker. In fact, butchers 
occasionally rely on his herd to salvage a bad day when few animals are supplied to 
the slaughterhouse. He also keeps an eye out in the communities for any possible 
leads to potential sellers. 
 
Distributors: Butchers hire boda boda (motorbike) operators to distribute meat to 
specific locations or trading centres after slaughtering. Distributors place meat inside 
metallic containers, which are then tied onto a motorbike for transportation. Some 
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butchers have bought their own motorbikes for the task. During low seasons, they 
use these motorbikes to transport clients.  
 
Veterinary officer: This is a government officer who inspects meat and animal 
intestines after slaughtering to ascertain their fitness for human consumption. No one 
may distribute uninspected meat. Butchers pay the officer KES 400 (€4) for every 
head of cattle inspected and KES 200 (€2) for each head of small stock. The officer 
puts a stamp on the sides of the meat to indicate that it is safe for consumers. 
When meat is unsafe for consumption, due to diseases or infections, the officer 
supervises its disposal. To avoid such losses, butchers often insist on knowing the 
health condition of an animal before purchasing it. Experience has taught them how 
to observe signs of sickness. However, butchers may consciously purchase an 
animal that shows signs of sickness.  
It is a gamble that can easily lead to a loss when the veterinary office finds the 
animal unfit for consumption and orders its disposal. However, taking such a risk 
may also be rewarding when the meat is found safe for consumption. Indeed, some 
butchers who successfully negotiate very low prices for animals that show signs of 
sickness end up making huge profits, but massive losses are inevitable.  
 
Consumers: They are the backbone of this local food system. According to 
butchers, several categories of meat customers are important in the business. They 
include brokers who trade in green maize and Irish potatoes, truck drivers who 
transport food produce from farm plots in Maiella and Enoosupukia, labourers who 
harvest maize from farms, and local distributors of food produce from Maiella and 
Enoosupukia to various markets (using donkeys and motorbikes as transport). 
Others include tenants who rent farmland in Maiella and Enoosupukia, labourers 
engaged in cultivation for a wage, and especially women who harvest Irish potatoes. 
Villagers have branded these women, atumia a bubu (women who carry buckets).  
Other clients include herders who visit the study area to purchase crop residue for 
their animals with trucks, motorbikes, or donkeys; and boda boda operators who ply 
their trade in Maiella and Enoosupukia. Furthermore, Maasai families are 
increasingly dependent on meat from butcheries as opposed to slaughtering their 
animals.  
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In general, butchers noted that the booming cultivation business in Enoosupukia and 
Maiella, which continues to attract hundreds of farmers and labourers, plays a major 
role in the success of the livestock market. As a result, a once-collapsed livestock 
market has shown strong signs of recovery. During the 1993 violence, this important 
economic sector was abandoned as both Maasai and Kikuyu were engulfed in 
violence. A few months after the 1993 violence, only a bull and about six sheep were 
slaughtered and consumed in the study area in a week. Nowadays, between six and 
ten bulls and more than thirty small stock are slaughtered and consumed in the study 
area in a week (see Table 9). This amounts to a roughly 80% increase over a period 
of twenty years.   
 
Negotiating livestock prices: cross-cutting ties  
 Livestock trade creates space for negotiation and conversations across ethnic 
boundaries. Setting the livestock prices is imbued with symbolic repertoires, cross-
cultural communication, and loyalties. Such prices are thus not fixed – sellers and 
buyers skilfully negotiate their offers, often invoking beliefs, kin, and friendship 
relations. 
Normally, sellers want to maximise their trade while buyers, the majority of them 
butchers and brokers, want to generate as much profit as possible from every animal 
traded. In the end, sellers and buyers usually have a common motive – to arrive at a 
mutually agreed price that is beneficial for both parties. Therefore, livestock trade 
begins with two prices: a high price set by the seller, and a low price set by the 
buyer.  
To bridge the price gap, negotiations may take a few minutes, hours, days, or even 
months to mature. The success of a transaction is not guaranteed. However, some 
sellers may be forced by need, circumstances or existing cross-cutting ties to sell 
their livestock at a lower price than expected. As already noted, drought and/or the 
need to pay school fees and to invest in farming are a few factors that may 
encourage a seller to conclude a transaction.  
Apart from compromise that arises from need or circumstances, respect and 
conflicting loyalties resulting from friendship and/or kinship help some buyers and 
sellers to arrive at a price without much trouble. It was evident during fieldwork that 
buyers and sellers are keen to maintain good relations irrespective of the outcome of 
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a transaction. However, bad feelings are inevitable. A successful transaction, from 
the perspective of both sellers and buyers, may become the foundation of future 
social and economic interactions. This is a fact that actors seem to acknowledge.  
Haggling is common practice in any transaction. However, it is often time-consuming 
and does not necessarily guarantee a successful (or immediate) transaction. 
Nevertheless, haggling is paramount for any transaction because it merges the 
economic and the social space in a meaningful way. For the communities studied, 
haggling takes the form of a game, sometimes a joking relationship, which is 
anchored on experiences in negotiation and in making conversations. This game has 
no losers – actors accept a mutually agreed price as a win-win affair. Haggling 
makes both actors winners in their own right (socially and/or economically). 
The conversations and negotiations, which account for haggling, have several non-
economic purposes: (1) they provide an opportunity for actors to know one another 
on a personal basis and, by extension, to know their families. (2) Based on 
observation, chatting involves capacity-building and sharing of information about 
good practices in animal husbandry. (3) Through chatting, actors establish a 
relationship for possible trade in the future. Therefore, actors may consciously 
prolong haggling in order to find out something about one another, or to nurture 
friendship. In fact, the seemingly difficult sellers may become the most reliable 
suppliers in the future.  
During fieldwork, I spend time observing, listening, and recording conversations 
between herders and buyers at Maiella livestock market. Usually, potential buyers 
assume strategic positions in the market to observe the quality of animals brought to 
the market and to identify concerned sellers. The intent to make a purchase often 
starts with greetings and “small chat” after which a potential buyer quickly walks 
away after arousing the curiosity of a seller. He then begins to sample other livestock 
belonging to other sellers so that he can prove to the initial seller that he already 
faces enough competition.  
Haggling is conversational and does not necessarily involve discussions about 
prices. A buyer and a seller may talk about national politics, European football, or 
social problems as well as the opportunities and risks involved in livestock trade like 
rains or drought among others. The conversation becomes interesting when it 
approaches pricing. For instance, instead of quoting a price directly, a seller may 
wish to inform the buyer how well he cares for his livestock, for instance, by buying 
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pastures and related animal products (salt lick, disinfectants etc.). By doing so, a 
seller insinuates the quality of the livestock on sale, with the intention of supporting 
his price.   
In an interesting haggling encounter, a Maasai herder decided to take on a Kikuyu 
butcher on the subject of how badly Kikuyu treat their livestock by locking them up in 
controlled environments (zero grazing) without allowing them to roam and feed 
freely. The conversation took the form of a joking relationship. The butcher remained 
silent for a while, allowing the humour to fill the air. There was laughter in the market 
when the Maasai insisted that animals raised in a controlled environment always 
appear “moody” and that their meat is not sweet. In response, the butcher took his 
time to explain the diseases that Maasai livestock pick up when they are moved from 
one place to another. “Your animals eat anything, including plastic bags… see how 
thin they are?” he said, lifting one sheep off the ground, and continued: “I give it 6 
kilos” – an estimate of the sheep’s weight.  
In some cases, such a conversation may actually develop into a serious discussion 
on how to care for livestock and the available livestock products in the market, 
including drugs. After teasing one another for a while, the butcher offered to pay KES 
2,500 (€25) for the sheep, while still expressing his “disappointment” to all Maasai 
herders who let their animals roam and eat rubbish. By terming his price an insult, 
the Maasai herder doubled the butcher’s price and insisted that he could only sell 
each sheep at KES 5,000 (€50). The intention of setting such a high price was to 
begin a serious haggling process. Eventually, the butcher bought four sheep from the 
herder at KES 3,800 (€38) each. 
Generally, sheep and goats from the Maasai villages normally cost between KES 
3,500 and 4,500 (€35; €45) while those from Kikuyu herders cost between KES 
4,000 and 5,000 (€40; €50). These prices are flexible. When defending their higher 
prices, Kikuyu herders insisted they spend a great deal of time and money on caring 
for their livestock, including the purchase of fodder. However, Maasai also spend 
time moving their stock in search of pastures, and often purchase crop residue for 
their animals during the dry seasons. When such arguments do not bear fruits, 
Kikuyu insist that Maasai have more livestock than them and so they (Maasai) should 
sell their stock at lower prices. Rams and he-goats fetch higher prices than the 
female animals, which are believed to have less meat after several births.  
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Pricing of cattle (just like small stock) also differs considerably in relation to age, sex, 
and the source (geographical location) from which an animal is bought. Other factors 
that determine prices include animal breeds and mode of rearing. Buyers often 
determine the age of an animal informally at the point of sale. For a goat or sheep, 
buyers firmly hold the animal to the ground or between their legs and then open its 
mouth to check the teeth. Worn out teeth suggest old age, although such teeth may 
in fact indicate the intake of acidic foods or substances, which corrode them. Old age 
is equated with a smaller amount of tougher meat.  
In terms of sex, oxen generally fetch higher prices than cows, and are also preferred 
for slaughtering. However, buyers interested in keeping livestock prefer females, for 
the purpose or reproduction. Exotic breeds (for beef or milk) fetch higher prices than 
the local varieties. For example, Borana bulls fetch higher prices as compared to the 
local breeds kept by Maa-speaking groups. Butchers approximated the weight of 
Borana bulls at around 160 to 180 kgs compared to Maasai traditional breeds, which 
fall between 100 and 120kg (see similar estimates in Dahl and Hjort, 1976). 
However, weight approximations are determined by prevailing grazing conditions, 
which are subject to change across time and space.  
The mode of rearing animals is also an important consideration in pricing livestock. 
For instance, bulls reared in a zero grazing environment by Kikuyu in Maiella trading 
centre fetch higher prices that bulls reared in a traditional Maasai pastoral manner. 
Butchers suggested that zero grazing often produces animals with more weight. For 
instance, a bull reared through zero grazing at Maiella trading centre costs about 
KES 50,000 (€500) while bulls of a similar size but kept in free-range conditions at Ol 
tepesi le Parsimei or Sakutiek fetch prices of around KES 45,000 (€450) and KES 
40,000 (€400), respectively. Generally, butchers said that animals reared in free-
range conditions, though often larger in size, have less meat. These estimates may 
not be indicative of the appropriate method of livestock husbandry and do not 
necessarily suggest that Maasai animals are always cheaper in price or lower in 
weight compared to those from other groups.  
The source of an animal is similarly an important factor in pricing. The “source” is 
simply the geographic location from which an animal is bought. If a bull is purchased 
from an area further from Maiella trading centre, it incurs transportation costs to the 
slaughterhouse. This cost is reflected on the price of the respective animal unless the 
seller offers to drive it to the slaughterhouse himself, thereby saving on the 
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transportation costs. For example, a bull reared in Maiella trading centre retains its 
price of KES 50,000 (€500) because it is close to the slaughterhouse and thus does 
not incur transportation costs.  
In contrast, a bull purchased from Ol tepesi le Parsimei and Sakutiek villages, which 
are further from Maiella, will cost less by roughly KES 1,000 (€10) or KES 2,000 
(€20), which is then used to pay transportation costs. Driving livestock from the point 
of sale (from the villages) to the slaughterhouse or to the livestock market may take 
between one and three days depending on the distance covered.  
Just like in the livestock market, haggling takes the form of a conversation whenever 
butchers visit the homes of potential sellers or suppliers. Such visits may or may not 
be organised. A seller contacts a butcher, often through his mobile phone, to notify 
him about the intention to sell livestock. The seller may also send word through his 
friends to invite a butcher to his home to negotiate the price of an animal. He may 
also visit a butchery or the slaughterhouse to inform butchers about the availability of 
livestock for slaughter or send a member of his family to convey the information.  
An unplanned visit by a butcher may be based on rumours that a herder is willing to 
sell his animal(s). In some cases, a butcher may just decide to drop by a village and 
ask villagers to refer him to persons who may be willing to sell livestock. Over time, 
some butchers have developed strategic networks across the studied villages with 
both Maasai and Kikuyu individuals who furnish them with information on prospective 
livestock sellers.  
Whether such visits are planned or unplanned, a successful transaction is mainly 
determined by a mutually acceptable price. Furthermore, such a visit may open 
future opportunities for livestock trade. Sometimes herders and buyers may disagree 
on prices, forcing them to abandon the transaction, despite prior arrangements for 
the visit.  
Below is a conversation between a butcher (Kaiyoro) and one of his suppliers 
(Lemeria). Kaiyoro is of Kikuyu descent while Lemeria is a nusu nusu (Kikuyu mother 
and Maasai father). The two met in a small hotel at Maiella trading centre on 
24.04.2015 to finalise a transaction involving the purchase of sheep. They conversed 
in Swahili: 
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Kaiyoro (the butcher): …For the two sheep can I give you eight? (KES 8000/€80) 
Lemeria (the supplier): No way! I’m sure you do not know the breed I want to bring.  
Kaiyoro: Provided you do not bring thin “gasorobo” (a typical breed). I saw you         
              selling some the other day in the market. 
Lemeria: The one I am referring to here is a merino (breed of fine-wool sheep)...they 
               are very fat. 
Kaiyoro: Good. They will be slaughtered on Monday morning. You must bring them 
              to the slaughterhouse first thing. 
Lemeria: That’s fine: 
Kaiyoro: Recently I found some Maasai in Sakutiek who know how to care for their  
              sheep. I learned a lot from them and even rented land from one of them. 
              I have planted grass on this land. I have also planted wheat. By June this 
              year (2015), I want to have over thirty sheep there. If I can get some  
              gasorobo I can keep them there for some time to fatten them for sale. 
Lemeria: But merino has a lot of fat?. 
Kaiyoro: This is why I said that a mixture (cross-breeding) of gasorobo, which has 
               more meat, and Merino, with more fat, gives the right combination, the  
               Hampshire (referring to the Hampshire down breed). Of course, I must give  
               them drugs to protect them from worms, and also salt lick.  
Lemeria: Yes, the Marc lick super (referring to a type of salt lick sold locally in  
              Maiella trading centre). You also boil some herbs for them to prevent worms 
              and give them fodder, not unga (crushed maize) because it damages their  
             teeth. 
Kaiyoro: Worms are different. Some affect intestines; others affect the meat. There  
              are drugs for all types of worms. So you need to mix all drugs and give the  
              livestock then ensure that you do not take them for long distances to herd.  
              By the end of this year I want to be able to slaughter my own sheep and  
              goats. 
Lemeria: I will sell my sheep so that I can invest in new breeds. 
Kaiyoro: Sell the unpleasant rams but retain the females. Later you will bring a better 
              breed of rams for them. However, I am concerned that you keep moving  
              them up and down and exposing them to worms from different places. Also  
              you better keep only fifty of them which can fetch you good prices than a  
              hundred which cannot give you much money. There is shortage of pastures,  
              you know. 
Lemeria: This year I will divide my herd into two. I will retain thirty sheep at home 
              and then I will send the other thirty to another place where they can feed  
              comfortably. 
Kaiyoro: One needs to be strategic these days. You see the rains are also  
              ‘misbehaving’ in some areas (not as abundant as before). 
Lemeria: When it rains, sheep prices will go up. 
Kaiyoro: So, you said eight is fine? (returning to the conversation on the price of  
               sheep). 
Lemeria: Make it nine (KES 9000/€90), you are my friend.  
Kaiyoro: eighty four, we end this matter (KES 8400/€84) 
Lemeria: Add at least two hundred shillings. 
Kaiyoro: We cannot fall out, eighty-five is fine (KES 8500/€85). 
Lemeria: Fine, I will personally bring them on Monday. 
Kaiyoro: Here is KES 500 (€50). I will pay the balance when you bring the Sheep.  
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Notably, this conversation develops into an exchange of ideas about modern 
methods of herding and the various products available to improve animals’ health 
and to find pasture. The supplier also reveals that herders rely on traditional drugs 
(herbs) to treat animals and to prevent them from infection by worms. The fact that 
the buyer makes a down payment for the sheep symbolises trust. 
A livestock seller and a buyer may fall out over the pricing. Such failure may not 
necessarily mark the end of a transaction. Whenever a buyer and a seller fall out 
over the price of an animal, they have the chance to reconsider the prices offered 
and may then decide to make a second attempt. As noted, the sale of livestock is 
often informed by need, season, compromise, and respect. In some cases, however, 
both parties may decide not to go ahead with a transaction despite these factors. In 
some cases, brokers and butchers are forced to buy livestock at slightly higher prices 
than usually intended, especially when the supply is low. Such compromises are 
normal occurrences in any business.  
   
Controlling trade in stolen livestock  
To prevent the sale of stolen livetsock, butchers and brokers ensure that they only 
rely on trusted suppliers and individual owners of livestock. Indeed, the local 
livestock food system is a complex network of interpersonal relationships, which 
have grown across time. Persons who are new in the system must provide 
identification documents or be introduced by friends who have presence in the 
network. This helps to stamp out illegal livestock trade and related crimes.  
Butchers do not buy livestock from young herders. For instance, teenagers must 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that they have the blessings of their parent to sell 
the animals. Butchers also prefer to purchase livestock from individual owners 
personally at their homes than to purchase livestock from the fields. By doing so, 
they can trace a transaction to the homes of the sellers involved when necessary. 
Nevertheless, a successful deal may turn out to be a transaction involving stolen 
livestock.  
In one incident, a broker bought sheep from his relative at Olosho lole Kaloi village 
and supplied them for slaughtering. Afterwards, accompanied by a police officer 
attached to the chief of Maiella, the father of said seller approached one butcher 
complaining that one of the slaughtered sheep was stolen from his herd. The police 
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officer arrested the butcher. Through a phone call, the butcher’s employees 
contacted the broker who had supplied the sheep and requested him to report to the 
police station to settle the matter.  
The plaintiff demanded KES 4,000 (€40) as compensation from the butcher, but the 
latter denied any wrongdoing. Later on, the broker pleaded with the police to release 
the butcher and requested them to refer the case to a local mechanism at the 
household level. The request was granted although the butcher had to part with 
some money in the form of a bribe. Later on, the butcher demanded reimbursement 
from the broker. However, the broker insisted that the KES 3,000 (€30) paid as a 
bribe was quite a big amount. This led to an exchange of words between the butcher 
and the broker, which saw them terminate future transactions.  
 
Blessing, curse, and ritual practices in livestock trade  
Beliefs in misfortunes and the curse play a major role in shaping social-economic 
interactions in the livestock trade environment at Maiella trading centre. In his book, 
“Time, Space, and the Unknown: Maasai Configuration of Power and Providence”, 
Spencer (2003) makes a strong statement about how belief in misfortune and 
uncertainty influences the social life of the Maasai. As observed in the studied area, 
such beliefs are accompanied by notions of age and respect for elders, irrespective 
of gender and ethnicity. Therefore, most Maasai and Kikuyu involved in livestock 
trade, just like in most other economic enterprises, take the utterances of their elders 
seriously. These utterances, according to them, carry possible blessings or curses 
that could potentially affect their lives and livelihood strategies.   
In any ordinary livestock market day in the studied area, there is observable respect 
between age groups. Younger herders and livestock traders respect their elders 
irrespective of gender and ethnic background. Such respect is evident in the 
language used in negotiating livestock prices, which does not involve teasing (joking 
relationships). Actors make an effort to limit any behaviour that elders could read as 
disrespectful. For instance, haggling, in this context, takes the form of persuasion, 
and often takes less time compared to that between members of the same age 
group.  
Especially the Maasai community believes that failure to show respect to elders, or 
angering them, may invoke curses, which could trigger infertility or death in the 
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victim’s herds or family. In some of the conversations recorded during this study, 
younger herders even asked their elders whether they were happy and satisfied with 
a transaction, irrespective of whether someone made a purchase or not. Positive 
feedback is taken as a form of blessing, which could favour livestock multiplication 
and successful pastoralism. In such cases, a herder of the lower age category 
(including teenagers) refers to a buyer in the higher age category (those older than 
them) as “father” or “mother”. I overheard a few say, “I want you [the elder] to buy 
this sheep so that you can bless my herd”. Kikuyu traders have increasingly 
acknowledged these beliefs in the supernatural.  
Kikuyu butchers, for instance, ensure that a transaction involving the sale of livestock 
ends with a mutually agreed price. The challenge is however how to balance 
haggling, the commitment to a mutually acceptable price, and the need to maintain or 
establish friendship while at the same time carefully navigating an activity whose 
effects may contribute to the demise or progress of one’s business. For this reason, 
haggling becomes a conversation, and not an exchange of words with the potential 
to arouse anger.  
Belief in the curse is especially important. In one incident, Ole Sirika, a Maasai elder 
from Nkampani village, was driving his three sheep past the slaughterhouse to the 
livestock market when a Kikuyu butcher stopped him. After a short conversation, the 
butcher and the seller agreed on a price for the sheep. However, upon receiving the 
money, Ole Sirika did not seem pleased. He insisted that one of the sheep was 
bigger than the rest and could have fetched more money in the livestock market had 
he not accepted the offer.  
The butcher was not comfortable with Ole Sirika’s response so he offered him extra 
KES 100 (€1) for the big sheep. The butcher then asked Ole Sirika to perform a ritual 
on the sheep to repulse any possible curse, which, as some believe, could deter 
customers from purchasing the meat. Locals refer to this ritual as kufungua (Swahili, 
“to open”) and is meant to “wish someone well with their endeavours following a 
misunderstanding”. Ole Sirika spat on the sheep and murmured a few words. 
According to the butcher, the act of spitting on the sheep revoked any unfavourable 
circumstances in his business. Some Kikuyu butchers noted that such curses could 
lead to losses caused by theft of meat or other misfortunes, including the possibility 
of the meat being left to rot due to lack of customers.  
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Credit relations in livestock trade 
Credit relations are central to livestock trade. In most cases, butchers purchase 
livestock from their suppliers and brokers on credit. They make a down payment and 
settle the debt when they have sold the meat. During the study, it was common to 
hear a butcher calling their trusted suppliers to bring livestock for slaughter even 
without negotiating for a price in the first place. Due to long-term relationships 
between butchers and some suppliers, the latter already know the kinds of animals 
that individual butchers prefer, and can estimate prices based on previous 
transactions. 
However, previous transactions do not necessarily stop suppliers or brokers from 
negotiating for more money for their livestock, and butchers are usually flexible with 
prices depending on the size, breed, and sex of the animal. The mobile platform, M-
Pesa, has increasingly replaced cash payments for livestock. 
In some cases, sellers may visit butcheries unannounced accompanied by livestock 
for sale. If the butchers are not able to raise the money required to purchase the 
livestock, they often negotiate with such sellers to collect the money, usually after a 
day or two when customers have bought the meat. Of course, some sellers may 
need the money immediately and have no time to wait. In such situations, a butcher 
may pay half of the money and promise to settle the balance later after selling the 
meat. 
Credit relations mostly exist between actors who have known each other for 
extended periods and have built trust over time. Interestingly, Kikuyu butchers noted 
that Maa-speaking sellers were more likely to accept credit than their Kikuyu 
counterparts, who mainly prefer immediate payment for their livestock. Indeed, some 
butchers noted that one does not have to be a close ally of a Maasai to negotiate 
credit.  
The allegiance of butchers is tested through this business. There were clear 
indications that butchers honour their debts, as this increases their trustworthiness 
among the suppliers, brokers, and individual livestock sellers. With such trust, 
butchers are able to draw reliable suppliers closer and ensure that they do not lack 
meat for their customers. It is a business of loyalty whose success is measured 
through maintenance of social relationships that often transcend the business 
environment.  
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Social capital as a buffer in livestock trade 
In order to enhance their financial security and as a way of creating safety nets 
against shocks in livestock trade, butchers and other actors in the local food system 
(both Maasai and Kikuyu) started a self-help group some years ago. The self-help 
group has two aims: (1) to establish a network of various actors in livestock trade 
who can assist one another through kind (social capital), and (2) to raise money from 
all members, which is reinvested in livestock trade and as capital for diversification. 
By the end of 2014, the group had attracted about forty members. Each member 
contributes KES 400 (€4) every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. Participants give 
this money to members on a rotational basis so that they can reinvest it in expansion 
of individual livestock businesses or for diversification into other livelihood activities, 
such as cultivation. Butchers use the money to increase their own herds through 
purchase so that they will be able to supply the same in the future for slaughter. 
Some rely on the money to settle debts or losses incurred in their businesses. Others 
use it for personal needs, which may not be related to business.  
Members with urgent needs (hospital bills, school fees etc.) can request priority in 
allocation of the money. This form of social capital makes livestock trade an 
economic as well as a social enterprise.  
Table 9 enriches the preceding chapter by providing data collected at the 
slaughterhouse in Maiella between April and May 2015. The table shows the number 
and type of livestock slaughtered in the days of the study, the sources of the 
livestock, and the cross-cutting ties that emerged from livestock trade (as already 
discussed). The data in the table are derived from observation and field notes 
collected for specific days of the study.  
On each of the days of the study, we recorded the number and sex of animals 
brought to the slaughterhouse and interviewed respective persons who brought the 
livestock in order to understand their origin and any possible connections between 
livestock traders as shown in the preceding discussion. We also observed how the 
livestock were slaughtered, as well as the details of the meat inspection and the 
distribution to markets. Each day brought new and interesting stories about livestock 
trade. These stories, from which the discussion in this chapter is derived, are 
presented in the table as they were captured in the field. 
167 
 
The table shows that the main markets for meat include Maiella, Dry, and Goigoi 
trading centres, as already noted. Kamere, a small town located close to the agro-
industrial hub at Lake Naivasha and home to thousands of flower farm workers, is an 
important market as well. Apart from the study area, other sources of livestock for 
slaughter include areas in Sakutiek Sub-location and Kongoni Sub-location (Figure 
4). In the table, bulls are abbreviated ‘B’; cows, ‘C’; Sheep, ‘S’; and goats, ‘G’. 
 
Table 9. Livestock trade and cross-cutting ties in Maiella and Enoosupukia between  
              April and May 2015.  
 
 
 
Date 
Animal Slaughtered  
Supply Bull (B) 
Cow (C) 
 
Sheep (S) 
Goat (G) 
Sources of animals and cross-
cutting ties between 
herders/suppliers, brokers, friends 
and butchers. 
13.04.2015 2B 11S A Kikuyu farmer bought the bulls from a 
Maasai herder during the dry season 
when supply of livestock was high. He 
then “fattened” them for sale through 
zero grazing and with commercial feed 
and injectable nutrients at Maiella 
trading centre. The farmer contacted 
several Kikuyu butchers expressing his 
interest in selling the two bulls. 
 
A Kikuyu farmer brought nine sheep to 
the slaughter house following a 
previous arranged with a Kikuyu 
butcher. Two other Kikuyu butchers 
bought three sheep from Maasai 
herders at the livestock market in 
Maiella trading centre.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre; Dry and Goigoi 
village markets and 
Kamere market.  
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre, Dry and Goigoi 
village markets.  
14.04.2015 2B 3S A Maasai herder contacted a Maasai 
livestock broker and invited him to visit 
his home and purchase the bulls.  
 
A Kikuyu farmer from Maiella trading 
centre sold two sheep to a Kikuyu 
butcher. A Maasai herder from 
Nkampani village brought a sheep to 
the slaughterhouse for sale.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre and Kamere 
market. 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre and Dry village 
market.  
15.04.2015 0 9S Three Kikuyu butchers bought five 
sheep from Maasai herders at the 
Maiella livestock market, and a Kikuyu 
farmer of Maiella trading centre 
supplied the other four sheep to Kikuyu 
butchers. 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre, Goigoi and Dry 
village markets. 
16.04.2015 1B 2S A Kikuyu slaughterman had earlier 
purchased the bull from a Maasai 
herder of Sakutiek. He then “fattened” it 
for three months through zero grazing 
and with commercial feeds in 
preparation for sale.  
 
A Kikuyu farmer from Kokoti village sold 
the sheep to a Kikuyu broker who 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre. 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
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visited his home in search of livestock 
for slaughter.  
17.04.2015 2B 9S A Maasai herder from Ng’ondi village 
(Kongoni Sub-location) sold the bull to 
a Kikuyu butcher. The latter had sent 
word through his friends to potential 
suppliers in the area. The herder called 
the butcher by mobile phone to go for 
the bull. A Maasai herder from 
Nkampani village brought the other bull 
to the slaughterhouse following 
previous arrangements with a Kikuyu 
butcher.  
 
Individual butchers (of Kikuyu descent) 
bought sheep from Maasai herders who 
had brought them to the Maiella 
livestock market. 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre, Goigoi and 
Kamere markets.  
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre, Goigoi and Dry 
village markets. 
18.04.2015 No animal was slaughtered on this day 
19.04.2015 2B 7S One bull belonged to one of the Kikuyu 
butchers who availed it for slaughter 
following high demand for beef and low 
supply of bulls for the day. A Maasai 
herder of Sakutiek had sold the other 
bull to a Kikuyu butcher at the Maiella 
livestock market on 17.04.2015.  
 
A Kikuyu butcher bought three sheep 
from a Maasai herder from Olosho lole 
Kaloi village who contacted him by 
mobile phone to visit his home. A 
Maasai herder from Mpeuti village 
brought the other four sheep to the 
slaughterhouse for sale.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre and Goigoi village 
market. 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
20.04.2015 1B 9S; 1G A Kikuyu broker was contacted by 
phone by his Kikuyu friends of Ndabibi 
(Kongoni Sub-location) who were asked 
by Borana herders of the area to look 
for possible buyers of one of their bulls. 
 
A Maasai herder from Nkampani village 
brought five sheep to the 
slaughterhouse for sale. A Kikuyu 
butcher purchased the other four sheep 
from a Maasai herder from Mpeuti 
village. A Kikuyu broker bought the goat 
from a Kikuyu farmer at Maiella trading 
centre. Sellers contacted buyers via 
mobile phones to arrange for the 
transactions. 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre, Goigoi and Dry 
villages markets. 
 
Goat meat:  Maiella 
trading centre 
21.04.2015 1B 3S A Kikuyu butcher bought the bull from a 
Maasai herder from Enoosupukia. 
 
A Maasai herder from Nkampani village 
contacted a Maasai livestock broker by 
phone to visit his home to purchase two 
sheep. A Maasai herder who often 
supplies livestock to Kikuyu butchers 
brought one sheep for slaughter.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
22.04.2015 1B 11S A Maasai herder from Kigumu area 
(near Mpeuti village) sold the bull to the 
Kikuyu slaughterman.  
 
On this day, individual butchers brought 
their own sheep to the slaughterhouse. 
Beef: Ng’ondi market near 
Lake Naivasha 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre, Goigoi and Dry 
village markets. 
23.04.2015 1C 5S A Kikuyu farmer of Maiella trading 
centre sold the cow to a Kikuyu 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
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butcher. The cow had lived for a long 
time without getting pregnant despite 
the presence of mature bulls. The 
owner concluded that it must have been 
infertile, thus prompting the sale.   
 
A Maasai herder of Nkampani village 
brought three sheep to the 
slaughterhouse for sale. A Kikuyu 
farmer supplied the other sheep to 
Kikuyu butchers at the slaughterhouse. 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
24.04.2015 1C 8S The cow had suffered a broken leg. The 
owner, a Maasai herder from Nkampani 
village, contacted a Kikuyu butcher by 
phone to go for it. 
 
A Kikuyu herder from Goigoi village 
sold four sheep to a Kikuyu butcher. 
Another Kikuyu butcher bought the 
other four sheep from two Maasai 
herders of Mpeuti village. 
Beef: Kamere market and 
Maiella trading centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
25.04.2015 2B 5S A Kikuyu butcher owned one of the 
bulls, which was slaughtered on this 
particular day. The Kikuyu butcher had 
bought it six months ago from a Maasai 
herder of Enoosupukia during the dry 
season. He then kept it at a local 
church ground, on which it fed and 
regained weight. A Kikuyu herder from 
Maiella trading centre sold the other 
bull to a Kikuyu butcher after days of 
negotiations. 
 
Mandevu, a Maasai herder who keeps 
sheep in Nkampani village and 
Enoosupukia area, brought three sheep 
to a Kikuyu butcher. Mandevu is one of 
the reliable suppliers of small stock. A 
Kikuyu farmer from Maiella trading 
centre invited one of the butchers to his 
home to purchase the other two sheep. 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
26.04.2015 No animal was slaughtered on this date 
27.04.2015 2B 11S; 1G Kikuyu butchers sent word through 
friends seeking persons interested in 
selling their bulls. They managed to find 
two Kikuyu farmers from Maiella trading 
centre from whom they purchased the 
bulls. 
 
Kikuyu butchers contacted herders by 
phone who commonly supply them with 
livestock for slaughter.  
Maasai herders responded and 
supplied sheep as follows: four sheep 
from Olosho lole Kaloi village; four from 
Nkampani village; a goat from Mpeuti 
village and a sheep from Sakutiek 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre, Goigoi and Dry 
village markets 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre, Goigoi and Dry 
village markets 
28.04.2015 Heavy downpour on this particular day constrained supply of animals for slaughter.  
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29.04.2015 2B 10S A Kikuyu livestock broker brought a 
young bull to the slaughterhouse and 
sold it to a Kikuyu butcher who had 
asked him to bring it. Another Kikuyu 
butcher bought the other bull from a 
Kikuyu farmer from Mpeuti village. 
 
Butchers had contacted their suppliers 
the previous day by phone requesting 
animals. A Maasai supplier from Mpeuti 
village drove five sheep to the home of 
the Kikuyu slaughterman early that day. 
Individual Maasai herders brought the 
other sheep to the slaughterhouse early 
in the morning for sale.  
Beef: Ng’ondi market near 
Lake Naivasha and 
Maiella trading centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre, Goigoi and Dry 
village markets. 
30.04.2015 The government veterinary officer who inspects all slaughtered animals before they are 
distributed to respective butcheries was absent on this particular day. Hence, no animal was 
slaughtered. The officer contacts butchers in advance to inform them of his absence.  
01.05.2015 2B 11S A Kikuyu farmer visited the 
slaughterhouse in the morning and 
asked brokers willing to purchase a bull 
to accompany him home. The other bull 
was purchased from a Maasai owner of 
Mpeuti village. 
 
A Kikuyu butcher bought four sheep 
from Maasai herders at the Maiella 
livestock market. Other Kikuyu butchers 
bought sheep from their Maasai 
suppliers in Sakutiek and Dry village.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre and Ng’ondi village 
market. 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre, Dry and Goigoi 
village markets. 
02.05.2015 2B 4S; 2G The two bulls belonged to a Kikuyu 
butcher. He had bought them from 
Maasai herders some time before to 
rear them for slaughtering.  
A Kikuyu butcher exchanged his two 
sheep for two goats with a Kikuyu 
resident of Maiella trading centre 
following high demand of goat meat. A 
Maasai herder from Nkampani village 
sold four sheep to a Kikuyu butcher at 
the slaughterhouse following a previous 
arrangement between the two.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Goat meat: Maiella trading 
centre 
03.05.2015 1 0 A Kikuyu butcher was contacted on 
phone by his Maasai friend of Moi 
Ndabi village (Kongoni Sub-location) to 
visit him and purchase a bull, which 
appeared sickly.  
The government 
veterinary officer found the 
beef fit for human 
consumption but the 
intestines were disposed 
of.   
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
04.05.2015 1B 11S; 2G The Kikuyu owner of the bull 
slaughtered this particular day lives 
close to the slaughterhouse. He 
delivered it to the slaughterhouse 
himself.  
 
A Kikuyu butcher made prior 
arrangements with a Maasai supplier 
from Sakutiek to visit his farm and 
purchase two goats and two sheep. 
Kikuyu butchers bought four sheep 
from Kikuyu owners at Maiella trading 
centre and the other four from Maasai 
herders of Dry village. A Maasai herder 
from Nkampani village sold one sheep 
to a Kikuyu butcher.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Dry and Goigoi 
village markets and 
Maiella trading centre 
 
Goat meat: Maiella trading 
centre 
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05.05.2015 3B 10S; 1G Three different Maasai herders supplied 
the bulls for slaughter on this particular 
day. They were from Sakutiek, Dry, and 
Mpeuti villages. 
 
Two Kikuyu butchers purchased five 
sheep from Kikuyu farmers from Maiella 
trading centre. Other Kikuyu butchers 
bought three sheep from Maasai 
herders at the Maiella livestock market 
on the particular day.  
A teenager of Maasai descent, who is 
associated with one of the reliable 
suppliers of livestock from Sakutiek, 
brought two sheep for sale at the 
slaughterhouse. A Maasai herder from 
Nkampani village brought the goat to 
the slaughterhouse for sale as well. 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre; Goigoi and Dry 
village markets 
 
Goat meat: Maiella trading 
centre 
06.05.2015 1C 
(heifer) 
8S The heifer belonged to the Kikuyu 
slaughter man.  
Butchers came with their sheep. Some 
bought them the previous day in the 
livestock market at Maiella from 
different herders. A Kikuyu butcher 
purchased a sheep from a Maasai 
herder at Ol tepesi le Parsimei village. 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Dry and Goigoi 
village markets and 
Maiella trading centre 
07.05.2015 No records. Researchers were on a short break  
08.05.2015 1B 9S;3G George, one of the Kikuyu brokers, was 
contacted by phone by a Maasai herder 
of Ol tepesi le Parsimei village to visit 
his home and purchase the bull. 
However, the two fell out over the price. 
On his way back to Maiella, George 
met a Maasai herder and his long-term 
friend who offered to sell him a bull. 
This particular bull cost him only €200 
and was later sold for almost twice as 
much. This was George’s “big day”. To 
commemorate it, he bought his friends 
beer, and was drunk at the time of the 
interview.  
 
Kikuyu butchers purchased the goats 
from Maasai herders who had brought 
them for sale in the Maiella livestock 
market. A Maasai herder from Mpeuti 
village brought two sheep to a Kikuyu 
butcher at Maiella trading centre.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre. 
 
Mutton: Goigoi and Dry 
village markets, Maiella 
trading centre 
 
Goat meat: Maiella trading 
centre 
09.05.2015 1B 7S The bull belonged to the slaughterman.  
 
Kikuyu butchers bought the sheep from 
herders at the Maiella livestock market 
the previous day. 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
10.05.2015 No animal was slaughtered on this date 
11.05.2015 2 8S; 3G A Kikuyu butcher bought a bull from a 
Kikuyu farmer from Maiella trading 
centre. Another Kikuyu butcher bought 
the other bull from a Maasai herder 
from Ng’ondi village. 
 
Two motorbike operators allied to one 
broker from Enoosupukia brought the 
sheep to the slaughterhouse on this 
particular morning. A Maasai herder 
from Nkampani village supplied the 
goats to a Kikuyu butcher. 
 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre and Dry village 
market 
 
Goat meat: Maiella trading 
centre 
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12.05.2015 1B 9S;4G A Maasai neighbour contacted his 
Kikuyu ally and broker by phone. The 
broker visited the home of the seller 
and purchased the bull. 
 
A teenage herder of Maasai descent 
from Sakutiek brought two sheep to the 
slaughterhouse after prior arrangement 
with a Kikuyu butcher. Kikuyu butchers 
bought seven sheep from Kikuyu 
farmers from Maiella trading centre, 
and two sheep from the Maiella 
livestock market.  
A Maasai herder from Kimondi village 
(Sakutiek area) brought the goats to a 
Kikuyu butcher following prior 
arrangements for the delivery.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Goigoi and Dry 
village markets; Maiella 
trading centre 
 
Goat meat: Dry village 
market and Maiella trading 
centre 
13.05.2015 2B; 1C 7S; 2G The owner of the cow, a Maasai herder, 
claimed that it was infertile and thus 
had to sell it. A Kikuyu broker brought 
two bulls from Ng’ondi villlage. They 
were purchased from Maasai herders. 
 
Mandevu, a Maasai supplier of small 
stock, brought four sheep to a Kikuyu 
butcher from his farm in Enoosupukia. 
Kikuyu butchers from Maiella livestock 
market purchased the other three while 
the two goats were purchased from a 
Maasai herder of Nkampani village. 
Beef: Kamere market, 
Maiella trading centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Goat meat: Maiella trading 
centre 
14.05.2015 No animal was slaughtered on this date 
15.05.2015 1C 7S; IG A Maasai herder of Dry village 
contacted a Kikuyu broker by phone to 
visit his home and purchase a cow that 
looked sickly.  
 
A motorbike operator delivered two 
sheep on the orders of a broker of 
Enoosupukia. Kikuyu butchers bought 
three sheep from Kikuyu farmers from 
Maiella trading centre and another two 
from the livestock market at Maiella. 
The goat was purchased from a Maasai 
herder at the Maiiella livestock market 
as well. 
The government 
veterinary officer 
inspected the beef and 
found it fit for human 
consumption. The 
intestines were disposed 
of.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Dry village market 
and Maiella trading centre 
 
Goat meat: Maiella trading 
centre 
16.04.2015 1B 8S;1G Musa, a Kikuyu broker who markets 
green maize, contacted one of the 
Kikuyu livestock brokers by phone to 
purchase his bull. Musa lives in Mpeuti 
village.  
 
A son to one of the Maasai suppliers of 
small stock in Nkampani village 
delivered two sheep and a goat to the 
slaughterhouse following arrangements 
between the father and a Kikuyu 
butcher. Individual Kikuyu butchers 
brought the other sheep for slaughter.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Goigoi and Dry 
village markets; Maiella 
trading centre 
17.05.2015 4 5S Letasim, one of the Maasai herders and 
a supplier of livestock from Sakutiek, 
brought one bull to the slaughterhouse 
following prior arrangement with Kiragu, 
a Kikuyu butcher. Chuma, a Maasai 
supplier of bulls called the Kikuyu 
slaughterman to visit his home in 
Mpeuti to purchase a bull. A Maasai 
Beef: Kamere market and 
Maiella trading centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
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broker delivered the other bulls to the 
slaughterhouse. 
 
Two Kikuyu butchers brought the sheep 
and goats to the slaughterhouse from 
their homes (they owned them).  
18.05.2015 0 12S;3G Kihara and Mandevu, two Maasai 
herders and suppliers of livestock, 
brought two sheep each from 
Enoosupukia area. Joseph, a Kikuyu 
farmer from Maiella trading centre, 
brought two sheep to Baba Jane, a 
Kikuyu butcher. Kikuyu Butchers 
bought the other sheep and the goats 
from herders in Dry village and Maiella 
trading centre. 
Mutton: Goigoi and Dry 
village markets; Maiella 
trading centre 
19.05.2015 1B 0 The bull belonged to one of the Kikuyu 
butchers.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
20.05.2015 No records. Researchers were on a short break 
21.05.2015 The government vet officer was not present on this date. Hence, no animal was slaughtered.  
22.05.2015 2B 9S One bull belonged to a neighbour of the 
Kikuyu slaughterman who offered to 
sell it to him. A Maasai herder from 
Sakutiek brought the other bull 
following previous arrangements with a 
Kikuyu butcher.  
 
Kikuyu butchers bought four sheep 
from Maasai herders at the Maiella 
livestock market. A Maasai herder from 
Enoosupukia brought three sheep to 
the slaughterhouse for sale. Kikuyu 
butchers from Dry village brought two 
other sheep to the slaughterhouse.  
Beef: Kamere and Maiella 
trading centre 
 
Mutton: Dry and Goigoi 
village markets; Maiella 
trading centre 
23.05.2015 1B 3S; 1G The bull belonged to the 
slaughterman’s brother in law who was 
in need of money to pay school fees for 
his child.  
 
Kaiyoro, one of the Kikuyu butchers, 
send his two workers to Baba Lii, a 
Maasai herder of Enoosupukia, to bring 
three sheep, which he had purchased a 
few days prior to this specific day.  
A man who was identified as being of 
Kisii descent brought a goat with a 
broken leg to Kaiyoro’s butchery for 
sale.  
Beef: Kamere market; 
Maiella trading centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Goat meat: Maiella trading 
centre 
24.05.2015 No animal was slaughtered on this date 
25.05.2015 1C 11S The cow was not mature enough but 
the owner, a Kikuyu farmer, was in 
need of money to attend to a hospital 
emergency, thus prompting the sale. 
 
Kikuyu butchers bought five sheep from 
the livestock market at Maiella the 
previous day. Two Kikuyu butchers 
from Dry village market brought four 
sheep to the slaughterhouse, and 
Kikuyu butchers purchased the rest 
from individual Kikuyu farmers of 
Maiella trading centre.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Dry and Goigoi 
village markets; Maiella 
trading centre 
26.05.2015 1B 0 The young bull was notorious for 
fighting other bulls in the herd. As a 
result, the Kikuyu owner decided to sell 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
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it. He contacted the slaughterman on 
phone. 
 
27.05.2015 1B 9S This was an immature bull. The lack of 
supply of bulls for the day forced a 
Kikuyu butcher to salvage the situation 
by bringing this young bull to the 
slaughterhouse.  
 
Kikuyu butchers brought their own 
sheep for slaughter.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Goigoi and Dry 
village markets; Maiella 
trading centre 
28.05.2015 1B 4S A Kikuyu butcher had bought the bull 
from a Maasai herder from Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei during the dry season. He 
“fattened” it at home through zero 
grazing until it was fit for slaughtering. 
 
Kaiyoro, a Kikuyu butcher, owned the 
four sheep. There was no supply of 
sheep on this particular day, thus he 
opted to bring his own for slaughtering.  
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
29.05.2015 The government veterinary officer was absent on this date. Hence, no animal was slaughtered 
30.05.2015 1C 7S A Kikuyu farmer from Maiella trading 
centre exchanged his Friesian female 
calf for a traditional local breed of a 
mature cow belonging to a Maasai 
herder of Nkampani village. The 
exchange followed a few days of visits 
to inspect both animals. The Kikuyu 
farmer then brought the cow for sale at 
the slaughterhouse. 
 
Kikuyu butchers had purchased the 
sheep from Maasai herders at Maiella 
livestock market the previous day. 
Beef: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
Mutton: Maiella trading 
centre 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL 
 
Bulls - 
46  
 
 
Cows - 7 
 
 
Sheep - 
253 
 
 
Goats - 25 
 
 
 
 
 
331 head of livestock were traded and slaughtered in 37 days 
 
 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
 
As shown in Table 9, a total of 331 head of livestock (bulls, cows, sheep, and goats) 
were traded and slaughtered at Maiella trading centre within the month (April-May 
2015). Out of the animals traded, 14% (46) were bulls, 2% (7) were cows, 76% (253) 
were sheep, and 8% (25) were goats. Several factors account for the disparities in 
the number of livestock traded and slaughtered.  
The climate (mostly cold) is conducive to rearing sheep, as opposed to goats, which 
do well in warmer areas. Consequently, the majority herders do not keep goats in the 
studied area, except in the warmer villages (e.g. Nkampani, Ol tepesi le Parsimei, 
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and Olosho lole Kaloi). The good supply of sheep has also influenced the preference 
of mutton in the diets of many consumers.  
As noted before (in this chapter), herders prefer not to sell cows. Cows are preferred 
for procreation to grow herds, and for milk. Milk is an important source of income 
(through trade) and contributes to household diet. As shown in Table 9, and 
discussed previously, the cows slaughtered were either sick or infertile. Some were 
sold out of need for money to attend to important obligations.   
In general, small stock (sheep and goats) constitute the largest percentage of the 
livestock traded. The increasing conversion of pasturelands into intensively cultivated 
landscapes has progressively reduced herding spaces, making it difficult to support 
large cattle herds. As a result, farmers and herders do not wish to keep large herds 
of cattle (and even small stock) owing to the problem of space and possible herder-
farmer conflicts.  
The table also shows that livestock were slaughtered almost every day during the 
period of the study. When animals were not slaughtered on any particular day, it 
meant that meat from the previous day was still available for customers. Additionally, 
there may have been hindrances in the supply of livestock or in the consumption of 
meat, sometimes due to a heavy downpour, which could have obstructed supply or 
prevented customers from going to Maiella trading centre. The absence of livestock 
for slaughter is quite rare, but is possible, given the unpredictable channels through 
which butchers source livestock. Additionally, as shown in the table, slaughtering 
does not take place when the veterinary officer is absent.  
The growth of livestock trade is largely a recent phenomenon. This follows the 
growing number of customers, most of whom are migrant workers or other people 
engaged in farming activities or other businesses in Maiella and Enoosupukia. As 
already noted, this rapid growth signifies a strong state of recovery for a market that 
had collapsed two decades ago. Actors in this local livestock food system seem quite 
pleased with the economic gains obtained so far and the social relationships nurtured 
through time, and would very much like to maintain the state of affairs.  
As shown in the table and in the previous discussion, a wide range of cross-cutting 
networks and conflicting loyalties emanate from livestock trade. Livestock trade is not 
merely an economic venture but is richly embedded in social capital, thereby 
nurturing a Maasai/Kikuyu partnership, which has traversed and transgressed 
perceived (or real) social boundaries. Indeed, livestock trade becomes a complex 
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network of interactions between Maasai and Kikuyu interconnected with shared 
aspirations of commerce and social prosperity, where actors have little concern with 
the identities of their alliances. 
Notably, actors refrain from any form of discrimination, which may take the form of 
negative ethnicity. The success of this local food system principally depends on the 
loyalty that actors accord one another and the depth of trust, sometimes expressed 
through credit relations. Moreover, the slaughterhouse provides space for the sale of 
livestock which are physically impaired or infertile, thereby reducing the risks of death 
or loss. 
A rather striking feature shown in the table is the possibility for Maasai herders to 
engage in barter trade with their Kikuyu neighbours in order for the Maasai to 
enhance their livestock breeds (see 30.05.2015 in Table 9). Such networks and 
opportunities are examples of social obligations and reciprocal exchanges, which 
shape a society with specific values and aspirations. 
Each actor is important in the functioning of the livestock food system. The discussed 
social-economic interactions enhance social solidarity between the groups studied. 
Negotiations and conflicting loyalties encourage social control necessary for peaceful 
coexistence. Indeed, actors denounce intercommunity violence, fearing the possible 
breakdown of trade and of interpersonal ties that have taken much effort to restore. 
Social relations develop and bind individuals and groups for mutual economic 
benefit.  
 
The next chapter (Chapter 7) presents an unusual form of trade and alliance between 
Maasai and Kikuyu: an emerging trend in hairdressing among Maasai women and 
girls, a vital market for Kikuyu-run salons at Maiella trading centre. 
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CHAPTER 7: Hairdressing and cross-cutting ties in a 
Maasai/Kikuyu context 
 
A common portrayal of an idealized Maasai woman in the media and in scholarly 
work depicts her wearing traditional shuka (red robes) and adorned with a wealth of 
necklaces. The beaded ornaments worn in the stretched ear lobes complement a 
shaved head. Shaving heads among Maasai women is an age-old practice with 
symbolic meaning (see Coast, 2001). Traditionally, Maasai women shave their heads 
bald to symbolise childbirth and, sometimes, in accordance with membership of a 
particular age group.  
Nowadays, however, a considerable number of Maasai women prefer to grow and 
keep their hair long or to wear artificial air on their heads, contrary to their tradition, 
and probably to keep up with modern trends. In the studied area, the majority of 
these fall in the 20- to 40-year-old age category. Some suggest that hair has nothing 
to do with childbirth or infant growth and development, while the more independent 
individuals, a few of whom are employed or doing business, want to free themselves 
from such traditions that represent symbols of an idealized patriarchal system in 
some ways, like female circumcision.  
Notably, influence from the neighbouring Kikuyu community contributes to the 
change of attitude and style. In this chapter, I describe the cross-cutting ties resulting 
from hairdressing in a Maasai/Kikuyu context. By utilising an extended case study, 
the chapter discusses data collected from the busiest hairdressing salon located in 
Maiella trading centre, where both Maasai and Kikuyu women seek hairdressing and 
beauty services.  
How does contemporary hairdressing, using modern hairdressing equipment and 
chemicals, influence the attitudes of Maasai and Kikuyu towards one another, and 
how do cross-cutting ties in the business enhance social solidarity? The case study 
of Sharon’s salon at Maiella trading centre helps to answer this question.  
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Photograph  11. Shaved heads, an age-old practice among Maasai women, which  
                          persists to date especially among elderly women (photograph by  
                          author at Inkisanjani primary school, Kajiado county, November, 
                          2015).  
 
 
Photograph  12. Maasai women with natural and artificial hair. Modern hairdressing  
                          is common among women of the younger generation (photograph by  
                          author at Inkisanjani primary school, Kajiado county, November,  
                          2015). 
 
Sharon is a Kikuyu woman aged 30 whose hairdressing services at Maiella trading 
centre have carved her a market niche with a female clientele of both Maasai and 
Kikuyu descent. The choice of Sharon’s salon for this study was informed by months 
of observation, paying attention to the flow of clients and interactions on the 
premises. The case study follows two months of data collection between April and 
May 2015, much of which is prsented in Tables 10 and 11. My assistant Sarah 
Nyanjui and I visited Sharon’s salon for about sixty days consecutively. The aim of 
the daily visits was to collect data on the number of clients visiting the salon, the 
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clients’ ethnic backgrounds and origins, the services sought by individual clients, and 
the mode of payment used.  
We also recorded conversations between Sharon (and her employees) and the 
clients. We were especially interested to find out about the relationships that exist 
beyond the salon premises, and what such relationships mean for the business and 
for the actors involved. Evidently, various social networks transcend the economic 
environment of hairdressing and arguably tie actors into friendship solidarity, 
reciprocity, and loyalty. Notably, Maasai women, among them a few high school and 
college students, constitute an important client base for Sharon’s hairdressing 
business.  
 
Sharon’s biographical details, and the hairdressing business 
Sharon was born in Tigoni, Limuru in 1986. She got married in 2007 to a Kikuyu man 
who was living in Maai Mahiu, Naivasha (see Figure 4). The husband had just 
completed a course in veterinary services and wanted to try his hand in the 
veterinary business. After exploring possible market niches, the couple decided to 
open a veterinary shop in Maiella trading centre to supply livestock and agricultural 
products and services to the herders and farmers in the region. They left Maai Mahiu 
for Maiella in 2008, covering a distance of about 80 kilometres. This was the period 
when the Rift Valley was experiencing massive politicised violence partly aimed at 
removing Kikuyu migrants from areas perceived to belong to other groups. 
Nevertheless, the 2007/2008 post-election violence did little to prevent this young 
couple from pursuing a dream. 
By 2011, the business had attracted hundreds of Maasai and Kikuyu clients. It is then 
that Sharon enrolled for practical training sessions on hairdressing at Celina’s salon, 
which was adjacent to the veterinary shop. After a year, Sharon successful 
completed her course and was employed at Celina’s salon. Her customers, the 
majority of whom were women of Maasai descent, regarded her skills in hair blow-
drying highly. Her efforts as a trainee saw her create a pool of customers.  
In 2012, Sharon’s boss, Celina, opted to convert her salon space into a boutique. 
Sharon saw this as a good opportunity to run her own salon. She purchased Celina’s 
hairdressing equipment and rented a small mabati (corrugated iron) house of about 
5m², which was strategically located next to her husband’s veterinary shop. 
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Therefore, Sharon’s clients found it easy to find her new premises. In fact, the 
veterinary shop helped to market Sharon’s new venture, as the husband directed 
many of his clients (both men and women) to the salon. The men would later refer 
their wives and daughters to Sharon. 
Soon after opening the salon, Sharon informed us that she was receiving at least 10 
Maasai women and 15 Kikuyu women on a weekly basis. During the study, we found 
out that the number of Maasai females who sought Sharon’s services on a weekly 
basis had quadrupled while the number of Kikuyu women doing so had doubled. 
Sharon’s Maasai clients include teachers, farmers, and traders. While the majority of 
Maasai women prefer Sharon’s services at Maiella, some Kikuyu counterparts, most 
of whom earn an income from formal employment or business, prefer to seek 
hairdressing services in Naivasha town. By doing so, Maasai clients avoid 
transaction costs (bus fares) to Naivasha town, while some Kikuyu businesspersons 
seek to expand and enrich their networks in Naivasha town. Some just want other 
members of society to perceive them to be hardworking individuals because they are 
able to afford frequent trips to Naivasha town – there is some symbolic capital 
associated with travelling in these communities.  
However, Sharon’s skills and the relationships she nurtures with her clients, often by 
extending credit services and negotiable prices, puts her business in an 
advantageous position. Therefore, she continues to attract new clients while retaining 
older ones.  
Just like any other business, there are good days and bad days. A good day for 
Sharon is one where she is able to attend to many clients. This is not always the 
case. Sometimes her clients are seasonal. Following abundant rainfall and good 
harvests, Sharon attends to many customers, thereby making good profits. This 
means that the majority of clients have enough to eat at home or to sell and so they 
can spare some money for hairdressing.  
During dry periods, however, the livestock and farming economy shrinks, forcing 
actors to save money for restocking herds or for buying food. At those times, Sharon 
will mostly depend on her salaried clients or those whose activities do not involve 
livestock or crop production. Notably, droughts translate to bad credit. According to 
Sharon, during droughts, the majority of customers who seek credit facilities for 
hairdressing take a long time to repay their debts, and some may simply disappear. 
Based on observation, some clients clear their debts to appease Sharon so that they 
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can seek fresh credit on hairdressing (records of credit and repayment of debts are 
shown in Table 11). However, customers who do not clear their debts are not eligible 
for future credit, as discussed below. Similarly, prolonged heavy rains also contribute 
to poor returns from the business because rainfall usually prevents customers from 
visiting Maiella trading centre. 
Nevertheless, during market days (Tuesdays and Fridays), weekends, and prior to a 
social event in a village (wedding, burial, circumcision ceremony etc.), the number of 
customers exceeds the small space of the premises. Some clients patiently sit 
outside the salon to wait for their turn, while others book their services when the 
number of customers reduces. Some may reschedule their visit.  
Nowadays, clients make reservations via mobile phones or directly by word of mouth 
when they visit the salon. However, circumstances may force some to be impatient – 
like the need to attend a wedding or a funeral. To ensure that she attends to as many 
customers as possible, Sharon employed six of her eleven trainees. At times, Sharon 
is forced to hire the services of trusted friends who may not have a large inflow of 
customers in their own premises. However, especially some Maasai customers 
demand to be attended by Sharon only, and if she is busy, some leave. She may 
persuade them to reschedule, but this will not work when the clients are preparing to 
travel or to attend an important ceremony like a burial or a wedding event.  
Apart from her prowess in hairdressing, Sharon relies on her clients to market her 
skills to their friends and family through word-of-mouth. She calls it “network 
marketing”, relating it to Jesus, who only used a few disciples to spread the gospel to 
the entire world. In an interview, Sharon noted that polygyny among the Maasai was 
indeed a blessing for her salon. She explained: 
Maasai men have several wives. When I beautify the hair of one of the wives, 
she will boast to the co-wives. The other wives and their daughters will then 
beg her to refer them to my salon. When they come, they insist on having a 
similar hairstyle to the one the person who referred them to this salon had.  
 
Furthermore, Sharon has made friends with both Maasai and Kikuyu customers 
through time, which often transcends the hairdressing business. Especially some 
Maasai women invite her to attend social events like celebrations of childbirth, 
fundraising drives, weddings, and circumcision parties. These friends introduce 
Sharon to their network of friends and family in attendance, most of whom eventually 
become her customers. Often, Maasai clients award Sharon with hairdressing 
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contracts, for instance, to attend to brides and their friends prior to a wedding. She 
noted:  
If a wedding is on Saturday, I can receive about 30 customers on Thursday 
and another 25 on Friday. My six employees are not enough during such busy 
days so I hire the services of other hair stylists in Maiella who may not be as 
busy.  
 
Customer satisfaction is key to client retention. Therefore, to be able to deliver the 
best services and to conduct themselves professionally, Sharon trains her 
employees in business etiquette, tailoring this to the local context. During the study, 
she fired two of her hair stylists who were accused of gossiping about one of her 
reliable Maasai customers. According to Sharon, each employee should strive to 
create a client base of her own. This goes beyond perfecting hairdressing skills to 
nurturing good relations with customers as well. A few employees already have a 
firm client base. However, Sharon insists on inspecting her employees’ work to 
ensure the satisfaction of her customers.   
Sharon’s Kikuyu friends also market her skills to their Maasai friends. One day, Jane, 
a Kikuyu woman who operates a corn-mill, brought her Maasai friend to the salon. 
The two met when Jane rented a piece of land for cultivation from the friend’s Maasai 
husband. Jane met this long-term friend at Maiella trading centre and decided to 
reward their friendship by having Sharon attend to her hair. Later that week, the 
Maasai woman brought two of her friends to Sharon for similar services.  
Hairdressing prices are negotiable. The most expensive hairstyles range between 
KES 1,000 (€10) and KES 1,500 (€15). Maasai woman often seek these. They 
equate expensive hairstyles to respect and admiration. As shown in Table 11, the 
majority Kikuyu spend at least KES 700 (€7) on hairdressing. As shown in the table, 
hair blow-dry costs KES 1,200 (€12) and matuta nne (a simple hairstyle), KES 80 
(€0.80).  
Payment for hairdressing is flexible. In most cases, Maasai women who seek 
Sharon’s services rely upon their husbands to clear their bills, sometimes after a 
successful sale of livestock in the market. Sharon explained:  
When a customer comes, we assist her to find the most appropriate hairstyle, 
which suits her budget. We then proceed to do her hair hoping that she has 
money. However, most clients never reveal that they have no cash with them. 
Once her hair is done, she will sit in the salon to wait for the husband to come 
and clear the bill. One day, ten Maasai women came here early in the morning 
to seek my services. Later on, they sat in the salon and began to chat while 
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waiting for their husbands to come and clear their bills until late in the evening. 
Their husbands tell them to wait in the salon.  
 
The frequency of visits by Maasai women to the salon is higher than that of their 
Kikuyu counterparts. According to Sharon, many Maasai women have not yet 
learned how to care for their hair to make it last long. The majority do not take heed 
to the advice to apply hair chemicals. In the interest of displaying their beautiful hair, 
some will not mind the dirt the hair accumulates as they weed or collect firewood in 
the forests. They want to show off their hair to friends as a statement that their 
husbands, who pay for hairdressing, are caring. It also indicates that both husband 
and wife are “enlightened” and on good terms.  
Sharon noted that a Kikuyu woman might keep the same hairstyle for up to two 
months while a Maasai woman may frequent the salon every two weeks. However, it 
is problematic to categorise such observation in relation to ethnicity or to generalise 
it. To improve their confidence, Sharon and her employees praise the looks of their 
customers after attending to them. During the study, it was common to hear, “Wait 
until your husband sees you!”; “You look young for a woman your age, the old look 
that you came with is now gone after this wonderful hairstyle”; “Your friends will not 
even recognize you”.  
When asked to describe her relationships with her clients, Sharon said that they are 
like her own sisters. She revealed that some Maasai clients open up to her, 
especially about their marital problems. “We talk about alcoholic husbands, 
‘bedroom’ matters, personal grooming, and inheritance disputes, among many other 
issues”, she noted.   
More importantly, Sharon advises her Maasai customers on family planning and the 
spacing of children. During the study, a Maasai friend visited the salon after a few 
months of absence – she had given birth. A discussion ensued that circled around 
the use of Norplant94 for family planning. 
 “These people [doctors] lie to us that we cannot get pregnant while breastfeeding” 
she complained as Sharon continued to blow-dry her hair. “I don’t know what to do 
and Baba Faith [husband] does not want to give me a break”, she continued as they 
all burst out in laughter. However, the client was happy that she had finally given 
                                                          
94 Norplant is a long-acting hormone that is inserted under the skin and prevents conception for up to 
five years (http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Norplant), see also Reich and Frost (2008) 
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birth to a boy. She explained that the husband had threatened to marry another wife 
to bear him sons. Nevertheless, she complained that it was still too soon to have a 
baby after the last one.  
The use of Norplant or other family planning methods still faces strong cultural 
constraints. In fact, it appeared as though the woman was not as afraid of the 
procedure itself as she was of the possibility that her husband would get wind of her 
decision to consider the procedure in the first place. She actually did not know how to 
convince her husband to consider the somewhat alien idea in a patriarchal society 
where it is socially appropriate to have many children. 
“Some say that it makes them weak sexually and worry that their men will look for 
other wives; others say that those who use such ‘things’ may never get children in 
the future… my husband wants more children, you know”, she continued, referring to 
myths associated with Norplant.   
However, a moment of silence followed when Sharon suddenly rolled up her sleeve 
to reveal where her Norplant rods were implanted. Henceforth, the Maasai woman 
paid attention as Sharon advised her to visit the doctor and consult the latter more 
about the matter: “Sometimes women have to keep their secrets to themselves, 
because men also rarely share their secrets with us”, advised Sharon when the client 
continued to worry about the husband’s reaction if he knew that she had undergone 
the procedure. 
Apart from family planning “lessons”, Sharon has also managed to convince another 
Maasai client to approach her husband and talk about his intention to marry a second 
wife without her consent. Apparently, the woman in question feared that the new wife 
could disturb the peace in the family and probably complicate inheritance matters. 
Sharon coached her client to convince the husband to allow her participation in the 
search for a co-wife in order to avoid possible marital disputes. 
Moreover, Sharon has made it her duty to participate in both the good and the bad 
times that her clients experience. If any of her customers falls sick, she has to visit 
them, or at least to send a get-well message through her friends. Sharon also sends 
her sick clients materials such as sugar or beef. Similarly, she will visit a client with 
presents to celebrate childbirth. Sharon’s customers respond with a similar gesture. 
When they harvest crops, they share some portions with Sharon; when a cow gives 
birth, some milk is brought to her. These non-obligatory forms of sharing function to 
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cement both social and economic relationships. They also minimise notions of 
ethnicity while enhancing social cohesion.  
 
The conversation below is between Sharon and a Maasai man. The man visited 
Sharon’s salon to settle his wife’s hairdressing bill. The couple live in Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei village. The man stood outside Sharon’s salon and beckoned her to 
approach (very typical for most Maasai men). After short greetings, the man went 
right to the point:  
 
Maasai man: Is it you who has done the hair of this one (pointing to his wife)? 
Sharon: Yes, you see how smart she looks now. 
Maasai man: How much is this (pointing to the wife’s head)? 
Sharon: One thousand six hundred shillings (KES 1,600/€16). 
Maasai man: Osho! (surprised) That money is worth a mature sheep! 
Sharon: (laughing) Ah no, there are other hairstyles that cost above two thousand 
Kenya shillings (€20). 
Maasai man: Why then did you not plait her the one for two thousand? 
Sharon: She loved this one; you see how it looks great on her? 
Maasai man: Is there anyone inside the salon who has the hairstyle worth two 
thousand shillings? 
Sharon: Only one, but she left already; another one will come tomorrow morning. 
Maasai man: Fine, fine. Now for this one, I will pay one thousand (€10). 
Sharon: (screaming loudly) Wooi! That is not possible. You know there is buying the 
hair products, cleaning, and even drying with electricity (blow-dry). If you count these 
you will notice that I am only getting a very small profit. Your wife becomes beautiful 
and I earn something small for my children. 
Maasai man: So you cannot reduce this amount, even by one hundred shillings (€1)? 
Sharon: I can give you a discount of fifty shillings (€0.50) because your wife is a good 
friend. However, I do not always give such discounts. You can even ask others – 
they will tell you that you are so lucky today. 
Maasai man: So how much now? 
Sharon: One thousand five hundred and fifty (€15.50). 
Maasai man: Fine, and next time you plait her the one for two thousand shillings 
(€20) so that I can see. 
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Sharon: Good, you will see how smart she will look. 
Maasai man: (paying)… And how many years will this hairstyle last before she can 
change it? 
Sharon: (laughing) If she keeps it well, applies oil daily, it can last a month.  
Maasai man: (after paying) Okay, is the doctor here? (referring to Sharon’s husband 
who runs a veterinary shop next to the salon). 
Sharon: Go right ahead, he should be there.  
 
Table 10 shows a record of Maasai and Kikuyu clients who sought Sharon’s 
hairdressing services in the months of April and May 2015. The actual number of 
clients is derived by computing two particular hairstyles, that is, “weave” and 
“application of hair chemicals”. This is because the very clients may have also 
purchased “blow-dry” services or “additional hairstyling services or products” shown 
in the table.  
 
Table 10. Maasai/Kikuyu hairdressing at Maiella trading centre in April and May 2015 
 
 
Date/M
onth 
2015 
Type of service Additional 
services/products 
Weave Application of hair 
chemical 
Blow-dry e.g. Hair clips/Buds, 
Jewellery 
Maasai Kikuyu Maasai Kikuyu Maasai Kikuyu Maasai Kikuyu 
12.04 1 1  1 2 1 2  
13.04      2  2 
14.04 7 1  1 6 2 10 2 
15.04  3   1 4 1 2 
16.04 2 4 1 1  3 1  
17.04 10 2 3  7 3 7 2 
18.04 1 4   3 5 2 1 
19.04 1 2  1 4 3 2 2 
20.04 4 2   2 5 3 1 
21.04 6 1   12 5 12 3 
22.04 2 4   2 3 2  
23.04 2 2 1 2 2 4 5 3 
24.04 9 2  1 12 4 7 1 
25.04 1 3  1 2 3 1 1 
26.04  1   2 1   
27.04 1 3  1 2 4 2 1 
28.04 3 1    1   
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29.04 1 2   2  2  
30.04 2 2 1  1 3 1 1 
01.05 6 6  2 3 1 3 2 
02.05 3 4 2  2 2 2  
03.05  1    2  1 
04.05 2 3   1 2 1 2 
05.05 3 1 1  6 2 3 3 
06.05 1 2  1 3 3 5 1 
07.05 2 3 1 2 1 3 1  
08.05 4 1  2 9 2 6 2 
09.05 3 3   2 3 3 2 
10.05  1    1   
11.05 1 2  1 2 2 2  
12.05 4 1 1  7 2 4 2 
13.05 1 1   1 2  2 
14.05 2 1  1 2 2   
15.05 4 2 1  8 2 6 2 
16.05 1 2 1  4 3 2 3 
17.05 1 1   2 3 1  
18.05 2 3  1 3 2 2 1 
19.05 5 2 1 1 13 1 7  
21.05 2 3   1 3 2 3 
22.05 3 1 1  6 3 4 2 
23.05 3 2  1 2 4 1 3 
24.05 1 3 1 1 2 4 1 3 
25.05 4 1   1 3 3 2 
26.05 6 2   12 3 7 1 
27.05 2 1   1 3 2 1 
28.05 2 3  2 3 3 3 2 
29.05 7 2 1  12 2 10 2 
30.05 2 2  1 4 4 2 1 
31.06 1 3   1 2  1 
TOTAL 131 64 17 25     
(Source: field data, 2015) 
 
Based on the data provided in Table 10, a summation of the two main hairstyles 
shows that roughly 237 customers sought hairdressing services at Sharon’s salon in 
about 50 days. On average, the daily customer flow is 5 clients, which puts the 
weekly average customer flow at 35 customers (Maasai and Kikuyu). The table also 
reveals that Maasai women are the dominant customers who seek hairdressing 
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services at the salon, at 62.45% (148 customers), while Kikuyu clients come second 
at 37.55% (89 customers).  
Apart from attaching a great deal of social value to hairdressing, the number of 
Maasai clients is suggestive of the trust and the good relations they enjoy with 
Sharon. However, as discussed below, hairdressing also comes with some cultural 
barriers especially when a male hairdresser is hired to attend to Maasai women.  
 
Male hairstylist in a Maasai context: cultural and moral barriers  
During the study, Sharon hired Sammy, a professional male hairstylist and a trainer 
at Maiella polytechnic. However, despite his excellent skills, particularly Maasai 
customers were not pleased with him. In contrast, Sharon’s Kikuyu clients did not 
see anything wrong with a man attending to their hair. Married Maasai women 
equated Sammy with their own sons, whom custom forbids from infringing upon their 
parents’ privacy. Radcliffe-Brown and Forde (1950) were influential in interpreting the 
social function of this form of behaviour in anthropology, which they refer to as 
“avoidance relationships”.  
Avoidance relationship is customarily based on respect rather than having a negative 
(or bad) feeling towards another person. In the context of this study, Maasai women 
also revealed the importance of patriarchy in such avoidance relationships. As one of 
them put it, “how would I explain to my husband if he found a man touching my head 
or feet? He will be so angry and will forbid me from coming to this salon”.  
Efforts by Sharon to convince her Maasai clients of Sammy’s skills were ultimately 
unsuccessful. Some even complained that they could not be comfortable gossiping 
about their husbands in the presence of a man – suggesting that the salon gave 
them space to speak freely. However, Maasai women who were not yet married did 
not show much concern for the avoidance relationship. Nevertheless, in the interests 
of her clients, Sharon had to terminate Sammy’s contract. Common knowledge 
especially when dealing with Maasai clients (just like other customers) holds that a 
dissatisfied client will pass this information to others, who may then refrain from 
seeking services from that particular premises. 
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Customer satisfaction  
Creating time for her customers is one of the most important factor that Sharon 
considers for customer retention and satisfaction. Sharon avails herself to her 
Maasai and Kikuyu clients when needed and may even cancel an important activity 
to attend to them. When a reliable client does not visit the salon for some time, 
Sharon calls them on the phone to find out their whereabouts. 
A good number of Sharon’s clients have young children. For a long time, Sharon 
faced difficulties while attending to clients who came to the salon with their babies. 
As a remedy, she bought a small bed and some toys for these babies. However, 
after a while, Sharon noted that the majority of Maasai women did not put nappies on 
their babies. As a result, the babies would defecate on the bed.  
After noticing the unpleasant trend, Sharon began to urge the clients with babies to 
use nappies on them. However, some Maasai women insisted that their husbands 
forbid them to put nappies on babies, arguing that “nappies constrain babies by 
reducing their comfort”. Nevertheless, Sharon successfully convinced some seven 
Maasai clients to adopt the practice, and hoped that they would influence many more 
in the future.  
 
Credit relations in hairdressing  
Just as in the other economic activities discussed in previous chapters, hairdressing 
also comes with credit facilities. Sharon keeps a credit records book (Table 11) with 
names of clients and the amount of money owed to them. In most cases, some 
clients may settle a fraction of their bill and promise to pay the balance on a later 
date or sometimes in the future.  
Sharon insists on writing the names of new clients who seek her services on credit. 
She may also perform some background checks to ascertain whether a client 
qualifies for credit. For instance, she might insist on knowing the origin, family 
members, and friends of the client. By doing so, Sharon can make follow-ups with 
these friends if such clients disappear without settling their debts. However, clients 
who have a long-standing relationship with Sharon, and those introduced to the salon 
by her close allies, are exempted from the credit records book. For this category, 
Sharon relies on the loyalty of her trusted customers. 
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Sharon’s clients prove their credit-worthiness by settling their debts. Once they do 
so, she removes them from the credit book. Normally, she considers customers who 
often invite her to ceremonies and to their homes for parties and for women’s groups 
as special. Sharon may propose to do their hair even when they had not planned to 
do so. “When you get money you will bring it to me; the most important thing is for 
you to look smart”, she tells them.  
The majority of Maasai customers prefer to settle their bills rather than access 
services on credit. Those who do not bring money with them would have arranged 
with their husbands to clear their bills already. The Maasai clients who visit the salon 
with money often carry specific amounts for particular hairstyles and may not want to 
incur more costs by accepting a different, more expensive hairstyle. However, should 
a trusted client prefer a hairstyle that costs more than the amount of cash she has 
immediately to hand, she can pay the money she has and then settle the balance in 
the future and before her next appointment.  
Over time, Sharon noted that those clients who often sought services on credit were 
those who were independent; that is, the women who did not depend on their 
husbands to settle their hairdressing bills. These included teachers who earn a 
salary, and those in business. A businessperson, for instance, may promise to pay 
her debt after the sale of goods. 
Table 11 shows a debtors’ record obtained from Sharon’s hairdressing business. It 
shows the dates when clients accessed hairdressing services on credit, their ethnic 
background, the type and cost of hairstyle, the down payment made, and the amount 
owed to specific clients. When a client clears their balance, Sharon makes a note by 
ticking next to the client’s name. Some clients may pay their debts in several 
instalments, while the majority prefer to settle their debts in at least two instalments. 
The table also shows clients who made a down payment and did not return to clear 
their balance. Client names are listed as either Kikuyu or Maasai. While it is 
necessary to refrain from using labels that seem to reinforce ethnic identity, one must 
acknowledge the anthropological dilemma in describing people who still use the very 
labels but abhor the possible negative connotations in them.  
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Table 11. Maasai/Kikuyu debtors’ record at Sharon’s hairdressing business 
 
Date of 
Debt 
Client’s 
Ethnic 
Background 
 
Hairstyle 
 
Cost (KES) 
 
Down payment 
 
Balance  
 
Debt Status 
05.08.2013 Kikuyu 1 Weave 650 400 150 Cleared 
23.08.2013 Maasai 1 Pony 700 500 200 Cleared 
18.09.2013 Kikuyu 2 Blow dry 120 0 120 Cleared 
07.10.2013 Kikuyu 2 Mwongezo 1 600 500 50 Cleared 
(11.12.2013) 
12.11.2013 Maasai 2 Mwongezo 2 900 700 200 Cleared 
16.11.2013 Kikuyu  Blow dry 120 0 120 Cleared 
11.12.2013 Maasai 3 Kinky 1,500 1,200 300 Cleared 
11.12.2013 Maasai 1 Kinky 1,500 1,300 200 Cleared 
11.12.2013 Kikuyu 2 Blow dry 120 80 40 + 50 for 
07.10.2013 
Cleared 
21.12.2013 Maasai 4 Kinky 1,500 1,250 250 Cleared 
23.12.2013 Maasai 5 Winnie 900 700 100 Not cleared 
23.12.2013 Maasai 2 Kinky 1,500 1,100 400 Cleared 
23.12.2013 Kikuyu  Rasta 650 500 150 Cleared 
29.12.2013 Kikuyu 5 Mwongezo 2 900 500 400 Not cleared 
29.12.2013 Kikuyu  Full palm 1,000 800 200 Cleared 
03.01.2014 Maasai 6 Blow dry 120 0 120 Not cleared 
21.01.2014 Maasai 7 Line piece 300 200 100 Cleared 
28.02.2014 Kikuyu 10 Mwongezo 1 600 400 200 Not cleared 
20.03.2014 Kikuyu  Rasta 800 500 300 Cleared 
21.05.2014 Kikuyu 11 Blow dry 120 50 70 Not cleared 
30.05.2014 Maasai  Brenda 1,800 1,500 300 Cleared 
22.08.2014 Maasai 9 Mwongezo 2 900 0 900 Cleared 
28.08.2014 Maasai 1 Mwongezo 2 900 700 200 Cleared 
30.09.2014 Maasai 4 Mwongezo 1 600 500 100 Cleared 
16.10.2014 Maasai 2 Half Rasta 1,000 800 200 Cleared 
25.11.2014 Maasai 10 + 
child  
Mwongezo x2 1,200 1,000 200 Not cleared 
11.12.2014 Kikuyu 1 Weave 650 500 150 Cleared  
19.12.2014 Maasai 3 Brenda half 1,300 1,000 300 Cleared 
20.02.2015 Kikuyu 8 Blow dry 120 0 120 Not cleared 
08.04.2015 Kikuyu Mwongezo 1 650 500 150 Cleared 
18.04.2015 Maasai 1 Pony 700 600 100 Cleared 
04.05.2015 Maasai 2 Afro Kinky 1,600 1400 200 Not cleared 
(Source: field data, 2015) 
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Table 11 shows that out of 32 clients who accessed services on credit, 24 (75%) of 
them cleared their debts. Only 8 (25%) had not managed to settle their debts at the 
time of the study. As shown in the table, specific numbers have been allocated to 
clients of interest to identify the number of times they accessed services on credit 
and their payment statuses. 
For example, “Maasai 1” and “Maasai 2” accessed services on credit four times, 
while “Kikuyu 2” accessed credit facilities three times. According to Sharon, the three 
have proven their credit-worthiness by successfully clearing their debts. Sharon was 
confident that “Maasai 2” would settle her balance dated 04.05.2015. In the future, 
she does not intend to include these clients in her debtors’ book, since they have 
earned her trust. 
“Maasai 3”, “Maasai 4”, and “Kikuyu 1” accessed services on credit twice, as shown 
in the table. They all managed to clear their debts. These have already earned 
themselves some trust for possible credit in the future. “Maasai 1, 2, 3, 4, and 10” live 
in Nkampani village. Out of these, “Maasai 10” had not cleared her debt at the time of 
the study. Especially the customers from Nkampani village consider Sharon an 
important member of their society – they frequently invite her to visit their homes. 
All Kikuyu clients except “Kikuyu 7” and “Kikuyu 5” live in Maiella trading centre. The 
latter are married to Maasai men and live in Sakutiek, which neighbours the study 
area. According to Sharon, “Kikuyu 7” brought “Maasai 6” to the salon. “Kikuyu 7” 
then assured Sharon that the Maasai friend would pay her debt within the month. 
However, the next time “Kikuyu 7” sought Sharon’s services, she found out that her 
friend had not even made a down payment, let alone cleared her debt. That time, 
“Kikuyu 7” accessed services on credit and made a down payment. However, she 
too has not settled her debt since.  
Sharon began to send word to these two customers through their friends in Sakutiek 
to remind them of their debt. However, neither of them had shown up to clear their 
debt at the time of this study. Other examples of unpaid debts shown in the table 
include “Kikuyu 5”, “Maasai 5”, “Kikuyu 10”, and “Kikuyu 11”.  
Interesting scenarios also occur. Take the case of “Maasai 9”. It was her first time 
visiting the salon. Neither Sharon nor her employees had met her before. She chose 
a hairstyle worth KES 900 (€9) (see Table 11). The client revealed later on that she 
had arranged with the husband to pick her up from the salon and to clear the bill after 
selling his sheep in the market. Unfortunately, the husband did not manage to sell 
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any sheep. Late that evening, he came to the salon dragging the sheep with a rope. 
He explained his frustration and told Sharon that he was a close friend of her 
husband, the veterinary officer. He then promised to bring the money himself to the 
salon or to give it to Sharon’s husband the next time he visited Sakutiek for work. 
Later on, the man gave Sharon’s husband the money.  
 
Cultural beliefs: “plastic teeth” and “dirty saliva”  
In early 2014, Sharon gave birth to her second baby girl. She took two months’ leave 
from her normal salon activities. After this short break, she resumed her work but she 
had to bring the baby along. After a week, she noticed that the baby had developed 
some strange restlessness and appeared to be suffering from a lot of pain. During 
the week, one of her Maasai clients visited the salon and was concerned about the 
condition of the child. Sharon explained that the doctor had examined the baby and 
had not diagnosed any ill health.  
The Maasai client asked to check whether someone had “given” the child “plastic 
teeth”. This is a belief that someone who possesses supernatural powers may have 
caused the baby to develop premature teeth. The person could have done so 
consciously or unconsciously by simply staring at the baby or uttering some words 
about its beauty. Community members consider people with such supernatural 
powers to be in possession of mate chafu (Swahili for “dirty saliva”).  
After washing her hand, the Maasai woman put a finger inside the baby’s mouth and 
confirmed her guess. The baby had developed two premature premolars, which must 
have been causing her the pain and endless crying. She exclaimed:  
These are plastic teeth. Someone with mate chafu must have seen this baby. 
If left unattended, the pain may even kill this baby…I know an old woman in 
Nkampani village who revokes such spells.  
 
Sharon tried to persuade her client to accompany her to this old woman (witch 
doctor) but instead she directed Sharon to the witch doctor’s home. The following 
day, Sharon went there to seek help. The witch doctor used some herbs and 
performed some rituals on the baby to revoke possible spells in the future95. She also 
revealed the identity of the one who had cast the spell – one of Sharon’s clients. 
Sharon chose not to reveal the identity of the culprit to her employees and her clients 
                                                          
95 Notwithstanding the fact that babies can actually develop their first teeth as early as their third 
month.  
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because she had no possible way of confirming the witch doctor’s claims except to 
ask the person directly, which could have affected her relations with other clients.  
 
In conclusion, hairdressing, just like land rentals and intermarriage, involves a wide 
range of material and non-material (social) exchanges and relationships that 
transcend the commercial business environment and give shape to locally 
contextualised forms of trust and loyalties. Generally, material and social exchanges 
give economic transactions a strong social meaning and promote a cohesive social 
fabric between Maasai and Kikuyu. Such relationships and their cohesive effect have 
strong basis in anthropological and sociological theory and particularly within the 
reciprocal exchange and social exchange theories (Blau, 1964; Malinowski, 1922; 
Mauss, 1925). However, the debate in Anthropology has been how to distinguish 
non-market exchanges from commodity exchanges and the manner in which they 
articulate with the market exchanges (see Gregory, 2001: 5039). Widlok’s distinction 
between sharing, exchange, and reciprocity provides a better understanding of non-
market transfers (Widlok, 2013). In the case under consideration, social relationships 
and business enterprises complement one another. 
Sharon’s case is only a single example of the social significance of a multi-ethnic 
economic environment. Trade brings Maasai and Kikuyu together in shared spaces 
and embodies multiple virtues of trust, respect, reciprocity, and related cross-cutting 
ties. Indeed, similar business enterprises including veterinary services, shops, hotels 
and bars, and trade in food products exemplify similarly interesting networks of 
relationships between Maasai and Kikuyu. These networks of relationships 
encourage solidarity and peaceful coexistence.  
Just as in land rentals and livestock trade, credit relations in hairdressing 
demonstrate the depth of trust between Maasai and Kikuyu, which help to strengthen 
social-economic ties in the studied area. However, it is important to note that 
hairdressing still faces some cultural constraints in Maasai society. Some associate it 
with loose morals, and others see hairdressing as a form of erosion of tradition. 
However, a good number consider hairdressing part of the inevitable social-cultural 
transformations brought about by the market economy and through the influence of 
other groups. The decision to maintain long hair or to use artificial hair to enhance 
ones beauty in the Maasai community is mainly an individual one as much as it is a 
collective one through peer pressure.  
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The preceding chapters (chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) reveal the multiplex character of 
cross-cutting ties. Ties and networks transcend the immediate reasons for which they 
are created, building a society in which alliances, loyalties, and both symbolic and 
social capital help to foster and sustain peaceful relationships between Maasai and 
Kikuyu as actors appropriate mutual benefits from local and national markets, often 
without limitations of ethnicity or prevailing social-political dynamics. Those chapters 
especially reveal the role of agency in transforming a formerly violent setting into a 
social situation characterised by intercommunity exchanges. Through such networks, 
Maasai and Kikuyu are able to share not only resources but also the market space 
where meaningful interactions emerge.  
 
The next chapters (chapters 8 and 9) shift the focus to the non-violent resolution of 
disputes and conflicts in the studied area. The chapters show how networks of 
relationships between Maasai and Kikuyu help to prevent and resolve disputes and 
conflicts without recourse to violence as a negotiating tool or as a means to protect 
and control resources. Peaceful relationships in a society are not necessarily devoid 
of interpersonal competition and conflicts, with possible violent scenarios. Indeed, 
peace is not necessarily the absence of conflict or violence.  
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CHAPTER 8: Institutional innovation and peacebuilding: 
local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi96 
 
This chapter frames peacebuilding in Kenya and the studied area with reference to 
local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi. Thereafter, chapter 9 presents a dozen 
narratives highlighting how these institutions attend to different disputes that form the 
social order in the studied area, and the constraints faced. 
 
Security is a shared mandate of all people living in Kenya. The first rule of 
security is vigilance…we must all embrace Nyumba Kumi (President of Kenya, 
20.10.2013) 
 
Let us not give criminals space to operate…this will be achieved through the 
recently established Nyumba Kumi initiative (President of Kenya, 20.10.2014). 
 
This is a dispute between neighbours and can be handled at home with the 
assistance of the local peace committee. There was no need for John [a Kikuyu 
farmer] to drive a hundred cattle [belonging to a Maasai herder] to the police 
station. He should have raised his complaint with his local peace committee first. 
We request you [police] to refer this matter back home so that we can try to 
resolve it there (local peace committee chair, Enoosupukia, March 2014). 
 
These statements capture Kenya’s recent adoption of a collaborative/participatory 
approach for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and prevention of crime. Drawing 
from the institutionalist perspective, this chapter will explore the role of Local Peace 
Committees (LPCs) and the Nyumba Kumi (community policing) initiative in the 
prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts in the south of the 
Kenya’s Rift Valley. The chapter seeks to address two related questions outlined in 
the introduction: 
a) How are rules (institutions) developed in the face of changing human-
environment relationships, and in what ways has the recent effort by the State 
to “implant” grassroots-level institutions affected the management of conflicts 
and crime?  
b) Under what circumstances can LPCs and Nyumba Kumi contribute 
institutional support for peaceful conflict management and crime prevention?  
                                                          
96 The chapter builds on a journal article, “Local peace committees, Nyumba Kumi, and the formal 
security sector in hybrid governance arrangement for conflict resolution and crime surveillance in 
Kenya”, which is under consideration for publication in the Africa Spectrum journal.   
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At the beginning of this thesis, I emphasized that cross-cutting ties and conflicting 
loyalties may not necessarily prevent the occurrence or escalation of disputes or 
violent conflicts. The social and economic significance of cross-cutting ties and 
conflicting loyalties, as discussed, helps to nurture social control, and possibly to 
transform attitudes towards violence, by reducing the ethnic notions of “us” versus 
“them”.  
While networks of relationships play an essential role in enhancing peace in multi-
ethnic contexts, they also have the potential to generate tensions and conflicts. In the 
context of this thesis, alliances create opportunities for negotiations, discussions, and 
compromises necessary for conflict resolution, but they may not necessarily 
guarantee mutually acceptable settlements or lasting agreements. 
Disputes and conflicts are integral to the social order in shared social and ecological 
spaces. What matters most is how actors prevent, pacify, and/or resolve small-scale 
disputes at the local level in order to prevent their escalation into large-scale 
situations where people begin to fight each other. Therefore, while cross-cutting ties 
and conflicting loyalties are crucial in mixed communities, the value of rules and laws 
to sanction behaviour at the grassroots level, cannot be underestimated. It is 
important to emphasize that the methods, mechanisms, strategies, or norms that 
actors apply in dispute resolution could possibly strengthen or alternatively lead to 
the breakdown of good relations between disputants or between their friends, their 
family members, or affiliates.  
In the Maasai/Kikuyu agro-pastoral borderlands on the fringes of Lake Naivasha 
basin, Local Peace Committees (LPCs) and Nyumba Kumi Committees (NKCs) have 
gained considerable prominence in the last decade, for rendering themselves useful 
in the prevention and nonviolent resolution of local disputes that arise due to 
differences in sentiments or emotions. This chapter will show that the current setup 
of the neo-traditional institutions includes women and youth, unlike previous councils 
of elders, which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were mainly composed of 
male elders who exercised authority over native groups.  
Nowadays therefore, society members irrespective of age and gender (superficially) 
share in decision-making processes regarding local affairs. In some cases, 
communities have made efforts to integrate LPCs and NKCs into their overriding 
social structure and age-set organization. Such “grafting” of contemporary LPCs (or 
new rules) to an existing body of traditional rules (defined by councils of elders) does 
198 
 
not always work, and it could end up creating social stratification and related 
problems, as discussed later in the chapter.  
Through case-oriented examples, the chapter will demonstrate how LPCs and NKCs 
resolve disputes at the local levels, and their lack of capacity to handle complex 
situations or conflicts that are characterised by politicised opinions and ideas. It will 
also reveal the complexities that affect Kenya’s devolved peace and security 
apparatus, which are typical for institutional synergies largely guided by co-
management ideas. 
The chapter builds primarily on data derived from focus group discussions (FGDs), 
involving LPCs in 3 villages of Enoosupukia Location, with 33 members, 11 in each 
committee, and NKCs representing 3 villages (clusters) in Maiella Sub-location with 
roughly 30 participants, to discuss the ethnography of LPCs and NKCs. I also 
attended and recorded proceedings (through note-taking and voice recording) of 
dozens of dispute-resolution events in real time, and included oral testimonies from 
purposively selected disputants on ongoing disputes. It was also necessary to 
investigate the cases that chiefs, LPCs, or NKCs had already resolved in order to 
gain deeper knowledge about the “sustainability” of settlements and adherence to 
agreements, and the attitudes of disputants and their affiliates after the dispute.  
First, however, I will briefly examine the transformation of traditional judicial 
institutions in Kenya in the last century in order to understand how they have 
evolved.  
 
Reintroduction of indigenous authority in Kenya 
Following widespread interethnic “clashes” and Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kenya 
in the last decade, the state embarked on a devolution of capacities for ensuring 
security and peace to the local level by creating LPCs and NKCs. These changes 
were conditioned and framed by ideas of decentralization and delegation of 
responsibilities from the state to the community level. 
As shown in Table 12, and in the following discussion, LPCs are (superficially) 
shaped after social institutions deemed traditional – that is, councils of elders – and 
are therefore an attempt to standardize an aspect of customary law. Nyumba Kumi, a 
strategy of anchoring community policing at the household level, is derived from 
ideas that encourage the participation of community members in local surveillance 
199 
 
initiatives, particularly drawing from Tanzania’s socialism policy of the last few 
decades.  
In the context of Kenya, traditional judicial institutions have undergone successive 
stages with reference to the development and changes of policy in the last century 
(under colonial and post-colonial regimes), as described below.  
 
Institutional innovation: from council of elders to local peace 
committees and Nyumba Kumi 
Arthur Phillip, writing on behalf of the colonial government of Kenya, summarizes the 
stages of development and changes of policy with regard to traditional judicial 
institutions in a 1945 report97. In Table 12 below, I have included the period after 
Kenya’s independence (1963) to illustrate a form of “renaissance” of traditional 
authority, which is largely driven by contemporary social-political dynamics.  
 
Table 12. Transformation of indigenous judicial institutions in the last century 
 
Period Changes in policy on indigenous judicial institutions 
1895-
1902 
The British government in Kenya vaguely recognized the existence of certain indigenous 
judicial institutions or councils of elders, which exercised authority over native groups. 
Councils of elders heard and determined civil cases (e.g. land disputes) for respective 
native groups by applying local norms, values, and institutions (native law and customs). 
They also dealt with criminal cases, such as homicide, where elders ceremonially 
cleansed offenders through ritual sacrifices to allow their reincorporation into society. 
Although the Europeans did not understand the nature of these institutions, they 
tolerated the continued exercising by them of their traditional functions under the 1897 
Native Courts Regulation, except in certain restricted areas in which a system of direct 
administration had already been established. The colonial administration extended this 
direct system in the course of time to supersede entirely the indigenous institutions.  
1902-
1910 
The colonial administration, through Provincial Commissioners (PCs), introduced a 
method of administration through the agency of government headmen (chiefs), and 
native tribunals became closely associated with it. Chiefs rapidly acquired considerable 
                                                          
97 Rhodes House/Weston Library. 753.12, r.7/1945 (1). Report on Native Tribunals by Arthur Phillip, 
Crown Council, pp. 13-15. Government Printer, Nairobi: In, RHO, 753.12, r. 7: Kenya Miscellaneous 
Blue Books on Social Affairs, 1930-1958. 
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power as a consequence of the backing given to them by the government, and this 
power extended to the administration of justice. Even though the jurisdiction of the 
council of elders was recognized, the influence of the chief seemed usually to have been 
dominant. Later on, the 1907 Courts Ordinance repealed all earlier provisions of the 
authority of indigenous judicial institutions. The elders who were traditionally qualified to 
exercise judicial functions were driven into an attitude of apathy, of sulky acquiescence, 
or even of hostility. Under the Ordinance, the role of chiefs fell under the supervision of 
the Governor, and their jurisdiction was limited to civil matters where the amount claimed 
did not exceed 250 rupees, and to “petty” criminal matters, excluding serious crimes 
such as homicide. These changes, according to Arthur Phillip, may have “sown seeds of 
many future difficulties”. 
1910-
1920 
The governorship of Sir Percy Girouard saw a notable change in the policy. The aim of 
the 1911 Native Tribunal Rules was to reduce native tribunals altogether. The Governor 
recognized only a few councils of elders, which were constituted under and in 
accordance with native laws and customs to exercise jurisdiction over the members of a 
native community. This change seemed improbable because it excluded many other 
native tribunals, which according to native laws and customs had jurisdiction over 
natives and which “deserved” recognition as well.  
In response to grievances raised by native groups concerning the rules, the 
administration attempted to restore the authority of indigenous judicial bodies but this, 
according to Arthur Phillip, “was more easily said than done…the authority and the self-
confidence of those bodies had been badly shaken”. Chiefs retained authority on judicial 
matters. The result was that the tribunals still ended up being subservient to the chiefs, 
and if they did try to assert their independence, they found themselves powerless to 
enforce their judgements. 
Collisions between native law and custom and English law intensified. For instance, the 
Kikuyu queried the idea of criminal law to prohibit athamaki a kiama (councils of elders) 
from sentencing witch doctors to death by burning. Moreover, native groups opposed the 
suggestion that land (and other) cases should be taken to Nairobi to be decided by 
judges who knew “nothing” about native law and customs. 
1920-
1930 
Administration officials at the district level, driven by the desire to control native tribunals 
that were still in operation, levelled many accusations against them in an attempt to 
convince the central government that such tribunals were “useless” if left unchecked. 
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They reported on the unsatisfactory state of the native tribunals, some referring to them 
as generally corrupt and inefficient, a state of affair they attributed to lack of supervision. 
Some complained that “courts of elders will not for some generations, if ever, be 
satisfactory criminal courts”. Others noted that “courts held by elders if not closely 
supervised by European officers would invariably lead to great abuses”. Others 
complained that government was lending its support to a native judicature, which was 
corrupt and largely “impotent”. Such accusation led colonial officials to enforce a policy 
of close supervision of tribunals at the district level following the 1930 Native Tribunal 
Ordinance. The effect was a further reduction of native tribunals.  
By the 1940s, much disagreement existed regarding the procedure for resolving 
disputes. Native methods aimed to restore peace and goodwill, and to bind or re-bind 
the two disputing groups together into a give-and-take reciprocity. The European system 
tended to widen the gulf between disputants by granting all the rights to one of them to 
the exclusion of the other, with no cognisance of the social implications this might have. 
1945-
1963 
During this period, the administration constructed modern courthouses, leading to the 
greater separation of the executive and judiciary. All these changes involved, in most 
cases, an ever-increasing departure from native custom, and a reduction of the number 
of members of native tribunals. According to Arthur Phillip, only ten elders were to be 
paid each month, instead of the fifteen or twenty who had exercised judicial authority 
before the changes were effected. In the report, Arthur Phillip noted that out of hundreds 
of tribunals, only 139 native tribunals existed as of 1945. These were as follows: Coast 
Province, 42; Nyanza Province, 29; Rift Valley Province, 22; Maasai District, 11; 
Northern Frontier District, 10; Turkana District, Nil. Hundreds of councils of elders and 
native tribunals lost effectiveness by the 1940s.  
Collision between English law and native law and customs persisted. Native groups 
opposed punishment by death, imprisonment, or fine in criminal law, preferring instead 
settlement by compensation and reincorporation into society through a ritual repast, or 
re-communion through a ritual sacrifice. 
1963-
1990s 
The independent government of Kenya adopted the colonial legacy (formal/English law), 
which led to an ever-increasing departure from native law and customs. The government 
supported chiefs, who henceforth exercised an absolute mandate to mediate civil cases 
at the local levels. The state also supplied chiefs with a few police officers with whom to 
enforce orders. At the time, the social inequalities, which were principally rooted in 
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colonial land policies, began to shape tenure problems in local environments, leading to 
instances of often politicised land disputes and violent conflicts. Freedom of movement 
also created instances of interethnic conflicts, which were mainly linked to control over 
resources.  
1990s-
2000 
Resource-based conflicts, including cattle raids, became notorious particularly in the 
pastoral regions. Due to what many attributed to state failure in the management of 
intercommunity violence, councils of elders in these marginalized (with little or no 
presence of security agencies) arid and semi-arid areas seemed to be the only solution 
to rampant insecurity, conflicts, and cattle raiding. Indeed, some councils of elders and 
local peacebuilding initiatives supported by faith-based organizations and NGOs gained 
considerable recognition for rendering themselves useful in local affairs. Councils of 
elders particularly in northern Kenya became popular following the prevention and 
resolution of rampant inter-clan raiding and competition over pastures and water points, 
which had caused massive inter-clan attacks.  
In Wajir county, for instance, the Degodia and Ngare clans signed the Al Fatah 
Declaration, Modogashe Declaration, and Garissa Declaration, through the agency of 
local elders. These declarations prescribed penalties for raiding, murder, and related 
crimes. They also provided channels for cooperative resource use allowing “outsiders” to 
negotiate for grass and water points peacefully (for further discussions on these 
declarations see Chopra, 2008; Menkhaus, 2008; Odendaal, 2010). Similar 
peacebuilding strategies at the community level also gained some popularity among 
other communities in Kenya during this period (see examples in Pkalya, Adan and 
Masinde, 2004; Cuppen, 2013). 
2000-
2015 
Following the 2007/2008 post-election violence and increasing instances of politicised 
interethnic conflicts and Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks in Kenya, the state – through 
inspiration from the pastoral peace initiatives, specifically the community-based peace 
agenda in Wajir – created neo-traditional institutions at the community level, which were 
(superficially) shaped after customary law. In 2010 (or thereabouts), local peace 
committees and Nyumba Kumi were enshrined in the Laws of Kenya, Cap 10, Article 
159 (2), and Article 244(e) of the National Police Service Act, Section 96(1), 
respectively, as attempts to co-manage conflict and to assist the state in surveillance at 
the local-levels.  
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As shown in Table 12, informal institutions have gained considerable presence in 
local affairs, at least since the early 2000s, but the official conferment of rights on 
them under the Kenya’s Constitution in 2010 enhanced their legitimacy. This 
conferment of rights to handle local-level conflicts and prevent crime was primarily 
driven by co-management ideas and principles in vogue over the last few decades. 
LPCs and Nyumba Kumi are intended to bring together synergies between formal 
state organizations and a diversity of civil-society organizations (NGOs and 
community-based organizations) in the management of conflicts and prevention of 
crime as discussed below.  
Co-management of resource-based conflicts 
 What is co-management? In answering this question, Carlsson and Berkes (2005: 
66) provide three similar definitions:  
1. Collaborative management, or co-management, is the sharing of power and 
responsibility between the government and local resource users (Berkes, 
George and Preston, 1991: 12).  
2. Co-management is the term given to governance systems that combine state 
control with local, decentralized decision-making and accountability and 
which, ideally, combine the strengths and mitigate the weaknesses of each 
(Singleton, 1998: 7). 
3. Co-management is the sharing of responsibilities, rights, and duties between 
the primary stakeholders, in particular, local communities and the nation-state; 
a decentralized approach to decision-making that involves the local users in 
the decision-making process as equals with the nation-state (The World Bank, 
1999: 11). 
4. It is a partnership in which government agencies, local communities and 
resource users, nongovernmental organizations and other stakeholders 
negotiate, as appropriate to each context, the authority and responsibility for 
the management of a specific area or set of resources’ (IUCN, 1996). 
Drawing from these definitions, co-management ideally involves the sharing of 
responsibilities and participation in decision-making processes between state and 
non-state actors (communities, NGOs, civil society groups, and development 
partners etc.) guided by the appreciation of diverse capacities, methods, ideals, and 
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“shared” aims. It is a collaborative approach that combines formal and informal 
institutions and strategies.  
This combination of institutions, or what some call hybrid governance arrangements 
(Cleaver et al. 2013; German and Keeler, 2010; Kumar and De la Haye, 2011; Adam, 
Verbrugge, and Boer, 2014) is hailed as bringing a new approach to conflict 
management (see Castro and Nielsen, 2001). In recent decades, co-management or 
participatory approaches to managing natural resources and conflicts have gained 
considerable attention (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2007). The development world 
considers the collaborative management of conflicts and peacebuilding activities to 
be a prerequisite for sustainable development and enduring peaceful interactions 
(World Bank, 2011; UNDP, 2014; DFID, 2010: 21). Practitioners of contemporary 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding (Lederach 1997; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 
and Miall 2011) have also popularized collaborative peacebuilding approaches that 
link institutions and actors from local communities, the state, and civil society 
organizations.  
However, co-management approaches are often characterised by a wide range of 
notorious complexities, as shown by Carlsson and Berkes (2005: 67). For instance, 
local communities are rarely coherent and homogeneous units; collaboration 
dilemmas are possible when different actors adopt different ways of performing their 
responsibilities; and questions of legitimacy and governance can easily fuel conflicts 
between different actors and institutions (e.g. between formal law and informal rules). 
Therefore, Castro and Nielsen (2001) warn that co-management agreements can 
escalate old conflicts or create new ones. The intention of the state to control local 
affairs could end up creating more problems or divisions in the state-community 
relationship. As we shall see, the devolved peace and security framework in Kenya is 
already enmeshed in such complexities. 
Why “involve” non-state actors in peace and security matters? In Kenya, state- 
and/or elite-driven measures (like politically driven peace caravans) have been the 
cornerstone of peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts since independence. 
However, Kenya’s formal state mechanisms have not been particularly effective in 
preventing, responding to, or resolving intercommunity resource-related violent 
conflicts and crime (Chopra, 2008: 5; Odendaal, 2010: 39). Chopra (2008) notes that 
“official laws and judicial processes lack the capacity to understand the locals’ 
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definition of crime and conflict resolution – ideas and value systems of local 
communities, which define crime and prescribe how conflicts should be solved”. 
Therefore, the state’s adoption of co-management ideas in the last decade was not 
only driven by rising cases of insecurity and crime, but also a response to context-
specific grievances surrounding control over and access to land and other resources 
between ethnic groups. Echoing the president’s address, in which it was stated that 
“security is a shared mandate of all people living in Kenya”, the state decentralized 
conflict management responsibilities and crime prevention by “implanting” LPCs and 
Nyumba Kumi at the community levels and sharing such responsibilities with other 
non-state actors. Perhaps this move was also a demonstration to Western allies that 
the country was putting measures in place to tackle violent conflicts and crime in the 
attempt to create a secure environment for foreign investors and tourists. 
LPCs gained popularity mainly after the atrocities committed in the 2007/2008 post-
election violence. About four years later, the state created the Nyumba Kumi 
initiative. While LPCs are meant to solve local conflicts through arbitration, Nyumba 
Kumi are thought of as measures for local surveillance. However, as shown later in 
the chapter, the mandates of LPCs and NKCs are increasingly conflated at the local 
level and local people are changing the systems to suit their norms and needs, and 
against (seemingly so) the state vision plans for these institutions.   
 
State vision plan for local peace committees 
During the 1990s and early 2000s, local peacebuilding initiatives, partially fostered by 
NGOs and faith-based organizations (FBOs) and partially based on traditional clan 
structures, engaged themselves successfully in conflict resolution. Notably, in Wajir, 
northern Kenya, a group of local women engaged local elders from the warring 
Degodia and Ngare clans in a peacemaking process, between 1990 and 1993, that 
helped to end violence between the groups (Menkhaus 2008).  
This experience partly informed the state, which in 2001 created a National Steering 
Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), to coordinate 
peacebuilding and conflict-management activities in the country. NSC brought 
together state and non-state actors, including key ministries, civil society 
organizations (e.g. National Council of Churches in Kenya; Peace and Development 
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Network), international organizations (e.g. Saferworld, Mercy Corps), and 
development partners (e.g. USAID)98.  
In light of decentralization and delegation of conflict-mitigation responsibilities, the 
NSC created LPCs at the community/village level in an effort to integrate informal 
(customary-based) conflict-resolution mechanisms with formal ones (e.g. by courts). 
Chairs of LPCs and chiefs, who are the “eyes” of the central government at the local 
level, form the Sub-location (or Location) Peace and Security Committee, while 
chiefs and other state administrators at the Ward level form the Ward Peace and 
Security Committee, and the structure becomes increasingly bureaucratic at higher 
levels, as shown in Figure 12. 
Superficially, the 47 counties of Kenya have individual structures relatively similar to 
that shown below. Arguably, therefore, NSC and the central government’s Ministry of 
Internal Security (Interior Ministry) coordinate a rather amorphous peace and security 
framework. The interlinkages indicated by the arrows in Figure 12 show intended 
synergies between committees, the right/authority to order/control, and possible 
provisions of legitimacy. 
 
 
Figure 12. Kenya‘s devolved peace and security institutions.  
                                     (Source: field data, 2014) 
 
                                                          
98 See http://www.nscpeace.go.ke/about-us/membership.html 
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Photograph 13. Mpeuti village local peace committee 
(Photograph by author, 2014).  
 
The overarching role of LPCs as outlined in the National Policy on Peacebuilding and 
Conflict Management (NPPBCM, 2011) is to broker agreements between conflicting 
parties. LPCs in Enoosupukia, however, have developed a very broad and somewhat 
vague portfolio drawing from ideas shared by both the NSC and the NPPBCM. LPCs 
in Enoosupukia outlined the following roles: 
1. Preventing, managing, and resolving land- and ethnic disputes; 
2. Resolving inter-clan cattle rustling; 
3. Spearheading community policing (surveillance); 
4. Ensuring children (boys and girls) receive an education, and reporting parents 
who discriminate based on gender in schooling to the local administration for 
possible prosecution;  
5. Developing ways to end possible cases of early marriage and school dropouts;  
6. Monitoring and reporting (to state agencies) early warning signs of intra-
/intergroup rivalry, as well as reporting politicians who preach ethnic essentialism 
through inflammatory statements.  
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7. Monitoring development projects and reporting pertinent infrastructural and 
related needs to the local administration and higher offices.   
How communities adapted LPCs to the villages of Enoosupukia is discussed after 
the next section.  
 
State vision plan for Nyumba Kumi (community policing) 
Notably, Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya in 2013 and 2014 and rising crime rates 
breathed a sense of urgency into the need for a new policing framework. Previous 
community policing experiments in Nairobi and its environs produced undesirable 
results (see Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003). Touts converted police booths in 
Nairobi, which were meant to restore public confidence in the force and to bring 
security closer to the citizens, into “toilets” or money-collection points99. Rampant 
corruption, illegal detention, and mistreatment of people by police, as well as extra-
judicial killings, deepened mistrust between the police and the public (see KHRC, 
1998b; Ruteere and Pommerolle, 2003).  
Despite these limitations, the President himself supported the Nyumba Kumi initiative 
as one that could redefine community policing in Kenya. Nyumba Kumi takes the 
smallest social unit (household) as the starting point for surveillance. The Draft 
Guideline on implementation of Community Policing (DGCP, 2015: 2) notes that, 
“Nyumba Kumi clusters do not necessarily involve ten households [as the name 
might suggest]; clusters may be in a residential court, in an estate, a block of houses, 
a manyatta, a street, a market centre, a gated community, or a village, and cut 
across divisions of creed, politics, ethnicity, gender, or any other sectarian affiliation”.   
Kenya’s Nyumba Kumi largely borrows from Tanzania’s socialism policy 
(villagization, or Ujamaa) popular in the early 1970s (see Boesen, Madsen, and 
Moody 1977). In Tanzania’s settings, Nyumba Kumi chairs (popularly known as 
“balozi wa kitongoji”) monitored day-to-day activities and interactions of respective 
cluster members, recorded visitors, and served as custodians of local security. 
However, the concept lost its effect in Tanzania, at least from the 1980s. 
Consequently, some Kenyans argue that the state borrowed a failed system, to 
salvage an important security situation100.   
                                                          
99 Standard Digital, February 24th  2016, “City security booths turned into toilet banks”. 
100 Brainstorm, November 26, 2013, “Interrogating the Nyumba Kumi Initiative”. 
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The state proposed that the following members should constitute each NKC: three 
members of the public (considering ethnic balancing, age, gender); a representative 
from each religion in a cluster; a businessperson; a county government 
representative; a youth; a woman; the area assistant chief, and a representative from 
each government-policing agency with presence in a cluster/locality (DGCP 2015: 8). 
In practice and based on observation, however, NKCs derived membership from 
community members in specific clusters only – none had a government-policing 
agent as a member. 
Arguably, the state has failed in resolving the mistrust between police and the public 
sufficiently to warrant a collaborative framework. Another problem with this official 
proposal of membership into NKCs is the perception of clusters and communities as 
being homogeneous and coherent entities. Moreover, struggles over jurisdiction and 
power differences between different policing agencies in Kenya (the Kenya Police, 
the Administration Police, the Kenya Defence Forces, the National Intelligence 
Service, the Criminal Investigation Department, the police Anti-stock Theft Unit, and 
the Game Rangers) is notoriously problematic. The possibility for these agencies to 
cooperate “smoothly” in peace and security matters and to join and/or support NKCs 
and clusters may be difficult. Other complexities are discussed later in the chapter.  
Just like LPCs, NKCs are at the bottom of Kenya’s devolved community policing 
structure (Figure 13). At the helm (at the national level) are the Interior Ministry and 
the NSC. Figure 13 illustrates Kenya’s devolved community policing structure using 
the example of NKCs in Maiella Sub-location as the grassroots-level institutions. The 
ethnography of NKCs in Maiella Sub-location, as well as that of LPCs in 
Enoosupukia Location, is discussed next. As shown in Figure 13, chairs of NKCs and 
chiefs form the sub-location community policing committee, which links the local level 
to formal security apparatus in the ward, sub-county, county, and the state. The 
interlinkages (indicated by arrows) show the proposed sharing of security 
information, the level of authority, and the intended cooperation in attending to 
security matters.  
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Figure 13. Nyumba Kumi structure of Maiella Sub-location.  
(Modified from the DGCP, 2015) 
 
The State, through the DGCP (2015), proposed numerous roles for NKCs. As shown 
below, the list is more about “what to do” and less about “how to do” it. 
 
Table 13. Roles of Nyumba Kumi as mandated by the State 
 
 
 
Resolve boundary disputes;  
 
Device methods to promote “jua jirani 
yako” (know – your – neighbour);  
 
Resolve watering points disputes;  
 
Resolve access to watering points and 
grazing disputes;  
 
Develop ways of improving the 
environment (e.g. street/building 
lighting);  
 
Resolve inter-ethnic cattle rustling;  
 
Resolve known ethnic differences;  
 
Develop a system of identification of 
aliens;  
 
Develop systems of identifying hotel 
patrons;  
 
Develop a system of identifying tenants;  
 
Promote cluster security education;  
Develop ways of improving safety of 
passengers;  
Identify and monitor social development 
activities;  
Monitor and evaluate local economic 
activities;  
Carry out local crime mapping;  
Assess and evaluate poverty, health needs and 
employment levels of cluster members; 
Recommend day-to-day security actions;  
Manage jigger and other vector-based 
infestations;  
Monitor safety of forests;  
Promote performance education etc. 
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By comparing the roles supposedly played by LPCs and NKCs, there is considerable 
duplication of mandate, which could potentially create conflicts when the two 
institutions operate simultaneously within a given cluster/village, as discussed later in 
the chapter.  
 
Adapting local peace committees to the local environment of 
Enoosupukia 
Usually, chiefs in liaison with other government officials call for a baraza101 whenever 
there is need to address community members regarding important matters affecting 
them. Some months after the 2007/2008 post-election violence, residents of 
Enoosupukia were called to a baraza to select members for LPCs. During the 
baraza, county officials briefed villagers on the requirements of age, gender, and 
ethnicity for membership in LPCs, and facilitated the selection of members. The 
crowd then split into village groupings and each group selected a team of eleven 
LPC members. The LPCs henceforth exercised jurisdiction over their respective 
villages. 
The selection process was quite informal; villagers called out names of possible 
candidates, and either supported or rejected the names by raising hands without 
giving any reasons for their choice. Thereafter, committees drawn from each village 
nominated a chair, a vice-chair, and a secretary. There was no need for a treasurer 
because these committees do not handle money. Concerns over unclear village 
boundaries and jurisdiction did little to stop the selection process.  
The number of persons who constitute each committee (eleven) is significant. This 
odd number allows committee members to uphold or reject decisions (e.g. on a 
settlement; removal of a member from office etc.) with limited risk of getting equal 
numbers on either side when they vote. However, based on observation, settlements 
seldom involve voting, and rarely will all committee members turn up for meetings. 
Usually, only the officials (chair, vice-chair, and secretary) are actively involved in the 
day-to-day affairs of the committee. 
Tables 14, 15, and 16 show personal attributes of committee members who 
constitute the LPCs of Mpeuti, Olosho lole Kaloi, and Ol tepesi le Parsimei villages in 
                                                          
101 Swahili word for council, but commonly used to refer to formal meetings attended by villagers, local 
administration, and representatives of the central government. 
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Enoosupukia Location, Narok county. Table 17 analyses the personal attributes of 
members of these committees combined. 
 
Table 14. Mpeuti village LPC members 
Members Designation Sex Age Ethnicity Education Wealth/Income 
M1 Chair M 50 Dorobo Primary 
dropout 
1.   Owns 10 acres of land 
2.   Leased 6 acres to 5 Kikuyu tenants 
3.   Farms 2 acres of land 
4.   Livestock: 10 cattle 
M2 Secretary M 67 nusu nusu 
(Kikuyu/Maasai) 
Primary 
complete 
1.   Owns 6 acres of land 
2.   Farms 4 acres of land 
3.   Livestock: 4 cows 
M3 Vice-chair M 38 Dorobo Secondary 
dropout 
1.   Owns 8 acres of land 
2.   Leased 6 acres to 8 Kikuyu tenants 
3.   Farms 3 acres of land 
4.   Livestock: 10 cattle 
M4 Senior elder M 50 Dorobo Primary 
dropout 
1.   Owns 5 acres of land  
2.   Leased 3 acres to 4 Kikuyu tenants 
3.   Farms an acre of land 
4.   Livestock: 2 cows 
M5 Senior elder F 50 Dorobo None 1.   Owns 5 acres of land 
2.   Leased 3 acres to 5 Kikuyu tenants  
3.   Farms an acre of land 
4.   Livestock: 2 cows 
M6 Youth F 30 nusu nusu 
(Kikuyu/Maasai) 
Primary 
dropout 
1.   Farms an acre of land 
M7 Senior elder F 70 Dorobo None 1.   Owns 5 acres of land  
2.   Leased 3 acres to 5 Kikuyu tenants 
3.   Livestock: 3 cows 
M8 Junior elder M 45 nusu nusu 
(Dorobo/Kikuyu) 
Primary 
dropout 
1.   Owns 6 acres of land 
2.   Leased 2 acres to 3 Kikuyu tenants 
3.   Livestock: 4 small stock 
4.   Farms 2 acres of land 
M9 Junior elder M 40 Dorobo Primary 
dropout 
1.  Owns 10 acres of land  
2.   Leased 6 acres to 7 Kikuyu tenants 
3.   Livestock: 1 cow 
4.   Farms 2 acres of land 
M10 Pastor and 
Senior elder 
M 50 Dorobo Diploma 1.   Owns 8 acres of land 
2.   Leased 5 acres to 6 Kikuyu tenants 
3.   Farms 2 acres of land 
4.   Livestock: 5 cattle 
M11 Senior elder M 67 Maasai None Supported by family 
 (Source: field data, 2014) 
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Table 15. Olosho lole Kaloi village LPC members 
Members Designation Sex Age Ethnicity Educatio
n 
Wealth/Income 
M1 Chair M 56 Maasai None 1.  Owns 15 acres of land 
2.  Business: runs a shop, hotel and a   
      Corn-mill at his home. 
3.   Livestock: 150 small stock; 10 cattle  
M2 Vice chair M 38 Maasai Primary 
dropout 
1.  Owns 35 acres of land 
2.  Farms  6 acres of land 
3.  Business: sale of Irish potatoes 
4.  Livestock: 40 small stock 
M3 Secretary M 30 nusu nusu 
(Maasai/Kikuyu) 
Primary 
complete 
1.  Owns 7 acres of land 
2.  Farms 4 acres of land 
3.  Leased 3 acres to a Kikuyu tenant 
4.  Livestock:  30 small stock 
M4 Junior elder M 45 Maasai None 1.  Owns 20 acres of land 
2.  Farms 2 acres of land 
2.  Livestock: 80 small stock; 20 cattle 
M5 Youth F 35 nusu nusu 
(Kikuyu/Kalenjin
) 
Primary 
complete 
1. Farms an acre of land 
      
 
M6 Senior elder F 50 Kikuyu 
(married by a 
Maasai) 
Primary 
dropout 
1. Farms 5 acres of land 
 
M7 Senior elder M 40 nusu nusu 
(Maasai/Kikuyu) 
Primary 
complete 
1.  Farms 10 acres of land 
2.   Leased 5 acres to 4 Kikuyu tenants 
3.   Business: livestock trader/broker 
4.   Livestock: 30 small stock; 5 cattle 
M8 Senior elder M 52 Maasai None 1.  Owns 30 acres of land 
2.   Farms an acre of land 
M9 Senior elder F 47 Maasai None 1.  Owns 8 acres of land 
2.   Livestock: 150 small stock 
M10 Youth F 39 Maasai Primary 
complete 
1.  Farms an acre of land 
       
M11 Youth F 33 Maasai None 1.  Farms an acre of land 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
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Table 16. Ol tepesi le Parsimei village LPC members 
Members Designation Sex Age Ethnicity Education Wealth/Income 
M1 Chair M 38 Maasai None 1. Owns 30 acres of land 
2.  Leased 10 acres of land to 5  
     Kikuyu tenants 
3. Farms 3 acres of land 
4.  Livestock: 400 small stock; 50 cattle 
M2 Secretary and 
chief advisor 
to the area 
chief 
M 42 Maasai Primary 
complete 
1. Owns 30 acres of land 
2. Farms 12 acres of land 
3. Livestock: 375 small stock; 35 cattle 
M3 Vice-chair M 45 Maasai Primary dropout 1. Owns 45 acres of land 
2. Farms 20 acres of land 
3. Livestock: 350 small stock; 100 cattle 
M4 Senior elder M 50 Maasai None 1. Owns 50 acres of land 
2. Farms 15 acres of land 
3. Livestock: 48 small stock; 10 cows 
M5 Senior elder M 55 Maasai None 1. Owns 30 acres of land 
2. Farms 10 acres of land 
3. Leased 4 acres to 2 Kikuyu tenants 
4. Livestock: 50 small stock; 10 cattle 
M6 Junior elder M 45 Maasai None 1. Owns 30 acres of land 
2. Farms 3 acres of land 
3. Leased 5 acres to 2 Kikuyu tenants 
4. Livestock: 70 small stock; 30 cattle 
M7 Youth M 37 Maasai Primary dropout 1. Owns 30 acres of land 
2. Farms an acre of land 
3. Leased 3 acres to 2 Kikuyu tenants 
4. Livestock: 50 small stock; 10 cattle 
M8 Youth M 45 Maasai None 1. Owns 30 acres of land 
2. Farms 4 acres of land 
3. Leased 4 acres to 4 Kikuyu tenants 
4. Livestock: 70 small stock; 10 cattle 
5. Business: livestock trader/broker 
M9 Junior elder F 40 Kikuyu 
(married to 
a Maasai) 
Primary dropout 1. Business (supply of Irish potatoes) 
2. Farms 3 acres of land 
M10 Senior elder F 50 Maasai None 1. Farms an acre of land 
 
M11 Youth F 35 Maasai Primary 
complete 
1. Farms 3 acres of land 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
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Table 17. Composition of LPC members in Enoosupukia, Narok County 
Variables N % 
Gender Male 22 66.7 
Female 11 33.3 
  
Age 
30-40 13 39.4 
41-50 15 45.5 
51-60 2 6.1 
>61 3 9.1 
  
  
Ethnicity 
Maasai 18 54.5 
Dorobo 7 21.2 
Nusu nusu  6 18.2 
Kikuyu 2 6.1 
  
  
Education 
None 14 42.4 
Primary 
dropout 
10 30.3 
Primary 
complete 
7 21.2 
Secondary 
dropout 
1 3 
Diploma 1 3 
  
  
Main Sources of 
Income 
Livestock 23 69.7 
Leasing 
farmland 
15 45.5 
Farming on 
own land 
29 88.8 
Business 4 12.1 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
 
In stark contrast to indigenous judicial institutions, which were composed of male 
elders, members of LPCs include women and youth, as shown in Table 17 (at least 
one third). The State aims to mainstream gender issues in conflict resolution by 
empowering women towards peacebuilding and the long-term mitigation of conflict 
(NPPBCM, 2011). However, the cultural norms of patriarchy and the socially 
constructed gender roles still present inequalities between men and women in 
dispute resolution, just as is the case in NKCs. Interestingly, elders (over 60 years of 
age) are rarely involved. Instead, males in their 30s and 40s are largely preferred as 
committee members.  
However, the few elders over 60 are necessary because society believes they 
possess historical knowledge of land matters. They also pronounce curses by 
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invoking supernatural power to resolve difficult matters (discussed below). There is 
considerable ethnic diversity in LPCs. However, and perhaps as might be expected, 
members of dominant ethnic groups in a particular village predominate in the 
respective committees (see Tables 14, 15, and 16).  
Literacy is not a requirement for membership of a committee. Consequently, almost 
half of committee members are illiterate (42%). Only a few have attended some 
introductory classes in formal education. Although important, conflict resolution 
through application of local norms and values may not necessarily require skills 
acquired through formal education. Nevertheless, almost all committee secretaries 
can read and write. They keep records of dispute resolution proceedings and of 
settlements.  
The majority of committee members speak the local languages (Maa and Gikuyu) as 
well as Swahili. This enables the use of indigenous languages in dispute resolution, 
which encourages dialogue but does not necessarily guarantee settlements. 
Committee members subsist on several income-generating activities. Almost all of 
them own land individually or through their families. The majority (about 90%) 
engage in subsistence and small-scale commercial cultivation. A good number are 
landowners who lease farmland to tenants of Kikuyu descent. A large percentage 
(about 70%) own livestock in varying quantities, with the exception of women who, 
according to patriarchal norms in the Maasai society, rarely have ownership or 
disposal rights to land and livestock, unless they acquired them mainly through 
purchase or as gift.  
Adapting the Nyumba Kumi initiative to the local context of Maiella 
In a bid to adapt NKCs to specific local situations, villagers and the local 
administration of Maiella Sub-location selected seven community members from 
each village to form NKCs, taking each village as an independent cluster (see the 
example given in Figure 13). In the end, they selected fourteen NKCs – equivalent to 
the villages that LPCs already governed. Selection of members of NKCs resembled 
that of LPCs and was conducted sometime in 2013. As noted earlier, none of the 
NKCs observed had a government-policing agent as a member. However, individual 
committees make the effort to cooperate with police where necessary, as shown in 
some of the cases presented in the next chapter.  
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Tables 18, 19, and 20 show the personal attributes of members of three NKCs of 
Maiella Sub-location. The three villages (clusters) are Maiella trading centre, Kokoti, 
and Nkampani. Except for Nkampani, the Kikuyu dominate the other villages. Table 
21 analyses the personal attributes of members of these committees. 
 
Table 18. Members of Nyumba Kumi Committee in Maiella trading centre 
Member Age Sex 
(M/F) 
Ethnicity Education Wealth/Income 
M 1 Chair 33 M Kikuyu Primary 
complete 
1. Shop 
2. Matatu operator (public 
transport) 
M2: Secretary 31 M Kikuyu Primary 
complete 
1. Casual worker at the 
transport business  
M3 60 M Kikuyu None 1. Farmer (rents farmland) 
2. A few livestock (zero 
grazing) 
M4 50 M Kikuyu Primary dropout 1. Farmer (rents farmland) 
 
M5 50 M Kikuyu Primary dropout 1. Maize mill operator 
2. Charcoal trader  
M6 25 F Kikuyu Secondary 
complete 
1. Vegetable dealer 
M7 60 F Kikuyu None 1. Farmer (rents farmland) 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
 
Table 19. Members of Nyumba Kumi Committee in Nkampani village 
Member Age Sex 
(M/F) 
Ethnicity Education Wealth/Income 
M 1: Chair 57 M Maasai None 1. Farms 2 acres of land 
2. Livestock (50 sheep, 1 cow) 
M2: Secretary 20 M Maasai Secondary 
complete 
1. Casual worker at Or Power geothermal 
plant 
M3 33 M Maasai Primary 
dropout 
1. Livestock (120 goats; 3 cows) 
2. Farms 3 acres of land 
M4 40 M Maasai None 1. Livestock (50 small stock) 
2. Farms an acre of land 
3. Night watchman at Or Power 
geothermal plant 
M5 30 M Maasai None 1. Livestock (30 cattle; 50 small stock) 
2. Farms an acre of land 
3. Boda boda (motor bike) operator   
M6 40 M Maasai None 1. Livestock (200 sheep; 1 cow) 
2. Causal worker at Or Power geothermal 
plant 
M7 40 F Maasai None 1. Farms two acres of land 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
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Table 20. Members of Nyumba Kumi Committee in Kokoti village 
Member Age Sex 
(M/F) 
Ethnicity Education  Wealth/Income  
M 1: Chair 47 M Kikuyu Primary 
dropout 
1. Farmer (rents farmland and cultivates 
3 acres of land at home) 
M2: Secretary 46 F Kamba Secondary 
complete 
1. Farmer (rents farmland and cultivates 
one acre of land at home) 
M3 46 F Kikuyu Primary 
complete 
1. Farmer (rents farmland and cultivates 
half acre of land at home) 
M4 48 M Kikuyu Primary 
dropout 
1. Blacksmith 
2. Farmer (rents farmland and cultivates 
at home) 
M5 40 M Kikuyu Primary 
complete 
1. Butcher at Maiella trading centre  
M6 43 M Kikuyu Primary 
complete 
1. Operates a clothes shop 
M7 30 M Kikuyu None 1. Boda boda (motor cycle) operator 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
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Table 21. Composition of Nyumba Kumi members in Maiella Sub-location, Nakuru  
                 County 
 
Variables N % 
Gender Male 16 76.2 
Female 5 23.8 
  
Age 
20-40 11 52.4 
41-50 7 33.3 
51-60 3 14.3 
>61 0 0 
  
 Ethnicity 
Maasai 7 33.3 
Kikuyu 13 62 
Kamba  1 4.7 
  
  
 
Education 
None 8 38 
Primary dropout 5 23.8 
Primary 
complete 
5 23.8 
Secondary 
complete 
3 14.3 
Diploma 0 0 
  
  
Main Sources of 
Income 
Livestock 5 23.8 
Farming on 
rented land 
8 38 
Business 6 28.6 
Casual work 2 9.52 
 
               (Source: field data, 2014)      
 
Notably, the governance structure of NKCs is quite similar to that of LPCs in 
Enoosupukia, except for the fact that each NKC has seven members. As shown in 
Table 21, NKCs have considerable breadth of ethnic, gender, and age 
representation. Just as with LPCs, villagers preferred those under 40 years of age as 
members of respective committees, and did not include elders over 60. Moreover, 
the majority of committee members have completed primary school. Cultivation and 
business are primary subsistence bases.  
In principle, cluster members should report possible crimes and security concerns to 
their NKCs, who then pass the information to security agencies. However, what 
constitutes a “crime” is unclear to many. It is difficult to tell whether an “alien” is a 
genuine visitor, or to assess their potential to commit a crime. Furthermore, 
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corruption arguably perpetuates crime and insecurity, as described below. This has 
resulted in a reduction of the morale necessary to conduct surveillance among some 
NKCs, which instead focus on dispute resolution through arbitration, just like LPCs. 
In Maiella trading centre, the NKC regulates alcohol sale and consumption following 
the Alcohol Drinks Control Act (clubs do not open earlier than 5pm). However, some 
bar owners have found ways to manipulate the system in order to do business 
throughout the day. Some lock their customers inside the bars during the day, while 
others sell beer from their homes. The NKC at Maiella trading centre also monitors 
the livestock trade by collaborating with traders (butchers, brokers etc.) to prevent 
trading in stolen livestock. Nowadays, livestock traders must adhere to operational 
rules, which prohibit the purchase of livestock from strangers, but some break these 
rules anyway (see Chapter 7 on livestock trade). Other cases here include 
shoplifting, slander, and fights.  
Herder-farmer conflicts are common in other clusters. There is massive reduction of 
grazing land due to agricultural intensification in the study area. Consequently, 
livestock movement is progressively restricted and confined to narrow paths 
bordering adjacently fenced crop farms of Maasai and non-Maasai farmers. 
Nowadays, both NKCs and LPCs handle herder-farmer conflicts and tenure disputes, 
which partly contributed to the 1993 violence.  
NKCs in Maiella Sub-location translated the ideas and roles proposed by the State in 
the DGCP (2015) and created some guiding principles (“do’s and don’ts”) that 
community members consider as “ideal” behaviour or “proper” conduct. In the local 
level, these guiding principles represent the “constitutions” of respective NKCs. I 
have deliberately outlined the handwritten guiding principles below as they appeared 
on the several pieces of paper stored at the chief’s office in Maiella. I have also 
italicized a controversial principle that demonstrates male domination over women 
particularly in the Maasai patriarchal context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
221 
 
Table 22. “Constitutional” principles of selected Nyumba Kumi committees  
 
Beer selling hours, gambling, and pool 
table games will be monitored seriously to 
avoid idleness of residents  
 
If anybody is under the influence of 
alcohol, he or she should not disturb 
others. 
 
Herders must take care of their livestock 
so that they don’t destroy crops; if this 
happens the case will be handled by 
Nyumba Kumi committee. 
 
All disputes will be handled within the area 
by the Nyumba Kumi committee. 
  
Everyone should respect land boundaries; 
anyone who destroys the beacons put by 
surveyors will be held accountable.  
Nyumba Kumi will settle any boundary 
disputes. 
 
Wife beating is not allowed, but if it 
happens it should not take place during 
the night to avoid alarming other people 
 
No one should sell drugs [e.g. “bang” - 
cannabis sativa]. 
Children’s rights must be respected, children 
should not be given heavy duties at home; all 
children of schoolgoing age must be in school; 
parents who don’t allow their children to go to 
school will face the law. 
 
Everybody’s rights should be respected 
regardless of ethnicity, gender, and religion. 
 
Youngsters should live in harmony and respect 
each other. 
 
Stealing is not allowed under any 
circumstances. 
 
No illegal brew is allowed in this area. 
 
All visitors should be reported to the nearest 
Nyumba Kumi committee member for 
information. 
  
 All homesteads must have a usable toilet to 
prevent disease outbreak.  
 
When it rains everybody should plant trees to 
improve the environment. 
 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
 
Complexities of “hybrid” systems and co-management agreements  
 
The institutional arrangement of Kenya’s devolved peace and security frameworks 
(Figure 12 and Figure 13) is quite abstract, ambiguous, and bureaucratic. Apart from 
the complexity of governance, state control of local environments may create 
divisions between formal and informal mechanisms and peacebuilding strategies.  
The paradox of duplication of roles between NKCs and LPCs has resulted in the 
absorption of one system by the other in the studied area. In Enoosupukia, Narok 
county, there is little effort to implement Nyumba Kumi as an independent institution. 
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Instead, LPCs in this Maasai-dominated area are increasingly taking on Nyumba 
Kumi roles. Nowadays, LPCs in Enoosupukia implement the jua jirani yako (Swahili, 
know-your-neighbour) campaign, a facet of surveillance. For instance, they ensure 
that landowners probe for information and identification documents from land-
seeking clients before leasing land. At Maiella Sub-location, NKCs have replaced 
LPCs, whose effect progressively diminished, at least since 2013. In a recent baraza 
at Maiella trading centre, NKCs called on government officials to scrap LPCs. The 
confusion brought about by duplication of mandates means that the roles intended by 
the state for LPCs and NKCs are increasingly conflated at the local level.   
Moreover, it appears as if the decentralization of peacebuilding institutions to 
community levels has meant a form of devolution of corruption. During fieldwork, it 
was noted that some rogue police officers profit from the security information 
(“intelligence reports”) shared by LPCs and NKCs. Informants complained that rogue 
police officers use security information reported by NKCs to enrich themselves. 
Instead of convicting persons accused of offences (e.g. possible Al-Shabaab 
sympathisers, persons who trade in illegal alcohol or other substances etc.) such 
police officers demand bribes from them in exchange for their freedom. In an 
interview, a chief revealed how these officers use intelligence reports to make 
money: 
When some police gather intelligence reports from the local communities, 
Nyumba Kumi, or LPCs, they use such information to enrich themselves 
rather than to end crime and insecurity in that specific cluster. Community 
members can inform police that a member of their cluster is selling illicit 
alcohol or drugs, or perhaps they suspect one of being an Al-Shabaab 
sympathiser. Cluster members may even direct the police to the exact 
location, believed to be the hideout of a culprit hoping that police will arrest 
him. However, some notoriously corrupt police will hardly apprehend possible 
offenders. Instead, they use offenders and crime as sources of income by 
soliciting for bribes while pretending to be conducting investigations. There are 
cases where some police actually protect criminals so that they can continue 
to “feed” off their criminal acts. Recently, a Nyumba Kumi cluster informed 
police of a possible Al-Shabaab suspect. The police arrested the culprit but 
released him shortly after the arrest, arguing that they lacked evidence to 
sustain charges in a court. Later on, it was revealed that the suspect paid his 
way out of police detention. A few days after his release, I was informed that 
the culprit threatened a chief with murder. In another incident, police warned a 
person who brews illicit alcohol to “go slow” on his activities lest he arouse the 
curiosity of chiefs… here, jails or courtrooms are for the poor! Worse, some 
corrupt senior police officers source information directly from unofficial 
“informants” from villages whom they have “recruited” instead of collaborating 
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with chiefs and other institutions to gather and share information relating to 
security matters.  
 
However, corruption may not be blamed on the hybrid governance arrangement per 
se; it is also nested in both the formal and informal sectors. These situations have 
continued to deepen mistrust between policing agencies and the public. 
As noted above, corruption is not limited to State officials, however. Usually, 
disputants tend to “reward” LPCs and NKCs with some money or food during or after 
arbitration proceedings. Locals call this, “cooking for wazee” (elders). This practice is 
reminiscent of the food and/or beer that villagers customarily served council of elders 
in the nineteenth century during arbitration proceedings. Based on observation, 
however, it can undoubtedly influence committee decisions and interfere with the 
outcome of a settlement. Villagers noted that such transaction costs are lower 
compared to the time and money spent when disputants record complaints with the 
chief, police, or courts. Both formal and informal mechanisms are also vulnerable to 
political manipulation. For example, committees can be used to further political 
agendas or to recruit voters directly from the households.   
The legitimacy question is equally important. Usually, disputants choose between 
LPCs and NKCs to record a complaint in areas where the two institutions coexist. 
LPCs consider themselves superior to NKCs, and vice versa. LPCs consider their 
neo-traditional sanctioning methods to be akin to those applied by councils of elders, 
whose expediency is still reflected at the local level. NKCs weigh their legitimacy 
against the broader goal of national security, with which they are associated, and 
thus boast state support. Such power struggles invariably shape interactions 
between actors, but rarely play out in the open.  
Conflicts between formal law and informal rules in the definition of crime and the 
administration of justice already threaten the “hybrid” frameworks. For instance, while 
LPCs may consider handwritten documents or word of mouth as proof of ownership 
of land, courts usually consider title deeds. Community members are increasingly 
learning to exploit such weaknesses. Moreover, crimes such as wife battering are 
accorded less weight especially in the Maasai culture, where patriarchy has a great 
impact on gender relations. Despite the recently enacted Protection Against 
Domestic Violence Act, 2015, some LPCs still dismissed women who reported 
domestic violence (see Table 25 appendices). Lastly, neighbourhood surveillance, 
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according to some informants, contravenes their constitutional right to privacy. In the 
cases observed, some villagers expressed their dissatisfaction when asked to 
account for their visitors and to share information about individual household 
members with LPCs or NKCs. 
Despite the complexities that characterise co-management or the “hybrid” systems, 
community members still regard LPCs and NKCs highly, particularly in the settlement 
of interpersonal and intergroup disputes in Maiella and Enoosupukia, as discussed 
below. 
 
Conflict resolution at the local level 
Community members prefer to resolve matters in dispute at the community level 
(informal level). Participants here are mainly neighbours with their affiliates (friends 
and kin). Nowadays, a LPC or NKC will guide the process. At this level, settlement of 
disputes is relatively fast (instant justice) and with lower transaction costs. Moreover, 
conflict resolution largely adheres to local norms and values, where LPCs and NKCs 
primarily build on traditional conflict-handling methods that mostly involve 
negotiation, forgiveness, compensation, and compromises, as exemplified in the 
cases below. Notably, such methods are intended to be sensitive to the land 
question although they may clash with formal law.  
Indeed, where informal mechanisms for handling disputes and crime clash with 
formal procedures, the legitimacy of Nyumba Kumi and LPCs is adversely affected. 
In most cases, formal law supersedes informal rules. Nevertheless, the need to 
restore and sustain peaceful relations between neighbours enhances the legitimacy 
of local mechanisms. By adhering to local norms and values in conflict resolution, 
these neo-traditional institutions could be thought of as echoing historical patterns 
and recreating a past where informal rules shaped intercommunity relations and 
social-economic interactions in the nineteenth century, as discussed earlier.  
Despite the presence and value of LPCs and NKCs, disputants are free to record 
their complaints with formal institutions; chief, the police, or courts, particularly if they 
question the credibility of LPCs or NKCs, when local arbitration fails, or when a 
matter in dispute is difficult (lacks evidence or involves contested evidence). LPCs 
and NKCs usually engage security agencies in situations that threaten to deteriorate 
into violent conflicts. When disputants skip their LPCs or NKCs and record 
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complaints with the chiefs or police, the latter can either handle the matter alone, 
involve the concerned LPC or NKC of a specific cluster, or the police may refer the 
matter to the LPCs or NKCs, usually when it involves traditions (witchcraft, 
patriarchal norms, and marital laws and disputes, etc.). The local administration may 
also refer a matter in dispute to higher offices, but some disputants drop their 
charges for fear of transaction costs when a case escalates to the formal institutions. 
Moreover, formal mechanisms usually have little concern for the social implications 
of a decision or settlement.  
Based on observation, NKCs and LPCs have no procedural rules for bringing 
conflicting parties to an agreement, to resolve a matter in dispute, or to carry out 
surveillance. Instead, some innovate ways they deem appropriate depending on the 
situation, need, context, and the parties involved. They also create bylaws from 
experiences of day-to-day situations, and as directed by government officials (see 
cases below). With respect to local surveillance, committee members cooperate with 
community members to report possible security threats to the chiefs or to police 
officers. As already mentioned, however, some police officers may misuse the 
intelligence from local communities for selfish gains.  
Irrespective of the institution, there is no guarantee of binding settlements. 
Compromises based on the notions of good neighbourliness, though instrumental in 
arriving at “mutual” agreements, may not prevent a similar or related dispute in the 
future. Therefore, in order to enforce settlements, some LPCs in the Maasai society 
invoke the supernatural power of engai (God) through curses where necessary. The 
curses involve persuading the supernatural powers to punish offenders with 
misfortunes. These may manifest in the form of illness, death, miscarriage, or 
infertility of livestock or the offender and their kin. LPCs usually warn offenders that 
they may be cursed if they did not adhere to a settlement agreement. Such 
individuals may include suspected robbers, persons whom villagers accuse of 
immorality, or women who because of domestic disputes threaten to run away to 
their matrimonial homes. Kikuyu tenants who live in Maasai villages, and Kikuyu 
women married to Maasai fall under the jurisdiction of LPCs of those villages. They 
too respect the curse.  
Apart from committee elders, male youths can also pronounce curses, but only in 
relation to offences committed by their peers or by those below their age category, as 
described below in cases of dispute resolution among the emerues age group. 
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Arguably, the Maasai society is attempting to integrate LPCs into its belief systems 
and age organization.  
The belief in supernatural power (gods, spirits, and ancestors) in African traditional 
religious ontology dates back several centuries, and is still reflected in traditional 
songs, legends, and myths. At least before the 1900s (when Christianity became 
firmly entrenched in most of Africa), indigenous belief systems were essential pillars 
of the social structure across almost the whole of Africa (see Evans-Pritchard, 1937). 
Anthropologists show that indigenous beliefs, and particularly the belief in the curse, 
enhance social control and help with the resolution of disputes at the local level. 
Discussing social control among mixed communities of northern Tanzania in the 
early 1960s, Gulliver (1963) described how the Arusha agricultural Maasai settled 
disputes, by applying the curse and other methods, among groups characterised by 
kinship, friendship, and age categories. Indigenous belief systems are central in the 
context of dispute resolution in the studied area. Arguably, traditional beliefs persist 
despite the changes that modernization brought to African religions. Such 
persistence and the continued importance of indigenous norms, values, and beliefs 
can be seen as an indication of their “resilience”. 
In the next chapter (chapter 9), I have provided several examples in the form of 
cases where LPCs invoked the curse to punish deviance, to ensure that disputants 
adhered to the terms of settlements, and to resolve what could be described as 
difficult situations (see Cases 5 and 6).  
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CHAPTER 9: Conflict resolution: cases 
 
This last chapter is based on narratives of conflict resolution from a local perspective 
in Maiella and Enoosupukia. It is meant to enrich the previous chapter on local peace 
committees and Nyumba Kumi, by demonstrating how disputants interact with these 
institutions in the local level. An attempt is made to integrate the analyses of each 
narrative separately, though briefly. Only a dozen cases are described at length, due 
to the limitation of space. In Table 25 (appendices), I have analysed close to 100 
cases that were reported between 2014 and 2015. The cases are fairly different and 
involve both related and unrelated persons: kin, in-laws, friends, colleagues, 
neighbours, tenants and landowners, livestock traders, couples, as well as persons 
who are not related by blood, adoption, marriage, or pursuit of economic wellbeing. 
Therefore, these cases demonstrate the influence of interpersonal relationships, 
economics, and culture in peacebuilding. 
Despite the fact that LPCs and NKCs face enormous constraints and complexities, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, they still represent the only hope for most 
villagers who are disadvantaged by the complexity of the formal justice system. The 
chapter begins with a few cases where LPCs and NKCs have successfully settled 
disputes peacefully. Thereafter, I will discuss two examples where attempts in 
resolving some conflicts failed, thereby augmenting the problem and the possibility to 
provoke instability.  
Cases 1, 2, 3, and 10 are examples of land-related disputes between Maasai and 
Kikuyu. In Case 4, a group of Kikuyu were engaged in a dispute over the sale of 
furniture at Maiella trading centre. In Cases 5 and 6, LPCs invoked the curse to 
resolve difficult social problems. Here, cultural beliefs in supernatural power guide 
the process. Cases 7, 8, 9, and 10 reveal how the Maasai attempt to integrate 
contemporary conflict resolution (LPCs) to the overriding age-set organization and 
belief systems. This attempt to graft on innovations into an existing body of traditional 
norms does not always work and could potentially create societal divisions or even 
conflicts.  
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Case 1. Cattle in “prison” 
 
John, a Kikuyu farmer aged 42, rented five acres of land from a Maasai in Olosho 
lole Kaloi village in 2007. He successfully negotiated with his landlord to settle on the 
farm and started growing a mixture of crops including maize, beans, Irish potatoes, 
French beans, onions, and coriander.  
In March 2014, on a Sunday, a herd of close to a hundred cattle strayed onto John’s 
farm and mauled four acres of his maize plantation. The cattle belonged to Peter, a 
Maasai resident of Olosho lole Kaloi village. John was returning home from church 
when he saw the animals on his farm. He ran fast to drive them away, but on noticing 
the damage caused, he decided to drive the cattle to Maiella police station at Maiella 
trading centre. The boys herding Peter’s cattle failed in persuading John to 
reconsider his decision.  
The large herd attracted the attention of a good number of villagers (Maasai and 
Kikuyu), the majority of whom were returning home from church. Some Maasai 
youths had already identified the cattle as belonging to Peter by examining the 
pattern of ear notching. John did not answer their curious questions. By the time he 
arrived at the police station, a group of Kikuyu friends had joined him, and another 
group of curious Maasai followed at a distance. There was a near “clash” at the gate 
of the police station as the Maasai tried to persuade John to consult Peter before 
recording his complaint with the police. A police officer quickly unlocked the gate and 
allowed John to move “his” herd to an open space inside the compound. “Nothing is 
left of my crops!” he retorted.  
“Are there no ‘wazee’ [referring to LPC], in your village who can handle this matter?” 
asked Senior (the senior police officer). John, who perhaps did not expect the 
question, remained silent. A short while later, a few LPC members of his village 
(where he farms) arrived at the police station. Peter had reached out to them already 
when his boys had told him about the incident. The LPC officials headed straight to 
the police desk, cutting through the curious crowd.  
“Peter informed us about this matter; we could not mobilize all LPC members 
because some are still in church. We decided to come here to assist”, the LPC chair 
told the police. “Did you assess the loss reported by him (pointing at John)?” asked 
Senior. After a brief silence (perhaps an indication that the LPC had not done so), 
Senior continued, “Go back, assess the damage and then come back with a report”. 
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The chair notified Peter about the development and asked him to meet them at 
John’s farm. By 6pm that evening, the LPC had reported their observation at the 
police station. At the time, John’s followers were busy advising him how to go about 
claiming compensation, some quoting large sums of money. 
“This is a dispute between neighbours and can be handled at ‘home’ with the help of 
the LPC. There was no need for John to drive a hundred cattle to the police. He 
should have raised his complaint with his LPC first. We ask you (police) to refer this 
matter back ‘home’ so that we can try to resolve it”, requested the chair of the LPC. 
John, together with a few of his followers who were keenly following the discussion, 
left unannounced when the police granted the request.  
Senior asked a LPC representative to ascertain the number of cattle – there were 
eighty. “The cattle will spend the night here with us. In the meantime go back home 
and deal with this case,” he said. The LPC and supporters from the Maasai 
community left the station around 8pm for their homes in Olosho lole Kaloi village. 
Some LPC members decided to pass by Peter’s home to inform him about the 
proceedings. A new development, however, confronted them upon their arrival at 
Peter’s home.  
John was already at Peter’s home with a contingent of LPC members from the 
neighbouring villages of Mpeuti, Nkampani, Ol tepesi le Parsimei, and Range. 
Apparently, John’s unannounced disappearance from the police station was to solicit 
as many followers as possible to amass the influence necessary to add weight to his 
complaint. Twenty-eight LPC members of Maasai descent along with John’s Kikuyu 
followers had gathered at Peter’s home, perhaps anticipating the arrival of Peter’s 
LPC. John had lamented to them that the police did not show seriousness with 
regard to a matter so crucial – one that could trigger intergroup “clashes”. After a 
brief deliberation, LPC members made a unanimous decision to discuss the matter 
first thing the following day, after which they scattered in small groups to their 
respective villages for the night. The introduction of new supporters, LPCs, or NKCs 
of interest also happens when a matter in dispute traverses several villages.  
The case resumed early the following morning at Peter’s home. The disputants and 
their associates, about ten friends and relatives from each side, along with eleven 
LPC members of Olosho lole Kaloi village, eight LPC members from Range village, 
four LPC members from Mpeuti village, ten LPC members from Ol tepesi le Parsimei 
village, and six Nyumba Kumi members from Nkampani village attended the meeting. 
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It was very clear to all that a settlement was necessary and urgent, in order to end 
the growing tension on both sides of the divide.  
A short break in the hearing and determining of a matter in dispute in the studied 
area allows disputants to consult widely with their followers – with regard to 
compensation and/or the social effects of the dispute. LPC members already 
expected John to propose financial compensation. Rarely does an LPC enforce a 
settlement. Instead, the committee provides an opportunity for dialogue between the 
disputants and allows them enough time to consult their followers. Such dialogue 
may lead to two scenarios: 
A plaintiff may propose compensation (usually money), which is beyond the 
defendant’s expectations. In this case, a defendant will propose a counter-offer, and 
a series of negotiations follow. LPC members only intervene to impose order where 
necessary, or to remind disputants about the value of good neighbourliness, often 
emphasizing the need for a mutual agreement. However, failure to reach a 
settlement derails the process, perhaps even prompting a further postponement. At 
this point, LPCs may invite experts, like the area agricultural officer, to assess and 
value the crops damaged.  
Usually, the agricultural officer will accompany disputants, together with the 
concerned LPC or NKC, to make a manual count of the crops damaged. Where 
manual counts are not feasible, they estimate the loss in terms of acreage of crops 
using the prevailing market rate, which is then discussed as settlement. Should early 
warning signals of violence or actual “clashes” appear, the committee will 
immediately seek the intervention of security agencies. Such signs may include 
verbal exchanges, fights, or threats. Additional parties to a dispute often introduce 
more transaction costs (money, time etc.). However, if a plaintiff proposes an amount 
that is satisfactory to the defendant, the matter is soon concluded.   
To the surprise of the defendant and his followers, John demanded only KES16,000 
(€160) as compensation, which was lower than they had anticipated. Despite the 
damage caused to the crops, John could still salvage some maize cobs for food. 
However, his brief speech shed light on the compromise. He said, “We should be 
more careful with our livestock and caution the boys herding them. We are 
neighbours in this village… today it was my farm, tomorrow it will be that of another 
person”.  
231 
 
Indeed, John was deliberately appealing to LPC members whose authority he had 
overlooked the previous day. His speech confirmed that he had re-evaluated his 
position as a tenant and acknowledged that loyalty was demanded of him by his 
landlord and villagers. The defendant’s side welcomed John’s gesture, and Peter 
was ready to pay the compensation.   
Later, committee members reported the settlement to the police for the release of the 
cattle. Peter paid John in the presence of the police and LPC members, thereby 
legitimizing the settlement. The police then asked John to pay KES 8,000 (€80) so 
that they could “close his case file” – he complied, aware that this was a bribe. LPC 
members were delighted because such transaction costs served to caution other 
villagers against recording complaints with formal institutions. However, transaction 
costs may not deter some disputants from seeking audience with formal institutions. 
Some utilize their own resources, others take advantage of social-political 
connections, while yet others may consolidate themselves and/or their resources and 
use collective action to their advantage.  
Later that week, the LPC drew important lessons from John’s case and developed a 
few bylaws, which they later communicated to community members in a baraza. 
Below is a translation of the bylaws: 
1. When livestock stray into farms, tenants should not take the animals to the 
police station. Instead, they should look for an LPC member to record their 
complaint. Taking livestock to the police can trigger conflicts between herders 
and farmers. 
2. Herders are advised to take care of their livestock so that they do not stray 
into crop farms.  
3. Landowners leasing farmland to tenants should assess the tenants’ 
identification documents and backgrounds to ensure that they do not deal with 
criminals. 
The last point (3) relates to the surveillance roles associated with Nyumba Kumi (see 
table 13). The LPC in this village has adopted some of the roles assigned to the 
Nyumba Kumi institution. 
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Case 2. Unauthorized logging  
Mailot, the plaintiff, is a Maasai who owns 12 acres of land, which neighbours that of 
Kairu, a Kikuyu who inherited land from his father at Mpeuti village. Mailot lives in 
Duka Moja, about 60km from Mpeuti village. He has therefore leased his farm at 
Mpeuti village to about eight Kikuyu tenants for cultivation.  
To avoid frequent visits to his farm, Mailot made an arrangement with his neighbour, 
Kairu, to keep an eye on his farm for possible land grabbers and to keep watch over 
the activities of his tenants. Henceforth, Kairu would also allocate Mailot’s land to 
interested tenants, receive their payment, and then send it to the landowner. In return 
for this, Mailot pays Kairu a small portion of the money collected from the tenants for 
their leases. Usually, Kairu subtracts his portion of money and then sends the 
balance to Mailot often through mobile money transfer (M-pesa).  
This arrangement between neighbours has lasted for many years. However, 
sometime in 2014, Kairu took advantage of Mailot’s absence from his farm and 
helped himself to a few trees to sell as timber. One day, Kairu hired a power saw and 
descended on Mailot’s trees, cutting down several of them. Mailot’s tenants, who 
were working on their rented plots at the time, witnessed the incident, and called their 
landlord by phone to report Kairu’s actions.  
Upon receiving the information, Mailot called the chair of the Local Peace Committee 
(LPC) at Mpeuti village by phone, who immediately informed other committee 
members about the complaint. LPC members in Mpeuti village, just as in other 
villages, live in close proximity to each other. This reduces the amount of time taken 
to inform one another about an incident which requires their attention. The chair 
managed to gather a few members, and together they went to Mailot’s farm, where 
they found Kairu already splitting the wood. Kairu was surprised that the tenants he 
was meant to supervise had reported him to the landowner. After a while, an angry 
Mailot arrived on a boda boda (motorcycle). While pleading for forgiveness, Kairu 
claimed that he was not sure about the extent of his boundary, although it was very 
clear to everyone including the LPC that he had crossed the boundary. 
Nevertheless, Mailot decided to bring a surveyor to align the boundary. After this 
brief exercise, Kairu accepted his mistake. However, Mailot was not quick to forgive 
his neighbour; instead, he demanded KES 50,000 (€500) as compensation when he 
realised that Kairu had cut down more trees for sale from his farm before. 
Committee members deliberated the matter for a while, after which the chair noted: 
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“You two have been good neighbours all along. You must keep this in mind. This 
arrangement has been good for both of you until this very moment. It is also good of 
you [pointing at Kairu] to accept your mistake and to ask for forgiveness. However, 
you also know very well how long it takes to protect a tree to maturity. Therefore, you 
should also understand why Mailot is angry with you. Our intention is to see this 
friendship grow. Therefore, it should not be broken by this incident”. He continued, 
“While the committee acknowledges the loss, we also feel that the compensation 
quoted is quite high. Although your neighbour [looking at Mailot] has committed an 
offence, he had not yet sold the timber; perhaps you may want to sell it yourself and 
use the money. The committee is of the opinion that Kairu should reimburse you 
(Mailot) KES 2,000 (€20) to cover the cost of the boda boda and to cover the 
surveyor’s fee. The committee also directs him to plant a hundred trees to replace 
the few he has cut down. He will care for these trees until such a time that they are 
mature enough”.  
After some deliberations, Mailot and Kairu were satisfied with the decision. They 
shook hands, perhaps to signify a reunion. When I visited Mailot’s farm later on, I 
observed that Kairu had already planted the trees as asked. The two neighbours 
retained their friendship. In fact, Kairu still collects rental money from Mailot’s tenants 
as before. 
This case builds on the previous discussion of the reciprocal and symbolic 
relationship between actors in a leasehold arrangement (land-seeking tenants and 
the landowners). It also contributes to the principal-agent theory. The presence of 
tenants on a parcel of land deters possible land grabbers and illegal loggers. By 
reporting the incidence to Mailot, his tenants protected his ownership rights to the 
land. It also served as a way of creating trust between the tenants and their landlord, 
which could possibly guarantee the extension of their leasehold periods.  
This case can also demonstrate trust-building between Maasai and Kikuyu 
neighbours in general. Despite his offence, Kairu retained his role on Mailot’s farm. 
One may argue that such cross-cutting ties enhance social solidarity across ethnic 
boundaries despite disputes. Such relationships may offer a possible explanation 
why a good number of Maasai reabsorbed some migrant farmers of Kikuyu descent 
who had been evicted from their land during the 1993 violence, and the ease with 
which some reclaimed or re-rented their land. 
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Case 3. Herder-farmer dispute 
In February 2015, two Kikuyu men found cows destroying Mike’s maize crops near 
Nkampani village. They were just in time to witness three boys driving the animals 
from the farm. Upon interrogation, the boys told them that the cows belonged to 
David, a Maasai herder from Nkampani village. One of the men called Mike by phone 
to notify him about the incident. 
Mike, who was in Maiella trading centre, informed a police officer at the chief’s office 
about the incidence. The officer immediately accompanied Mike to his farm. After 
assessing the damage, the police officer summoned David to Maiella police station. 
The same day, David reported to the police accompanied by members of his 
Nyumba Kumi committee.  
After a short discussion, the chair requested the police to refer the case to the 
Nyumba Kumi for possible resolution. He told the police that they would involve 
Nyumba Kumi officials of Kokoti village, Mike’s home village. Mike accepted the 
request. Therefore, the police called the Nyumba Kumi chair of Kokoti village to 
inform him about the decision. They also asked David to pay for boda boda transport 
for the team of five to go and assess Mike’s farm. 
After assessing the damage, the two chairs asked Mike and David to discuss the 
matter amongst themselves and try to find a solution. After a while, Mike told the 
committee members that he had fallen out with David over the amount of money 
required for compensation. He demanded KES 5,000 (€50) while David only agreed 
to pay KES 3,000 (€30). After an unfruitful second attempt, the Nyumba Kumi 
officials decided to do a manual count of the maize consumed or destroyed.  
They accounted for 85 maize cobs. They then used a market rate of KES 10 (€0.10) 
for each green maize cob and estimated Mike’s loss at KES 850 (€8.50). They then 
estimated the crop residue consumed by David’s cows to be a “donkey load” of about 
KES 150 (€1.50). For the hardened soil due to animal footprints, they settled on KES 
300 (€3) and an allowance of KES 200 (€2) for the time Mike “wasted” that day. This 
amounted to KES 1,500 (€15). Mike did not raise further complaints, especially after 
engaging the men with the tedious exercise of counting maize cobs. A delighted 
David offered to pay boda boda transport for the participants back to Maiella trading 
centre to inform the police about the settlement. In this case, the police did not 
demand a “fee” from the disputants.  
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This settlement may not have been a mutual one, but the plaintiff willingly accepted 
the verdict of the committee, perhaps an example of a compromise. In other 
instances, a plaintiff may reject the compensation, and instead escalate the matter to 
higher offices. For instance, he may bring the area agricultural officer to assess the 
damage and calculate the loss, as already noted, and in most cases, the plaintiff may 
be asked to cover the transport and other costs that could be incurred during the 
exercise. Therefore, the decision whether to escalate a matter in dispute to higher 
offices involves cost – benefit considerations and if the costs outweigh the intended 
benefits, there is a likelihood that the plaintiff will eventually compromise by 
accepting a particular settlement. Sometimes, land-seeking clients who wish to 
maintain a leasehold arrangement could end up counting such losses as any other 
unpleasant circumstances in the business environment and therefore hope for better 
times in the future.  
 
Case 4. Purchase of a stolen table  
In April 2015, Janet, a Kikuyu salon attendant at Maiella trading centre informed her 
friends that she was interested in purchasing a table for her business. Her friend, 
Joshua (a Kikuyu) overheard the conversation. After a few days, Joshua came to 
Janet’s salon and told her that his friend Leo (a Kikuyu) was looking for a buyer for a 
table he did not use anymore. Apparently, Leo needed the money urgently because 
he had consumed several beers at Don’s bar the previous day, only to claim that he 
did not have money on him to clear the bill after draining the beer. Don (the bar 
owner) demanded the money within six hours and threatened to report the matter to 
the police if Leo did not comply.  
Fearing that his friend would be reported to the police, Joshua convinced Leo to sell 
the table to raise the money for his bill. Apparently, Leo had separated from his wife 
some weeks ago and so he used her absence as an excuse for her not using the 
table. Joshua offered to witness the transaction and to append his signature to a sale 
agreement. He also assured Janet that Leo would offer her a good price. Later that 
day, Janet asked the men to bring the table to her house in Maiella trading centre 
where they could then discuss the price. 
Joshua and Leo brought the table to Janet as requested. Leo asked for KES 1,500 
(€15) but, after haggling, Janet paid KES 1,200 (€12) for it. She then prepared a sale 
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agreement after paying the money, which they all signed. Joshua asked for a 
brokerage fee of KES 300 (€3) but only managed to get KES 200 (€2) from Janet for 
his “troubles” in assisting in the transaction. The two men left immediately to Don’s 
bar and cleared the outstanding bill. 
On 30.04.2015, Leo’s mother-in-law, accompanied by her daughter (Leo’s wife) 
visited the police station at Maiella and accused Janet of buying a stolen table. 
Apparently, Leo’s mother-in-law had given her daughter the table when she got 
married on condition that she would return it when her husband bought one for their 
home. However, following a marital dispute, Leo’s wife ran back to her parents 
without the table. Later on, a friend of Leo’s mother-in-law informed her that she had 
seen Leo and another man carrying a table, which was then sold to Janet. The senior 
police officer summoned Janet to answer to the allegations.  
Janet was bitter; she told them that she had not conspired to steal the table. She 
explained the transaction and presented the signed agreement. Janet demanded a 
reimbursement of KES 1,400 (€14) in exchange for the table. She even stormed out 
of the police station without permission leaving a confused mother, daughter, and the 
police officer. After a week, the police summoned Janet back to the station. This time 
she found Leo’s mother-in-law. The senior police officer assured Janet that she 
would receive reimbursement for the table from the plaintiff within a week. He 
convinced Janet to return the table to Leo’s mother-in-law and promised her (Janet) 
that he would personally pursue her reimbursement from Leo. Janet agreed to 
surrender the table. 
However, after a week, Janet did not receive her reimbursement as promised. The 
police officer had asked her to collect it from the station. Instead, the officer kept 
telling Janet that he was still pursuing Leo who had “disappeared into thin air”. Later 
on, the police arrested Leo and locked him up in a police cell for five days hoping that 
one of his friends would come to his rescue – but none did. The police then decided 
to release him on condition that he would find a way of raising the money and bring it 
to them for the settlement. When Janet demanded an explanation for his release, the 
police officer told her that they could no longer keep him because he was doing 
nothing in the cell but enjoying free food. Keeping him in the cell was not a solution to 
find the money.   
After Leo’s release, Janet immediately reported the matter to her Nyumba Kumi 
chair. The chair notified a few committee members and they organized a meeting 
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with the police officer. In the meeting, attended by Janet and three Nyumba Kumi 
committee members, the police officer informed them that Leo had promised to bring 
the money to him after a week of his release, but he had not done so.  
After a short discussion on the way forward, the committee members proposed to 
invade Leo’s house and auction any valuables like clothes, household utensils, beds, 
and mattresses, to raise the money for Janet’s reimbursement. The Nyumba Kumi 
chair promised to give Leo four days’ notice, after which they would descend on his 
house. The committee also resolved that Janet would only receive KES 1,200 (€12). 
Afterwards, she could pursue Joshua for the extra KES 200 (€2). I left the study area 
before the conclusion of this matter.  
Apart from revealing how participants devise solutions to particular situations, this 
case reveals some weaknesses in the handling of a matter in dispute by the police. 
When disputants are not satisfied with how the police handle a matter in dispute, 
they may seek assistance elsewhere. It is commonplace to auction items belonging 
to an offender if he does not take responsibility for his actions.   
 
Case 5. The curse: a teacher impregnated his pupil  
Moses, the defendant, aged 30, is a nusu nusu (offspring of Kamba and Maasai) and 
was until this incident a primary school teacher at Olosho lole Kaloi primary school. 
He is married with three sons. Following a shortage of teachers in the school, a 
board of teachers and parents hired Moses in 2010. Before his appointment, Moses 
was residing in Nkampani village, which neighbours Olosho lole Kaloi village.  
Sometimes in May 2014, Mary, a class four pupil aged 20, suffered prolonged 
stomach aches and frequent vomiting. Her mother (Maasai) treated her with 
indigenous herbs but the situation got worse. Eventually, she discovered that Mary 
was pregnant. Upon receiving the news, Mary’s father (Maasai) was very upset 
because he had offered the daughter a chance to enrol in school instead of marrying 
her off at a young age. However, the shame she brought to his home was not 
comparable to the money used in school fees. Mary’s father demanded to know the 
person responsible for the pregnancy so that he could force him to marry her and 
pay her bridewealth. Mary identified her own teacher, Moses, as the offender. 
This revelation not only saddened her parents but also threw the entire school and 
village into panic – other parents were hoping that their daughters had not also 
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succumbed to him (Moses). Mary’s father and the Local Peace Committee (LPC) 
took up the matter immediately. Worse, they revealed that Moses was Mary’s distant 
cousin. The two belong to a clan of over 1,000 members, which spans several 
villages. Moses and Mary’s parents use an identical style to notch their livestock, 
signifying how close the two families are in the bloodline. Sexual relationships 
between relatives are customarily prohibited in this area; exogamy is the rule rather 
than the exception.   
When he met LPC members, Mary’s father had one request: “people like Moses 
should not be allowed to roam the streets freely because they present an imminent 
danger to the morality of the society”. He asked the committee to involve the police in 
the matter. However, the LPC decided to engage the school administration first. They 
summoned Moses to a meeting attended by the school’s head teacher and other 
teachers as well as Mary and her parents. The meeting was the first of its kind in this 
village and so it drew the attention of dozens of parents who wanted to confront 
Moses. However, fearing possible chaos, the LPC did not admit parents to the 
meeting.    
As is common in the meetings chaired by the LPC, the pastor, who is also a member 
of the committee, said a brief prayer after which the chair stood. “Mary, when was the 
last time you slept [had sex] with Moses?” he asked. “On the 5th March 2014”, she 
replied. The chair went on, “Mwalimu [teacher] is this true?” Moses remained silent, a 
trend he repeated after every question. This angered those in attendance. The head 
teacher stepped in: “since he [Moses] does not want to speak, let us bring a medical 
doctor here to confirm this pregnancy and more so to run pregnancy tests for all girls 
in this school”.  
Suddenly, there was an uninvited contribution, “I did not impregnate this girl, I 
boarded a bus that had several passengers aboard already”, retorted Moses who 
seemed quite disturbed by the head teacher’s request. Everyone understood the 
metaphor. Moses was insinuating that Mary had been having sexual affairs with 
other men. Nevertheless, his interjection did little to distract LPC members who 
quickly supported the head teacher’s proposition, noting that it would serve a greater 
purpose if villagers knew the statuses of their daughters.  
The following day, a medical doctor from Nairragie Enkare, a settlement close to 
Narok town, came to the school through the invitation of the head teacher. He was 
“armed” with the necessary kit to run pregnancy tests. The matter had almost 
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crippled learning for close to a week. Parents hoped that the tests would not open a 
Pandora’s Box – but that they certainly did.  
Priority for testing was given to the upper primary classes (6, 7, and 8). Thirty pupils 
were subjected to the test. Out of these, two Maasai girls were confirmed pregnant, 
but it was difficult to confirm the men who had impregnated them. Therefore, another 
day passed and the confusion mounted. The following day, the head teacher referred 
LPC members to the District Education Officer (DEO) who is stationed at Oloibot in 
Narok county.  
However, the DEO quickly distanced himself from the matter when he heard that the 
named person (Moses) had been hired through a local process and was therefore 
not a government official. “By allowing him [Moses] to teach your children in the first 
place, you allowed him to do whatever he wished to them”, said the DEO, who 
quickly escorted the LPC members and the head teacher out of his office. He asked 
them to report the matter to the police for criminal investigation.   
The case dragged for another few days as actors deliberated over the way forward. 
At the time, Moses, whose patience had worn out, opted to leave his job, insisting 
that he was not comfortable working there anymore. He returned to Nkampani village 
and began to search for jobs elsewhere. The matter in dispute was a real test of the 
capacity and unity of LPC members, whose confusion could be seen in their varied 
views on the way to proceed. Some members considered involving the police; others 
preferred to handle the matter locally.  
Moses’s father weighed in on the matter in the attempt to vindicate his family. A 
matter of this kind, according to him, could possibly lead to clan disintegration, for 
which the society would hold his family accountable. If Moses was found guilty, by 
whatever means, his father was already willing to persuade village elders and the 
LPC to perform a ritualised cleansing ceremony to “remove” the sin from his family, 
as is customarily acceptable in such circumstances. First, he reached out to Moses’s 
wife to see if she could persuade her husband to own up to his actions. All this time, 
Moses had maintained his innocence and his wife believed him. 
Therefore, Moses’s wife had to either betray her husband’s trust by persuading him 
to engage himself with the matter, or to disobey the request by her father-in-law. 
Eventually she succumbed to public pressure since all rumours pointed towards her 
husband – she opted to run away from home convinced that her husband had 
become a “‘jogoo’ [rooster] which does not respect its offspring”. Her LPC members 
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had forbidden her to leave the village, but neighbours notified the LPC that she left 
early the following day without her children. An LPC whose mandate is to ensure 
unity in the society watched helplessly as the situation became worse.   
Eventually the committee unanimously agreed to invoke the curse. The curse is 
usually the last option for settling a difficult matter in dispute. In this case, elders and 
the LPC would persuade the supernatural power of engai (God) to send misfortune 
or death as punishment to the offender if he did not own up to his actions. First, 
however, the committee had to do some preparations to set the stage for 
administering the curse. Preparations involved informing villagers that elders and the 
LPC would invoke the curse on a specific day and the reasons for doing so.  
By notifying the villagers, LPC members give time to the offender(s) to surrender 
themselves before the curse is pronounced. Should an offender admit guilt during 
this “preparation time”, the elders and LPC may decide to pardon him and institute 
the process of punishment. Fearing the effects of the curse, two men (a Luhya and a 
Maasai) admitted to having impregnated the two pupils who were identified during 
the pregnancy tests in the school, but no one owned up to being responsible for 
Mary’s pregnancy.  
The committee decided that Moses’s guilt or innocence would be determined by the 
curse. Normally, persons above the age category of the alleged offender or the 
offender’s age-mates can pronounce a curse. Since the matter was already before 
the elders, Moses’s age-mates, who are locally known as emerues in the Maa 
language (those in their 20s and 30s) let the elders (known in Maa as erabaun), 
some of whom constitute the LPC, take charge of the matter. A few elders usually 
represent those in the community in such an event. In this particular matter, the LPC 
chair pronounced the curse at Mary’s home:  
 “If this baby [pointing at Mary’s belly] belongs to Moses, may he never sleep with 
another woman”, he cursed. A LPC member explained to me the meaning of this 
statement. He informed me that the chair called on supernatural powers to punish 
Moses with infertility if he was guilty of the offence. Community members believe that 
the externalities associated with such a curse might extend to the offender’s family 
and livestock.  
The chair continued, “If this baby belongs to another person and not Moses, may you 
[pointing at Mary] not hold in it your hands”. By this statement, the chair called upon 
supernatural powers to cause misfortune (perhaps death) to the baby if Moses was 
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not its biological father. Elsewhere, in Nkampani village, elders allied to Moses’s 
family pronounced a similar curse, “If the baby does not belong to this family [to 
Moses] may it not eat this money”. Moses’s father had offered to pay KES 60,000 
(€600) for child support. Therefore, the curse called upon supernatural misfortune on 
the baby if Moses was not its biological father.  
In the studied village, there is no specific place set aside to carry out such curses or 
related ritual practices. Actors choose a suitable location for the activities depending 
on the nature of the matter at hand. They may decide to hold the meeting or 
ceremony at a neutral location, away from the compounds of either disputants. 
However, a disputant’s compound or homestead is usually ideal in most cases.  
After a curse is pronounced, the next stage is to wait upon engai to perceive the 
offence and to send misfortunes at his will. The belief here is that engai will punish 
the offenders if he deems so and at his own time. Three scenarios are possible here; 
(1) the offender may succumb to pressure and still admit guilt before the curse takes 
effect; (2) the offender may, after observing some early signs of misfortunes, admit 
guilt, and can then plead with elders and the LPC for revocation of the curse, where 
he may be asked to present a sheep for the ritual; or (3) the offender may remain 
defiant and face the curse. Often, the curse is intended to “force” offenders to admit 
guilt. Rarely will offenders ignore early warning signals for fear of possible 
externalities of a curse.  
The mood in Olosho lole Kaloi village was that Moses would admit guilt and plead for 
mercy before the birth of the baby – but he did not. In November 2014, Mary was 
rushed to the hospital after suffering prolonged labour pains. Moses insisted on his 
innocence, “let her die; she is a liar”, he told a relative who accompanied Mary to the 
hospital by phone.  
After hours of labour, Mary’s baby died at birth. Villagers who received the news 
were convinced that engai had send a misfortune on the child. The death of the child 
“confirmed” that Moses was not the father after all. Upon receiving the “good news”, 
Moses’s wife returned home to beg her husband for forgiveness. To date, the two are 
still married. Mary’s ordeal and the constant bad-mouthing from her age-mates did 
not break her passion to continue with school. At the time of this study, Mary was 
pursuing her education at a secondary school.  
The Luhya man who admitted to having impregnated one of the other two girls 
pleaded for mercy and the committee scheduled a meeting to discuss his case. They 
242 
 
believed that the man would pay her bridewealth for marriage. In the other case, a 
Maasai cousin of the pupil claimed responsibility for her pregnancy. He said that he 
had been ashamed to do so earlier because of his close blood relation with the girl. 
The committee ordered him to surrender a ram to them for a ritual sacrifice to engai, 
in the attempt to appease him to revoke possible curses upon the family. They also 
ordered him to pay KES 500 (€5) monthly for child support after birth. 
Later on, I was informed that after giving birth, the girl left the baby in the care of her 
aunt and has never been seen in the area since. The cousin still pays child support 
money to the aunt as required. A ceremony to cleanse the family was postponed in 
the hope that the mother would come back home – she had not returned by the time 
I left the study area. An elder told me that the LPC had proposed to conduct a ritual 
to cleanse the baby.  
The use of curses to resolve a matter in dispute is quite rare in the studied area. 
However, some situations where disputes seem difficult to resolve call for the agency 
of supernatural powers. Apart from pregnancy matters, theft cases where the 
offender is unknown may also call for the use of the curse. Notably, the curse and 
ritual oaths, just as with other aspects which concern belief systems that 
anthropologists study, are not readily decipherable and are somewhat difficult to 
explain. The researcher only attempts a description of the situation based on 
personal observation and with reference to information from key informants.  
 
Case 6. Sexual immorality and the curse 
Lilian is a nusu nusu (offspring of Maasai/Kikuyu) aged 50, married to a Maasai from 
Olosho lole Kaloi village since 1980. In 2000, Lilian’s husband got a government job 
as a local administrator at Sakutiek, which is roughly 30km from Olosho lole Kaloi 
village. Before her husband left, Lilian had five children, but after a while, she gave 
birth to another child out of wedlock, while he was away. This angered her husband, 
who decided to marry a second wife. Since then, Lilian began to engage in sexual 
affairs with young men almost half her age.  
In January 2015, a sexual affair between Lilian and Stephen, a young Maasai man, 
came to light. Stephen’s wife recorded a complaint with the chair of her Local Peace 
Committee (LPC) following a violent confrontation with the husband over the matter. 
She explained: 
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My husband does not sleep at home; he does not eat food from his kitchen, 
because he comes home tired. It has been months since he read my 
constitution and I found out that he has been reading Lilian’s constitution.  
 
Stephen’s wife used these common metaphors, “eating food from his kitchen”, and 
“reading constitution”, which are coinages in the Sheng language referring to “sexual 
relations with one’s wife” and “having sexual intercourse”, respectively.  
After receiving her complaint, the chair informed other LPC members and sent word 
to Lilian and Stephen to attend a hearing at the former’s home. Previously, the 
committee had threatened Lilian with a curse if she did not refrain from sexual 
immorality when Stephen and another man fought over her. According to the LPC, 
Lilian’s behaviour was setting a bad example to the rest of society. Stephen’s age-
mates, the emerues, also warned him to stop his lust for a woman of his mother’s 
age and to focus on stabilizing his already collapsing marriage – and he promised to 
do so. 
At the time, Lilian scoffed at the LPC, blaming her behaviour on the husband who 
had “fled” home and married another woman. The LPC unsuccessfully pleaded with 
Lilian’s husband to return home. He insisted that he could not stand the shame 
caused by the wife’s adulterous behaviour.  
 A repeat of the offence made it clear to all that persuasion alone would not end the 
immoral behaviour. This time, Stephen’s age-mates decided to invoke the curse 
against him. Elders in Lilian’s age group were equally ashamed of her behaviour. 
According to them, Lilian had repeatedly insulted them by luring her “sons” to 
immorality instead of being a good role model to them and their wives. They too 
decided to invoke the curse against her. 
Customarily, the emerues can curse an offender who is younger or in their age 
category, but not their elders. One of Stephen’s age-mates and a member of the LPC 
told me that the presence of the offender when invoking supernatural punishment 
against them is necessary. The locus where the curse is pronounced, though 
important, is not usually fixed, although this usually brief exercise is commonly 
conducted at the offender’s home.  
Stephen, Lilian, and a few representatives from each age group attended the 
meeting. They then bundled themselves in respective age groups of the offenders. A 
representative of Stephen’s age-mates gave a brief speech on the group’s 
frustration, insisting that Stephen had disrespected them because he had 
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consciously broken his earlier promise. He then noted that Stephen had left them 
with no choice but to issue a warning that is sanctioned by supernatural 
consequences. A silent Stephen listened as the presiding age-mate called on engai 
(God): 
… If you do not stop this behaviour, may punishment pass through your mouth 
and legs so that it will no longer be possible for you to repeat this act...  
 
By this curse, Stephen’s age-mates persuaded the supernatural power of engai to 
perceive and punish his offence by sending injury into specific parts of his body if he 
did not honour the warning. This case, like the last (Case 5), is comparable to the 
use of the curse among the agricultural Arusha of Tanzania (see Gulliver1963, 286). 
However, unlike the Arusha where one does not command engai, it appears as if 
Stephen’s age-mates specifically directed supernatural affliction in the form of injury 
to specific parts of the offender’s body. Just as in the case reported by Gulliver, the 
Maasai in the study area do not provide a timeframe to engai within which he should 
perceive the offence and send punishment. Similarly, elders in Lilian’s age group, led 
by the LPC chair pronounced supernatural bodily harm upon her if she did not refrain 
from the behaviour.  
A few days later, when Stephen was doing his normal duties on his farm, a tree 
branch fell off and hit his lower jawbone. The impact crushed a few teeth and caused 
a painful swelling. Community members and his age-mates were convinced that 
engai had perceived of his “sin” and therefore send the injury. Fearing that he would 
lose his teeth, Stephen dashed to look for his age-mates. He pleaded for their mercy 
and for revocation of the curse.  
By pleading for mercy, Stephen demonstrated his weakness against his age-mates 
and acknowledged supernatural authority. In this society, an offence does not 
necessarily break the bond between age-mates. As observed, age-mates are 
accountable to one another. When an offender pleads for mercy and for the 
revocation of a curse, other age-mates have the duty to ceremonially reincorporate 
him into the society by conducting a ritual.  
A few conditions must be met in order to revoke a curse. The offender must 
demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that he has acknowledged the offence, that 
he is subject to the group’s decree, and that he will never repeat the offence. This is 
difficult to determine but, as observed, the perceived power of the curse and 
particularly its possible externalities encourage offenders to adhere to the terms of 
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settlements. Unlike other offences where the curse is not invoked, informants noted 
that it was unlikely for one to repeat an offence for which a ritual was conducted to 
revoke a curse.  
In this village, curses are usually revoked in the evening at around 8pm, in the 
presence of the offender’s kin and when livestock are back from herding. Villagers 
believe that the ritual also revokes any possible externalities on the latter. On the day 
in question, eight age-mates arrived at Stephen’s home. According to custom, 
Stephen prepared a glass of milk for the ritual. From one age-mate to the other, they 
took a sip of the milk and held it in their mouths for a while until all participants had 
sipped some. They then spat the milk back into the glass one after the other, forming 
a mixture of milk and saliva. Thereafter, Stephen and his next of kin drank this 
mixture from the glass. Apart from being a way of reincorporating an offender into a 
specific age group and in the society, drinking this mixture of saliva and milk is 
believed to cleanse the offender and his kin and therefore to revoke the curse. Rarely 
do they drink beer or feast after such events, unless the offender is willing to show 
group loyalty by offering a goat or a ram for a feast. In most cases, the family of the 
offender treats participants to a cup of tea and some bread, perhaps some 
lunch/dinner if the ceremony lasts longer than expected.  
This symbolism of group solidarity is not new in the studied area. Interviews with 
elders revealed that the Kikuyu and Maasai participated in joint ritual repast to 
express unity during the Mau Mau uprising against the colonial administration in the 
early 1950s. However, in this ritual of solidarity, a ram was slaughtered and its blood 
was collected in a bowl. The Maasai and Kikuyu men in attendance then pierced 
their skins with sharp objects (arrows), and each contributed a few drops of own 
blood, which was mixed with the ram’s blood.  
Participants then took a sip of the mixture. Sharing blood symbolized “brotherhood” 
among the Maasai and Kikuyu and formed a bond between the two groups, where 
the Maasai were bound by curse not to reveal the whereabouts of Kikuyu Mau Mau 
fighters to British soldiers. This way, the Maasai protected Kikuyu who hide in their 
manyattas when British soldiers began to pursue participants of the Mau Mau 
uprising.   
Lilian also suffered an injury to her leg. While doing her daily chores, she stepped on 
a stick, which pierced her leg. Relatives immediately rushed her to the hospital 
following excessive bleeding. Doctors attended to her and discharged her after 
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sometime. For close to a month, however, Lilian’s wound did not heal – it was still 
swollen at the time of the study. Villagers believe that a piece of stick must have 
become lodged in her leg. According to the LPC, Lilian’s condition was a 
supernatural infliction, which would only change when she disowned her offence and 
pleaded for mercy. A committee member told me that if Lilian decided to do so, they 
would invite her husband to a ritual.  
In conclusion, this case shows how a LPC resolved a difficult matter through the 
agency of supernatural powers. Notably, Stephen, whose parents are Kikuyu and 
Maasai, is not exempted from the dictates of his age-set organization in the Maasai 
ideal. In fact, two of his age-mates, who pronounced the curse and consequently 
attended the revocation ritual, also share Kikuyu and Maasai blood. After Stephen’s 
age-mates revoked the curse, Stephen repented his sins in church and is said to 
have distanced himself from immorality. Henceforth, he dedicated his life to serving 
in a local church. According to his friends, Stephen’s behaviour changed for the 
better, a change that saved his marriage.  
It is important to reiterate that curses and ritual oaths as mechanisms of social 
control and dispute settlement are based on a group’s belief system and are 
therefore understood and described in the same way. It remains a puzzle (spiritually) 
whether adherence to Christian faith, which is widespread in the area, conflicts with 
Maasai engai (God) and the traditional beliefs in curses and oaths.   
 
Attempts at integrating dispute resolution to age organization  
Ol tepesi le Parsimei village has made the effort to integrated LPCs to the overriding 
age-group organization. In this village, membership of LPCs is subdivided into two 
male age-set categories: senior males (erabaun), aged above 40s and 50s, and 
junior males or youths (emerues), in their 20s and 30s. The emerues may be 
compared to the morans. Perhaps as a reaction to the decreasing significance of 
moranhood in this portion of the former southern, which was largely driven by 
colonial policies of the1920s102, youths in the studied area seem to be recreating the 
symbolic instrument of the moran institution through LPCs.  
                                                          
102   Such policies included the abolition of raiding and the attachment of heavy penalties on the vice; 
the colonial office also recruited morans as government askaris (police) and organised various social 
activities like sporting events in the effort to keep them “busy”. Rhodes House, Oxford/Micr. 
Afri./515/Annual Report/1923-1924. 
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Nowadays, the few male youths who become members of LPCs not only represent 
other age-mates in dispute resolution, but also somehow become their leaders. 
Interestingly, in the Maasai villages studied and particularly in Ol tepesi le Parsimei 
village, male youths show a degree of separateness from their elders when handling 
their affairs and disputes. They strive to resolves matters in dispute that affect their 
age-mates in the exclusion of the elders, as demonstrated by the cases below.  
In this village, community members adapted LPCs into the three main kinship groups 
that form an entire clan. The three families: Ol tepesi Ol Parsimei, Ole Teti, and 
Olmani, constitute the largest population of Ol tepesi le Parsimei village, while a few 
other members span across several neighbouring villages, including Nkampani and 
parts of Enoosupukia. Consequently, three LPCs emerge from the setup each 
representing one of three kinship groups. They include: 
 
1. Ol tepesi Ol Parsimei peace committee. This is centrally located in Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei village, and draws its entire membership from one family (the 
Naadokila family). The family is notably the most populous and powerful, 
socio-economically, with enormous wealth in livestock and land. Table 16 
shows the personal attributes of members of this committee. I have adopted 
this particular committee for the case studies and discussion below.  
2. Oleteti local peace committee. This committee covers parts of Nkampani 
village and the neighbouring Inkoroinito village. 
3. Olmani local peace committee. This committee stretches northwards from Ol 
tepesi le Parsimei village, covering areas of Kipise Adjudication Section and 
Enoosupukia.  
Membership of the three LPCs is flexible. With time, some members found 
themselves sitting on almost all three committees and exercising judicial functions on 
behalf of the entire community. For instance, the only senior elder who managed to 
complete primary school sits on all committees. Other committee members refer to 
him as “the learned one” – a reference that gives him symbolism in the community. 
He also doubles as an advisor to the area chief on local affairs. His prowess in 
writing has earned him the position of secretary in all three committees. Other 
members rely on him to report a matter in dispute or a settlement to government 
officials in writing.  
248 
 
Each of these three LPCs is further broken down into age-set groupings with respect 
to junior males (emerues) and senior males (erabaun). One may argue that such 
flexibility of LPCs and fluidity of committee members within a homogeneous group 
demonstrates the institutional capacity to adapt to the prevailing social order at the 
local level. One may also see it as a way of adapting and integrating a neo-traditional 
institution into an informal, traditional system, or vice versa. Except for Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei village, there is very little to discuss about such integration in other villages. 
Cases 7, 8, and 9 show how the emerues resolve matters affecting their age-mates. 
Case 10 involves both the emerues and erabaun. 
 
Dispute resolution among the ‘emerues’ age-group 
In Ol tepesi le Parsimei village, the emerues age-set strives to resolve disputes 
involving individual peers and their families without involving the elders. These 
youths take dispute resolution as a “private” affair, which must be confined within the 
age boundary. Seeking advice or assistance from elders in order to resolve a matter 
in dispute reduces the respect that society accords the emerues as future leaders of 
the community. The society perceives male youths as weak and ill-prepared for 
future responsibilities in the society if they make a habit of consulting elders about 
their own affairs. Furthermore, as observed, the society attributes a failure of male 
youths to resolve a matter in dispute to disunity and possible malfunction of the age-
set system. Such a failure amounts to public shame and renders a serious blow to 
the symbolic apparatus of power and authority.     
Arguably, therefore, integrating LPCs and dispute resolution into the traditional age-
set organization prepares youths for future roles as elders and leaders of the society, 
an image that youths must protect. According to the elders interviewed, such an 
arrangement helps to nurture decision-making skills among the young generation, 
and equips them for possible tougher times, when their decisions will transcend their 
immediate group. Moreover, their young ones are socialized in these values - 
thereby enhancing cultural learning. 
As shown in the cases below, the emerues also influence their wives and families to 
respect the age-set and to report marital and related disputes to members within the 
age category. As observed during fieldwork in Ol tepesi le parsimei village, the 
emerues attend to disputes that involve all members of their age group in the village 
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irrespective of ethnic affiliation. Therefore, Kikuyu land-seeking clients and other non-
Maasai youths who work or live in the village are under the authority of the age 
group. This also applies to Kikuyu women in their lower age category who are 
married in the Maasai village. They too must report their complaints to members of 
the age group, except when the nature of the matter in dispute demands the 
audience of the elders (women or men).  
Notably, Kikuyu women learn to fit in the prevailing dispute resolution arrangement of 
their Maasai peers at the time of marriage. They are encultured in the Maasai 
customs to respect their elders as their own mothers and fathers. They also learn 
how to respect members of their age group as their own sisters and brothers. Young 
wives may then gossip about their husbands in their respective age groups while 
keeping a social distance from their parents-in-law. Above all, they learn to share 
their problems and frustrations with their peers and to seek advice from them on 
matters concerning the family and the socially constructed gender responsibilities, 
while sharing marital experiences during social and economic interactions and 
activities.  
At weddings, funerals, and related social gatherings, one can easily notice an 
elaborate social space, which women consciously maintain in their sitting 
arrangement, with respect to age. However, when one has serious marital disputes, 
she may seek the attention of her mother-in-law, whose responsibility includes that of 
ensuring that the son’s marriage remains intact.  
As observed in Ol tepesi le Parsimei village, a woman whose husband is in the  
emerues age group will report a marital dispute or related family problems to the 
husband’s male peers, often without consulting the husband. Case 7 below 
describes a situation in which a woman wronged her husband when she lost money 
meant for shopping.  
 
Case 7. Wife loses KES 700 for shopping  
David, a member of the Maasai emerues age group, gave his Maasai wife KES 700 
(€7) to buy household items from Maiella trading centre. However, his wife lost the 
money on her way to the trading centre. David’s wife knew that her husband would 
be angry and perhaps beat her because he had spent the previous day selling sheep 
to be able to raise the money. Instead of returning home to explain herself to the 
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husband, she went to the home of her husband’s age-mate, Ken, to report the 
matter. Ken is a member of the emerues age-set, which forms part of the Ol tepesi Ol 
Parsimei peace committee (dominated by the Naadokila family, see above).  
After explaining her problem, David’s wife persuaded Ken to accompany her home 
and to ask for forgiveness from the husband on her behalf – he complied. They found 
David in his house. Ken asked David’s wife to wait outside the house so that he 
could “set things right” with her husband before she could join them. He told David 
that his wife had wronged him by losing the money and, apart from regretting her 
mistake, she was requesting for forgiveness so that there could be peace between 
them.  
Ken then offered to pay David the money and cautioned him against beating his wife. 
The matter was put to rest. When asked, David said that he could have disciplined 
his wife for carelessness were it not for Ken’s intervention. He still held the opinion 
that the wife may have lost the money when she was busy gossiping with other 
women.  
By taking on the responsibility for paying back the lost money, Ken demonstrated an 
example to other peers in resolving a matter affecting “one of their own”. This 
example could also be explained from the perspective of polyandry in the Maasai 
society, where a woman socially marries the entire age group of her husband. The 
male peers, in this case, are responsible for the welfare of the families of their peers.  
 
Case 8. Early marriage in a Maasai/Kamba context 
Lydia, a Kamba girl whose family runs a small shop and hotel at Ol tepesi shopping 
centre, was impregnated by Jonah, a  Maasai youth of the emerues age-set of the 
Naadokila family (Ol tepesi Ol Parsimei peace committee, see above). Lydia was still 
in primary school. Jonah’s age-mates called him for a meeting when they found out 
that he was responsible for the pregnancy. Rumours had it that Jonah had been 
pursuing Lydia for a while. She also confirmed that he was indeed the one 
responsible for her pregnancy. 
In a meeting organized at Jonah’s home, his age-mates forced him to agree to marry 
Lydia as a second wife, and said that they would initiate dialogue with her father, and 
even offered to assist Jonah to raise the bride wealth. According to members of this 
group, marrying Lydia as a second wife was the most appropriate way for Jonah to 
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take responsibility for his actions. When Jonah’s age-mates met at Lydia’s home two 
days later, Lydia’s father became furious when Jonah confessed to the pregnancy. 
Lydia’s father told the group off and rejected the proposed marriage of his daughter 
to “the Maasai”, whom he furiously insulted, by associating Jonah’s behaviour, 
“defiling” his schoolgoing daughter, with immorality in the society.  
Senior elders (erabaun) of the village local peace committee got wind of the matter 
and the unsuccessful meeting. They proposed to get involved in the matter but the 
emerues rejected their offer and insisted that they had the capacity to resolve the 
issue peacefully. The elders distanced themselves from the matter, but followed 
proceedings in case their intervention was needed.  
After their failed attempt, the youths organized a second meeting amongst 
themselves. This time they agreed to give Lydia’s family some time, hoping Lydia’s 
father would reconsider his decision regarding the marriage proposal. Meanwhile, 
they began to plan for childbirth. They told Jonah to search for a fat ram, which would 
be slaughtered for Lydia upon giving birth, as is customary in the Maasai society. 
They also directed Jonah to save KES 5,000 (€50) for Lydia’s family to meet her 
needs and that of the baby. When Lydia gave birth, Jonah’s age-mates returned to 
her family and slaughtered the ram in honour of the newborn son.  
They then contributed money amongst themselves, raised KES 10,000 (€100), and 
presented it to Lydia’s mother for the baby’s upkeep. This time round, Lydia’s father 
seemed to have cooled down his anger, a gesture that Jonah’s age-mates welcomed 
as a sign of acceptance in the family. However, they did not make a second appeal 
for marriage at the time, but opted to save this for a later date. “We are still giving 
Lydia’s father time to calm his anger … he will then decide whether to give us a wife 
or the son”, one of them said in a group interview. 
This case is interesting in at least three ways. First, Jonah’s age-mates did not 
consult his first wife (who is in her 20s) on the decision to have a co-wife. However, 
she knew that she was subject to the rule that bound his husband’s age-mates 
requiring all members to take responsibility of their actions. In this society, breaking a 
group’s decree could provide possible grounds for a curse whose penalty may 
include loss of livestock or even death. Peers have the power to initiative a curse 
where necessary.  
Secondly, Jonah’s age-mates demonstrated their ability to resolve a complex matter 
(at least they tried), without asking for help from their elders. Perhaps the situation 
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might have been resolved faster if it had been discussed by the elders (erabaun). 
Perhaps Lydia’s father would have listened to those in his age group than to a bunch 
of young folks who may not have had enough skills and experience to negotiate for 
bridewealth and for marriage. Nevertheless, the elders respected the wishes of the 
youth to be allowed to handle the matter alone, perhaps as another way of preparing 
them for future related or different matters.  
Third, the procedure for handling the matter in the Maasai setting is exported to a 
family of Kamba descent. This shows that both Maasai and non-Maasai inhabitants 
of Ol tepesi le Parsimei village are under the authority of the village’s local peace 
committee.  
 
Case 9. Fight: Maasai/Kikuyu youth 
One day, Gitau, a Kikuyu who came to Ol tepesi le Parsimei village to rent farmland 
with his mother from Kinangop, got into a fight with Pose, a Maasai youth of Ol tepesi 
Ol Parsimei peace committee. Gitau was hurt in the fight. He went to the hospital at 
Maiella trading centre and afterwards recorded his complaint with the police at the 
chief’s office. The police summoned Pose to the station. 
Instead, Pose’s age-mates decided to go to the police station themselves. They 
pleaded with the police to refer the case back “home” for possible resolution. Their 
leader said:  
These two [Gitau and Pose] are of the same age-set [late 20s], they are 
neighbours, and their parents live in the same village. We want peace 
between them. We mean no harm. If Pose is locked up in jail, Gitau will not 
have peace in his mind. Pose must also reconcile with Gitau in order to have 
peace in his mind. The two families will only cooperate if they resolve this 
matter peacefully.  
 
The senior officer was persuaded and allowed them to resolve the matter on their 
own and to later inform the police about the proceedings.  
Upon arrival at the village, Pose’s age-mates organized a meeting between the 
disputants and their parents. After discussions, they found Pose guilty and resolved 
that he should compensate Gitau with a sheep for the pain inflicted upon his body. 
They also ordered Pose to reimburse Gitau with KES 2,000 (€20) to cover the boda 
boda (motorbike) fare to the hospital. Later that day, Pose presented Gitau with a 
female sheep, which had just given birth so that he could start to milk it. By the time I 
was leaving the study area, Gitau’s sheep had given birth to twins. His sheep had 
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therefore increased to four out of the compensation. There has not been any dispute 
between the two neighbours since the settlement.  
In summary, the emerues demonstrate a strong commitment to peaceful resolution of 
disputes affecting members of the age group without considerations of ethnic 
differences. With reference to the last case, the chief and police noted that they 
welcome instances where community members use their own cultural attributes in 
order to resolve disputes. According to a member of the group, the fact that Gitau’s 
sheep multiplied so quickly symbolizes Pose’s genuine remorse and willingness to 
transform the relationship between him and his peers.   
 
Cases 7, 8, and 9 show dispute resolution from the perspective of the emerues in Ol 
tepesi le Parsimei where dispute resolution is organized with respect to age. Several 
examples may be given for situations were senior males (erabaun) participate in 
disputes affecting the emerues age-set. More importantly, the erabaun handle 
disputes that have the potential to cause ethnic tensions between emerues of Maasai 
and Kikuyu. Such incidences include boundary disputes, herder-farmer conflicts, and 
related problems, as demonstrated by case 10.  
 
Case 10. Farmer-herder dispute and a bond through animal blood 
In a case involving a Maasai herder and a Kikuyu farmer, the Maasai’s livestock 
strayed into the farm of the former and destroyed crops. The farmer lives in Maiella 
trading centre and has rented farmland in Ol tepesi le Parsimei village. He thus 
engages in circular forms of mobility to and from the farm. The Maasai herder is 
resident in the village and a member of the Naadokila family, home of the Ol tepesi 
Ol Parsimei peace committee.  
The Kikuyu farmer found the livestock grazing on his crops. It was a market day at 
Inkoroinito shopping centre near Nkampani village and many people, including the 
Local Peace Committee (LPC) members, had gone to the market. The farmer 
decided to take the animals to Maiella police station, fearing that the boys herding 
the animals would not disclose their offence to the owner of the livestock.  
The boys called the owner of the livestock by mobile phone and informed him about 
the incident. On receiving the news, the former immediately searched for LPC 
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members at the shopping centre and, together with two elders, they hurried through 
a shortcut and intercepted the farmer before he could move the animals far.  
The rains had just started and the animals had not recovered fully from a prolonged 
drought, so they were still weak and could not move fast. The elders pleaded with 
him to surrender the animals and to allow them to discuss the matter back home (at 
the household level). The farmer notified them that he had tried to find LPC members 
and the owner of the livestock. He justified his action in the event that the boys 
decided not to reveal that the animals had damaged his crops.  
After spending time moving the weak animals back home, they all assessed the 
damage caused on the farm. After some negotiations, the elders resolved that the 
Maasai herder would compensate the Kikuyu farmer with KES 4,000 (€40) and a 
female sheep.  
Financial compensation in conflict resolution, though popular among the Kikuyu 
community, has little weight among the Maasai. In most cases, the Maasai accept 
livestock (usually female) as compensation in dispute settlements. Livestock, they 
argue, symbolizes the reunification of disputants by the blood of the animals, and 
villagers interpret their reproduction as signifying long-term friendship between 
disputants, or transformation. Money, they argue, creates a weak bond, which may 
last only until it is spent. Generally, however, compensation involves both livestock 
and money. The Maasai have increasingly influenced Kikuyu towards this form of 
settlement.  
 
In summary, by trying to integrate the neo-traditional conflict resolution mechanisms 
and ideas into the traditional age-set organization, the studied Maasai communities 
are managing to adapt LPCs to their overriding social structure, thereby giving LPCs 
shape and identity. As demonstrated in the cases, dispute resolution through NKCs 
and LPCs, though facing various challenges, helps to transform relationships 
between disputants and to limit situations where small-scale disputes could transform 
into large-scale interethnic strife. More importantly, cross-cutting ties between 
neighbours and between age groups, as well as between landowners and tenants 
among other interest groups help to bring disputants to negotiate in a peaceful 
manner, and, sometimes, to compromise for a greater good. This echoes historical 
patterns (as discussed in chapter 1 and in chapter 8) where the ancestors of these 
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communities applied local norms and values to solve disputes and enhance solidarity 
and interdependence.  
Nevertheless, LPCs and NKCs lack the capacity to deal with serious conflicts, the 
majority of which relate to ownership and control of land and which are characterised 
by politicised ideals. Based on observation in the studied villages, LPCs and NKCs 
usually attend to minor disputes, which if left unattended could easily cross borders 
and degenerate into potential security threats.  
In most cases, difficult or serious land conflicts between and within particular ethnic 
groups, are decided through formal procedures including the courts. Some may be 
resolved at the county land ministries. Below are two extended cases (Cases 11 and 
12), which demonstrate scenarios of complex land disputes in the studied area that 
have proven quite difficult for LPCs, NKCs, and the local administration.  
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Case 11. Plot 24: Maasai/Kikuyu land ownership dispute  
The following extended case discusses an ongoing land ownership dispute between 
a family of Kikuyu descent and another of Maasai descent, which has lasted for close 
to twenty years. The plot of land is located in Kipise Section in Enoosupukia, near 
Mpeuti village. In the photograph below, Isaac, an elderly Kikuyu farmer, who claims 
ownership of the disputed land, showed us some documents to support his claims. 
These include a handwritten sale-of-land agreement between him and Ncheka (the 
alleged seller) dated to 1975 – that is, over forty years ago.  
 
 
Photograph  14. Isaac displaying a handwritten sale-of-land agreement between him  
                          and Ncheka ole Omerae dated 1975 (source: field data, 2014).   
 
In the following discussion, I will explore various pieces of evidence of the alleged 
transaction: the handwritten sale-of-land agreement, a beacon certificate, which is the 
equivalent of a title deed, and correspondence from the District Land Adjudication 
and Settlement Office (the DLASO), which is located in the Ministry of Lands and 
Settlement in Narok county. Through my own observation of the evidence and with 
reference to facts about the matter in dispute, the case study will show the possible 
twists and turns in local-level land ownership disputes and the struggles involved in 
the pursuit of tenure rights. It will also reveal possible threats to the institution of 
patriarchal inheritance.  
I will highlight and discuss a manipulated part of the handwritten agreement, which 
makes it difficult to ascertain the actual size of the piece of land sold. Additionally, I 
will assess the legitimacy of handwritten documents as proof of ownership rights to 
land, in the era of formal title deeds, and show actors’ tendencies to revoke such 
257 
 
evidence on grounds of admissibility in contemporary determination of land disputes. 
The discussion also reveals the problems that a plaintiff may face following the death 
of a key eyewitness to an informal transaction regarding land whose ownership is 
disputed several decades after an alleged transaction.  
Due to the sensitivity of the matter in dispute, I chose to use proxy information where 
necessary, and to avoid frequent contact with the disputants, and/or circumstances 
which could possibly interfere with the ongoing dispute or influence other related 
situations in the studied area. I also spread the investigation over several months to 
build trust with key informants. That said, the evidence provided here is in the public 
domain and does not, in my opinion, incriminate any of the concerned parties. The 
case exemplifies the complex land question in Kenya and the studied area. 
I will begin with a brief background of the disputed land. In order to situate this 
context, I will revisit the earlier discussion on migration of Kikuyu from Central 
Province and consequent agricultural colonization in the Rift Valley (Chapter 3). 
Thereafter, I will focus on the dispute arising from the alleged transfer of ownership 
rights to the land in question (Plot 24). Afterwards, I will demonstrate the plaintiff’s 
unwavering quest for justice and the hardships faced, as well as the defendant’s 
position and the justification with which it carries.  
The concluding discussion analyses the possible paths (or situations), which the 
ongoing dispute may take. It also explains various social-economic changes that 
motivate actors to invest time and money in property-related claims today. Despite 
the intrigues and the difficult circumstances that faced the disputants in this case, 
none of them used violence or ethnic affiliation as tools to claim tenure rights. The 
case study will engage the reader with an actual scenario of land disputes in 
Enoosupukia. It is also meant to enrich previous discussions on possible disputes 
that emerge due to historical land transfers from Maa-speakers to Kikuyu farmers 
(Chapter 3). 
 
Background to the dispute 
When the British appropriated land in Central Kenya from the late nineteenth century, 
they forced thousands of Kikuyu to migrate elsewhere in the search of land and 
settlement (see Chapter 3). The majority of Kikuyu negotiated for settlement and 
farmland from Dorobo hunter-gatherers and Maasai pastoralists in the Rift Valley. 
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Maa-speakers either sold, gifted, or exchanged land for wives and food produce with 
Kikuyu farmers, a process that led to massive appropriation of resources, and the 
colonization of agricultural frontiers in the Rift Valley.  
With the increase of land-seeking clients, driven by demographic pressure, poverty, 
and landlessness in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, new frontiers including 
Enoosupukia and other parts of the former Maasai southern reserve were 
progressively converted into means for market-oriented food production. The story of 
Isaac (the plaintiff in the case in question) starts in the 1950s, when he moved to 
Maiella.  
Isaac was among those farmers of Kikuyu descent who migrated from Central Kenya 
to the south of the Rift Valley in the search of settlement and farmland. Together with 
his wife, Ruth, and five children, Isaac migrated from Limuru to Maiella in the 
southern periphery of Lake Naivasha basin around the 1950s. Here, the family joined 
a group of about 600 farmers, mostly of Kikuyu descent, who bought Maiella Estate 
from an Italian settler in the early 1960s (see Chapter 3). 
In the early 1970s, Isaac, together with other Kikuyu, began to explore more land 
opportunities in Enoosupukia, an area known for conducive soils and abundant 
rainfall for agriculture. However, Maa-speakers were not quick to sell land to 
“strangers” who showed up at their doorsteps – one had to establish his presence 
among them for some time, perhaps make friends, drink beer together with them, or 
perhaps present a daughter for marriage. Isaac accepted a job offer from the family 
of Kisiye ole Mdol. Henceforth, he farmed for his Maasai boss for a monthly wage of 
KES 70 (€0.70). Isaac’s job helped him to nurture and cement friendship with other 
Maasai and Dorobo families in Enoosupukia.  
From the standpoint of what one could relate to a “social engineer”, Isaac hoped that 
his network of friends would assist him in buying his own land to supplement his other 
piece of land in Maiella. Indeed, Ole Mdol gave Isaac an acre of land for free on 
which to build a house for his family and to cultivate food for them. Having found a 
new place to live, Isaac moved his family from Maiella to Enoosupukia.  
For about four years, Isaac and his family lived on Ole Mdol’s farm. By this time, the 
family had increased by three children. In the fifth year of their stay, Ole Mdol began 
to sell portions of his land to interested buyers with the intention of moving away from 
Enoosupukia to another land elsewhere. Isaac saw this as a good opportunity to 
purchase additional land, but Ole Mdol declined his request and demanded one of 
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Isaac’s daughters for a wife in exchange for land. Isaac’s daughter declined, which 
quashed the chances for his father to gain land from his employer. Unlike in the 
Maasai culture, where a father can easily marry off his daughter in order to gain 
wealth (usually livestock), the Kikuyu rarely force their daughters into arranged 
marriages.  
Nevertheless, Isaac’s wife called his brother from Limuru, who disguised himself as 
an ordinary land-seeking client and purchased an acre and half of land from Ole Mdol 
on her behalf. This portion of land was not enough for a family of ten. Therefore, 
Isaac continued to seek out more farmland among Maa-speakers in the area. He met 
Ncheka ole Omerae (the father to the defendant in this case) from whom he allegedly 
bought six acres of land on a willing buyer–willing seller basis. Said parcel of land is 
the subject matter of this case study.  
According to Isaac, his family lived and cultivated the disputed land for over twenty 
years. During this time, the defendant did not raise any dispute against the plaintiff’s 
ownerships rights. However, sometimes in 1994, after the 1993 violence and forced 
movement of Kikuyu farmers from Enoosupukia (see Chapter 3), the son of Ole 
Omerae allegedly grabbed Isaac’s land and began to cultivate on a portion of it, and 
leased another portion to land-seeking tenants (mainly Kikuyu).  
After the violence, Isaac returned to Enoosupukia to reclaim his land, but Ole 
Omerae’s son engaged him in what appeared to be a cat-and-mouse game. A 
serious dispute over the land ensued, which saw the disputants separately, and 
sometimes jointly, approach the Ministry of Lands and Settlement in Narok in the 
search of a solution. This dispute is still ongoing (based on follow up information from 
informants after fieldwork). Isaac claims that Ole Omerae’s son, who is in his 30s, 
robbed him of his six acres of land, which he “genuinely” bought from his father. 
However, the defendant claims that the land in question is his rightful inheritance. 
Who then is the rightful owner of this land? 
 
Plot 24. Purchase of the disputed land  
I will now discuss some questions that arise from the sale of the disputed land and 
the legitimacy of the handwritten sale-of-land agreement. Figure 14 shows the 
original Swahili handwritten agreement, which is translated (in its entirety) afterwards. 
However, for purposes of this discussion I have circled a part of the original 
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document, which appears to have been manipulated perhaps to conceal important 
information about the actual size of the parcel of land that allegedly changed hands, 
the discussion of which follows thereafter.  
As shown in the document (Figure 14), the alleged transfer of ownership of the land 
in question happened on 26.06.1975. Two eyewitnesses sanctioned the transaction; 
Mputiai ole Kiondo, a Dorobo on the defendant’s side, and Kimani wa Gitau, a Kikuyu 
on the plaintiff’s side. The witnesses either signed or put a thumbprint on the 
handwritten document, which henceforth became proof of transfer of ownership 
rights. 
Participants in the transaction also affixed a Kenya postage stamp on the handwritten 
document, perhaps to symbolize that the contract was binding and to provide 
assurance that the concerned parties understood the terms of the agreement. 
Henceforth, Isaac stored the handwritten agreement, perhaps oblivious that it would 
stand a difficult trial four decades later.  
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Figure 14. Handwritten sale of land agreement between Ole Omerae and Isaac 
                 Kimama (see translation below) (source: field data, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
262 
 
Translation of Figure 14 
 
Note: The underlined part of the translation below appears to have been manipulated 
as shown in the original handwritten agreement (above). As a result, the original 
handwritten sale of land agreement shows a serious discrepancy with regard to the 
cost of the land. Kenya shillings is abbreviated, ‘Shs.’ or ‘KES’.  
 
 
 
26th June, 1975 
AGREEMENT TO SALE LAND 
(KIPISE SECTION/ENOOSUPUKIA) 
 
Today 26/6/1975, I Ncheka ole Omerae (ID Card Lost) have sold Mr. Isaac Mwangi 
Kimama ID No. 0908548/63 land three acres (3 acres) for 1,500 Kenya shillings 
(Shs. 1,500) per acre. He has paid me in full nine thousand Kenya shillings (Shs. 
9,000) and thus has no debt. The plot number is twenty-four, No. 24, Kipise Section. 
 
Witnesses 
1. Mputiai ole Kiondo (no signature) 
2. Kimani wa Gitau (signed) 
 
Seller: Ncheka ole Omerae (thumbprint) 
Buyer: Isaac Mwangi Kimama (signed) 
 
(Kenya postage stamp) 
 
 
 
Several points can be inferred from the document. The handwritten agreement points 
to the possibility of a transaction involving the sale of land. However, the document is 
informal, as compared to a title deed, and is thus not legally binding in statutory 
terms. Therefore, the defendant or a court may revoke it on grounds of admissibility 
in a formal court process. It thus appears that the defendant took advantage of this 
fact in the attempt to claim the land as his rightful inheritance.   
Indeed, the defendant insists that the handwritten agreement is a mere fabrication, 
which should be considered null and void. However, the defendant’s mother contends 
that Isaac and his family lived among them for years and were in fact respectful 
friends. Nevertheless, the defendant insists that the agreement between his father 
and Isaac was based on access rights only and therefore did not refer to the transfer 
of ownership rights. 
Was there a transaction of this kind in the first place? Let us consider two 
assumptions:  
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Assuming the transaction did actually take place, going by the sale agreement, the 
next question would be the actual size of the piece of land, which changed hands at 
the time, and the amount of money paid for it – this is where the problem lies. In a 
later evidence (below), Isaac insists in writing that he bought six acres of land from 
the defendant’s father. From his standpoint, the only way to verify whether the 
transaction did take place is through the handwritten agreement and the 
eyewitnesses who sanctioned the transaction.  
However, someone appears to have tampered with the original document on the part, 
which could have otherwise guided us to verify the actual size of land sold. I have 
circled this contentious part (see Figure 14 and the underlined part in the translation). 
In the manipulated part of the agreement, someone appears to pass the impression 
that Ole Omerae sold only three acres to Isaac.  
This presents yet another query. If indeed the sale involved only three acres and 
each acre as per the agreement cost KES 1,500, the total price for three acres would 
then be KES 4,500 and not KES 9,000 as shown on the document. This, of course, 
does not make mathematical sense. The figures that are not tampered with (the price 
per acre, KES 1,500, and the total amount paid, KES 9,000) give a more accurate 
impression. Going by these figures, one can argue that Isaac may have bought six 
acres at a cost of KES 1,500 per acre, and thus paid a total of KES 9,000.  
Both seller and buyer are illiterate (for Isaac, at least now). Therefore, someone else 
may be blamed for tampering with such important evidence. However, questions 
about the person responsible for manipulating the evidence and the motivation to do 
so remain unanswered. Surprising, despite this discrepancy, concerns over the size 
of the piece of land that was allegedly sold seems to have somehow escaped the 
attention of concerned parties. These include the DLASO, which has been involved in 
the matter.   
Assuming the transaction did not take place, one must be compelled to explain the 
existence of a document that testifies to the contrary, and perhaps show alternative 
motives behind the dispute. These questions are better answered after exploring 
other forms of evidence, which I present below. However, as noted in Chapter 3, 
there were claims that land-seeking Kikuyu may have used various strategies to 
defraud illiterate Maa-speakers of their land at least from the early twentieth century.  
Indeed, some Maa-speakers in the studied area still insist that some land-seeking 
Kikuyu increased the sizes of lands acquired from the former by dubious means. 
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Some argue that the latter progressively extended their boundaries in order to 
appropriate more land illegally or changed access and user rights into ownership 
rights through handwritten “agreements”. Going by this assumption, one might expect 
that some ignorant Maa-speakers may have signed or put thumbprints on documents 
containing terms incomprehensible to them. This may be possible, considering the 
fact that many land deals were sealed over drinks of beer at the time.  
Nevertheless, the control and ownership of land was a crucial topic in post-colonial 
Kenya and, as one would expect, individuals were more cautious while dealing with 
land sales particularly after the experiences of the colonial regime. The Maasai, 
having lost much of their land to British settlers, also became aware of the 
importance of land ownership as opposed to settling for access rights. Consequently, 
eyewitnesses became important actors in transactions involving the sale of land. Of 
course, the possibility of using an eyewitness as an accomplice to appropriate land 
illegally cannot be underestimated.  
It is important at this point to turn to other evidence to proof ownership of the disputed 
land, but first I will shortly describe how the land was allegedly grabbed. 
 
Plot 24: ‘Tribal’ clashes and the land grab  
According to Isaac, during the 1992/1993 “tribal” clashes in Enoosupukia, Maasai 
vigilantes and government askaris (administration police) evicted his family from the 
land in question together with thousands of members of the Kikuyu community who 
were living or cultivating in the area. In his calculations (Figure 15), Isaac estimated 
loss of property worth about KES 300,000 (€3,000) including housing materials; 
corrugated iron sheets, building stones, fencing wire, and a balance beam; household 
items and other property such as a water tank and a bicycle; livestock (5 sheep and 2 
donkeys), and crops (5 acres of maize and 1 acre of potatoes). Perpetrators of the 
violence either stole, destroyed, or burned this property.  
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Figure 15.The property lost by Isaac during the 1992/3 “tribal” clashes (source: field  
                 data, 2014).  
 
At the height of the violence, Isaac’s family fled to Maiella trading centre and joined 
other internally displaced persons. When police closed the camp housing internally 
displaced persons (see Chapter 3), Isaac rented a mud house at the trading centre 
where the family has lived since. After the 1993 violence, Isaac made efforts to 
reclaim his land, only to realise that the defendant had settled on it and leased part of 
it to about six Kikuyu tenants.  
According to Isaac, occupation of the lands left behind by fleeing Kikuyu was 
common in Enoosupukia at the time – newcomers of Maasai descent or some Maa-
speaking neighbours of the Kikuyu had already put these idle lands in use some 
months after the “clashes”. When some Maa-speakers were pursuing their Kikuyu 
neighbours to settle back on their lands or to continue farming on the rented plots 
after the violence, others took advantage of their absence to utilize or grab their land. 
The selfish Maasai were driven by the desire to reclaim lands that they had already 
sold to Kikuyu, which had proven to have immense agricultural potential. Other 
motivations included intentions to lease such lands after the violence to land-seeking 
clients for money, or to practice proprietorship of the soil. There was no doubt that 
farmland would be in great demand after the “clashes”.  
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Isaac visited the homestead of the defendant and made his claim known. At first, the 
defendant (Ole Omerae’s son) did not object to the request to move from the land. 
Such a response assured Isaac the possibility of there not being any form of dispute 
between the two families concerning the land. However, a few days later, the 
defendant remained adamantly on the land, ignoring both the plaintiff and his own 
parents, who tried to persuade him to vacate the land and to cease his activities upon 
it. This brings up the question of the actual ownership of the disputed land.  
 
Plot 24: Disputed claims and proof of ownership 
Apart from the handwritten agreement already discussed, a beacon certificate issued 
to the plaintiff by the demarcation officer in charge of the Kipise Adjudication Section, 
who sits at the DLASO, confirms Isaac’s claims. After the land adjudication exercise 
of the late 1970s (see Chapter 3), the adjudication offers concerned presented 
individuals believed to be the rightful owners of parcels of land in the adjudicated 
area with beacon numbers (locally known as beacon certificates).  
A beacon number, in this case, is seen as a “formal” equivalent of a land title deed. It 
confers ownership rights of the systematically demarcated and numbered parcels of 
land to person(s) named on its face, as shown on Isaac’s beacon certificate below. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Isaac’s beacon number for plot 24 (source: field data, 2014).  
 
Beacon numbers/certificates are the basis upon which the land’s ministry prepares 
title deeds. An officer at the DLASO confirmed that the office does not issue a beacon 
number in cases where a particular parcel(s) of land is entangled in a dispute at the 
time of adjudication. Instead, the parties involved in the dispute must first iron out 
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their case through the means at their disposal. They may try to settle the dispute with 
the nearer agnates of the disputants or by engaging a local peace committee. If the 
dispute is not resolved, the plaintiff can pursue justice through the courts. Should 
disputes emerge later after issuance of a beacon number, a plaintiff files a case 
(known locally as an objection case) at the Lands and Settlement Ministry for action – 
the Ministry usually advises disputants to cease any activities on the land in question 
until their case is determined.   
Apart from the land adjudication officials, a demarcation committee includes local 
elders. These elders must be residents of the village(s) targeted for land adjudication, 
they must be known to the community members, and must be conversant with 
matters relating to property rights and land transfers (in the form of gifts, inheritance, 
or sale) in their area. Their role is primarily to guide the government adjudication 
officials (including surveyors) on infrastructural boundaries in their village(s), such as 
roads and school compounds, during the adjudication process, and to verify 
ownership of the claimed plots of land.  
Additionally, persons claiming ownership of land must avail themselves, or at least 
send reliable representatives, during the adjudication exercise, to indicate the 
boundaries of the concerned parcels of land. It is often at this point when disputes on 
land ownership or alignment of boundaries must be raised. In the absence of such 
disputes, the committee assumes that claimants and their adjacent neighbours are in 
full agreement regarding the boundaries and ownership rights. The committee then 
lists the claimant(s) of that particular parcel of land as its legal owner(s).  
Thereafter, the committee allows some time for possible late claims or objection 
cases after the exercise. Only then can the land adjudication officer issue beacon 
numbers. Therefore, official registration of plot 24 under Isaac’s name and the 
subsequent issuance of a beacon number add some legal weight to the question of 
ownership. However, as noted earlier in Chapter 3 and in Case 12 below, community 
members levelled corruption allegations against the demarcation committee involved 
in the subdivision process. Such allegations were not unique to Enoosupukia. On the 
Maiella side, disputes emerged during the subdivision of Maiella Estate pitting the 
Ng’ati society directors against Kikuyu society members, as discussed in the next 
case (Case 12). 
Some Kikuyu informants on the Enoosupukia side alleged that the Narok lands office 
went on to issue Maa-speakers with beacon numbers on lands already registered 
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under Kikuyu names. This means that one parcel of land would bear the registration 
of two persons (a Maasai and a Kikuyu) as its rightful owners. Kikuyu landowners 
claimed that some Maasai politicians at Narok colluded with the lands office in the 
attempt to enable as many Maasai voters as possible to repossess the lands they 
had transferred to Kikuyu. 
The plan, according to Kikuyu informants, was to allow Maa-speakers to institute 
legal proceeding against concerned Kikuyu “landowners” of Enoosupukia after which 
the politicians would provide them with legal assistance to win such suits. The Narok 
land office denied these allegations. No attempts have been made to investigate 
corruption or the alleged illegal issuance of beacon numbers. As a result, we are only 
left to make sense of the evidence, which is connected directly to the matter in 
dispute.  
After prolonged reluctance on the part of the defendant to vacate the disputed land, 
Isaac decided to seek justice through the DLASO fearing the possibility of losing his 
land. 
 
Plot 24: Isaac’s painful pursuit of justice 
Correspondence from the DLASO and from the demarcation officer in charge of 
Kipise Adjudication Section confirms Isaac’s complaint. In a letter dated 15th 
September 2004, the officer in charge at the DLASO warned the defendant to vacate 
the disputed land. The letter confirms that the defendant had not raised any dispute 
against the plaintiff’s ownership of the land and termed the latter’s activities and 
settlement on the land illegal since he had not sought for Isaac’s approval. The letter 
(Figure 17) reads:  
I refer to the Demarcation Officer’s letter dated 14th September 2004 on the 
land complaint P/NO. 24 Kipise Adjudication Section. It would appear from the 
demarcation officer’s letter that you have illegally settled in the above parcel of 
land belonging to Isaac Mwangi Kimama without his consent. You are also 
cultivating in the said land. The purpose of this letter is therefore to urge you to 
stop your activities in the said land and vacate the same when you harvest the 
current crops in the farm. Please note that if you do not heed the advice 
contained herein the registered owner of the land Mr. Isaac Mwangi Kimama 
shall be allowed to seek eviction orders against you in a court of law, as there 
is no registered dispute against his ownership of the land. Please heed. 
           
           DLASO, Narok county. 
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Figure 17. Warning letter from DLASO (source: field data, 2014).  
 
After this warning, Isaac hoped that the matter had been resolved finally, and that the 
defendant would vacate the land as advised. However, the defendant continued with 
his activities on the disputed land, seemingly ignoring the DLASO’s advice. By 
adamantly remaining on lands “owned” and farmed by members of Kikuyu descent, 
who had fled the 1993 violence, some Maa-speakers were hoping that the concerned 
Kikuyu would not return to Enoosupukia to reclaim them. If they did, some Maasai 
hoped to lease these lands to the Kikuyu landowners or to other land-seeking clients. 
When asked, informants from the Maa-speaking community defended themselves 
arguing that they did not intend to grab these lands, but were only interested in 
utilising them until the Kikuyu owners returned to reclaim them. This was not the case 
with Isaac’s situation.  
Prior to the 2007 general elections, the defendant took advantage of the tensions in 
Enoosupukia to expand his activities on Isaac’s land with the hope that Isaac would 
fear for his life, as had happened in the early 1990s. This time, Isaac acted swiftly 
with yet another appeal seeking the intervention of the Ministry of Lands and 
Settlement through the DLASO on the matter. However, the DLASO did not issue 
eviction orders or initiate a court injunction against the defendant, as had been 
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promised in the 2004 letter (above), on the account that the accused did not vacate 
Isaac’s land. Rather, in a letter dated 20th July 2007, the officer in charge at the 
DLASO directed the demarcation officer in charge of Kipise Adjudication Section to 
ensure that the defendant did not cultivate or construct additional houses on the 
disputed land until the case was determined. The letter (Figure 18) reads: 
The Plot no. 24 is affected by an appeal to the minister case receipt No. 
9453272 pending hearing & determination. It has been established that 
Nchewa (ole Omerae) family is the one using the land and have cultivated 
maize and Irish potatoes and constructed two temporary houses. This is to 
request you to ensure no further development is realised until the appeal is 
heard and determined. 
 
 
Figure 18. Response by the DLASO to Isaac’s appeal (source: field data, 2014) 
 
One thing is worth mentioning here. It would appear, according to the 2004 
correspondence from the DLASO and the demarcation officer, that the matter had 
already been determined and therefore, as one would expect, did not require further 
hearing and/or determination. Notice that in the 2004 correspondence, the two offices 
were in agreement that the accused had illegally invaded the plaintiff’s plot of land. 
The two offices did not dispute Isaac’s ownership rights to the land but, in fact, 
affirmed it. They also issued a stern warning to the defendant to vacate said land, 
failing which they would initiate legal proceedings against him. Therefore, there is a 
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possibility that the defendant may have appealed against the DLASO’s directive. This 
could explain the need for a second hearing and determination of the case.  
After the DLASO’s response, Isaac hoped that the office would conduct proper 
investigations to ascertain his ownership rights. However, for close to ten months, the 
defendant remained adamantly on the disputed land and the DLASO did little to 
resolve the matter. Isaac, who unlike his counterpart chose not to invest in the 
disputed land, could not stand the prolonged silence. In a letter dated May 2008, 
Isaac wrote another appeal to the Ministry through the DLASO explaining his 
situation. In his appeal (below with translation) Isaac goes on to explain how he 
acquired the land, its cost and size, and related evidence to support his case. The 
translation of the appeal (Figure 19 below) reads: 
To DLASO 
16th May 2008 
 
RE: Appeal to Minister a Case on Plot 24 Kipise Adjudication 
I want to appeal against a land adjudication decision, which was delivered on 
6th May in a case between me and Surupen ole Ncheka. On that date we went 
to the land officer but the judgement reached in my view was not a fair one.  
(1) The land transaction started on 26/6/1975 when Ncheka ole 
Omerae sold me 6 acres of land at a cost of KES 9,000 at the 
rate of KES 1,500. Witnesses were Mputiae ole Kiondo (who is 
now deceased) and Kimani Gitau who is still alive. This is further 
proved by the written agreement attached there on. 
(2) Kipise was adjudicated and I was given land No. 24. In 1992 
after tribal clashes we were evicted and after some years later I 
came to realise that my land was occupied by Ncheka’s family. I 
sought help through the Narok lands office to settle the case. I 
was issued yet with a letter telling Ncheka’s to vacate from my 
land, the letter is again attached to proof my case.  
I have stayed on the said land for more than 20 years without anyone raising 
an accusing finger. With all these documents attached, there is no doubt that 
the land belongs to me. Sir, I am anticipating another fair hearing 
 
Yours, Mwangi Kimama.  
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Figure 19. Isaac’s appeal dated 16. 05. 2008 (source: field data, 2014).  
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In his appeal, Isaac notes that one of the key eyewitnesses to the transaction, 
Mputiae ole Kiondo, a Dorobo, had already died. For Isaac, the death of a key 
eyewitness rendered a big blow to his evidence on the land transaction. This has 
serious ramifications should the matter escalate to a court of law, as discussed 
below. By the end of fieldwork in 2014, Isaac was still waiting for the DLASO’s 
response to his appeal. Notice that this was six years after the last official response 
on the matter. During this time, some of the main officers working on the case were 
transferred from Narok, following the introduction of a new county administration, 
after the 2013 general elections. Even after waiting for over six years for a response 
from the DLASO, Isaac has not given up.  
When I visited the Ministry of Lands and Settlement at Narok town towards the end 
of 2014, I was taken through thousands of objection cases that relate to land 
boundaries, ownership rights to land, and inheritance, among others. Disputants 
continue to report similar complaints to the office on regular basis, and there is no 
indication of how long the objection cases will take before resolution, or if they will 
ever be resolved at the county level.   
 
Plot 24. Concluding discussion 
 
The death of Mputiae ole Kiondo, who allegedly witnessed the land transaction 
between Isaac and Ncheka ole Omerae in 1975, may weaken the plaintiff’s appeal, if 
it is taken to mean a lack of evidence, in a possible formal court process. As already 
discussed, the handwritten agreement, which is a key proof of the plaintiff’s 
ownership right to the disputed land, is itself weak by virtue of being informal, and 
therefore may not suffice as evidence in a formal justice system, unless the 
mentioned eyewitnesses are present to give it weight.  
The only living eyewitness in this transaction (allegedly concluded in 1975) is Kimani 
wa Gitau, a Kikuyu. However, this witness may be seen as a possible accomplice, by 
virtue of coming from the same ethnic group as the plaintiff, and therefore the 
possibility for his dismissal on grounds of a conflict of interest. In light of this 
possibility, Isaac’s handwritten proof of ownership of the disputed land and his sole 
witness may not suffice in a situation involving a determined defendant who insists 
that Isaac’s rights to the disputed land were purely limited to access and not 
ownership.  
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As noted by Peter Little on the tendency of Maa-speakers to invoke “marginalization” 
to claim land (Little, 1998: 444), the defendant may argue that a Kikuyu “social 
engineer” (Isaac) used a handwritten document to defraud an ignorant and illiterate 
Maasai of his land at the time.  
However, official proof of Isaac’s ownership of the land, as discussed, comes from 
the demarcation officer in charge of Kipise Adjudication Section, who registered Plot 
24 in Isaac’s name, and consequently issued him with a beacon certificate. Based on 
the discussion, issuance of a beacon certificate is preceded by a form of due 
diligence, where all parties involved must avail themselves during the adjudication 
exercise, to verify ownership and to show the boundaries of their claim. Notably, the 
defendant did not raise any objection against Isaac’s ownership right to the land at 
the time of adjudication (from the mid-1970s). Therefore, one may argue that both 
the seller and buyer acknowledged each other’s rights.  
The DLASO also upheld Isaac’s proof of ownership to the land, thus adding some 
legal weight on his case. Nevertheless, the office shows a lot of reluctance in 
handling the matter in dispute. Arguably, such reluctance may be associated with 
possible attempts by local actors (perhaps from the defendant’s side) to influence the 
land-handling office. 
Moreover, there has been failure to investigate corruption allegations levelled against 
the demarcation committee to establish the nature of Isaac’s alleged purchase of the 
disputed land. Furthermore, the alleged registration of Maa-speakers on lands 
already registered under the names of members of Kikuyu descent presents an 
imminent problem for the case and related land disputes in the area, perhaps with 
possible ethnic strife. 
Furthermore, the land question in Kenya has the tendency to drag along both the 
powerful and powerless actors (economically and/or socio-politically), at the local and 
national levels, some of whom join the bandwagon at various stages and with 
different intentions. In most instances, the materially endowed or those with the 
“right” political connections often win the day, through illegal or irregular means. 
From living in the comfort of a stone house, to now surviving in a mud-walled single 
room, where soiled utensils scatter the fireplace area in one corner of the house, 
Isaac must invest money, time, and energy in pursuit of justice, single-handedly, 
against the wealthier family of the defendant.  
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Perhaps a more appropriate mechanism to handle such a complicated dispute is 
through the Local Peace Committees (LPCs). However, the government constituted 
LPCs in the area less than ten years ago, while the dispute at hand goes back some 
forty years. Additionally, by the time LPCs come into play, the matter had already 
escalated to higher offices with formal jurisdiction. However, LPCs have successfully 
appealed a few of such cases for determination at the household level. Isaac hopes 
that the offices concerned will refer the case to a local mechanism where, perhaps, 
customary law in the form of oath-taking may be invoked.  
The challenge facing LPCs as constituted, however, is the conflict between formal 
statutory systems and informal community-driven mechanisms on the prescription of 
dispute resolution. Assuming Isaac’s case were to be referred back to the grassroots 
institutions, the formal system must first acknowledge and support the capacity of 
informal mechanisms to deal with such matters, and especially uphold the legitimacy 
of informal transactions relating to land, as well as the application of traditional 
dispute-resolution mechanisms (e.g. oaths, curses etc.). Notably, the possible 
externalities associated with the effects of these traditional dispute-resolution 
mechanisms (as shown in Cases 5) may conflict with the rights of offenders and their 
associates, as prescribed in formal law. This dilemma has often constrained the 
balance between conflict resolution and global human rights.  
In the interest of ending similar land disputes in the studied area, some Kikuyu 
considered paying the previous Maa-speaking landowners some additional money to 
offset the accrued value of their disputed lands. However, such settlements are also 
informal and largely dependent on the goodwill of both parties. This kind of 
arrangement does not appeal to Isaac, who sees it as pressure to re-purchase land 
that he already owns, the current value of which (see below) he cannot afford.  
This case also raises the attention of the dynamics in patriarchal systems. The 
powerful apparatus of patriarchal inheritance, and the crises of generational control 
in patriarchal systems brought about by modernization, deserve attention. The 
current generation is at pains to challenge “old” ties and alliances that were formed 
between their parents and “outsiders” – relationships that led to the transfer of lands 
which, according to the sons of these parents, should have been their rightful 
inheritance.  
What has changed? Why are actors at the local level spending money and time in 
pursuit of tenure rights despite protracted disputes? To answer these questions, I will 
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compare the social and economic values that people attach to land today with those 
of the 1970s, when the alleged transaction took place.  
As already discussed, the disputed six acres of land allegedly changed hands in 
1975, at a cost KES 9,000 (€90), each acre costing KES 1,500 (€15). Today, an acre 
of land near Naivasha town costs at least KES 1 million (€10,000). The same acre of 
land at Kayole area, a rapidly growing suburb a few kilometres from Naivasha town, 
costs about KES 1.6 million (€16,000). At Naivasha’s south lake area, a hub of 
tourism and agro-industrial investments, the price of an acre could be four times that 
of an acre in the town area. Land for sale is quite rare here.  
Land prices at the southern periphery of the basin, about 50Km from Naivasha town, 
where the study area falls, are considerably lower due to the remoteness of the area. 
However, the area’s agricultural potential and recent plans to develop necessary 
infrastructure (e.g. roads) by the county governments, will undoubtedly offer 
competitive prices for land in the future. Ease of access to these areas by roads is 
expected to increase agricultural investments and to lower operating costs.  
At Enoosupukia, an acre of land cost roughly KES 200,000 (€2,000). Going by this 
price, the disputed six acres of land would cost KES 1.2 million (€12,000) or more. A 
primary school teacher who earns a monthly salary of KES 30,000 (€300) will have to 
save his entire salary for forty months in order to have said amount.  
Apart from the increase of the price of land, the economic potential of land in terms of 
productivity has also changed greatly. Isaac estimated his loss of maize during the 
1993 violence to have a value of KES 100,000 (€1,000), implying that each acre 
could have made him KES 20,000 (€200). Today, under favourable conditions 
(abundant rainfall and little frost), the same acre of maize may be worth roughly KES 
40,000 (€400), and the six acres KES 240,000 (€2,400). The sale of Irish potatoes, 
which usually mature within 90 days under favourable conditions, could attract as 
much as KES 480,000 (€4,800) from the six acres.  
Apart from the productivity of farmland through the sale of produce, landowners are 
making money through leasehold arrangements. In Enoosupukia, landowners usually 
lease an acre of farmland for a year at a minimum of KES 6,000 (€60). Therefore, the 
disputed six acres, when leased, could earn a landowner KES 36,000 (€360) in one 
year. This money can pay school fees for a child in a local secondary school for two 
years. Therefore, land is valuable as an asset for speculation, as collateral for loans, 
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and when leased for commercial agriculture, or farmed for food. A landowner may 
also decide to build rental houses on his land.  
Based on these calculations, one can infer the importance of land ownership today, 
the motivation to appropriate land, and the reasons why actors take land disputes 
more seriously than before. Tenure disputes threaten inheritance and the survival of 
a family and its generations (as discussed in the conclusion).  
Apart from the economic benefits, there are several social benefits associated with 
land ownership in the studied area. Due to continued land-use change and the 
market economy, most Maa-speakers increasingly take land ownership to be an 
important form of wealth, an asset to complement livestock. Land is also replacing 
livestock in matters of inheritance and, sometimes, as payment for bridewealth 
(Campbell, 1993). Indeed, ownership of large tracts of land increasingly defines the 
“success” of a man and determines the number of wives and the size of his family – 
putting in mind such needs as food and education, among others.  
Additionally, Maasai landowners engage in leaseholds to broaden social ties and to 
create alliances that are often driven by mutual benefits with “outsiders” as discussed 
in Chapter 5. Therefore, the majority of Maa-speakers, just like their Kikuyu 
counterparts, are keen perhaps more than before to accumulate more land. Similarly, 
they utilize all means available at their disposal to claim land and to win related 
cases, even if it calls for reference to autochthony or by remaining on lands already 
claimed by others. There are also situations where Maa-speakers have sold their 
livestock to finance court cases and/or to influence the justice system in favour of 
ownership rights to land. 
 
The important lesson, from the discussed land ownership dispute, is that actors are 
increasingly refraining from the use of violence or negative ethnicity to claim land. 
Though a lengthy and costly process, and in spite of the unpredictable nature of the 
outcome of the ongoing dispute, the situation has been peaceful and there was little 
possibility that this particular dispute would arouse interethnic tensions. The matter in 
dispute has remained fairly at an interpersonal level.  
Such cases are not new to the studied area. There is possibility that they will 
continue to generate concerns over peaceful relations in the future. The risk of 
violent conflicts is undoubtedly high under such situations, but the studied 
communities are hopeful particularly when they compare the present situation to 
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earlier periods when such small-scale interpersonal disputes easily transformed into 
large-scale intergroup conflicts. With respect to the studied case, the formal justice 
system may not necessarily guarantee justice (as defined by the disputants), in the 
long run, and may interfere with future relations between the two households and, 
perhaps, those of their friends, or associates.  
Nevertheless, land disputes have created opportunities for institutional development 
and tenure transformations where those possessing handwritten sale-of-land 
agreements are finding ways to gain title deeds in a bid to protect their tenure rights. 
However, the government can only prepare title deeds after the Lands Ministry in 
Narok has successfully heard and determined the over three thousand land-related 
cases (objection cases). 
Despite such challenges, there is unwavering purchase of land and agricultural 
intensification in the studied area and its environs. After the subdivision and 
privatization of a communally owned land or family land, landowners wishing to sell 
their holdings usually advertise such lands through their network of friends by word-
of-mouth. In 2014, while I was doing fieldwork, a group farm at Narasha near Maiella 
was subdivided amongst the Maasai owners. Surprisingly, individual owners 
immediately began to sell their holdings to other Maasai and non-Maasai people 
before they could apply for title deeds. In order to avoid possible dispute in the future, 
area chiefs, local peace committees, and Nyumba Kumi insist on sanctioning such 
land deals, but most people conclude them silently, privately, and informally anyway.  
 
Case 11 has described a situation where formal mechanisms of resolving disputes 
could deepen the problem rather than bring the anticipated solution. Case 12 (below) 
describes a more complex situation that threatens to degenerate into intra-or-
intergroup violent conflicts.   
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Case 12. Geothermal boom and conflicts in Olkaria and Narasha 
The following case study extends the previous discussion on the sale of a European-
owned ranch (Maiella Estate) to mainly members of the Kikuyu community in 1964 
soon after Kenya’s independence (see Chapter 3). It specifically focuses on the 
intragroup conflicts arising from the subdivision of this society land. The massive 
expansion of geothermal investments in Olkaria and Narasha, close to Maiella, in the 
last decade has rapidly changed the economic value of land in these rural areas and 
transformed the attitudes of Maasai and Kikuyu towards the once remote area. 
Funding for geothermal investments in the areas comes from multinational 
development partners like the World Bank and Africa Development Bank103. Such 
investments are framed by the ideas of Africa’s sustainable/green energy solutions 
driven by climate-change discourses and the Africa Renewable Energy Fund 
(AREF).  
The case study gives an example of the complexities that arise when the state, 
driven by global ideas and national economic prospects, installs investments in rural 
environments often with little concern over tenure arrangements and land-use 
patterns. The discussed disputes bring together powerful actors (mainly the state and 
Kenya’s electricity giant, KenGen) and local “powerless” actors (Maasai and Kikuyu). 
I will mainly focus on Narasha, which is shared by the two groups, and because it 
falls within the studied area. Here, the emerging disputes exceed the capacity of 
local peace committee, Nyumba Kumi, and the local administration. 
 
Background  
After independence, a group of Kikuyu farmers, the majority of whom had migrated 
from Central Province into the Rift Valley during the colonial era, bought Maiella 
Estate, a 16,338-acre farm from an Italian settler, perhaps oblivious of the fact that a 
portion of the farm had geothermal potential. They registered their farm in line with 
the Societies Act and henceforth named themselves Ng’ati Farmers’ Cooperative 
Society (as discussed in Chapter 3). The initial number of farmers who formed the 
society was 581.  
                                                          
103 See Kenya’s Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), www.renewableenergy.go.ke 
/index.php/content/38  
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Since 1968, the Maasai who lost the bid to purchase the farm began to claim 
indigenous rights to the land, claiming that their ancestors had not only used Maiella 
as a grazing area but the entire Naivasha area and beyond as well. In Chapter 3, I 
showed that the Maasai won a case filed against their eviction by Kikuyu from 
Maiella farm. Consequently, the court, which ruled in favour of historical injustices 
and marginalization, awarded the Maasai some 4,027 acres of Maiella farm, ending a 
two-decade court battle. Later on, a committee composed of Maasai and Kikuyu 
elders apportioned the 4,027 acres from Maiella Estate to the Maasai group. 
Afterwards, some of the Maasai elders supervised the subdivision of the land to their 
respective Maasai members. They earned themselves the title of directors.  
 
Subdivision of Ng’ati farm and ensuing wrangles  
A committee of nine Kikuyu directors was directly involved in the subdivision process. 
First, the directors subdivided Ng’ati farm (Maiella Estate) into three big chunks of 
land. The plan was to allocate each of the 581 society members with 2.5 acres of 
land in two of these chunks of land. In the third chunk of land, members would get a 
total of 5 acres each. This third chunk of land, with a total of 3,083 acres, is located in 
Narasha, an area straddling the Maiella-Narok border close to Olkaria, a hub of 
geothermal power generation in Naivasha.  
In the last five years or so, multinational investors and Kenya’s main electricity 
generating company, KenGen, have embarked on installing and expanding plants for 
exploitation of geothermal in Narasha, Olkaria and the Mt. Suswa areas. With the 
World Bank being the largest development fancier, Olkaria has become one of the 
largest single geothermal investment projects in the world and geothermal is now the 
largest source of electricity for Kenya104. KenGen’s Olkaria project alone is Africa’s 
largest steam development105. Ng’ati farm members believe that their directors must 
have known the geothermal potential of the 3,083-acre piece of land at Narasha 
because they were reluctant to subdivide it amongst the society members after 
subdivision of chunks 1 and 2. Before embarking on a discussion of this particular 
chunk of land, I will briefly focus on the local grievances arising from the subdivision 
of chunks 1 and 2 of Maiella Estate.  
                                                          
104 http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Kenya-eighth-largest-global-geothermal-producer-/-
/539546/2629336/-/fdrl5uz/-/index.html  
105 http://www.kengen.co.ke/index.php?page=business&subpage=geothermal&id=2  
281 
 
In Maiella, just like Enoosupukia, subdivision of land began around the mid-1970s 
and proceeded with few problems except for occasional interpersonal boundary 
disputes. However, problems emerged in the Ng’ati society when it occurred to 
members that the directors in charge of the farm had begun to sell land illegally to 
people who were not actual members of the society, and to gift the best lands to their 
close kin and friends.  
Such cases threatened to halt subdivision, but the clamour for individual property 
rights to land at the time added a lot of impetus to the desire for a conclusion of the 
subdivision process. After subdivision of chunk 2 of the Ng’ati society land, members 
complained that due to corruption in allocation of land their directors had increased 
the number of society members from the initial 581 to about 2,000, the majority of 
whom were new migrants of Kikuyu descent. This upsurge of new members and the 
corruption allegations became a cause of disagreement between the directors, 
genuine society members, and the new arrivals.  
Disgruntled Ng’ati society members began to call for a review of the subdivision 
process and for the eviction of “illegal” members. Informants noted that the directors 
had amassed a lot of wealth for themselves out of illegal land deals and, perhaps, 
established political connections with which to shield their dirty business, thereby 
making themselves almost untouchable.  
Nevertheless, some businesspersons and political hopefuls mobilized genuine Ng’ati 
members to seek formal legal assistance (through the court) against their directors. 
This came after Ng’ati directors failed to offer a possible solution to the burgeoning 
membership and the imminent land crisis.  
The land problem was exacerbated over time as some Ng’ati members began to 
subdivide and sell their own holdings to relatives, friends, and land-seeking clients. 
The presence of many new landowners caused an unwelcome dilemma, with the 
possibility of a review of the subdivision process. Moreover, some Ng’ati members 
had already died and the succession of land to their children had not been concluded 
– several objection cases to this effect were still waiting determination in Nakuru.   
The complications associated with a possible overhaul of the subdivision process 
were perhaps to the delight of society directors. However, since at least the 1990s, 
court cases between members of the Ng’ati society and their directors became 
commonplace. These subdivision cases persist to date.  
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“Our time to eat”: the Maasai and land 
Subdivision wrangles were not limited to Maiella. On the Maasai side, some elders 
who championed the court case leading to the award of 4,027 acres of land began 
the process of subdivision around the early 2000s. At the helm of the directors was 
John ole Linti, a former councillor. Nkampani village was one of the areas targeted 
for immediate subdivision. The 4,027 acres also included areas of Kimondi and Dry 
village, which were inhabited by some Maasai before the sale of Maiella Estate. 
However, unlike the Ng’ati farm, directors on the Maasai side had a fairly easy time 
during the subdivision process. The Kikuyu were a well-organized land-buying group, 
unlike the Maasai, who did not seem to have a specific number of claimants of the 
4,027 acres of land. Individuals and households, which actively raised funds through 
the sale of livestock to finance the court process, were considered the genuine 
owners of the land and thus accorded priority in the land subdivision.  
However, dozens of Maasai families migrated from other areas of Narok and Kajiado 
counties into Nkampani after word went around that their colleagues had won victory 
against the Kikuyu in court. The majority of these new comers thought that the court 
had returned the entire Maiella Estate to the Maasai community and were therefore 
hoping to get a piece of it. The agricultural potential of Nkampani village and the rest 
of Maiella Estate was an important pull factor for the majority of Maasai who wanted 
to practice proprietorship of the soil or to use the land for dry-season grazing. 
Some, like the family of my research assistant, Joseph Tome, came from as far away 
as Mosiro, which is close to the Tanzanian border. In Mosiro, the family has close to 
400 acres of land and hundreds of livestock. According Joseph, owning a piece of 
land with agricultural potential and closer to the urban was his father’s motivation for 
moving, which saw him bring one of his wives to Nkampani village.  
The majority of migrants were members of the Keekonyokie Maasai section, who 
took advantage of clan affiliation and social networks founded on pastoralism to seek 
land in Nkampani. Rarely would anyone turn them back, because clan affiliation 
enhanced collective claims to land. Therefore, after “losing” Maiella Estate to the 
Kikuyu, the Keekonyokie Maasai perhaps needed to establish a firm presence by 
recruiting new “arrivals” who could jointly protect their land whenever necessary (in 
court or elsewhere). Furthermore, those in the receiving area welcomed newcomers 
with the hope of exploiting possible opportunities for seasonal movement of livestock 
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to the sending areas, which would help to build resilience in the livestock economy 
against possible climate and environmental shocks and stress.  
A resident of Nkampani village noted, “The absence of a well-organized group of 
beneficiaries of the 4,027 acres of land gave Maasai directors the upper hand to 
allocate land to themselves, their kin, and close friends, as they deemed 
appropriate”. According to some beneficiaries of the 4,027 acres of land, the 
directors specifically allocated themselves land in some of the most suitable places 
for herding and cultivation, and sold land to new migrants. However, a system of 
“equitable” allocation of land saw directors subdivide the 4,027-acre piece of land 
into portions of 2.5 and 5 acres apiece for the residents. Some sections of the land 
remained undivided for several years; informants noted that directors transferred 
some of these portions to willing buyers, thereby making away with a fortune.  
Migrants in this Maasai-dominated area purchased land easily and cheaply, 
sometimes at KES 40,000 (€400) an acre. Often, they enjoyed the opportunity to own 
bigger chunks of land than those of long-term inhabitants. According to some, the 
directors worked on a “money-first” basis in preference of migrants. Just like the 
Kikuyu-owned Narasha area (discussed below), land subdivision disputes have 
increased in the Maasai portion of the former Maiella Estate.  
 
Narasha: geothermal-driven local claims to land 
The 3,038-acre piece of land at Narasha is of special concern to the present case. 
Many Ng’ati society members were too late to notice that Kenya’s electricity giant, 
KenGen, had expressed an interest in purchasing the land for geothermal 
exploitation. The society members I interviewed believed that KenGen expressed an 
interest in purchasing the land through area politicians who reached out to the 
society directors silently to discuss a price in either the late 1990s or early 2000s. 
This explains the reluctance of their directors to subdivide the land.  
Following the hopes of massive funding for green energy and the billions of shillings 
(see below) from the World Bank, Narasha (and Olkaria in general) grasped the 
attention of politicians in Nairobi and those of respective county governments of 
Nakuru and Narok. While the elite were considering ways that could allow them to 
partake in the green energy funds, dozens if not hundreds of herders of Maasai 
descent began to arrive with hundreds of livestock and to settle on or near the sites 
proposed for geothermal drilling, mainly at Kidong valley. Word went around that 
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KenGen was initiating a compensation plan for persons who because of the 
installation of geothermal plants would be relocated from their lands. Most new 
migrants wanted a piece of this “cake” and they were ready to put up structures at 
Narasha if only to be seen as genuine landowners. 
Sometime in 2013, it was clear to some Ng’ati members that KenGen would 
purchase the 3,038 acres of Narasha farm. According to some, their directors held 
“secret” meetings with KenGen to seal the deal. The directors, a few 
businesspersons from the area, and some politicians from Narok and Nakuru 
counties and KenGen officials allegedly attended these meetings. Ng’ati society 
members were excluded from such meetings, perhaps for fear that their participation 
would either stall or end the process prematurely. Ignorant members still hoped to 
get their share of 5 acres of Narasha farm.  
At least since 2007, KenGen together with multinational financiers (World Bank, the 
European Investment Bank, and Germany’s KfW) pumped billions of shillings into 
development of power plants in Olkaria106. In 2010, KenGen commissioned the 
development of phase II of Olkaria II station. In early 2015, KenGen was seeking 
$87m loan to expand its geothermal generation107. Much of this funding comes from 
the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) spearheaded by the World Bank’s Energy Sector 
Management Assistance Program (ESMAP). Ng’ati society members believe that 
part of KenGen’s KES 118.7 billion ($1.3 billion) set for Olkaria project108 was meant 
to purchase land with geothermal potential in Olkaria and Suswa area, including 
Narasha farm. 
The majority members of Ng’ati society did not know when the sale of Narasha farm 
happened. Since early 2015, the directors began to issue some KES 400,000 
(€4,000) to registered Ng’ati society members or their families. Many society 
members greatly welcomed the money and immediately began to use it. After all, 
their contribution to purchase Maiella Estate in 1964 was only KES 2,000 (€20) (see 
chapter 3). However, the fact that members were not involved in the transaction and 
the lack of clarity regarding the negotiation process for the land elicited strong 
reactions from a group of Ng’ati farmers who, led by some political hopefuls, began 
                                                          
106 http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/12/18/new-funding-to-boost-international-support-
for-geothermal-energy  
107 http://www.thinkgeoenergy.com/kengen-seeking-direct-loan-of-87m-for-70-mw-olkaria-
development/  
108   http://www.kengen.co.ke/index.php?page=business&subpage=geothermal&id=2  
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to strategize and plan the way forward. Hundreds of society members joined this 
bandwagon after spending their share – after the money was spent, some became 
conscious of a possible rip-off.  
Later on, rumours emerged that KenGen had paid only KES 505 million (€4.6m) for 
the 3,083 acres of land at Narasha. Except for those involved in the transaction, no 
one else could verify this amount. None of the members I spoke to had seen any 
bank documents or land transfer documents that would enlighten them about the 
transaction. The directors did not furnish members with such information. Worse, 
after the sale of Narasha farm, the directors concerned are said to have fled 
imminent chaos in Maiella, leaving their homes with a few relatives. Informants 
alleged that the directors bought themselves palatial homes and land in the up-
market area close to the shores of Lake Naivasha.  
After the sale of Narasha farm, at least two camps emerged from the Ng’ati society 
members. During my fieldwork in April and May 2015, the minority group supported 
the directors. Among these were family, friends, and associates of the directors. The 
other group was opposed to the transaction, arguing that the money “dished” to 
members was meant to “silence” them. Lost between the camps are masses who 
consist of the poor (financially and materially) and old members of Ng’ati society. The 
opposition, led by political hopefuls and businesspersons allied to Ng’ati society, 
estimated the value of the 3,083 acres at KES 2 billion (about €20,000,000) due to 
the geothermal potential and the current demand for land by multinational companies 
in the region.   
They also questioned the arithmetic behind the distribution of the alleged KES 505 
million to Ng’ati members, arguing that all 581 genuine members would have 
received an equal share of at least KES 800,000 (€8,000). The directors did not 
account for the rest of the money. A group of Ng’ati society members lamented that 
they did not receive their share of the KES 505m. Further, the opposing side argued 
that the KES 400,000 (€4,000) that some members received was only equivalent to 
the value of a quarter acre of land, while the directors should have paid each society 
member an equivalent of 5 acres of land. 
In May 2015, tensions mounted as increasing numbers of society members began to 
hold meetings meant to reclaim the 3,083 acres of Narasha farm from KenGen, 
vowing to use all mechanisms and institutions at their disposal. However, after 
previous experiences of slow and expensive court processes and the possibility of 
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powerful actors to manipulate the process through corruption or to weaken their 
claims, these disgruntled members decided to change tactics.  
Through the area Member of County Assembly (MCA) and other concerned actors, 
the Narasha case was brought to the attention of the parliamentary committee on 
land and the legal and justice committee composed of members of parliament. 
Members of these committees visited the area to assess the situation for further 
deliberation. However, this process proved to be slow as well, and the impatient 
Ng’ati members already suspected some possible mischief, perhaps because 
geothermal production was one of the “greatest” projects of the national government, 
and due to the international interests involved. 
In an interesting twist from the normal court processes, in May 2015, these members 
decided to seek an audience with the President at State House Nairobi, who 
coincidentally comes from the Kikuyu community. There is of course a challenge to 
this move. To seek audience with the President required Ng’ati members to amass a 
crowd worth the attention of the media and the public and perhaps to rely on political 
connections. Before I left the study area, some members were proposing to hire 
buses to ferry people from Maiella trading centre to State House, Nairobi. The 
intention was to arrive there in the numbers and possibly camp at the gates for days 
until they were granted an audience with the President to relay their grievances. This 
plan did not sit well with some people. 
Thereafter, it was rumoured that a local MCA aspirant interested in salvaging the 
situation for his future political ambitions was seeking the services of the outlawed  
Mungiki group to massacre the society directors and their affiliates. The rumours 
reached the area chief and other government officials in the area, who reported the 
matter to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Nairobi. Later on, the CID 
summoned the MCA aspirant to record a statement regarding the allegations, 
thereby thwarting any plans.  
In February 2016, after prolonged silence from the side of the government and from 
the society directors, Ng’ati members felt as if their claims were progressively losing 
weight and that it was time to act. Demonstrations at Maiella trading centre began 
slowly but transformed quickly and powerfully, leading to the closure of schools. For 
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several days, the schools remained closed and angry demonstrators torched houses 
said to belong to the directors or their affiliates109. Those targeted fled the area.  
Reacting to media reports and the state of insecurity, the head of the country’s 
security, accompanied by ministers and government officials, arrived in Maiella on 
2nd March 2016. The security chief nullified the deal between a land-buying company 
that had acted on behalf of KenGen. Further, his Ministry revoked 249 title deeds 
corruptly issued to non-members of the Nga’ti society and directed the CID to initiate 
legal action against the culprits in the land deals110. During the meeting with Nga’ti 
society members, Ferdinand Waititu, Member of Parliament of Kabete, accused 
some government officials of irregularly benefitting from the land (Maiella Estate) 
whose membership had risen from the initial 581 members to close to two thousand. 
If these assurances are anything to go by, there is possibility that Ng’ati society 
members will eventually get justice. However, this is not the first reaction from the 
state on similar matters – promises are made but they are seldom fulfilled.  
On the Maasai side, things are somewhat different. According to Christine Adongo, 
who did her PhD research at Olkaria, KenGen purchased land from some individual 
Maasai owners and relocated the latter from their traditional manyatta to modern 
concrete houses, which are served with electricity. Unverified claims hold that some 
Maasai sold each acre of land at KES 1 million (€10,000) by taking advantage of the 
geothermal “blessing”.  
The influx of Maa-speaking people into Olkaria still creates a possible problem for the 
geothermal companies. While some of these Maasai have grazed and lived in 
Kidong valley for many years, as discussed by Joseph Thomson in his 1883 travel 
notes (see Thomson, 1887), the majority are “new” migrants interested in the 
possibility of claiming historical land rights to the area and perhaps using this against 
KenGen’s plans. Indeed, in September 2014, a group of around 1,000 Maasai 
brought a case to Nakuru High Court claiming autochthony and ancestral rights to 
75,000 acres of land on which Kedong ranch stands. They also pleaded with the 
court to bar their possible eviction from the area by Kedong ranch and requested the 
                                                          
109 Daily Nation, February 10, 2016. “Protestors [sic] burn four houses in Naivasha in society land 
row”. 
110 Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, March 3, 2016. “Cabinet Secretary 
Joseph Nkaisserry Moves to Resolve Naivasha Land Crises” (http://www.interior.go.ke/?p=3074); 
Standard Digital, March 3, 2016. “State Cancels KenGen's Controversial Deal with Land Company”.  
 
288 
 
court to order KenGen to stop further geothermal development in “their” land111. The 
case is still ongoing as many more Maasai families migrate into the area.  
Things have also not been calm on the Maasai Nkampani side. Together with the 
new migrants of Nkampani and those in neighbouring Olkaria, the Maasai criticize 
their directors for grave misconduct and corruption during the land subdivision 
process. Some note with concern the increasing numbers of Maasai and non-Maa 
speakers who progressively purchased part of the 4,027-acre piece of land. Others 
still claim that the directors may have won the entire Maiella Estate from the Kikuyu 
in court but decided to sell the rest of it to Kikuyu Ng’ati farmers. Notably, there are a 
lot of uncertainties and misconceptions and people are learning to exploit these 
weaknesses.  
While the “battle” between the State, local elites, the powerful geothermal company, 
and local communities mounted, local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi were 
conspicuously missing in the “game”. The magnitude and complexity surrounding this 
land problem exceeds their power. It important to emphasize that the common media 
portrayal of “unending” violent conflict between Maasai and Kikuyu over Narasha and 
Olkaria is misleading. The branding of intracommunity disputes “ethnic conflict” 
circumvents real grievances with regard to land at the local level.  
In summary, the case study shows how local land claims play out in the context of 
contemporary large-scale investments – in this case, geothermal production in rural 
areas. Notably, however, the situation has been largely peaceful despite its potential 
to trigger violent conflicts.  
Themes emerging from the cases 
 
Several themes emerge from the described cases (case 1 – 12 above):  
1. History; 
2. Continuity/resilience;  
3. Risk management; 
4. Transformation;  
5. Generation/patriarchy; and  
6. Resistance  
                                                          
111 http://www.mashada.com/blogs/p/122450/ancestral-land-lawsuit-begins 
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The described cases and those analysed in Table 25 (appendices) take several 
forms: herder-farmer disputes, boundary disputes, marriage-related disputes, 
domestic fights, abusive language/slander, theft, and fights, among others. Above all, 
disputes do not always involve Maasai and Kikuyu – they are not always interethnic. 
Indeed, intragroup disputes feature more prominently in the studied area than 
intergroup conflicts. What messages can one draw from these cases? 
 
History: Most of the cases reveal that customary judicial institutions of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries still feature prominently in everyday life and in 
dispute resolution today. History therefore shapes and is shaped by contemporary 
dispute resolution, and the effects of this could inform the future. However, I argue 
that the attempt to “implant” innovations that are (superficially) shaped after 
customary law into an established body of norms, values, and constraints may create 
more problems that the intended solutions. For instance, local peace committees and 
Nyumba Kumi create new forms of stratification in society, and thus have the 
potential to disintegrate traditional institutionalized arrangements. Particularly, there 
is the likely danger of imposing formal rules on a traditional set-up, thereby damaging 
the state-community relationship. In somes cases, this grafting of newer institutions 
onto existing ones does not work.  
 
Disputes as continuity of ties/alliances: In virtually all studied cases, the 
disputants had good knowledge of one another before the dispute. They had either 
interacted or cooperated with one another in various ways – some were trading 
partners. While this does not necessarily guarantee a mutually acceptable 
settlement, it is crucial in bringing the disputing parties to negotiate and discuss 
peacefully, as demonstrated in the narratives. Notwithstanding the failure to broker a 
“sustainable” settlement, it may be rather problematic to assume that the occurrence 
of a dispute (automatically) erodes previous alliances, just as it is difficult to infer 
readily whether the outcome of a dispute (after a settlement) transforms the 
disputants’ attitudes towards one another for future peaceful relations.  
Generally, the described cases demonstrate the value of disputes in sustaining and 
maintaining alliances – that disputes and conflicts give society a definite formation 
(Simmel, 1904; Gluckman, 1955; Gulliver, 1963; Norbeck, 1963; Gregor and 
Sponsel, 1994). Indeed, the fact that alliances (such as those facilitating access 
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rights to land) are shaped alongside “mutual” expectation of benefits renders them 
somewhat “resilient”. This is because actors attempt to defend and protect them in 
order to continue benefiting from them, irrespective of the disturbances brought 
about by conflicts. They also become a potential bargaining tool, just as in any 
commercial firm where actors negotiate for various interests.  
 
Risk management: A good number of disputes arise from economic relations or 
transactions. Settlement of such disputes often contributes to risk management (or 
insurance) where an offender has to cover the financial losses of the plaintiff. 
However, the main problem here is how to measure the actual financial loss incurred 
(e.g., when livestock destroy a maize field). Obviously, this has the potential to 
generate more disputes. In most cases, the amount of loss is defined rather 
informally and is subject to different interpretations. Psychological harm (e.g. through 
slander), is even difficult to define as a “loss”. Nevertheless, actors still find ways to 
“quantify” psychological harm, and the offender may be asked to compensate the 
plaintiff with a female sheep or goat to make up for the offences. Similarly, such a 
settlement is possible following a fight in which blood is shed – in order to 
compensate for the lost blood.  
A good number of the cases also demonstrate a degree of cost-benefit analysis 
particularly within the patron-client relations, such as in the leasehold arrangements 
where landowners (patrons) transfer access rights to land-seeking clients. What 
starts as a patron-client relationship could easily transform into a principal-agent 
relationship as actors tailor their relationships towards mutual benefits.  
  
 
Transformation: Settlements vary depending on the nature of the dispute. Some of 
the cases listed in Table 25 (appendices) and a few of those described above are 
denoted “peaceful resolution”, meaning that said settlement played a role in 
reuniting, re-harmonising, and preserving amicable relations between disputants, as 
observed by Bonta (1996: 406). When the status of a case is designated “peaceful 
settlement” in the table, it simply refers to a mutual agreement, although the 
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settlement may not have necessarily transformed the attitudes of the disputants112. 
However, such categorisation is subjective and may therefore not give a clear 
scenario of the future of these settlements.  
Settlements that involve the exchange of livestock (e.g. case 9) are considered to 
hold a stronger symbolism of enduring peaceful relations than those involving 
money. While describing the significance of cattle as payment for bridewealth among 
the Nuer, Sharon Hutchinson (1996) made the distinction between the value of 
money and that of cattle. She notes, “Money has no blood”, implying that Nuer’s 
preference for cattle (“blood”) is necessary in constructing enduring relationships 
through bridewealth.  
 
Generation: This simply implies the crises of generational control in patriarchal 
societies brought about by modernisation. As shown in case 11, the younger 
generation defy the power and decisions of their elders (and parents) who gifted land 
to “outsiders” through customary alliances leaving the younger generation with little 
or no land on which to establish families. Moreover, they want to profit from the rising 
demand of land for commercial cultivation. Case 12, on geothermal exploration, also 
demonstrates the increasing value of local resources. Because most parents already 
subdivided and either sold, leased, or donated part of their holdings in the last 
several decades, patriarchal inheritance does not seem to promise enough land to 
the younger generation.  
Consequently, the younger generation challenge traditional authority, which they 
consider to be responsible for their present predicament. They then resort to 
attempts aimed at evicting the “outsiders”. Max Gluckman (1954) theorised similar 
behaviour as “rituals of rebellion”. He argues, “… these ritual rebellions proceed 
within an established and sacred traditional system, in which there is dispute about 
particular distributions of power… ”. He also suggests, “… these rebellions may 
perhaps be confined to situations where strong tensions are aroused by conflict 
between different structural principles, which are not controlled in distinct secular 
principles”. In chapter 4, I have described a similar case where Kikuyu women who 
                                                          
112 Additionally, as shown in Table 25, some disputes are designated as “ongoing”; to indicate that the 
resolution process had not been completed by the end of this study, while others are labelled “settled”, 
meaning that the LPCs, NKCs, or chiefs were still monitoring the situation after a settlement, at the 
time I left the study area. 
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are married in the Maasai society attempt to challenge patriarchy and the 
institutionalised aspects of Maasai culture that seem to conflict with Kikuyu norms, 
such as polygyny and “wife sharing”.  
 
Resistance: The focus here relates to the struggle of the “weak” against powerful 
actors – the local community members against the state and multinational 
corporations. In Case 12, members of a land-owning society resort to collective 
action in order to stop corrupt directors from selling a large parcel of society land to 
Kenya’s electricity giant, KenGen, by dubious means. The local community utilise 
collective action as a powerful weapon to protect their resources from powerful land 
grabbers. James Scott (1985) has theorised these forms of resistance as “weapons 
of the weak”. He suggests that such forms of peasant resistance are far more 
predominant, though usually “unseen”, than public protests.  
 
To conclude this chapter, it is important to emphasise a few points. First, the 
presence of disputes and violent conflicts in a social situation does not necessarily 
imply the absence of peace. Second, the way in which communities cope with 
violence and land disputes and respond to their damaging effects can be seen as an 
indication of their “resilience” (see Bollig and Anderson, 2016: 5). In the studied area, 
and with reference to the cases provided here, the disruptions and disturbances 
brought about by conflicts and disputes create opportunities for innovation of 
institutions. Such “resilient” responses are not entirely without hardships and 
constraints, but their continuous improvement, support, and application could 
encourage the transformation of violent situations into peaceful ones.   
The chapter also feed into the larger question that explores the impact of cross-
cutting ties in conflict situations. Certain conditions enable cross-cutting ties to 
prevent conflicts from getting out of hand, from becoming violent and from leading to 
a complete breakdown of social ties.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This ethnographic study has explored the role of cross-cutting ties and institutions in 
transforming a previously violent setting into a peaceful situation characterised by 
cooperation in land use and mutual social-economic dependence. It has focused on 
Maa-speakers (Dorobo, Ilkeekonyokie, and other sections of the Maasai) and 
migrants of Kikuyu descent who live together in the agro-pastoral borderlands of 
Maiella and Enoosupukia, located on the southern fringes of Lake Naivasha basin, in 
Kenya’s Rift Valley.  
Several questions that guided the study have been explored:  
With respect to the link between land, politics, and conflicts in the history of the 
studied area, the period between the early 1900s and early 2000s is considered 
(chapter 3). However, the fieldwork was closely focused upon the intermittent 
conflicts between the Maasai (Maa-speakers) and Kikuyu, which began from around 
the mid-1960s and transformed rather rapidly in the early 1990s into politicised 
violence. The violence accounted for the death of several dozen people and eviction 
of thousands of Kikuyu farmers from Enoosupukia. It also spread to other parts of the 
Rift Valley and affected other groups, in what appeared to have been an organised 
political strategy to “uproot” certain communities from lands perceived to belong to 
others. 
Two arguments are central in the discussion of intergroup relationships in the last 
century. First, conflicts over access to and control of grazing, farmland, and water 
points between Maasai and their neighbours are deeply rooted in the history of 
Kenya’s rangelands. Secondly, interdependent and peaceful relationships between 
these groups have also existed at least since their early contact with Europeans. 
Such relationships were strongly anchored on intergroup alliances, which 
necessitated various forms of exchanges and transfers: land, trade, adoption, cultural 
practices, and intermarriage, among others.  
Therefore, coexistence often preceded and succeeded periods of open conflict in the 
Rift Valley. Disruptions and disturbances caused by disputes and conflicts, I argue, 
were central in everyday negotiations over resource use. Together with the mutually 
beneficial relationships, they defined a social order marked by symbolic and adaptive 
responses to dynamic social-ecological systems. The formation of alliances helped 
the studied groups to navigate anthropogenic and naturally driven disasters, risks, 
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and uncertainties. Neither Maasai nor Kikuyu survived in isolation from one another. 
The twenty-first century has seen an increasing interpenetration of these past 
alliances, albeit with considerable changes.  
 
This brings me to the second question addressed in this study: To what extend do 
cross-cutting ties and the conflicting loyalties associated with them promote social-
economic interdependence and enhance locally contextualised forms of social 
control necessary for peaceful relations between Maasai and Kikuyu? To answer this 
question, several chapters have addressed linked themes that have been developed 
following the “life histories” approach: intermarriage (chapter 4), land transactions 
(chapter 5), livestock trade (chapter 6), and hairdressing in the Maasai/Kikuyu 
context (chapter 7). I will briefly attend to these themes below. 
 
On intermarriage and split allegiances  
Strikingly, intermarriages between Maasai and Kikuyu showed an upward trend, with 
Maasai men habitually marrying Kikuyu women – the period of violence in 1993 was 
no exception. Several reasons account for the disparities in intermarriage as well as 
its values (chapter 4). I argue here that rather than encouraging the formation of in-
group identities, intermarriage allows for “divided” identities, builds inter-group 
allegiances or conflicting loyalties, and necessitates cultural diffusion, which links 
communities together through internalized norms, values (e.g. circumcision, age-set 
system), and institutions.  
The conflicting loyalties associated with intermarriage encourage non-violent 
behaviour by providing room for negotiations and cross-cultural communication, 
which not only helps in the resolution of disputes but fosters social cohesion as well. 
Such loyalties are cemented through material and non-material exchanges and 
sharing. Therefore, intermarriage can be analysed as a potential instrument for 
minimising the possibility of conflict by reducing the notion of “us” versus “them”. 
However, marital ties and alliances might not necessarily obscure or erase lines of 
demarcation between groups, and may not stop the occurrence or escalation of 
conflict or violence, as shown in the discussion.  
Through intermarriage, Kikuyu land-seeking clients find opportunities to rent and, 
sometimes, purchase land from Maa-speaking in-laws and friends. A few Maasai 
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have gone ahead and adopted landless Kikuyu in-laws; some donate land to their 
Kikuyu in-laws, and others give them land as gifts for settlement and cultivation. 
However, land gifting and the symbolic apparatus attached to related traditional 
alliances are facing serious challenges from the younger generation. Nowadays, this 
younger generation (both Maasai and Kikuyu) is at pains to recover the lands that 
their parents either gifted or sold to “outsiders” over the last several decades. They 
are driven largely by the growing economic potential of land, and the need to build 
their own families and to defend inheritance rights for their offspring (case 11 and 
12). Through intermarriage, however, conflicting loyalties seem to enhance the 
protection of rights to land particularly for Kikuyu in-laws and their close allies in 
Maasailand.  
Moreover, intermarriage promotes trade between Maasai and Kikuyu friends and kin 
as actors maximise on the differential access to and control of resources (livestock, 
land, entrepreneurship, etc.). I emphasize here that trade, just like other forms of 
exchange between Maasai and Kikuyu, is not a new phenomenon – it is reminiscent 
of historical patterns. Thomson (1887) noted that the daughters exchanged during 
caravan trade between the two groups in the late nineteenth century later helped 
their new families to expand trading frontiers by, for example, breaking language 
barriers. There is therefore a notable form of historical continuity, which features 
prominently through intergroup relationships in everyday life in the south of the Rift 
Valley. What is interesting about contemporary alliances such as those emanating 
from intermarriage and cooperative use of land (discussed below) is the fact that they 
play out in rapidly changing social-economic situations and therefore tend to be 
commoditised more than ever before.     
The rather peculiar offspring of Maasai, Kikuyu, and Dorobo are central in the 
discussion on marriages (chapter 1, last part; chapter 4). Other people in the studied 
area refer to these offspring as nusu nusu (plural, manusu), a term derived from the 
Swahili word, nusu (half). The manusu not only embody conflicting loyalties of their 
parents and kin, but play an important role in facilitating rental land as well. The case 
study of Ole Sere’s farm provides an example.  
John Galaty (1993b) and Fredrik Barth (1969) posit that ethnic shifting through 
intermarriage or change of identity and the flexibility of social boundaries may not 
necessarily entail ethnic fusion. However, the special position occupied by offspring 
such as manusu deserves more attention in order to explain and possibly redefine 
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some popular assertions regarding ethnic identities and distinctions. Obviously, 
manusu align themselves with particular groups to protect patriarchal inheritance 
rights, but they have high regard for the conflicting loyalties of both kin that define 
them.  
 
On land transactions: the sharing of previously disputed land   
Scarce land resources have come into sharp focus in the last few decades following 
concerns over demographic pressure, privatisation and commodification of 
communally owned ranches, and the politicisation of resources and ethnic 
categories. Chapter 5 delved into these issues, particularly the cooperative use of the 
previously violently contested land resources between Maasai and Kikuyu. Almost 
every household in the studied area practices some form of cultivation, which usually 
serves both subsistence and commercial purposes, irrespective of the size of the 
farm. Growing populations in most parts of Kenya as well as the hundreds of 
thousands of flower farm workers at the agro-industrial hub in the Lake Naivasha 
area provide a ready market for food produce from the studied area.  
Through leasehold arrangements mainly involving Maa-speaking landowners and 
Kikuyu land-seeking tenants, agricultural intensification has profoundly changed and 
shaped the former communally owned ranches of the Maasai over the last few 
decades. In the discussion, I argue that leasehold arrangements have contributed to 
the colonisation of agricultural frontiers that were previously dedicated to livestock 
grazing. Here, the Kikuyus’ instrumental githaka system of control of land, which 
draws on kinship and friendship alliances, features prominently, although it does not 
go unchallenged. Some informants saw the githaka project as a form of “social 
engineering” whose facility, though well known, eludes possible strategies to control 
it.  
Nevertheless, leasehold arrangements constitute an important part of land sharing 
between landowners and landless clients. I argue that negotiations over access to 
land and the ensuing transfer of user rights from Maasai landowners to Kikuyu 
tenants makes land a shared rather than a contested resource. Land sharing and the 
accompanying material and non-material exchanges limit emotional forms of 
competition or collective claims to resources, and thus have the potential to reduce 
the possibility of conflicts.  
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Despite these values, land rentals and agricultural intensification constrain the free 
movement of livestock and undoubtedly reduce pasturelands. However, it would be 
misleading to make a general claim that these developments increase the 
vulnerability of the pastoral economy – yet many herders still hold this opinion.  
In the discussion, I have used the concept of “sedentary nomadism” to refer to 
situations where herders move livestock from the extensively cultivated areas with 
little or no pastures. Some herders engage in “sedentary nomadism” by hiring 
pastures in areas that are less cultivated away from “home”. Returns from leasehold 
arrangements afford some herders the opportunity to hire or purchase pasture and 
crop residue for their livestock within or outside their settlements. Others rely on 
kinship and friendship networks to exploit pastures away from “home”, and could 
engage in seasonal movement of livestock across several counties of Kenya (and 
sometimes into Tanzania), navigating borders, busy roads, urban spaces, and crop 
farms.  
A good number of poor herders graze by the roadsides, at the riverbanks or near 
water points, while yet others “steal” pastures in the “protected” Enoosupukia “forest”. 
In short, herders are increasingly engaging in a wide range of strategies in the 
attempt to ensure the survival of their livestock, while diversifying livelihoods through 
cultivation, trade, land rentals, and off-farm activities. Simply put, cultivation 
complements pastoralism. These adaptive responses are also subject to continuing 
changes in the refuge areas. Therefore, questions relating to the future of 
pastoralism under rapid ecological transformations, and whether current adaptive 
strategies are sufficient, remain unanswered.  
Furthermore, land renting and agricultural intensification account for new forms of 
dispute and conflict, most of which relate to the competing herder-farmer economies. 
Several cases have been described (Chapter 5 and 9).  
 
On livestock trade, and hairdressing 
Apart from intermarriage and land rentals, this study also revealed the value of trade-
related cross-cutting ties. Livestock trade (chapter 6) and hairdressing in the 
Maasai/Kikuyu context (chapter 7) are anchored in reciprocal exchanges, social 
capital, and joking relationships, which transcend the economic enterprise. The 
relationships and networks that arise from trade between the Maasai and Kikuyu 
298 
 
often develop into conflicting loyalties, where the values of respect and trust 
transform the economic space into a social space. Livestock trade in the studied area 
collapsed during the 1993 violence.  
However, the last two decades have witnessed a tremendous recovery of the once-
collapsed market. Livestock meat from Maiella is transported to the agro-industrial 
hub at Naivasha and to other markets. The Suswa livestock market is an equally 
important one. Here, traders load livestock onto trucks and then transport them to 
feed the rapidly growing populations of Narok, Nakuru, Giligil, Mombasa, and 
Nairobi, among others, and could even cross into Uganda.  
Generally, ties that are linked to marriage, leaseholds, and trade transcend the 
immediate reasons for which they are intended, and open up windows of opportunity 
in social exchange and economic transactions. While such exchanges are framed by 
desires to increase gains and avoid losses (Cook, 2001), they also have a 
fundamental socially cohesive effect. 
Credit relations in livestock trade, hairdressing, and in land rentals demonstrate the 
depth of trust and friendship between Maasai and Kikuyu actors. The social 
significance of relations that involve debt, credit, and reciprocity has been explored 
(Mauss, 1966; Gouldner, 1960; Peebles, 2010; Guérin, 2014; Wilkis, 2015). In the 
studied area, actors use debts and credit to create and/or cement friendship. This 
form of social capital is nurtured through indebtedness, and has the potential to 
reduce capitalistic forms of competition between the Maasai and Kikuyu and to 
enhance social solidarity.  
This study has revealed that debts and credit relations are the foundations upon 
which the local economy of the studied area thrives. In a different context, Guérin 
(2014) notes that credit relations also legitimise allegiance to creditors, and are 
therefore capable of producing hierarchy and domination. Notwithstanding such 
observations, debts and credit enhance reciprocity and non-obligatory sharing in the 
studied area, which is strongly integrated into the market economy and to everyday 
social-economic interactions. However, as shown in the examples (e.g. chapter 7), 
some debtors still find ways to manipulate creditors, the consequence of which 
interferes with the notion of trust.  
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On peacebuilding: Local peace Committees and Nyumba Kumi 
The last two questions that have been addressed in this study shift the focus of the 
discussion from the value of cross-cutting ties in conflict situations to peacebuilding, 
although both themes are intimately related: How are rules (institutions) innovated in 
the face of changing human-environment relationships? In what ways has the recent 
effort by the state to “implant” grassroots-level institutions affected the management 
of conflicts and crime, and under what circumstances can they contribute institutional 
support for peaceful conflict management and crime prevention?   
The discussion on peacebuilding (chapter 8 and 9) is primarily concerned with non-
violent conflict resolution at the grassroots levels. How do networks of relationships 
between Maasai and Kikuyu help to prevent and resolve disputes and conflicts 
without recourse to violence? The point of departure is an understanding that peace 
is not simply the absence of violence, but the capacity for and practice of nonviolent 
cooperation in the face of pertinent challenges.  
Disputes relating to land ownership, boundary alignment, herder-farmer cases, fights, 
and inheritance, among other issues, create opportunities for institutional innovation. 
In 2010, the state “implanted” local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi at the 
grassroots level and conferred on them the rights to handle specific conflicts and to 
prevent crime. Such developments were framed by ideas of decentralisation and 
delegation of responsibilities from the state to the community level. In the discussion 
(chapter 8), I relied on “co-management of conflicts” to theorise these developments.  
In the Kenyan context, co-management aims to encourage a cooperative framework 
between the state and non-state actors, including local community members (men, 
women, and youth), faith-based organisations, NGOs, and the civil society. While the 
agenda of “involving” the “community” in pertinent peace and security matters is 
necessary, the problem lies in its unrealistic nature and the complex and 
bureaucratic approach adopted (chapter 8). Consequently, there are serious 
complexities that threaten this state-community relationship and the devolved 
security and peacebuilding framework in Kenya and the studied area. Above all, this 
form of hybrid governance arrangement increases clashes between formal law and 
informal rules/constraints; it broadens gaps in bureaucracy; raises legitimacy 
concerns; and creates room for corruption, which is nested in both formal and 
informal institutions. While creating local peace committees and Nyumba Kumi, the 
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state also approached villages, villagers, and clusters of groups as homogeneous 
communities, with little consideration of the diversities in opinion, differential access 
and control of resources and economic/social power, social inequalities, and other 
differences. 
Despite these complexities, these neo-traditional institutions are gaining considerable 
presence in some rural areas by proving themselves useful in dealing with pertinent 
concerns, while in other areas they could end up causing more problems. In 
particular, the local peace committees are (superficially) shaped after social 
institutions deemed traditional. This gives the neo-traditional institutions some 
legitimacy because people consider them as a continuation of customary law and the 
authority of traditional judicial institutions, which applied traditional norms and values 
to “successfully” attend to grassroots-level conflicts in the last few centuries. 
Nowadays, such institutions represent the only hope for “justice” in many 
marginalised areas and in context-specific situations. Moreover, they are designed to 
handle context-specific matters that involve norms, values, and institutions that 
specific groups have internalised across time with reference to their environments 
and concerns (chapter 9). In some situations, however, the attempts to “formalize” 
indigenous judicial institutions creates confusion, outright rejection on the part of 
local communities, and fears of possible erosion of traditional norms and values that 
have historically defined social order.  
In the attempt to improve the effectiveness of local peace committees, the study has 
revealed how some Maasai groups attempt to integrate this neo-traditional institution 
into their overriding age organisation and belief systems. Maa-speakers have also 
progressively drawn their Kikuyu neighbours into the structure. The continued 
presence of Kikuyu in Maasailand has enabled them to appreciate Maasai norms 
and values of dispute resolution and to introduce their own mechanisms as well. The 
use of local languages (Maa, Gikuyu, and Swahili) creates space for discussion and 
negotiation, but this may not account for successful arbitration.  
Dispute resolution, as described in the cases in chapter 9, lead to various forms of 
settlement to make up for the offences committed: compensation (money and/or 
livestock), forgiveness, realignment of boundaries, warnings, and, sometimes, 
invoking the curse. Rarely can one guarantee a mutually acceptable settlement. 
Nevertheless, these informal mechanisms promise “instant justice” with regard to 
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matters in dispute, and usually attract lower transaction costs (money and time), as 
opposed to the formal dispute-resolution processes (in the courts).  
 
On the durability and effectiveness of cross-cutting ties and 
institutions  
 
How then can one measure the durability of cross-cutting ties and the effectiveness 
of local-level institutions? Can cross-cutting ties prevent the occurrence or spread of 
violence? Can the settlements brokered by local peace committees and Nyumba 
Kumi guarantee the transformation of attitudes between disputants and prevent the 
repeat of a dispute or conflict? What factors account for the formation and 
persistence of alliances? 
The “sustainability” of cross-cutting ties and social networks is difficult to determine. I 
am conscious that such ties may only be effective within limited temporal and spatial 
dimensions. They are also dependent on socio-political factors, which play out in 
specific communities and contexts. Current developments, however, provide room 
for some optimism.  
Institutions are necessary to prevent people from fighting each other (Darby, 2003). 
However, actors have the capacity to resist, oppose, and/or marginalise formal laws 
or unwritten constraints (see Foucault, 1982). Opposition, according to Simmel 
(1904), “gives us that feeling that we are not completely crushed in a relationship”. I 
regard the institutionalist perspective as necessary. However, I suggest that the 
perspective mostly aims to explain how violent activities can be brought to an end 
successfully.  
The interplay of formal and informal institutions in the nonviolent resolution of 
conflicts and peacebuilding is crucial. I am conscious that local peace committees 
and Nyumba Kumi are fairly recent innovations and are in many ways “incomplete”.  
There is room for continuous improvement and support. Currently, these local-level 
institutions have little power to enforce settlements. One strategy to do so has been 
to invoke the curse (chapter 9). Even so, these neo-traditional institutions may not 
stop the occurrence or escalation of conflicts or violence. In some cases, they fail to 
broker agreements between disputing groups. They are also vulnerable to 
manipulation by disputants and politicians, and could be used to politically influence 
villagers at the household level. 
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On the persistence of ties and alliances in multi-ethnic situations 
despite conflict and politicisation of landscapes 
What factors account for the formation and persistence of alliances in multi-ethnic 
situations despite conflict? The formation of alliances is largely motivated by several 
factors: economics, where individual and household are motivated by desires for 
economic welfare; demographic pressure and landlessness, where differential 
access to and control of resources creates room for negotiations and property rights 
arrangements that involve the transfer of access and user rights from landowners to 
landless clients; markets, where the demand for food produce and meat enhance 
cooperation between actors from different ethnic groups; and resilience, adaptation 
and risk management, where alliances act as safety nets against risks and 
uncertainties, while creating space for economic diversification.    
Therefore, I argue that ties and alliances in multi-ethnic situations could be thought of 
as strategies of appropriation of resources in the frontiers, driven largely by the 
pursuit of commodities and economic wellbeing. Obviously, there are inherent risks 
in this “game”, but actors take their chances anyway – some account for losses while 
others maximize returns and innovate ways to cope with such risks as conflicts and 
social-political dynamics. Alliances therefore tend to override other identities, 
especially where mutual benefits drive such associations. I argue that the formation 
of alliances in multi-ethnic settings indicates a form of historical continuity, which 
remains rather “undisturbed” despite the prevalence of ethnicised political 
economies. 
 
Lastly, following Gregor and Sponsel (1994), there is a need for researchers, 
particularly those focusing on the Global South, to go beyond the often spectacular 
incidences of “intercommunity” violence in order to understand systems of peace and 
nonviolence. The dominant narrative, “violent conflicts are socially and economically 
disruptive and contribute to the slow economic growth in Africa”, denies any role for 
agency in the non-violent resolution of local conflicts.  
Studies have indicated that disruptions, opposition, competition, and conflicts play 
important roles in supporting and maintaining society (Simmel, 1904; Gluckman, 
1955; Gulliver, 1963; Norbeck, 1963; Gregor and Sponsel, 1994). Simmel (1904: 
491) argues that harmony and disharmony, association and disassociation, are 
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aspects of social order, which all go toward making a society attain a definitive 
formation. Gluckman’s collection of essays, and particularly his 1955 work, “Custom 
and Conflict in Africa”, emphasise the socially integrative effects of expressions of 
conflict. His overarching idea is that expressions of conflict may lead to the re-
establishment of social cohesion and social control over time through customary 
allegiances and conflicting loyalties. 
Notwithstanding these observations, the focus has hitherto principally centred on 
explaining the causes of violent conflicts without serious consideration of post-conflict 
situations, or situations where prior violence turned into peaceful interaction. How 
communities cope with violence and respond to the damaging effects of disruptions 
and disturbances can be seen as an indication of their “resilience” (Bollig and 
Anderson, 2016: 5).  
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APPENDICES 
  
Table 23. Maiella Sub-location Census, 2009 
 
VILLAGES 
 
HOUSEHOLDS 
 
      MALE 
 
       FEMALE 
 
        TOTAL 
DRY A 48 89 115 204 
DRY B 120 274 303 577 
DRY C 116 247 239 486 
TANK MPYA 134 267 292 559 
KAHUMBU 47 89 115 204 
GITAMAIYU 122 243 307 550 
YATTA 104 207 224 431 
KAHUHO A 75 158 165 323 
KAHUHO B 77 159 173 332 
MAIELLA C I 112 156 178 334 
MAIELLA C II 165 280 286 566 
MAIELLA C III 104 163 230 393 
MAIELLA C IV 130 262 246 508 
GOIGOI 143 288 304 592 
MUKURU-UTUKU 104 201 262 463 
KAWANGWARE 141 279 317 596 
KOKOTI 109 245 260 505 
NKAMPANI 286 820 795 1615 
 
TOTAL 
 
2, 137 
 
4, 427 
 
4, 811 
 
9, 238 
(Source: KPHC, 2009) 
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Table 24. Ego-centred questionnaire: Maiella and Enoosupukia 
 
1. Suppose you need to borrow Unga (maize meal) or a Jembe (hoe). Who would you ask 
to lend you these sorts of things? 
2. Suppose you need to rent land to cultivate for some time. From whom would you ask for 
the land? 
3. If you wanted to buy a plot of land, who would be the most likely person to consult on this? 
4. Suppose you need someone to help you construct your wooden or corrugated iron house, 
or someone to repair it. Who would you ask for this kind of help? 
5. Suppose you need help to fill forms for a bank loan, or to fill an application form for your 
identity card. Who would you ask for help with such problems? 
6. Most people from time to time discuss business or other money-making activities with 
others. Looking back over the last six months, who are the people with whom you discussed 
matters important to you? 
7. Suppose you need to move from here to live in another place. Who would you ask for 
advice on such a major decision in your life? 
8. Suppose you have Malaria and must stay in bed for a couple of days. Who would you ask 
to take care of you or to help in some of your daily activities? 
9. Suppose you need to borrow some money. Who would you ask? 
10. Suppose you have a serious marriage or relationship problem with your partner which 
you cannot discuss with him or her. With whom would you talk about such problems? 
11. Suppose you are feeling depressed and you want to talk to someone about it. With whom 
would you talk about such problems? 
12. With whom would you go to the market once in a while or go for parties? 
13. With whom do you have contact at least once a month, by visiting each other to chat? 
14. If violence was to start (as it did in 1993) and you need someone to take care of you, 
your children or your property. Who would you ask for such help? 
15. Suppose you lose your land due to violence, who would you ask for help to stay in their 
house? 
16. Is there anybody else who is important to you, not mentioned so far? In-laws, relatives, 
or friends who are important to you? 
 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
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Table 25. Summary of dispute resolution in Maiella and Enoosupukia (2014-2015) 
Note:  
1. As shown in the table, the resolution process of particular disputes went through several 
stages, which are indicated as 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, depending on the number of stages or 
attempts in which disputants engaged respective LPCs, NKCs, chief and elders, or police in 
the resolution process. 
2. It is important to emphasize that actors handled almost all disputes peacefully – none of them 
degenerated into large-scale conflict. In the 1990s, such small-scale disputes could easily 
arouse intergroup violence with dreaded effects. This change may be an indication of restraint 
from violence, or perhaps the transformation of attitudes towards violence and negative 
competition.  
3. Local Peace Committee is abbreviated “LPC”; Nyumba Kumi Committee, “NKC” 
Disputants Village Matter in dispute Institution(s) and 
attempts at 
settling the 
dispute 
Settlement and status  
Kikuyu 
Family 
members 
Maiella 
trading 
centre 
Boundary dispute 
over family land 
 
Chief 
Boundary realignment with the help of a 
surveyor 
 
Status: peaceful resolution  
 
 
 
Kikuyu 
neighbours 
 
 
 
Kokoti 
 
 
Dispute over 
destruction of crops 
by livestock 
 
 
1st: NKC 
2nd: Police (Maiella) 
3rd: NKC and 
police 
1st:  The defendant was warned 
2nd: The police ruled in favour of the  
       Defendant. The plaintiff accused the  
       defendant of influencing the decision     
       by paying a bribe.  
3rd: Police referred the plaintiff to Kongoni  
       police station (the Divisional station) 
 
Status: The plaintiff did not pursue the   
              matter further for fear of  
              transaction costs. 
 
Kikuyu 
neighbours 
 
Maiella 
trading 
centre 
 
A cow destroyed 
crops on  
neighbour’s farm 
 
1st: NKC 
2nd: NKC 
1st: The defendant was warned 
2nd: Disputants were advised to fence their  
       respective parcels of land to control 
       movement of livestock. 
 
Status: NKC officials were  
             still monitoring the situation when I  
             left the study area.  
 
 
 
 
Kikuyu 
couple in a 
Maasai 
village 
 
 
 
 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
 
 
 
 
 
The wife reported 
domestic violence to 
her LPC 
 
LPC officials 
(Maasai) sent the 
Kikuyu woman 
back home to try 
to settle the matter 
with her husband.  
This is common in 
the Maasai society 
where patriarchy 
plays a crucial role 
in conflict 
resolution between 
a couple. One may 
understand this 
form of violence as 
symbolic (see 
 
A week later, LPC officials saw the husband 
and wife together on their farm. The officials 
saw it as a sign of peace between them. 
 
Status: Later on, the wife told us that she 
             had forgiven the husband. She also  
             admitted to having wronged him by  
             “disrespecting” him. On further 
              interrogation, it was revealed that 
              the LPC would have threatened  
              her with a curse if she decided to    
              run away to her matrimonial home.  
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Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maasai 
in-laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nkampani 
 
 
 
 
A marriage dispute 
between “in-laws” in 
which a Maasai 
teenager eloped to 
her Maasai 
boyfriend’s house.  
 
 
 
 
1st: Chief (Maiella) 
2nd: NKC 
3rd: Police(Maiella) 
– Following a  
   bloody fight  
   between youth  
   from both sides 
4th: Police   
      (Kongoni) 
5th: NKC 
6th: NKC 
1st: The girl’s parents rejected a marriage  
       proposal; the chief ordered the girl  
       to return to her parents to allow for 
       negotiations between the two families. 
2nd: The girl’s parents refused to discuss  
       the matter with the man’s parents 
       owing to long-standing rivalry between 
       the two families. 
3rd: Police referred the case to Kongoni  
      police station for possible resolution. 
4th: Police accused the girl’s parents of  
      initiating a fight between youth from  
      both sides. Fearing prosecution, the  
      girl’s parents requested police to refer 
      the matter back to their NKC. 
5th: In a sitting attended by dozens of  
      villagers, the NKC ruled in favour of the  
      girl’s parents and ordered the parents of  
      her suitor to compensate the youth  
      injured in the fight with KES 100,000 
      (€1,000) and a sheep.  
     The sheep was meant as payment for  
      the bloodshed in the fight.  
      Based on my understanding, such a  
      ruling was meant to appease the girl’s  
      parents and to prepare grounds for  
      marriage negotiations thereafter. In fact,  
      it was youths from the girl’s side who 
      started the fight. 
 
6th: Parents from both sides held peaceful  
      talks and the girl’s father blessed the  
      couple to revoke a possible curse in  
      marriage. They later began to negotiate 
      payment of bride wealth. 
 
Status: peaceful resolution 
 
 
 
 
 
Maasai 
livestock 
broker and 
a Kikuyu 
butcher 
 
 
 
 
 
Maiella 
trading 
centre and 
Sakutiek 
 
 
 
 
 
The Maasai sold 
stolen sheep to a 
Kikuyu butcher  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st. Police (Maiella) 
2nd: Family of the  
      seller and that  
      of the plaintiff  
 
1st: Police arrested the Kikuyu butcher 
      following a complaint from the owner of  
      the sheep. The Maasai livestock trader  
      had travelled and so the only  
      accomplice to the alleged theft was the  
       Kikuyu butcher.  
2nd: Both Kikuyu butcher and the Maasai 
       trader paid a bribe to police and the  
       former requested police to refer the  
       case back home (at the household  
        level) to be handled by the 
       trader and the family of the plaintiff.  
       It was revealed that a member of the 
       plaintiff’s family had sold the  
       sheep to the Maasai livestock trader. 
        
 
Status: The plaintiff (owner of the sheep) 
             was compensated for his loss.  
    1st: The plaintiff (pupil’s parents) demanded 
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Maasai 
pupil and 
her teacher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
 
 
 
 
 
A case in which a 
teacher was 
accused of 
impregnating his 
pupil  
 
 
 
 
 
1st: LPC  
2nd: LPC and  
      head teacher  
      and a medical 
      doctor  
3rd: LPC;  
  head teacher; 
District Education 
Officer (DEO) 
4th: LPC 
      that the defendant (teacher) be 
      arraigned in court to answer to the 
      charges.  
2nd: A medical doctor ran pregnancy tests in 
       the school and two more pupils were 
       found to be pregnant. 
3rd: The matter was referred to the DEO.  
      The DEO distanced himself from the  
     case noting that the teacher was not a  
     government employee. He had been  
     recruited through the Parents-Teachers  
     Association. The DEO referred the case  
      back to the LPC and advised them to  
      report such a matter to the police.  
4th: The LPC invoked the 
      curse to identify the males responsible  
      for the pregnancies of three pupils.  
      Fearing the effect of the curse, two men  
      came forward and begged the LPC for  
     mercy. The one responsible for  
     impregnating the pupil in question did 
     not come forward.  
      Supernatural power caused  
      the death of the baby at birth, a sign 
      that the teacher was not responsible for  
      the pregnancy after all. 
        
Status: According to the LPC, this was a  
       peaceful settlement. However, the  
       externalities associated with curses  
       contravene various aspects of formal  
       law, including the possibility of death. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LPC 
member 
and a 
primary 
school 
teacher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The LPC member 
broke into and stole 
household items 
from the teacher’s 
house when schools 
were closed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st: LPC  
2nd: LPC and head  
        teacher 
3rd: LPC,  
      head teacher  
      and the DEO 
 
1st: The offender pleaded guilty and  
       requested to be forgiven because he  
       was drunk at the time of the incident. 
       He agreed to replace the stolen items  
       with new ones and to repair the head  
       teacher’s house after the damage  
       caused. The LPC voted for his removal 
       from office due to the offence.  
        
2nd: The offender requested more time to 
        fulfil his earlier promise – an extension 
        was granted.  
3rd: The offender ran away from the village  
       never to be seen again. The committee  
       advised the DEO and police to arrest  
       him on sight for criminal procedure. 
 
Status: The offender was still at large by  
             The time I left the study area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kikuyu 
siblings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mpeuti 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A sister accused a 
brother of grabbing 
 
 
 
1st: LPC 
2nd: Human rights 
       group 
3rd: LPC and 
      District Officer  
 
1st: The LPC referred the case to a human  
       rights group in the area 
2nd: The human rights group referred the  
       case back to local peace committee,  
       noting its own inability to understand    
       local land matters. 
3rd: In a sitting presided by the LPC, the  
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land belonging to 
their mentally 
handicapped brother 
 
 
 
     (DO) 
4th: Human rights  
      group 
5th: LPC and  
      human rights  
      group 
 
      defendant pleaded guilty. The LPC  
      secretary drew an agreement of the 
      settlement, which was signed by all  
       family members in presence of the  
       DO who legitimized it.  
 4th: Later on, the defendant approached 
       the human rights group and accused  
       his sister of intending to grab the  
       land in question. The group requested  
       assistance from the LPC regarding the  
      new developments.  
5th: The committee warned the defendant  
      against using malicious ways to try to  
      evict his sister from the compound.  
 
 
Status: The LPC was still monitoring the  
             issue at the time of the study.  
 
 
 
Kisii and 
Luo tenants 
 
 
 
 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
 
 
 
 
The tenants rented 
farmland from a 
Maasai. A fight 
ensued when the 
two disagreed over 
their boundary of 
their rented plots  
 
 
 
1st: LPC 
2nd: LPC 
 
 
 
1st: The defendant (Kisii farmer) did not  
      show up for a meeting organized by the  
      committee. 
2nd: After a second failed attempt, the  
      committee wrote the defendant an  
      eviction letter to vacate the village and  
      the rented plot of land due to his bad 
      behaviour – he complied, fearing a  
      possible curse for disobeying the  
      directive.  
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
 
 
Nusu nusu 
and a 
Maasai 
migrant 
 
 
 
 
 
Mpeuti 
village 
 
Nusu nusu 
(offspring of Maasai 
& Kikuyu) reported 
that a migrant 
Maasai had grabbed 
his land 
 
 
 
1st: District Officer 
      (DO) 
2nd: LPC 
 
1st: The DO referred the case back to the  
       jurisdiction of the LPC. 
2nd: The committee ordered the defendant  
       to vacate land. Disputants signed a 
       written agreement to the settlement in 
       the presence of community members  
       as witnesses. A copy of the signed  
       agreement was sent to the DO.  
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
 
 
Kikuyu and 
Maasai 
neighbours 
 
 
 
Mpeuti 
 
 
The Kikuyu engaged 
in unauthorized 
logging on the 
Maasai neighbour’s 
land 
 
 
        
 
 
 
       LPC 
The defendant admitted his guilt and the 
plaintiff demanded €500 as compensation. 
After negotiations chaired by the LPC, the 
defendant was ordered to reimburse the 
plaintiff’s transport costs incurred attending 
to the matter in dispute, and to plant 100 
trees on the defendant’s land as 
replacement for the cut trees. The 
defendant was also ordered to care for the 
planted trees.  
 
Status: Peaceful resolution – the 
             neighbours are still friends  
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Kikuyu 
household 
 
 
Maiella 
trading 
centre 
 
 
An unknown person 
stole households 
items  
 
 
 
NKC 
The NKC initiated efforts to find the 
offender but were not successful. In this 
Kikuyu-dominated area, actors rarely 
invoke the influential curse to smoke out 
offenders.  
 
Status: the offender was still at large by the 
       time I left the study area.  
Kikuyu 
neighbours 
(women) 
Maiella 
centre 
Abusive words: The 
plaintiff told the chief 
that the defendant 
called her a 
“nothing” after a 
confrontation over 
livestock straying 
into each other’s 
farmland.  
1st: Chief 
2nd: Chief 
1st: The chief warned the defendant against  
      use of abusive language 
2nd: In a second hearing, the chief and 
elders advised the disputants to fence their 
land to prevent future problems.  
 
Status: The chief requested the NKC of  
             Maiella trading centre to monitor 
             the situation 
A group of 
Kikuyu 
women 
Kokoti One women 
accused her six 
friends of 
badmouthing her  
Chief The chief warned the defendants against 
use of abusive language. The secretary to 
the chief drew an agreement that was 
signed by all participants as a commitment 
not to repeat such an offence.  
 
Status: settled 
Kikuyu 
teenage 
couple and 
the girl’s 
parents 
Maiella 
centre 
The girl eloped to 
live with her 
boyfriend. Later the 
parents traced her 
whereabouts to him 
and notified the 
chief 
Chief The teenagers notified their parents that 
they were in love and did not want to end 
the relationship. The parents mutually 
agreed to allow them to marry. 
 
Status: peaceful resolution 
 
 
 
Kikuyu 
disputants  
 
 
 
 
Maiella 
 
 
 
Purchase of a stolen 
table 
 
 
 
 
 
1st: Police (Maiella) 
2nd:Police (Maiella) 
3rd:Police (Maiella) 
4th: NKC and  
      police (Maiella) 
 
 
 
1st: The defendant told police that she was 
       not an accomplice to theft. She bought  
       the table from the accused without 
       confirming its actual ownership. She  
       demanded reimbursement from the 
       mother in-law of the seller (the  
       plaintiff in this case)  
2nd: Police persuaded the defendant to  
       surrender the table to the plaintiff and 
       promised to pursue her money from the 
       seller – she surrendered the table 
3rd: Police arrested the seller but released 
      him after a while when no one showed 
      up to his aid. His release, according to  
      the police, would allow him to look for  
      the money as opposed to his stay in  
      their cells.  
      One week later, offender disappears 
4th: Suspecting mischief, the defendant  
      reported the matter to her NKC who, 
      after meeting with the police, agree to 
      auction the seller’s household items to 
      recover defendant’s money  
 
Status: I left the study area before  
          conclusion of this matter. 
Kisii tenant 
and a 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
Donkey beating   
LPC 
The defendant (the Kisii tenant) begged for 
forgiveness from the plaintiff.   
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Maasai 
neighbour 
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Kikuyu 
tenant vs. 
Maasai 
herder 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
Herder-farmer 
conflict: The tenant 
drove the livestock 
to the police station 
at Maiella trading 
centre after he 
found them 
destroying his crops.  
1st: Police (Maiella) 
2nd: LPC  
1st: The police referred the case to LPC for  
      possible resolution;  
2nd: After negotiations between LPC and  
      disputants, the LPC ordered the  
      defendant to pay monetary  
      compensation for the loss 
 
Status: settled peacefully  
 
Maasai old 
woman and 
youth vs. 
community 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
The confrontation 
involved an older 
woman whose 
appetite for sexual 
affairs with young 
men was getting out 
of hand 
 
1st: LPC 
2nd: LPC 
3rd: LPC 
4th: LPC 
1st: The officials warned the woman and her 
       lovers to stop their immoral behaviour 
2nd: The second warning involved the threat  
      of a curse if the offenders did not  
      adhere to the advice of the committee 
3rd: The committee in solidarity with  
       villagers pronounced the curse upon  
       the offenders 
4th: The curse took effect: one offender 
      begged for mercy after experiencing 
      what villagers believed to have been  
      supernatural punishment. Male youths  
      of his age set revoked his curse through 
      ritual repass. He then joined church 
      service and dedicated his life to Christ  
      and to the service of God.  
      The older woman defied the orders of  
      the committee, and her supernatural  
      injuries still caused her a lot of pain 
      during fieldwork.  
 
Status: Peaceful settlement 
Nusu nusu 
and a 
Maasai 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
Nusu nusu 
(offspring of Maasai 
& Kikuyu) farmer 
brought a truck to 
carry food produce 
from her farm. A 
Maasai neighbour 
denied the driver 
access through his 
farm, which was the 
only way to access 
the farm.  
LPC The LPC convened a meeting to resolve 
the standoff. After deliberations, they urged 
the Maasai to exercise good 
neighbourliness, as was the norm during 
harvesting periods. Eventually the 
committee resolved the deadlock without 
any payment of fees 
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Kikuyu 
tenant  and 
a Kisii 
tenant 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
Debt 
 
 
1st:LPC 
2nd:LPC 
3rd: Police  
      (Maiella) 
1st: The defendant insisted that he already 
       repaid the debt by working on the  
       plaintiff’s land but the latter denied the 
       allegations. The committee told the  
       disputants to present evidence or  
        witnesses to support their case 
2nd: The plaintiff brought a handwritten  
       agreement which was quickly faulted 
       by defendant and null and void. The 
       committee demanded for more  
       evidence but none was forthcoming.  
3rd: The plaintiff decided to take the  
       matter to the police. After a series of  
       payments of police bribes to sustain  
       their cases, the disputants mutually  
       agreed to drop the case after suffering  
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       serious transaction costs that already  
       superseded the initial debt 
 
Status: peaceful settlement 
Nusu nusu 
and a 
Maasai 
neighbour 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
Boundary dispute: 
The plaintiff was a 
member of the LPC. 
The nusu nusu is 
offspring of Maasai 
and Kikuyu 
LPC The committee sought the services of a 
surveyor to realign the boundary. The 
plaintiff was found guilty of similar offences 
and members unanimously voted to remove 
him from office 
 
Status: Peaceful settlement 
Kikuyu and 
Kamba 
(women) 
Olosho lole 
Kaloi 
Fight over a man 
(both women rent 
farmland in the 
village) 
1st: Police (Maiella) 
      and LPC 
2nd:Police (Maiella) 
3rd:Police (Maiella) 
1st: The committee and police ordered the  
      defendant to settle an outstanding  
      hospital bill for the injuries she caused  
      to the plaintiff 
2nd: There was a repeat of confrontations  
       thereafter and police arrested the  
      defendant and her husband whom the  
       women were fighting over 
3rd: The plaintiff requested police to pardon  
      the two and to release them; she paid 
      their bond for release and withdrew the 
      case against them 
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Nusu nusu 
vs. Maasai 
neighbour  
(women) 
Mpeuti These neighbours 
fought over grazing 
in each other’s land  
(Nusu nusu is 
offspring of Dorobo 
& Maasai) 
LPC The committee refereed the women back to 
their husbands and warned them not to 
present similar grievances without passing 
them through their husbands for possible 
resolution  
 
Status: the committee assumed that the  
       matter was put to rest when it did not  
       resurface   
Son and his 
stepmother  
Mpeuti The man did not 
want to recognize 
his father’s second 
wife as the heir to 
family property 
although she 
already had children 
(sons) with the dead 
husband  
 
LPC Before the burial of the household head, the 
committee sought the services of a 
surveyor to subdivide the land (16 acres) 
equally between the wives. Officials also 
supervised fencing of the two parcels. They 
directed youth to dig a grave for the dead 
man on the boundary of the two plots of 
land as a permanent marker that subdivides 
the two households. The committee then 
threatened the defendant with a curse if he 
insulted or mistreated his stepmother.  
 
Status: the matter did not resurface  
Kikuyu 
couple 
Mpeuti Marital dispute 
The wife found out 
that the husband 
was having an affair 
with a Turkana 
woman. She 
claimed that the 
husband was 
mistreating her and 
beating her up so 
that she could leave 
the home, in order 
1st: LPC 
2nd: LPC 
1st: The committee warned the man not to  
      mistreat his wife and to respect his  
       marriage 
2nd: Things got worse. The man decided to  
       divorce his wife for the Turkana lover 
       who allegedly began to beat him up  
       over alcoholism. Attempts to initiate  
       dialogue between the first wife and the  
       husband failed.  
       
 
Status: Villagers said that the man and his  
        Turkana lover disappeared to Turkana 
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to pave the way for 
the new lover 
         (northern Kenya) and have not been  
         seen since. With the help of the  
         committee, the first wife became the  
         custodian of the man’s land. 
            
Maasai 
couple 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
The wife lost money 
for shopping and 
was afraid to tell the 
husband in person. 
She asked for help 
to do so from a male 
age mate of the 
husband 
Age mates 
(emerues) 
The age-mate of the husband accompanied 
her to the husband and explained that she 
had lost the money. He then apologized on 
her behalf and promised to pay the lost 
money if the husband promised not to 
punish the wife. 
 
Status: peaceful resolution 
Maasai 
couple 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
Marital dispute and 
the wife ran to the 
husband’s male 
age-mate 
Age-mates 
(emerues)  
The age-mate of the husband took the wife 
back home. He listened to complaints from 
both sides and found both of them guilty. 
He then warned them against bringing 
shame to the group in the form of unstable 
marriages.  
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Maasai 
youths 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
Fight 
 
 
1st: An elder  
2nd: Youth age- 
       mates  
1st: The elder found them fighting and  
       stopped the fight and settled the matter 
2nd: Age-mates of the two called them 
       for a meeting and warned them to stop 
       spoiling the group’s loyalty by  
       appearing as a divided lot in the eyes  
       of the villagers.   
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Kamba 
pupil and a 
Maasai 
youth 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
A case of teenage 
pregnancy  
 
 
1st: Age-mates  
2nd: Age-mates 
3rd: Age-mates 
4th: Age-mates 
1st: Age-mates ordered the Maasai youth to 
      marry the teenager 
2nd: The age-mates proceeded to seek  
       blessing for a marriage from the  
       teenager’s parents but her father  
       rejected the request.  
3rd: The age-mates resolved to slaughter  
       a sheep for the teenager when she    
       gave birth, according to custom; they  
       also asked the one responsible for the  
       pregnancy to find €50 to give the  
       teenager’s parents for child support 
4th:  After the baby was born, the age-mates  
       slaughtered a ram for the mother and  
       contributed €100 from themselves 
       and gave it to her parents; They still  
       hoped that the father would allow the  
       two to marry.  
 
Status: possible peaceful resolution  
             through marriage 
Maasai 
youth 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
An age-mate was 
accused of stealing 
green maize cobs 
 
1st: Age-mates 
2nd: Age- mates  
      and LPC 
1st: The age-mates summoned the offender 
      for questioning but he did not show up 
      for the meeting. He disappeared  
      altogether from the village 
2nd: Later on, his age-mates “arrested” him  
      in a distant town. They brought him 
      home and convened a meeting with the  
      LPC. The committee threatened him  
      with a curse if he repeated the offence.    
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      Each committee member gave him a  
      sheep with which he could build his  
      herd – a sign of reincorporation into the 
society  
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Youths 
 
(Kikuyu and 
Maasai) 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
Fight 
 
 
1st. Police (Maiella) 
2nd: LPC  
1st: After police recorded statements from  
      the plaintiff, the LPC requested them to  
     refer the matter to the institution (to be  
     handled at the household level). The  
     police granted the request 
2nd: After discussions, the LPC agreed that  
      the defendant would reimburse the  
      plaintiff with transport and hospital  
      expenses incurred in pursuit of medical  
     care after suffering injuries during the  
      fight. In addition to this settlement, the  
      defendant gave the plaintiff a female  
      sheep to “pay” for the blood lost in the  
      fight. This was a sign that the defendant 
      deeply regretted his action and was 
      willing to begin a new journey of close 
      friendships with the plaintiff 
 
Status: Peaceful resolution; The female  
            sheep transferred to the plaintiff in  
            the form of a settlement had just  
            given birth. Therefore, the plaintiff  
            received two sheep. Within a short  
            period, the sheep had quadrupled –  
            In this village, such gesture  
            symbolizes continuity of friendship 
 
Maasai 
herder and 
Kikuyu 
tenant 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
Herder-farmer 
dispute 
 
LPC Livestock belonging to the Maasai herder 
strayed into the tenant’s farm and 
destroyed crops. The LPC convened at 
meeting and resolved that the defendant 
would pay some monetary compensation 
for the loss. Additionally, the defendant 
gave the plaintiff a female sheep. In this 
case, the blood of the sheep symbolized a 
long-term bond of friendship between the 
disputants after the settlement  
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Luhya 
couple in a 
Maasai 
territory  
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
Domestic fight  1st: Police 
2nd: LPC 
1st: The wife accused the husband of selling 
      produce and using the money to pay 
      harlots for sex. The husband, who did 
      not deny this accusation, told the police  
      that her wife was very abusive. The  
      LPC (made up of Maasai) went to the  
      police and requested them to refer the  
      case to them because the couple had  
      rented farmland in their village, thus  
      making them subject to the institution’s  
      jurisdiction. The police granted the LPC  
      the request 
 
2nd: After heated exchange of accusations  
       between the couple, the LPC found the 
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       woman guilty of disrespecting the  
       husband and warned her with forceful  
       eviction from the village if she repeated  
       her offence. They advised the wife to 
       be submissive to the husband. The  
       husband apologized to the elders for  
       airing their dirty linen in the public and  
       promised them that he would deal with  
       such private issues seriously 
 
Status: Peaceful settlement. There was no 
             further mention of this matter and  
             the couple continued to farm in the  
             rented plot of land 
Maasai 
landlord 
and two 
Kikuyu 
tenants 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
The tenants paid 
leasehold money for 
the same piece of 
land on different 
occasions. A dispute 
emerged when they 
both met at the farm 
ready to prepare it 
for planting  
LPC In this case, the LPC convened a meeting 
at the Maasai landowner’s home. He was 
put to task to explain the confusion 
surrounding the leasehold arrangement and 
was found guilty of inciting a dispute 
between two unsuspecting land-seeking 
clients. The LPC directed the landowner to 
reimburse the tenant who came second and 
the matter was put to rest. 
 
Status: Peaceful settlement  
Maasai 
neighbours  
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
Land boundary 
dispute 
LPC The LPC convened a meeting at the 
disputed boundary area. In attendance was 
the area surveyor, who realigned the 
boundary. The two neighbours met the cost 
of realignment of the boundary  
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Maasai 
men 
Ol tepesi le 
Parsimei 
A man suffered an 
injury at work due to 
his colleague’s 
negligence  
LPC In a meeting convened at the defendant’s 
home, the LPC resolved that he would 
reimburse the hospital bill and motorbike 
transport expenses incurred by the plaintiff 
during the period of medication. For the 
blood lost due to the injury, the defendant 
agreed to give his colleague two female 
sheep as compensation and as a sign of 
continuation of friendship  
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Kikuyu 
neighbours 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Land boundary 
dispute  
Chief and elders The chief and elders advised the 
neighbours to seek the services of a 
surveyor, with whom they realigned the 
boundary. The plaintiff paid the costs of 
realignment  
 
Status: Peaceful settlement  
Two Kikuyu 
women 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Abusive words: the 
women exchanged 
bitter words during a 
market day 
Chief and elders  The defendant pleaded guilty and asked for 
forgiveness. The chief and elders warned 
her against a repeat of the offence as it 
amounted to a defamation case. 
 
Status: settled 
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Domestic fight Chief and elders  This was a first incident of a domestic fight 
involving the couple. The chief warned the 
husband against wife battering and 
reminded him that it was contrary to the 
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rights of women. The couple was 
encouraged to communicate rather than 
fight over their misunderstandings. The wife 
forgave the husband and they signed an 
agreement prohibiting them from repeating 
their mistake 
 
Status: There was no repeat of this matter  
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Domestic fight 
 
1st: Chief and  
       elders  
2nd: In-laws 
3rd: Chief and  
       elders  
1st: The chief and elders referred the case  
       to the in-laws 
2nd: The wife ran to her parents after 
        unsuccessful negotiations 
3rd: The wife filed a case at the chief’s office  
      demanding child support from her 
      husband. The chief and elders directed 
       the husband to pay child support  
       money at a weekly rate of €8, to be  
       collected from chief’s office every  
       Friday  
 
Status: The husband was still adhering to  
              the settlement at the time of  
              fieldwork  
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Domestic fight 
 
Chief and elders  The wife demanded separation but the 
husband pleaded with the chief not to grant 
her the request. According to the husband, 
the wife already had another lover and 
could possibly use the separation as an 
excuse to live with the alleged lover.  
The chief and elders directed the couple to 
separate for a week and report thereafter. 
After this separation, the wife still 
demanded more time. The chief added 
another two weeks of separation. After two 
weeks and unsuccessful discussions 
between the couple and their in-laws, the 
chief directed them to stay away from each 
other indefinitely. The woman demanded to 
take her children, promising to care for 
them, and requested the chief to put the 
husband to task over regular payment of 
child support money. The chief granted her 
the request for custody of the children and 
advised the husband to comply with the law 
by supporting his children  
 
Status: Family break-up  
Kikuyu 
women 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The plaintiff said 
that the defendant 
spread rumours that 
she was HIV 
positive because 
she was earlier 
dating a man whose 
death villagers 
linked to AIDS.  
Chief and elders According to the chief, no medical tests had 
been conducted to ascertain if the plaintiff 
was indeed HIV positive or if the deceased 
lover died of the disease. Even so, the 
defendant had no right to spread such 
rumours. The defendant was threatened 
with a defamation case if she continued to 
spread the rumours   
 
Status: There was no repeat of this matter  
Kikuyu man 
and his 
lover 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
The man promised 
to marry the woman 
but upon 
Chief and elders The chief and elders directed the disputants 
to ascertain the paternity of the baby 
through a DNA test. If the DNA test proved 
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trading 
centre) 
impregnating her, he 
decided to find 
another woman. He 
claimed that 
perhaps the child 
was not his 
that the man was the child’s biological 
father, the chief advised him to prepare to 
care for the child as prescribed by the law. 
In the event that there was no match in the 
DNA, the woman was directed to reimburse 
the man with all costs incurred in doing the 
tests. The disputants signed a written 
agreement in the presence of their friends 
who came to witness the proceedings   
 
Status: the matter had not been concluded  
             by the time I left the study area 
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Domestic fight Chief and elders After the fight, the wife reported the matter 
to the chief. The chief summoned the 
defendant, who quickly demanded a 
divorce. A shocked wife pleaded with the 
chief to be allowed time within which she 
would return with a decision. The chief and 
elders told the wife to return to her parents 
with her four young children until she made 
a decision about the divorce. The couple 
had been in similar disputes before. In the 
meantime, the chief directed the husband to 
support the children 
 
Status: ongoing  
Two Kikuyu 
tenants and 
a Maasai 
landlord 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre)  
The tenants 
unknowingly rented 
the same plot of 
land from the 
Maasai landowner 
of Enoosupukia. A 
dispute emerged 
between the two 
tenants over access 
and user rights to 
the land. One tenant 
threated the other 
with death. 
Chief and elders In this case, the chief and elders did not 
involve the landowner, although he was at 
the centre of the dispute. Instead, they 
directed the tenant who paid his tenancy 
fees first to use the farm. The other was 
directed to initiate proceedings to recover 
his money from the landlord and to report 
any possible problem to the police 
 
Status: Settled – there was no repeat of 
this matter 
  
Step-
brothers 
and sisters 
(Kikuyu) 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
A sister sold family 
land without 
consulting her 
brothers 
Chief and elders  The disputed land was initially a property of 
the Ng’ati Cooperative Society. The chief 
and elders referred this case to the society 
officials for possible resolution 
   
Status: ongoing  
Kikuyu 
step-
brothers 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The dispute 
emerged after the 
directors of Ng’ati 
Farmers’ 
Cooperative Society 
sold a portion of 
Ng’ati farm (see 
Case 12 on Narasha 
farm) to a 
government 
parastatal and 
distributed some 
money to the 
members. In this 
case, a step-brother 
Chief and elders  The defendants (the three brothers) 
requested the chief and elders to refer the 
case “back home” (at the household level) 
and promised to share the money equally – 
their request was granted on condition that 
they also involved their grandmother to 
supervise the distribution of the money. All 
participants signed a written agreement to 
this effect. 
 
Status: unknown – There was no repeat of  
             this matter 
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feared that his three 
brothers (born of a 
deceased mother) 
would gang up 
against him and 
consume all the 
money. He 
demanded to 
receive an equal 
share 
Kikuyu 
siblings 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The dispute 
emerged after the 
directors of Ng’ati 
Farmers’ 
Cooperative Society 
sold a portion of 
Ng’ati farm (see 
Case 12 on Narasha 
farm) to a 
government 
parastatal and 
distributed some 
money to the 
members. In this 
case, the elder 
brother received 
€4.150 on behalf of 
the family. However, 
according to a 
younger brother (the 
plaintiff) the elder 
brother insisted that 
he only received 
€150 and not 
€4,150. The siblings 
demanded clarity on 
the matter and an 
equal share of the 
money  
Chief and elders  The defendant requested the chief and 
elders to refer the case back home, 
promising that he would share the €4,150 
equally among the five siblings – the 
request was granted and the chief 
demanded a report on the outcome of the 
matter.  
 
Status: Peaceful settlement – the matter 
             was put to rest following amicable 
             distribution of the disputed money 
Kikuyu 
couple after 
separation 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The wife accused 
the husband for 
failing to support his 
five children. In his 
defence, the 
husband insisted 
that the wife should 
not have taken the 
children if she did 
not have the ability 
to provide for them  
Chief and elders  The chief and elders reminded the husband 
of his obligation to pay school fees and 
upkeep for the children despite the broken 
marriage. After discussions, the wife agreed 
to return the children to the husband for 
schooling. The chief ordered him to allow 
the wife to visit the children during daytime 
and for the children to visit their mother 
whenever they wished to do so. The couple 
signed an agreement document after the 
settlement  
 
Status: peaceful settlement  
Father and 
son 
(Maasai) 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The son claimed 
that the father loved 
his elder brother 
more than him. The 
plaintiff feared that 
the father would 
pass all family 
Chief and elders  The chief and elders ordered the father to 
seek the services of a surveyor to subdivide 
the land equally to both sons on a specified 
date. The matter relating to hatred of the 
plaintiff, the chief and elders referred to 
Maasai elders for possible resolution. All 
participants signed a written agreement to 
this effect 
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property (especially 
land) to the brother 
 
Status: Unknown – There was no repeat of  
             this matter 
 
Father and 
son 
(Kikuyu) 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The dispute 
emerged after the 
directors of Ng’ati 
Farmers’ 
Cooperative Society 
sold a portion of 
Ng’ati farm (see 
Case 12 on Narasha 
farm) to a 
government 
parastatal and 
distributed some 
money to the 
members. In this 
case the son knew 
that his father had 
received the money 
from his shares of 
farm. The son 
demanded to have 
his share of the 
money. 
Chief and elders The chief and elders ordered the father to 
share the money with the son because the 
land sold was his rightful inheritance. The 
disputants signed an agreement after the 
settlement  
 
Status: Unknown – There was no repeat of  
              this matter 
A man and 
his barren 
wife 
(Kikuyu) 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The barren wife 
claimed that the 
husband sold food 
produce and gave 
all the money to the 
second wife. She 
demanded to be 
respected as a 
member of the 
family despite her 
condition 
Chief and elders The chief and elders assisted the family to 
initiate a process to subdivide the land and 
other family property to both wives. The 
properties included livestock and utensils. 
Family members then signed an agreement 
after the settlement  
 
Status: Unknown – There was no repeat of 
             this matter 
Tenant and 
landlord 
(Kikuyu) 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Land rental debt of 
€7. After failing to 
settle the debt, the 
landlord evicted the 
tenant from the farm 
hoping to sell his 
produce to recover 
the money 
Chief and elders  The chief and elders directed the tenant to 
clear debt on a specified date. The matter 
of prolonging his leasehold period was left 
at the discretion of the landlord. They both 
signed an agreement to that effect 
 
Status: Peaceful settlement – the tenant  
             cleared the debt as directed and  
             was allowed to harvest his crops.  
             However, the landlord did not  
             renew his tenancy contract 
Kikuyu 
family 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The dispute 
emerged after the 
directors of Ng’ati 
Farmers’ 
Cooperative Society 
sold a portion of 
Ng’ati farm (see 
Case 12 on Narasha 
farm) to a 
government 
parastatal and 
distributed some 
Chief and elders  The matter began with accounting for all the 
money that had been used on family-
related affairs. The chief and elders ordered 
the defendant share the balance equally 
among the 14 siblings. They all signed an 
agreement, which was sanctioned by four 
witnesses (neighbours) and the chief  
 
Status: No further complaint was  
             brought to the chief 
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money to the 
members. This 
family received 
€4,150 as 
compensation for 
their share of the 
land. A brother 
received the money 
on behalf of the 
family members but 
he kept it for 
himself. The other 
14 siblings reported 
the matter to the 
chief and demanded 
an equal share of 
the money.  
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The man married a 
woman with four 
children but they 
divorced after a few 
years. Later on, the 
woman demanded a 
share of the 
household items 
bought when she 
was living with the 
man 
Chief and elders  The disputants enlisted all properties 
including utensils and furniture before the 
chief and his elders who oversaw the 
distribution of the disputed items between 
the couple. Disputants then put thumbprints 
on an agreement binding them from 
interfering with each other’s lives.  
 
Status: Settled – There was no repeat of  
             this matter 
  
Kikuyu 
family 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
A household head 
fell sick and his sons 
demanded to share 
his property as 
inheritance. 
However, because 
their father was still 
ill, one of the sons 
hid the land title 
deeds, prompting an 
angry reaction from 
his brothers. Their 
grandfather also 
refused to reveal 
whether his son had 
other properties  
Chief and elders  The matter began with a listing of all family 
members and the chief and elders 
demanded the title deeds from the son – 
which he produced. They then initiated the 
process of subdividing all properties equally 
amongst the deserving siblings. The case 
was witnessed by nine neighbours, who 
also signed and put thumb prints on a 
written agreement in honour of the 
settlement   
 
Status: Settled – There was no repeat of 
this matter 
Kikuyu 
family 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Dispute over land Chief and elders  The argument over land subdivision had 
lingered in the family for a long time. When 
the siblings appeared before the chief and 
elders, the eldest son requested them to 
have the matter handled by a court of law – 
the request was granted and the family 
members signed a written agreement to 
signify that they were all pleased with the 
decision.  
 
Status: Unknown 
Kikuyu wife 
vs. Maasai 
husband 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The Wife accused 
the husband of 
having extramarital 
affairs; she 
demanded a divorce 
1st: Chief and  
       elders 
2nd: Maasai   
      Nyumba Kumi  
      officials of 
1st: The matter first appeared before the  
      chief and his elders but the Nyumba  
      Kumi of Nkampani requested the latter  
      to refer the matter to them to be  
      handled “at home” – the request was 
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and 
Nkampani 
village 
      Nkampani  
      village  
      granted 
2nd: Maasai Nyumba Kumi officials  
      convened a meeting and put pressure  
      on the Kikuyu wife not to leave her  
      husband. However, she insisted that  
      she would only remain with him if he  
      promised no future communication 
      with the alleged lover. She also  
      requested the committee to demand of  
      the husband to desist from his habit of  
      coming home late in the night  
 
Status: Peaceful settlement; there was no  
             separation after all 
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
After a domestic 
fight and separation, 
the wife demanded 
compensation for 
weeding the 
husband’s farm 
before the 
separation  
Chief and elders  The disputants counted the number of days 
of work that the plaintiff spent on the farm. 
They accounted for ten days and the chief 
ordered the husband to compensate the 
wife with €2.50 for every day worked, just 
as he would have paid a farm labourer for 
the same work. The disputants put thumb 
prints on a written agreement binding them 
from interfering with each other’s’ lives until 
they and their in-laws resolved the matter in 
dispute 
 
Status: Peaceful settlement  
Kikuyu 
women 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant 
wished that 
something bad 
would happen to her 
children 
Chief and elders  The chief and elders took the words uttered 
by the defendant as a curse and warned 
her against the offence. The defendant 
apologized. The disputants put thumb prints 
on written agreement in honour of the 
settlement  
 
Status: peaceful settlement  
Maasai 
man and 
Kikuyu 
woman 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The Maasai man 
who lives outside 
the study area 
impregnated the 
Kikuyu woman from 
Maiella; the Kikuyu 
woman then 
demanded money 
for child support 
Chief and elders The Maasai man agreed to raise the child 
and promised to support the mother. The 
chief and elders reminded him that it was 
against the law not to care for one’s 
children. They then signed an agreement  
 
 
Status: The Maasai man was still caring for 
the child at the time of fieldwork  
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
After a divorce, the 
wife accused the 
husband of not 
caring for his 
children, which were 
in the custody of 
their mother 
Chief and elders  In his defence, the husband questioned the 
circumstances, which led the wife to take 
their children, yet she was unable to 
provide for them. After an unsuccessful 
discussion about the custody of children, 
the matter was postponed. 
 
Status: Unknown  
Kikuyu 
youth self-
help group 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Members accused 
the group chair for 
not calling them for 
meetings in which 
group activities are 
discussed. Some 
alleged of 
Chief and elders  The group chair apologized and promised 
to invite all members to a meeting to take 
stock of their investments. During the 
meeting, the members accounted for their 
savings and properties (a few sheep and a 
farm). The chief and elders directed the 
officials to convene similar meetings on 
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misappropriation of 
the group’s savings  
regular basis. All members present signed 
a written agreement. 
 
Status: Peaceful resolution 
Kikuyu 
family 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The disputed 
involved four 
brothers over 
ownership of their 
father`s two acres of 
land  
Chief and elders  The chief and elders set a date for 
subdivision of the land equally among the 
four brothers. This settlement was 
sanctioned with a signed agreement 
 
Status: Peaceful settlement; the land was 
             subdivided later on  
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Domestic fight:  
The wife complained 
that the husband 
had developed a 
habit of chasing her 
and the kids from 
the house whenever 
he came home with 
meat so that he 
could cook it and 
enjoy it alone.  
1st: Chief and  
       elders  
2nd: Chief and 
        elder 
3rd: In-laws 
1st: In defence, the husband said that his  
      wife did not cook for him because he  
      always came home late, perhaps from 
      another lover. The wife demanded a  
       year of separation. The husband  
       pleaded with the chief not to grant the  
       request, fearing she would find another 
        husband. The chief and elders ordered 
       the couple to separate for two weeks  
       and to report back thereafter;  
2nd: After two weeks, the wife remained  
       steadfast with her request. The chief  
       and elders referred the case to the in- 
       laws for possible resolution;  
3rd: The in-laws settled the matter and the 
       wife decided to stay with her husband 
 
Status: Peaceful settlement  
Kikuyu 
lovers 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
After impregnating a 
woman, the 
boyfriend did not 
want anything to do 
with her. He stopped 
answering her 
phone calls or 
replying to her text 
messages. This 
angered the woman, 
who decided to 
pursue child support 
through the area 
chief 
Chief and elders  The chief and elders took the boyfriend to 
task. He pleaded for mercy and promised to 
care for the child. It was agreed that he 
would pay €20 every 3rd of the month for 
child support. The chief appointed the 
woman’s grandmother (her guardian) to 
receive the money henceforth that the 
defendant would bring to the chief’s office 
every month.  
 
Status: payment is ongoing  
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The wife accused 
the husband of 
having an ongoing 
tendency to demand 
money for beer from 
her, and that he was 
unable to support 
the family  
Chief and elder  In this meeting at the chief’s office, the wife 
demanded separation. She also demanded 
a share of the produce in a one-acre field. 
The chief and elders directed the two to 
separate temporarily and the food produce 
to be subdivided between them. They 
signed an agreement to this effect. 
 
Status: The result was a separation  
Kikuyu 
mother and 
son 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The mother 
complained that her 
son had rented 6 
acres of land to five 
Kikuyu tenants 
without her consent 
and that he had 
consumed €200 
Chief and elders  After discussions, the chief and elders 
allowed the tenants (who were present as 
witnesses) to continue cultivating their 
rented plots of land. They also warned the 
son not to lease the land unless given 
consent by the mother. All disputants 
signed a written agreement, which was 
sanctioned by the chief 
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collected from the 
tenants. The mother 
wanted to terminate 
all activities of the 
tenants 
 
Status: Peaceful settlement  
Kikuyu in-
laws 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The bride’s parents 
complained that 
their son-in-law did 
not bring them gifts 
to show respect 
when he visited their 
home. On one 
occasion he did not 
buy them drinks at 
the market to 
quench their thirst, a 
sign that was 
interpreted as 
disrespect. 
Chief and elders  The chief and elders found out that the 
bride’s parents no longer supported the 
marriage of their daughter to the groom’s 
family. The chief directed the in-laws to 
convene a meeting and to iron out their 
patient issues for possible resolution.   
 
 
Status: Unknown – There was no repeat of  
             this matter 
Kikuyu 
tenant vs. 
Kikuyu 
landlord 
Chief camp The landlord 
complained that the 
tenant had 
persistently refused 
to settle a leasehold 
debt of €10. She 
blocked the tenant 
from accessing the 
land, which 
prompted a serious 
confrontation 
Chief and elders  The chief and elders ordered the tenant to 
pay the debt, and an extra €7.50 as a fee to 
allow him to stay on the rented plot of land 
until the time for harvesting his crops. The 
two signed a written agreement to settle the 
debt and to terminate the leasehold 
arrangement in due course.  
 
Status: Settled 
Kikuyu in-
laws 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The bride’s parents 
complained that 
when their daughter 
eloped, the groom’s 
parents did not 
inform them that she 
was with their son. 
They also alleged 
mistreatment of their 
daughter – which, 
according to them, 
led their daughter to 
contemplate suicide.  
Chief and elders  The bride refuted her parent’s allegations 
and insisted that she was in good health 
and in marriage. Having attained the legal 
age of marriage (over 18), the chief and 
elders allowed the couple to follow their 
wishes and to invite their parents to 
negotiate bride wealth. 
 
Status: There was no repeat of this matter 
Kikuyu 
brother-in-
law vs. 
Maasai 
brother-in-
law 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The dispute related 
to bridewealth. The 
Maasai brother-in-
law told the chief 
that the Kikuyu 
cursed his livestock 
with death and 
infertility and wished 
his daughter’s 
bridewealth to be a 
dog   
Chief and elders  The Kikuyu brother-in-law was not happy 
with the marriage of his sister to the Maasai 
and especially on the bride price paid. The 
chief and elders found the Kikuyu guilty of 
interfering with the couple and was warned 
to desist from such behaviour. The Kikuyu 
signed a written agreement, while the 
Maasai put a thumbprint to stand for a 
signature.   
 
Status: Settled  
Kikuyu 
brothers 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The dispute was 
over crop produce 
on an acre land. The 
brothers disagreed 
whether to sell the 
produce and share 
Chief and elders  To avoid future confrontations, the chief 
and elders directed the family to hire the 
services of a surveyor to subdivide the land 
equally to all deserving family members.  
 
Status: Settled  
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the money to store it 
as food for their 
siblings 
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The couple 
quarrelled over their 
son’s school fee 
balance of €95. The  
mother paid €20 
hoping that the 
husband would clear 
the rest of the 
money after selling 
crop produce worth 
€200 – he did not. 
Instead, he 
disappeared from 
home, leaving a 
devastated wife and 
son.  
Chief and elders  The chief summoned the husband and 
authorised him to clear the balance 
immediately and to send their son back to 
school – he complied.  
 
Status: Settled 
Kikuyu 
neighbours 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Abusive words: 
A neighbour tied her 
goat on a 
neighbours land 
without her consent 
and the angry 
neighbour called her 
a harlot  
Chief and elders  The chiefs and elders found out that land 
was the cause of the problem. They 
directed the neighbours to fence their land 
to avoid future confrontations. The 
disputants then signed a written agreement 
 
Status: This matter was settled and did not  
             resurface   
Kikuyu 
women 
Maiella 
trading 
centre 
Abusive words: 
The plaintiff 
complained that the 
defendant called her 
a harlot and an 
uncircumcized bitch, 
and claimed she 
was HIV+ 
1st: Nyumba Kumi 
2nd: Nyumba Kumi 
 
1st: The defendant said that the plaintiff was 
        secretly eyeing her husband. Nyumba  
        Kumi officials warned the defendant  
        not to repeat the offence; 
2nd: Later that day, the defendant followed  
       the plaintiff to her home and challenged 
       her to a fight – The latter reported the 
       matter to her Nyumba Kumi, which  
       convened a meeting and threatened to  
       involve the police in the case if the  
       disputants failed in settling their 
       grievances.  
 
Status: There was no repeat of this matter 
Kikuyu 
women 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Wife sharing: 
The wife complained 
to her mother-in-law 
that the son was not 
meeting her 
conjugal rights. 
While contemplating 
on the way forward, 
the son’s wife told 
the mother-in-law 
that one of her best 
friend’s husbands 
was willing to attend 
to her sexual needs 
and that the friend 
was in support of 
the arrangement.  
Later on, her 
husband got wind of 
Chief and elders  The wife told the chief that people were 
accusing her of being a lesbian because 
her husband had spread rumours that she 
was having sexual affairs with her woman 
friend. She wanted the husband to stop 
spreading such rumours and perhaps focus 
on finding ways to satisfy her sexually.  
This case was the first of its kind. The chief 
and elders were perplexed and did little to 
find a solution. They advised the couple to 
desist from talking about immoral 
behaviours and especially those that relate 
to wife-sharing and lesbianism, which was 
unheard of in the area.  
 
 
Status: There was no further mention of  
              this matter 
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the matter and his 
alleged 
investigations led to 
the spread of 
rumours.  
Kikuyu 
couple 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
After 6 months of 
separation, a mother 
demanded to be 
given her 3 children 
by the husband. She 
claimed that she 
was ready to care 
for them with the 
help of her mother. 
She also demanded 
her share of 
household items  
Chief and elders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The chief and elders noted that the young 
children did not relate well to their mother 
due to her prolonged absence. The chief 
and elders resolved that the children would 
remain in custody of their father. It was 
agreed that the mother would visit her 
children only in the daytime, and the father 
was asked to allow the children to visit their 
mother freely. They both signed a written 
agreement, which was sanctioned by the 
chief.  
 
Status: Settled  
Kikuyu 
women 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Abusive words: 
The plaintiff alleged 
that the defendant 
called her a witch  
Chief and elders  A witness who was called to substantiate 
the matter refuted the accusations made by 
the plaintiff. The chief and elders warned 
the two women, who later signed a written 
agreement “binding” them against future 
behaviour.  
 
Status: There was no repeat of this matter 
Kikuyu 
women 
Chief camp Abusive words: 
The plaintiff claimed  
that the defendant 
called her a harlot  
Chief and elders  It was revealed that the exchange of 
abusive words resulted from earlier 
competition over a man. The defendant 
apologized. They both signed a written 
agreement prohibiting them from future 
related behaviour.  
 
Status: There was no repeat of this matter 
Kikuyu 
tenant vs. 
landlord 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
The tenant rented 3 
acres of land on 
credit and promised 
to pay on a later 
date. He later 
leased the land to 
another 6 tenants 
and went into hiding 
without having 
cleared his debt.  
Chief and elders  When the defendant resurfaced after a 
while, the landlord reported the matter to 
the chief and elders. The defendant was 
summoned to the chief camp. After 
deliberations, the chief and elders set dates 
for repayment of the debt and the culprit 
was warned with a possible jail term if he 
failed to comply. The disputants signed a 
written agreement to that effect.  
 
Status: The defendant cleared the first  
             instalment in early 2015 and was 
             expected to clear the second and  
             final instalment in due course.  
 
 
Kikuyu 
tenant vs. 
landlord 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Debt on leasehold; 
The tenant leased 
land on credit and 
did not pay the 
money as agreed. 
After several failed 
attempts to 
persuade him to 
settle the debt, the 
landlord decided to 
Chief and elders  The tenant promised to pay the debt. The 
chief and elders set a time to allow the 
defendant to clear the debt. This was later 
followed by a signed agreement, which was 
sanctioned by the chief.  
 
Status: I found out that the defendant paid  
            the debt as agreed. However, the 
            landlord was not willing to extend  
            the leasehold agreement beyond  
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escalate the matter 
further, taking it to 
the authorities  
            the specified time.  
Kikuyu 
tenant vs. 
landlord 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
Leasehold dispute: 
A female tenant 
claimed that she 
had rented and 
cultivated an acre of 
land for over 14 
years. She accused 
the landlord for 
initiating plans to 
evict her from the 
land when he leased 
the land to someone 
else without her 
consent. The new 
tenant then 
destroyed her Irish 
potatoes, sparking a 
heated dispute 
Chief and elders  After hours of discussion, the chief and 
elders found the landlord guilty and 
demanded that he paid the plaintiff €5 for 
her loss and to allow her to terminate her 
leasehold on a specified date. The 
disputants signed a written agreement to 
this effect.  
 
Status: Peaceful settlement  
Kikuyu 
brothers 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre)  
One brother 
harvested and sold 
timber worth €200 
from the family land 
and consumed the 
money alone. The 
other three brothers 
reported the matter 
and demanded their 
share of the money  
Chief and elders  The chief and elders advised the disputants 
to arrange for land subdivision with the area 
surveyor in order to stop future cases.  
 
Status: I left the study area when 
            arrangements to subdivide the  
            family land were underway.  
 
 
 
 
 
Kikuyu 
orphans 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
 
 
 
 
 
A man refused to 
care for his two 
brothers, one of 
whom is mentally 
handicapped  
 
 
 
 
 
Chief and elders  
The defendant claimed that the two 
brothers denied him user rights to their 
portions of land, which would have 
otherwise enabled him to provide food for 
them. The two brothers feared that the 
defendant would use their land to benefit 
himself.  
The chief and elders advised the disputants 
and other family members to convene a 
meeting and discuss the way forward.  
 
Status: There was no further  
             communication on this matter.  
 
 
Kikuyu 
siblings 
 
Chief camp 
(Maiella 
trading 
centre) 
 
In this case, a 
woman accused her 
brother of calling her 
a thief because he 
suspected that she 
had been stealing 
firewood from his 
portion of land. The 
brother then burnt 
down a portion the 
sister’s land  
 
Chief and elders  
There was no evidence to convict the sister. 
The chief and elders warned the brother 
against his behaviour and advised the 
family to live peacefully  
 
Status: There was no repeat of this matter  
              (in dispute) 
 
(Source: field data, 2014) 
